THE

ŚIVĀDVAITA-NIRṆAYA

(An Inquiry into the System of Śrīkaṇṭha)

OF

APPAYYA DĪKṢITA

Edited with an Introduction,
Translation and Notes

By
S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI
(Formerly Head of the Department of Philosophy
University of Madras)

UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS
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FOREWORD

The Śivādvaitanirṇaya of Appayya Dīkṣita edited with an Introduction, English Translation, and Notes by Professor S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri was published by the University of Madras in 1929. It has long been out of print. In view of its importance as a valuable study of the Śivādvaita of Śrīkaṇṭha, the University is bringing out a reprint now. It is hoped that this work will be found useful for a critical study of the particular school of Śaiva Philosophy associated with Śrīkaṇṭha.

Madras
January 19, 1974

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN
DIRECTOR
Centre for Advanced Study
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University of Madras

TO

THE ŚRĪ-ŚĀRADĀ-PĪṬHA

ŚṚṄGERI

PREFACE

THE existence and the importance of the present work have long been known to all familiar with the works of Appayya Dīkṣita. While the present editor was making a study of it in connection with the philosophy of Śrīkaṇṭha, its publication was suggested to him by Vedānta Viśārada S. K. Padmanābha Śāstrin of Mylapore, who willingly contributed in a very able measure the patience and scholarship required for the preparation of a critical edition. The University of Madras, who generously undertook to publish the work, required a translation to be provided. In this part of the task, the editor has had invaluable help from the University Department of Saṃskṛt, particularly from the University Professor, Dr. C. Kunhan Raja. The two Fellows in Saṃskṛt, Mīmāṃsakācārya S. K. Rāmanātha Śāstrin and Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit V. Venketrāma Sharma, have rendered considerable assistance in going through various Manuscripts and the press copy, in correcting proofs, and in various other ways. The authorities who obliged with the loan of Manuscripts are mentioned elsewhere. Among friends who by offering suggestions and in other ways gave considerable encouragement to the editor, special mention must be made of Mr. T. G. Ārāvamuthan, Advocate, Kilpauk, and Prof. P. P. S. Śāstrī, Presidency College, Madras.

The paragraphing of the Saṃskṛt text has been made to approximate to that of the translation, with the result that the former looks artificial in some cases. It was the editor's hope to make the presentation of the argument look clearer by such an arrangement. He will feel happy if that hope has not proved altogether illusory.

INTRODUCTION

I

LIFE OF APPAYYA DĪKṢITA

Time and again in the history of a country, there rise up figures of considerable interest and importance in respect of moral sincerity or religious zeal or political sagacity or scholary erudition. These are almost gigantic in their proportions, and are not infrequently acclaimed as incarnations of an element of godhead. Appayya Dīkṣita was such an outstanding figure in the history of South Indian scholarship. He was a marvel of learning, in width as well as depth, with remarkable powers of clear thought and forcible expression, and an indefatigable worker in the cause of truth.

Appayya's place of birth is known to be Adayapalam, a village near Conjeevaram. His works inform us that he enjoyed the patronage of three royal masters—Cinna Bomma, Cinna Timma and Venkaṭapati.[1] His descendants are still found flourishing in various stations of life, in most of the Southern districts of the Presidency. The period of his life and work is known to be the 16th Century A.D. It was also generally thought on the strength of a horoscope, that he was born in 1552—1553 A.D. and that he died in 1624. But the ravages of research have not spared us this certainty. The horoscope given to the world by Śivānanda Yogin (a 19th Century descendant and biographer of Appayya) has beed disputed by a 20th Century descendant of Appayya's[2]

1. See the introductory verses to *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* and the *Commentary on Yādavābhyudaya*, and the concluding verses of *Kuvalayānanda*.

2. See *The Date of Appayya Dīkṣita* by Y. Mahāliṅga Śāstri (*The Hindu*, 20—6—28) and two articles on *Appayya Dīkṣita's Age* by the same author in the *Journal of Oriental Research*, II, 225, and III, 140.

who calls in epigraphical aid from his ancestor's native village of Adayapalam to support the suggestion that Appayya must have been born some 30 years earlier, about 1520. For the view so propounded, corroboration is sought in the tag of a verse said to be quoted by Mahāmahopādhyāya Raju Śāstriār of Mannārguḍi, purporting to be from an ancient and lost biography of Appayya Dīkṣita. The arguments require to be elaborated and examined much more fully than they have been, before being accepted or rejected. That being no part of the present task, we shall pass on, contenting ourselves with the knowledge that the latter half of the 16th century seems undoubtedly to have been the period of Appayya's literary activity.

Appayya's father and grand-father were eminent teachers of Advaita. The grand-father was known as Ācārya Dīkṣita or more familiarly as Ācān Dīkṣita. He married twice, and the second wife was Totrāmbi, a Vaiṣṇava lady, daughter of Raṅga Rāja, a Vaiṣṇavite. The son of this union was also called Raṅga Rāja, after the maternal grand-father. This Raṅga Rāja, the Advaita Ācārya, reputed as a performer of the Viśvajit sacrifice, became the father and the spiritual preceptor of the renowned Appayya. Appayya remains the most illustrious member of that family, to this day. Next to him, but next only to him comes the famous Nīlakaṇṭha, poet and prime minister, who flourished at Madura, during the days of Tirumala Nāyak. Nīlakaṇṭha was the grandson of Appayya's brother, Ācān Dīkṣita.

It is said that Appayya married one Sumaṅgaḷa or Maṅgaḷanāyaki, the daughter of Ratnakheṭa Dīkṣita who, having rashly undertaken to make Appayya prostrate before him, found no other means of doing so, except by becoming his father-in-law.[1] There seems to be also a bare tradition that the lady was of Vaiṣṇava birth. The dispute with Ratnakheṭa and its sequel find mention in the *Ācān-Dīkṣitendra-Vamśāvali*, a poetical genealogy composed by Vīrarāghava Kavi, a descendant of Ācān Dīkṣita.

1. See *Appayya Dīkṣita's Age*, *Journal of Oriental Research*, II, 236.

Appayya is reputed to be the author of 104 works. Many of these are lost, not even the names being known. Of those said to be his, the authorship, ascribed often by vague tradition, is, in many cases, doubtful. The confusion is increased by the fact that some of his descendants—the father of Rāju Śāstriār of Mannārguḍi, and an anubhava—advaitin of recent days who died in the early years of the present century—bore the same name and were also writers, more or less prolific. Among the 104, we have to include commentaries written by Appayya on works composed in verse by himself. Thus, the *Ānandalaharī* and the *Ānandalaharīcandrikā*, count as two works, though they may be looked upon as constituting the verse and prose parts of one work.

The greatest number of these works relate to Śaiva religion or Advaita philosophy. Our author, however, was a redoubtable authority on other subjects, such as rhetoric and poetics, while his knowledge of Mīmāṁsā was unrivalled, as shown in his handling even of other subjects. The full extent of his grasp of Mīmāṃsā Śāstra may be gauged by his discussion of some knotty topics in the *Pūrvottara-Mīmāṁsā-Vāda-Nakṣatra-Mālā*. His *Kuvalayānanda* and *Citra-Mīmāṁsā* evince his knowledge of poeties and rhetoric. His appreciation of literature as such is shown by the *Commentary on Yādavābhyudaya*. True, many of these books were written to order, having been commissioned by different royal patrons, but they are none the less thorough and masterly, for that.

Appayya combined in himself the clear-sightedness of the philosopher with the zeal of the devotee. This accounts at once for his thoroughness and his catholicism. He could sympathise with all shades of thought and belief, since to him was vouchsafed the vision of their harmonious blending in the one Resplendent Colourless whole. He would yield to none in his passionate devotion to Śiva; but he would not like sectarian devotees pull down Viṣṇu to the level of a finite self.[1] As an advaitin,

1. See Commentary on verse 35 of the *Ānandalaharī*.

he held that Brahman was *nirguṇa*; but he also held that for facility of human comprehension, He appears "as if possesing guṇas, taking on the form of the blue-throated, three-eyed Being, accompanied by Aṁbā".[1] Though the bed-rock of all the Vedās, Āgamās and so on is but Advaita, "the fragrance of Advaita breaths in man only by the Grace of Him whose crest jewel is the tender digit of the moon".[2] As an advaitin, release meant for him realisation of identity with Brahman; but this is not to be, so long as there continues in the world even a single unredeemed soul. Till the final release of all, individual release is but the attainment of the being of Īśvara. We thus find throughout a spirit of sympathetic understanding and reconciliation, very far removed from dogmatic sectarianism.

And yet our author could wield his dialectical weapons forcefully, sometimes pitilessly. The extended hand of reconciliation not infrequently became the mailed fist. He does not hold, for instance, with the exaggerated claims of Mādhvācārya to divinity, and inveighs against him furiously in a notable passage in the commentary on verse 31 of the *Śiva-tattva-viveka*. Though, as noted before, he ha a profound regard for Viṣṇu, holding that "only by reaching Him can that place be attained, which belongs to the Immortal, primaeval blissful Being, who is Light, etc."[3] yet he could not brook those self-styled Vaiṣṇavas who reviled Śiva or contemplated treason against His supremacy.[4] Against these he directs his righteous indignation, quoting passages condemnatory of them, from the *Bhāgavata*, and commenting on them with great gusto (explaining "*durbhagāḥ*" of the original as "*saṁkirṇa-kṣetra-jātāḥ*"). For error as ignorance, he seems

1. *Śivatattvaviveka*, verse 13.

2. *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā*, Introductory verse 7. (Translation by Dr V. V. Ramaṇa Śastri).

3. *Ratnatrayaparīkṣa*, verse 5.

4. It must be noted that for Appayya, Śiva is above and beyond the three mūrtis,—Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra. He is not to be identified with Rudra, who is the embodiment of Tamas, and the Lord of Destruction, as the other two are Lords of Creation and Sustentation.

to have had comprehension and sympathy, but none for error masquerading as the whole truth.

One of Appayya's pupils was Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, famous as the author of the *Siddhānta-Kaumudī*. Bhaṭṭoji was from Upper India, where, among other things, he earned the opposition and ill-will of Paṇḍitarāja Jagannātha, a favourite of the Emperor, Shah Jehan. Bhaṭṭoji's preceptor, Appapya, also came in for a share of Jagannātha's enmity, the pupil's evil ways being set down to the master's evil influence. This Jagannātha wrote a critique of Appayya's *Citra-Mīmāṁsā* called *Citra-Mīmāṁsā-Khaṇḍana*. It is thought that about the period of this controversy between Bhaṭṭoji and Jagannātha, Appayya himself was at Benares. However that may be, he spent his last days in the South, and died at Cidambaram. In his last moments, he is said to have composed a verse and a half in praise of Cidambaram and the Dancer in the Golden Hall. "This city of Cidambaram is well-known for its sacredness. Splendidly modest sons (have been born to me). Some good works have also been written. My years are more than seventy. Longing for pleasure I have none. I want nothing. Only I am anxious to *see* my Lord's place. *There flashes* in my heart the rising Sun of the light of the Lotus-feet of the Dancer of the Golden Hall"[1] He expired in the middle of the second verse. One could wish for no more fitting *finale* to sucha a great life.[2]

The present work of Appayya's—known as the *Śivādvaita Nirṇaya* or the *Śivādvaita*, sometimes as the *Advaita-Nirṇaya*, has its merits and defects, from view-point of the average readers. It has the merit of being entirely in prose, and directed to one central idea. It has the further merit of expounding Appayya's conception not merely of Śivādvaita, but also of

1. Translation by A. V. Gopalachariar, *Yādavābhyudaya*, II, xvii.

2. For further information, see *Appayya-Dīkṣitendra-Vijaya* by Śivānanda Yogin, *Life of Śrī Appayya Dīkṣita* by A. V. Gopalachariar, in Vol. II of *Yādavābhyudaya* (S. V. V. Press), *Appayya Dīkṣita* in the *Siddhānta-Dīpikā*, IV, 261, and two articles on *Appayya Dīkṣita's Age* by Y. Mahāliṅga Śāstr *Journal of Oriental Research*, II, 225, and III, 140.

Śuddhādvaita, some of his distinctive conceptions in regard to the latter, such as that about release finding expression here. But in spite of fairly extensive quotations from the *bhāṣya* of Śrīkaṇṭha, it is not possible to appreciate the latter or assess it at its true worth, except in conjunction with an independent study of the *bhāṣya*. A study of the *Nirṇaya* by itself would be like reading up the criticism of a literary work, in the absence of direct acquaintance with that work. The difficulty is increased by the fact that certain doctrines of the *bhāṣyakāra*—such as the atomicity of the self are not mentioned or discussed by Appayya. But the *Nirṇaya* deserves to be studied, if for nothing else, at least as a remarkable example of our author's dialectical skill and clearness of thought. One other reason why the work is valuable to the students of Śrīkaṇṭha is the reference to Sudarśanācārya otherwise known as Haradatta. With reference to a verse quoted by the dialectical opponent from the author's *Śruti-Sūkti-Mālā*, it is said that Śrīkaṇṭha came after Haradatta. This, combined with very definite suggestions in the *Ānandalaharī* to the effect that Rāmānuja followed in the foot-steps of Śrīkaṇṭha, seems to be of great help in fixing the period of Śrīkaṇṭha. If the date is still uncertain, it is because Haradatta's period is not known; for, the obituary verse, whereon reliance used to be placed as giving the date of his death, proves to contain conflicting astronomical details and is inaccurate or spurious.[1]

Appayya tries to be as clear in his exposition, as in his thought. His attempts, however, are not always successful. He frequently labours his points to the extent of being tiresome. And, often enough, he leads us into a labyrinth of words from which he escapes, leaving us to find our way out, as best as we can. A single sentence may contain half-a-dozen distinct points and run nearly to a whole page. The task of the translator, who has to steer clear of the Scylla of unintelligible literalism and the Charybdis of free paraphrase is not enviable.

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1. See further an article on *Divine Omnipotence*, by the present writer, in the *Triveni* for March 1928.

ABBREVIATIONS

A. Śikhā	... Atharva-śikhā
A. Śirasi	... Atharvaśirasi
Kaṭha	... Kaṭhopaniṣad
Kauṣ. or Kauṣītaki	... Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
Ch.	... Chāndogya Upaniṣad
Taitt.	... Taittirīyopaniṣad
T. S.	... Taittirīya-Saṁhitā
Dh. S.	... Dharma-Sūtras
N. S.	... Nyāya-Sūtras
Praśna	... Praśnopaniṣad
Bṛh.	... Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad
B. M.	... Brahma-Mīmāṁsā
Br. V.	... Brahma-Vidyābharaṇam
M. N.	... Mahānārayaṇopaniṣad
Mu.	... Muṇḍakopaniṣad
Ś.	... Śaṅkara
Ś. Bh., M. Ed.	... Śaṅkara Bhāṣya, Memorial Edition
Śānti	... Śānti Parva, Mahābhārata
Śvet.	... Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad
Schomerus	... Der çaiva Siddhānta, Schomerus
ब्र.	... ब्रह्म-मीमांसा
शा. भा.	... ब्रह्म-सूत्र-शाङ्कर-भाष्यम्
ध. सू.	... आपस्तम्ब-धर्म-सूत्रम्.

II

THE WORKS OF APPYYA DĪKṢITA

The following list is based primarily on an article on Appayya Dīkṣita in the *Siddhānta-Dīpikā* (Vol. IV). The writer of that article would seem to have drawn principally from Aufrecht's *Catalogus Catalogorum* and Bhaṭṭaśrī Bālasarasvati Pandit Nārāyaṇa Sudarśana's introduction to the *Advaita-mañjarī* edition of the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*. These sources have also been consulted in the preparation of the present list. Prof. P. P. S. Śāstri of the Presidency College, Madras, has prepared a list mainly based on the manuscripts mentioned in the Descriptive and Triennial Catalogues of the Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras; he has also made use of the information available from the Tanjore Palace Library. Mr. Y. Mahāliṅga Śāstri, Advocate, Mylapore, a lineal descendant of Appayya Dīkṣita has made out a list from material that was in the possession of his great-grand-father, Brahmaśrī Rāju Śāstrin. These two lists have also been availed of. Many of the works here enumerated find mention in all the lists, while some are mentioned in only one or other of the lists. The initials given after the name of each work indicate briefly the authorities relied on in each case. Thus, A is Aufrecht, M is Mahāliṅga Śāstrī, N is Nārāyaṇa Sudarśana, S is P. P. S. Śāstrī, and SD is the *Siddhānta-Dīpikā*. Works wrongly listed by some of these are also mentioned, together with a note indicating the error actual or probable. It is hoped that the list here made out will provide a useful basis for further research.

1. *Adhikaraṇa-mālā* (SD; possibly identical with the *Mīmāṁsā-viṣaya-saṅgraha-dīpikā* listed by S).

2. *Adhikaraṇa-sārāvali* (M).

3. *Adhikaraṇa-kuñcikā* (S; M). This is probably the same work as No. 2. Dr. Ramaṇa Śāstrin mentions an *Adhikaraṇa-kañcuka*, which purports to be a commen-

tary on the *adhikaraṇa* ślokas of the *Dakṣiṇāmūrti brahma-sūtravṛtti.* A paper Ms. of this work in Devanāgarī characters is to be found in the Adyar Library. It is so different in style and doctrine from the general trend of Appayya's works that its attribution to him is strongly open to suspicion. It is not known whether this is the same as the *Adhikaraṇa-kuñcikā* listed by S and M.

4. *Apītakucāmbā-stava* [S. V. V.]

5. *Amarakośa-vyākhyā* (A; followed by SD. This is possibly identical with *Śabda-prakāśam* listed by S and M).

6. *Aruṇācaleśvara-stuti* (SD; M).

7. *Ātmārpaṇa-stuti* (or *Śivapañcaśikhā*) [B. V; S. V. V.]

8. *Āditya-stava-ratna* (or *Dvādaśāditya-stava*) [B. V.]

9. A commentary on the above [B.V.]

10. *Ūpakrama-parākrama* (A; M; N: S; SD).

11. *Kuvalayānanda* [Nirṇayasāgar].

Rasikarañjani, a commentary on the *Kuvalayānanda* is wrongly listed by Aufrecht, as that work appears to have been by one Gaṅgādhara Adhvarin.

12. *Kṛṣṇa-dhyāna-paddhati* (M; N; SD).

13. A commentary on the above (N; SD).

14. *Gaṅgādhara-aṣṭakam* (M: S).

15. *Durgācandrakalā-stuti* [S. V. V.].

16. A commentary on the above (M; N; SD).

17. *Citra-puṭa* (M; N; S; SD).

18. *Citra-mīmāṁsā* [Nirṇaysāgar].

19. *Jayollāsanidhi* (A; SD).

20. *Tattva-muktāvalī* (A; SD).

21. *Taptamudrā-khaṇḍana* (or-*vidrāvaṇam*) (A; M; S; SD).

Taptamudrāṅkaṇa-khaṇḍana (A; probably identical with No. 21).

22. *Tiṅ-anta-śeṣa-saṅgraha* (A; SD).

23. *Daśakumāra-caritra-saṅgraha* (or *saṁkṣepaḥ*) (A; M; S; SD).

24. *Dharma-mīmāṁsā-paribhāṣā* (SD; possibly the same as *Tāntrika-mīmāṁsā* listed by M alone).

25. *Nayamañjarī* (M; SD).

26. *Nayamaṇimālā* [Nirṇayasāgar].

27. A commentary on the above (M; SD).

28. *Nayamayūkha-mālikā* (A; M; N; SD).

29. A commentary on the above (SD).

30. *Nāma-saṅgraha-mālā* (A; N; SD).

31. A commentary on the above (A; N; SD).

32. *Nigrahāṣṭakam* [By Śivānanda Yogin at Benares].

33. *Nyāya-muktāvalī* (M; N; SD).

34. A commentary on the above (N; SD).

35. *Nyāyarakṣāmaṇi* [S. V. V].

36. *Nyāya-ratna-mālā* (M; SD).

37. A commentary on the above (M; SD).

Nyāya-saṅgraha-mālā and a commentary thereon listed by M alone are possibly identical with Nos. 36 and 37.

38. *Pañca-ratna-stava* (or—*stuti*) [S. V. V.].

39. A commentary on the above [S. V. V.].

40. *Pañca-svara-vivṛti* (SD).

41. *Parimalam* [Nirṇayasāgar].

Pañcagranthi a Vedānta work, listed by A and SD, is probably the same as No. 41, that being the fifth of the five Advaita works—The *Brahma-Sūtra*, Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya*, the *Bhāmatī*, the *Kalpataru*, and the *Parimalam*—which belong to one line of Advaita tradition.

42. *Pādukā-sahasra-ṭīkā* (A; M; SD).

43. *Pāṇinīya-nakṣatra-mālā* [or *Pāṇini-tantra-vāda-nakṣatra-mālā* published by R. V. Kṛṣṇamāchari, Kumbakonam].

44. *Pūrvottara-mīmāṁsā-vāda-nākṣatra-mālā* [S. V. V.]

45. *Prabodha-candrodaya-ṭīkā* (A; SD).

46. *Prākṛta-candrikā* (N; SD: probably the same as *Prākṛta-maṇi-dīpa* listed by S).

47. *Brahma-tarka-stava* [S. V. V.].

48. A commentary on the above [S. V. V.].

49. *Bhakti-śataka* (A; M; SD).

50. *Bhārata-sāra-saṅgraha* [S. V. V.]

51. *Bhārata-tātparya-saṅgraha* [S. V. V.; a commentary on No. 50].

52. *Maṇimālikā* (N; SD doubts if it is different from No. 26).

53. *Mata-sārārtha-saṅgraha* (N; SD; N says it is a work of seventy verses; it should then be different from the *Catur-mata-sāra-saṅgraha*, which comprises the *Nyāya-muktāvali*; the *Nayamayūkha-mālikā*, the *Naya-maṇi-māla* and the *Nayamañjarī*; this work is possibly the same as *Smṛti-mata-sāra* listed by M alone).

54. *Madhva-tantra-mukha-mardana* [B. V.]

55, *Madhva-mata-vidhvaṁsana* [B. V.; a commentary on No. 54].

Madhva-mata-khaṇḍana is listed by A and SD; this is probably the same as Nos. 54 and 55.

56. *Mayūkhāvali* (S).

57. *Mānasollāsa* [S. V. V.].

58. *Mārgasahāya-stotram* (S).

59. *Yādavābhyudaya-ṭīkā* [S. V. V.].

60. *Ratna-traya-parīkṣa* [B. V.].

61. A commentary on the above [B. V.].

62. *Rāmānuja-mata-khaṇḍana* (or *Rāmānuja-śṛṅga-bhaṅga*) (S; M; SD).

63. *Rāmāyaṇa-sāra-saṅgraha* [S. V. V.].

64. *Rāmāyaṇa-tātparya-saṅgraha* [S. V. V.; a commentary on No. 63].

Rāmāyaṇa-tātparya-nirṇaya (SD).

Rāmāyaṇa-bhārata-sāra-saṅgraha (A; SD).

Rāmāyaṇa-sāra (A; SD).

Rāmāyaṇa-sāra-stava; (A; SD); these four would seem to be but repetitions of the titles of 50, 51, 63, and 64. It is not likely that as many as eight books were written on the interpretation of the *Rāmāyaṇa* and the *Mahābhārata*.

65. *Laghu-vivaraṇa* [B. V.].

66. *Varadarāja-stava* [S. V. V.].

67. A commentary on the above [S. V. V.].

68. *Vasumati-citersenā-vilāsa-nāṭaka* (A; SD).

69. *Vidhi-rasāyana* (A; M; N; S; SD).

70. *Vidhi-rasāyana-sukhopajīvinī* (or—*sukhopayojanī*; A; M; N; S; SD).

71. *Viṣṇu-tattava-rahasya* (A; SD).

72. *Vīra-śaivam* (A; M; SD).

73. *Vṛtti-Vārtikam* (A; M; N; S; SD).

Vairāgya-śataka is erroneously listed by A and SD relyin on the authorship ascribed in Kāvyamālā I, 91. The work printed there turns out to be Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita's. See the latter's Minor Poems, published by S. V. V.

74. *Śānti-stava* (A; SD).

75. *Śikharṇi-mālā* [Advaita-mañjarī].

76. *Śiva-tattva-viveka* [Advaita-mañjarī; a commentary on No. 75].

77. *Śiva-karṇāmṛtam* [S. V. V.].

A commentary on the above is listed by SD. This is improbable, as the original itself is a short prosework, hardly needing any commentary.

78. *Śiva-dhyāna-paddhati* [B. V.].

79. A commentary on the above (N: SD).

80. *Śiva-purāṇa-tāmasatva-khaṇḍana* (A; SD).

81. *Śiva-pūjā-vidhi* (S; M; SD).

82. *Śiva-mahima-kalikā-stuti* [B. V.].

83. A commentary on the above, known as the *Mīmāṁsā-nyāyā-parimalollāsa* [B. V.].

84. *Śivādvaita-nirṇaya* [Madras University].

85. *Śivānanda-laharī* (or *Ānanda-laharī*) [S. V. V.].

86. *Śivānanda-laharī--candrikā* [S. V. V.; a commentary on No. 85].

87. *Śivārka-maṇi-dīpikā* (or *Śivāditya-maṇi-dīpikā*) [Nirṇayasāgar].

88. *Śivārcanā-candrikā* [Devakotah].

89. *Bāla-candrikā*, a commentary on No. 88 (N; SD).

90. *Śivotkarṣa-mañjarī* (A; SD; it is doubtful whether this is identical with Nīlakaṇṭha Dīkṣita's work of the same name).

91. *Śaiva-kalpadruma* (A).

92. *Siddhānta-ratnākara* (A; SD).

93. *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* [Advaita-mañjari].

94. *Stotra-ratnākara* (M).

95. *Haṁsa-sandeśa-ṭikā* (A; SD).

96. *Hari-hara-stuti* (S; M).

97. *Harivaṁśa-sāra-caritra-vyākhyā* (A; S; SD; the Ms. is in the Tanjore Palace Library; see Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts, Vol. VI. A and SD wrongly assign the orignal work itself to Appayya;

that work was composed by one Govindamantrin, a minister of the Koṇḍavīḍu chieftain).

Nārāyaṇa Sudarśana quotes several verses which enumerate many of the above works and mention in addition the *Abhidhā-lakṣaṇā-vṛtti,* treating of the same topic as *Vṛtti-vārtikam.* The verses, he says, are of Appayya's own composition, but we are not informed of the authority for the statement or of the source of the verses. If we count the *Mīmāṁsā-viṣaya-saṅgraha-dīpikā,* the *Śabda-prakāśa,* the *Tāntrika-mimāṁsā,* the *Nyāya-saṅgraha mālā* and its commentary, the *Smṛti-mata-sāra* and the *Abhidhā-lakṣaṇā-vṛtti* as independent works, we shall have a hundred and four on the whole. Information is now to hand from Tanjore of an *Alaṃkāra* work in Ms. called the *Lakāṇa-ratnāvali-vyākhyā.*

Note: The initials in the square brackets refer to the name of the publisher or the series, where the work has been published:

S. V. V. is the Śrī Vāṇī Vilās Press, Srirangam;

B. V. is the Brahma-Vidyā Press, Cidambaram;

Nirṇayasāgar is the press of that name in Bombay;

Advaita-mañjarī is the series of that name published at Kumbakonam;

Devakotah refers to the Śaivāgama-paripālana-saṅgam, Devakotah.

It would appear from the British Museum Catalogue that the text of the *Śivādvaita-Nirṇaya* was] published at Benares in 1905 by one Śri Kaṇṭha Prasāda Nārāyaṇa Siṃha.[1] It did not form part of any known series and copies seem to be very difficult to obtain.

1. This information was not available to the present editor earlier than January, 1930.

III

THE SYSTEM OF ŚRĪKAṆṬHA

Śrīkaṇṭha like the Śaiva-Siddhāntin, believes in three principles—*Pati* (the Lord), *Paśu* (the bound soul), and *Pāśa* (the bonds). The impurity of the bound soul is beginningless, like the presence of verdigris in copper. The impurity can be got rid of only by getting the souls to engage in action and enjoy the fruit. The creation of the world is for this purpose. The Lord has no object of His own to gain by creating the world; He does it, however, in the interest of the bound souls, in order to purify and to redeem them.

The Lord is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The world is, thus, the result of a transformation of Brahman. But transformation would imply change, that is, defect, in Brahman. Hence, Brahman's *pariṇāma* (transformation) has to be understood as holding only of His *Cit-śakti* (Intelligence-Energy). This *Cit-śakti* is the material cause, which takes on the form of the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent.[1] Brahman Himself (whom Śrīkaṇṭha identifies with Śiva) is the efficient cause. But these are distinguishable aspects of Brahman, not different entities; for, between Energy and the possessor thereof, there is non-difference. Because of the relationship to the Lord, through *Cit-śakti*, the world partakes of the Existence, Intelligence, and Bliss of the Lord. The existence of particular things is a fraction of the existence of Brahman; individual knowledge and bliss are fragments of the Knowledge and Bliss of Śiva. All this is taught by the Vedānta.

The Vedānta also appears to teach identity of Brahman and the finite self. This, however, is not to be taken literally. The

1. The first manifestation of *Cit-śakti* is Nārāyaṇa, who is thus the material cause of the world. He is of the form of the universe (*Viśvākāra*).

identity is only of the kind that subsists between the body and the embodied, the pervader and what is pervaded. When the faggot is pervaded by fire, we speak of it as itself fire.

Release comes through meditation on the Lord, after the acquisition of the necessary preliminaries of tranquility, faith, non-attachment to fruit whether in this world or the next, and so on. The meditation should take on any one of the forms prescribed by Upaniṣadic seers. The Lord may for instance, be contemplated as the small *ākāśa* within the heart or as the One Existence that evolved into all this. In all cases, the distinctive qualities of Śiva will have to be understood, such as blissfulness, freedom from sin, etc., and blue-throatedness, companionship of Umā and so on; for, the Lord is the abode of all auspicious qualities, and the texts, which make Him out to be attributeless, intend to deny only objectionable qualities.

In meditation, the Lord is to be thought of as the Self, for, so have contemplated sages of yore, saying, "I am, verily, Thou, O Lord, O Divinity; Thou, verily, art I". Release is the abandonment of the condition of bondage (*Paśutva*) and the attainment of the state of bliss (*Śivatva*). This cannot come about until the bonds are destroyed in the torrent of continuous meditation of identity with the Supreme. It is this identity that ancient seers have taught their disciples through texts like "*That Thou art*".

As the fruit of meditation, properly performed, one goes up to Brahman, after death, along the path of the gods. For those, who go along this path, there is no return. Some say, however, that there is no need for all to travel along this path, since for the devotees of the non-related (presumably what the pure-non-dualist calls *nirguṇa*-Brahman), there is attainment of release even here, i.e., with release from the physical body.[1] This exception in favour of the devotees of the non-related (*niranvaya-upāsakas*)

1. Or, possibly, "even while in this life". Śrīkaṇṭha does recognise, in a half-hearted way, the possibility of *jīvanmukti*, release while still in the world; this recognition constitutes one more breach between his system and qualified-non-dualism. See B M. III, 4, 50.

is made by Śrīkaṇṭha as often as there is occasion to talk of the path of the gods, for the others. Such statements naturally give rise to speculations as to whether Śrīkaṇṭha's system is really qualified-non-dualism (Viśiṣṭādvaita), though he chooses to call it so. And once the question is raised, there appear to be a number of indications which all tend to point to pure-non-dualism (*Śuddhādvaita*) as his ultimate doctrine. All these indications have been examined and exploited fully by Appayya Dīkṣita in his *Ānanda-laharī*, as also in the present work. Though the *Śivādvaita Nirṇaya* contains no explicit reference to the other work, yet there seems to be no doubt that it is the later of the two. While a number of passages—such as the discussion of Āpastamba's exaltaion of the house-holder's state, Śaṅkara's conception of release as the attainment of the nature of Īśvara, and so on are common to both works (in words, as well as in thought), there are certain elaborations of the argument, in the *Nirṇaya*, which would definitely make it out to be later.[1] Further, referring to an argument about *ākāśa*, in the sense of *Cit-śakti*, being identical with Brahman, in his *Ratna-traya-parīkṣā*, Appayya makes mention of the *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* and the *Śivānanda-laharī* (what we know as the *Ānanda-laharī*) but not to *Śivādvaita Nirṇaya*, though the argument is common to this work also, which, thus, seems to be later even than the *Ratna-traya-parīkṣā*. We shall next proceed to study Appayya's arguments in brief, for, a detailed consideration will easily become longer than the book itself.

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1. One or two of these may be noted here: (*a*) in the discussion of the view that the identity of the *jīva* and Brahman is but imagined, the *Nirṇaya* sets out both the view and the criticism in greater detail than the *Laharī*; (*b*) *Saguṇa* Brahman is shown in the *Nirṇaya* to be not merely the *avāntara tātparya* of Vedānta texts, but the indispensable pre-supposition of the synthesis of such texts as relate to *nirguṇa* Brahman; (*c*) the consideration of Āpastamba's criticism of *Saṁnyāsa* is fuller, further reasons being given for treating this as but *arthavāda*; there is also a reference to similar condemnation by Kṛṣṇa and some ancient sages; (*d*) there is an attempt to show, with reference to the Suvarcalā-Śvetaketu discourse in the *Mahābhārata*, that *vivartavāda* is acceptable to Bādarāyaṇa; (*e*) the arguments in support of the final position of the *Laharī* figure here also, but certain objections thereto are stated and met.

IV

APPAYYA'S ARGUMENTS

The *starting point* of the discussion, as we have already noted, is the statement about *niranvayopāsakas*, a statement which is made not in one place but in three—III, 3, 32; IV, 2, 13; IV, 3, 1. The expression *niranvaya* is far from clear; it means "non-related", presumably non-related to the universe, what Appaya Dīkṣita understands by the repeated use of the word *niṣ-prapañca*. It seems to refer to *nirguṇa*-Brahman, as conceived by the advaitin, it being well-known that he postulates the attainment of release even in this life, and certainly at death, without travelling along any path or tarrying anywhere. Śrīkaṇṭha, in such statements, apparently recognises the existence and validity of the concept of *nirguṇa*-Brahman. The reason for his referring to it only casually is not that he attaches no value to it, but that his purpose for the moment is the creation of faith in and devotion to *saguṇa*-Brahman; for, such devotion is a necessary propaedeutic to the attainment of the mental steadiness and concentration needed for the uninterrupted contemplation of *nirguṇa*-Brahman. The object he has primarily in view can be secured best by emphasising the *saguṇa* aspect and concealing (nay, even condemning) the *nirguṇa* aspect, though the latter be known to be the final truth. The procedure is paralleled by the condemnation of *saṁnyāsa* by the very sages who recognise it as an exalted order of life and extol it elsewhere. These are not moved by ignorance or error, but by the desire to save those of dull-wit who may take to the higher path of renunciation, having heard of the glories thereof, without having first acquired the requisite degree of firmness. Śrīkaṇṭha's procedure in suppressing and condemning the *nirguṇa* significance is similarly motived.[1] But since the truth may not be wholly concealed, it

1. It will be seen that Appayya's interpretation is conceived in the dominant spirit of Hindu philosophy and founded on the notion of *adhikāra bheda*

is partially indicated in these statements of Śrīkaṇṭha, which occur wherever there is occasion to mention departure along the path of the gods.

Nor may it be thought that the words "some say", with which the remark about *niranvayopāsakas* is introduced in every case, clearly shows that opinion not to be Śrīkaṇṭha's own; for, elsewhere, Śrīkaṇṭha introduces an opinion acceptable to himself, with the words "some say". This is in connection with the view that the Self of Bliss of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* is *Cit-śakti*, and Brahman there spoken of as the tail, the support, is the Supreme Brahman; though mentioned as a secondary view, this is really what is acceptable to him, as seen from his commentary on *Sūtra* I, 1, 2. The statement about non-departure for *niranvayopāsakas* should therefore be taken to be Śrīkaṇṭha's own opinion; this view is further re-inforced by his apparently sup-

(differences of competency). For any such notion, error is a degree of truth. The difficulty of such a theory, (as realised by Bradley and others of his mode of thought) lies in the element of positive opposition to truth. Error claims to be the whole truth, not merely a degree of it, and opposes the recognition of the higher truth. The partiality of the part is intelligible; but its opposition to completion and its claim to be complete, these seem hard to reconcile with the coherence-notion of truth and with absolutist metaphysics. The analogy of Āpastamba's condemnation of *saṁnyāsa* applies just to this positive aspect of error; the sage is not merely praising the house-holder's state of life, (which is a partial good), but is setting it up as the only good order, even running counter to *Śruti*. This, says Appayya, is for the purpose of securing undisturbed concentration on the grade of truth for which the subject is fit. When perfection in that stage is attained, the higher truth will dawn of itself. On such a hypothesis, one is led to speculate on the influence of the horrors of the Inquisition in the development of the Copernican theory. The cases would, of course, not be parallel, since the Inquisitors, to the best of our knowledge, were ignorant of the higher truth, and in this respect were unlike Āpastamba or possibly Śrīkaṇṭha. There would thus seem to be a difference between the opposition set up *by* the lower grade of truth, and the opposition set up *for* it by those cognisant of the higher truth. The latter is defensible, not the former. This is probably the reason why Appayya himself loses temper with the self-styled Vaiṣṇavas, though he considers Viṣṇu to be an element of god-head, one of the three gems, the worship of whom leads to that shining glory, which is the abode of the Immortal.

porting that position in his own person, in the commentary on III, 3, 32, where he says that therein is no inconsistency.[1]

The next point of considerable importance is the mode of meditation prescribed by Śrīkaṇṭha. The Lord is to be meditated on as identical with the self, not as standing thereto in the relation of the embodied to the body. The latter relationship expresses the Viśiṣṭādvaitin's manner of understanding Scriptural declarations of non-difference; and at one stage of his exposition Śrīkaṇṭha too leans to the same view. But this relationship is intended to appeal only to those who betake themselves to the path of service (*dāśa-mārga*), look upon the Lord as a Master in relation to servants, and can rise to no higher conception. For these, release comes about only very much later, after they have passed through the stage of servitude to Śiva. Those who desire release itself and are fit to seek it at least through *saguṇa* meditation, as on the *ākāśa* within the heart and so on, should contemplate Śiva as identical with themselves.

The very text of the Jābālas quoted by Śrīkaṇṭha supports this view; for, it asserts identity both ways: "I am Thou and Thou art I". The Viśiṣṭādvaitin too quotes this text, but without realising its implications. If, as he says, the finite self is an attribute of the Lord, the Lord may be said to be the finite self, not *vice versa*: for, the substantive may be identical with the adjective, but not the adjective with the substantive. The latter is more than any one attribute or aggregate of attributes. The *Śruti* declaration "I am Thou" becomes, in this case,

1. A modern translator of Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya* into Tamil doubts the genuineness of these passages and therefore jettisons them wholesale. The wisdom of the procedure is, however, doubtful; for, difficulties of reconciliation can at best lead to suspicion of their genuineness, not to proof of forgery. It is worth noting that besides the Manuscripts and traditions of Appayya's time, about ten Manuscripts from different parts of India have been consulted in bringing out two of the printed editions of Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*—that of the Pandit (1872), and that of the Government of Mysore. It is difficult to discard as spurious statements which evidently have such strong support See, further, the relevant portions of Sentinathier, *Brahma-sūtra-śivāttuvita Śaivapāḍiyam*.

meaningless. The text, "That Thou art" also teaches real identity, for, we are told that sages realise Śiva to be identical with their own Self and pass on this realisation to their pupils through texts like "That Thou art". This latter interpretation must be taken to negative the earlier interpretation even of *tat tvam asi* in II, 3, 42, *et. seq.*; for the two are contradictory and contradictories cannot both be accepted, as Śrīkaṇṭha says in his commentary on II, 1, 22. Even the *saguṇa-upāsaka* has thus to contemplate the Lord as identical with himself; hence Śrīkaṇṭha's doctrine of non-difference is more akin to Suddhādvaita than to Viśiṣṭādvaita.

The non-difference so indicated is confirmed on an examination of the relationship between Brahman and the universe. *Cit-śakti* is of the form of the universe and Brahman is of the form of *Cit-śakti*; hence, the universe is non-different from Brahman. But the advaitin maintains the non-intelligent universe to be an illusory manifestation. True, says Appayya, and Śrīkaṇṭha is bound to entertain the same view; for, how can *Cit-śakti* which is Intelligence evolve into what is non-intelligent? Evolution must be understood literally in the case of the Intelligent universe, and figuratively in the case of the Non-intelligent. The latter being thus fictitious, there is no difficulty in comprehending the perfect identity between Brahman and the *jīva* which has thus been rid of its limiting conditions. Nor can it be said that the Intelligent world may be similarly fictitious, that too being an evolute of *Cit-śakti*, as in that case, there will be none to experience release. Further, there is no need to declare it fictitious, for it is not subject to modifications like the material world. In the latter case, real identity has to be denied, as otherwise Brahman would be subject to change; but in the former case, the *jīva* is eternal and from its identity with Brahman, no evil consequence may be fore-seen.

This argument which establishes the non-difference of Brahman and the universe, through *Cit-śakti*, is liable to attack at two points. Non-difference may be denied as between Brahman and *Cit-śakti* or as between *Cit-śakti* and the universe. The latter

cannot be attempted, for the existence of existents like pot, cloth, etc., is said to be part of a larger, non-variable Existence, while individual bliss is a fragment of a larger Bliss. This more universal Existence and Bliss, if it is not Brahman, is at least *Cit-śakti*. But for participation in some such universal Bliss, the gradations of Bliss mentioned in the *Ānanda-Valli* would be unintelligible; for, each grade would be, otherwise, distinct from the rest, and there would be no sense in saying that the sage "untormented by desires" partakes of *each* grade. Nor could *Cit-śakti*, which is the Bliss of Brahman, make others happy, if it were different from them, for one man's bliss cannot *as such* cause happiness of another.

Nor is the attempt to make out Brahman to be different from *Cit-śakti* any more successful. Their non-difference is repeatedly declared in Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary, as when he says that the Supreme *ākāśa* (not the elemental ether) is the cause of the world, because it is non-different from Brahman or that both Brahman and His *Cit-śakti* are to be meditated on in the *dahara-vidyā*.

That Śrīkaṇṭha looks upon Brahman as in Himself unchanging is evident from his novel doctorine of transformation (*apūrva pariṇāma*), a transformation through *Cit-śakti*, which leaves Brahman unaffected. It is also seen from his making out that Brahman in so far as He is distinguished from *Cit-śakti* is only the operative cause.

Nor have we to depend only on our inference for the view that for Śrīkaṇṭha the non-intelligent world is illusory. The difference between that and the intelligent world is stressed by himself in his commentary on II, 1, 23 where he shows that while even the Intelligent world is designated as other than Brahman, the non-intelligent world, which has no kinship with Brahman, cannot claim to be non-different from Brahman.

It will also be noticed that the sūtras which seem to establish difference between Brahman and the finite self, (such as that

about deep sleep and departure—I, 3, 43) seek to prove only that Brahman in his omniscience is superior to the finite self, as such, in his little-knowingness. No doctrine of utter difference is propounded here.

The advaitin, for his part, does not insist solely on the illusoriness of the universe. To a certain stage and for certain purposes, he is prepared to admit that the universe evolves from Brahman. This doctrine of evolution (*pariṇāma-vāda*) is, indeed, helpful to him in establishing his illusion-doctrine; the former is the first step on which one rises to the latter, as the second. Śrīkaṇṭha's advocacy of *pariṇāma-vāda* is not, therefore, inconsistent with his holding to *vivarta-vāda*, as the final truth.

Further Śaṅkara himself has shown that the Vedānta-sūtras are capable of being interpreted as referring to *saguṇa*-Brahman. Very few of the sūtras, as a matter of fact, teach the *nirguṇa* doctrine. Even in establishing this, Śaṅkara has to make use of Brahman's attributes, that being the only way to show that the Vedānta texts do not refer to the non-intelligent *pradhāna* or to the finite self. He has also given an indication, in his commentary on I, 1, 3, that the sūtras in their entirety may be made to bear a *saguṇa* significance.

There is also another reason why Śaṅkara has to make use of the concept of Īśvara. Until the final redemption of all, release can take the form only of the attainment of the nature of Īśvara, not of merger in Brahman. That this is Śaṅkara's conception of release is evident from numerous passages in his commentary. Thus, while Śrīkaṇṭha's notion of creation as *pariṇāma* is not opposed to Śaṅkara's *vivarta-vāda*, there is some identity in respect of their notions of release.

It is also evident from numerous indications that, for Śaṅkara, *saguṇa*-Brahman is Śiva, a Being other than Viṣṇu or Saṃhāra-Rudra, the lord of destruction. One such indication is the frequent use of the term Parameśvara which generally denotes Śiva; another is the comparison of Brahman's presence in the

body to Hari's presence in the *sālagrāma* stone. The subject and object of a comparison cannot be identical; hence, *saguṇa*-Brahman (who is spoken of there) must be other than Hari. But such indications are extremely subtle and cannot appeal to the hearts or heads of devotees. Hence it is that what has been concisely indicated and provided for by Śaṅkara is elaborated by Śrīkaṇṭha Śivācaryā in the Śivādvaita.

V

EXAMINATION OF APPAYYA'S ARGUMENTS

The thesis set forth above is exceedingly attractive to any one who is not a confirmed Viśiṣṭādvaitin, and is almost convincing. Perhaps, the strongest of the points is that about the identity of the universe with Brahman, through *Cit-śakti.* The philosophical problem of the One and the many, the permanent and the changing is sought to be solved by the introduction of a third factor, which is one-and-many, permanent-yet-changing, viz., *Cit-śakti.* If this is not a mere name, we are entitled to examine the concept closely to discover how, if at all, it can be intelligible. The only possibility of taking it as intelligible lies, according to Appayya, in treating the non-intelligent world as an illusory manifestation, not as an evolute of the same grade of reality as the alleged cause. If this central position is once conceded, the rest of Appayya's argument and his conclusion may well be admitted.

Now, what the inherent logic of an argument demands is not always realised by those who urge the argument. Śrīkaṇṭha's position may logically culminate in *vivarta-vāda*; but this of itself is no proof of his awareness or acceptance of the culmination. Appayya seeks to build on a statement in the commentary on II, 1, 23. The statement in question, runs thus: "thus, even of the Intelligent, there is non-appropriateness of the being of Īśvara, because of their difference in respect of excess of attributes; what then of the non-intelligent, which is essentially of a different character? This is the sense". Now it is not Appayya's case that stones etc., are different from Brahman in the same way in which Intelligent beings are. Nor would he admit that the difference between the two is one of degree. And yet in the absence of community of nature, to some extent, the comparison of the two is unintelligible. On the hypothesis that both are of the form of

Cit-śakti (which is non-different from Brahman), this difficulty does not arise, but the original difficulty continues. Further, there is no point in the comparison at all, except on the basis of the difference of the finite self from Brahman. Comparison with the finite self is resorted to, as if the finite self were an intermediate link between the non-intelligent world and Brahman. If that link proves to be not other than Brahman, it can be no link at all and the object of the comparison is frustrated. There is no such difficulty in taking the sūtras, as they stand. The *jīva,* they seem to say, is different from Brahman, and the material world is still more different. The former conclusion is based on the latter, which requires no proof beyond the bare statement. What Śrī-kaṇṭha is driving at in his commentary is the view that the Supreme Being is other and higher than the world of both intelligent and non-intelligent beings. It cannot, therefore, be said on the strength of the commentary on II, 1, 23, that Śrīkaṇṭha is prepared to view the non-intelligent world as *vivarta.*

The explanation of the sūtras which teach difference between the finite self and Brahman is also very thin. It is said that I, 3, 43, teaches not absolute difference between the two, but a difference of degree in respect of their knowledge, Brahman being omniscient and the *jīva* little-knowing. But then the Viśiṣṭādvaitin does not maintain absolute difference between the two. He supports identity of a sort, as between body and the embodied, pervader and what is pervaded. He too speaks of the expansion and contraction of the intellect of the finite self, implying the difference in knowledge to be a difference of degree. It may well be that, in the last resort, such conceptions are unintelligible, except as synthesised in a theory of pure-non-dualism. To say, this, however, is not to admit that Śrīkaṇṭha recognised the need for or the possibility of such a synthesis.

It would, indeed, appear from his treatment of the finite self as atomic that he was far from conceiving of a synthesis of the kind. He maintains the doctrine of *aṇutva* (atomicity) of the *jīva,* (B. M. II, 3, 20-26), adopting in this the same view as the Vaiṣṇava Viśiṣṭādvaita, and departing strangely enough from the

conclusions of the Śaiva-Siddhānta.[1] And it is still more strange that in Appayya's extensive analysis of Śrīkaṇṭha's *bhāṣya*, this doctrine alone has come in for neither mention nor comment. It may be that the *dāsa-mārga* requires the text *That Thou art* to be interpreted on the basis of master and servant. Does it also require that the servant should be considered atomic? If so, the point is at least worth the trouble of statement and support. And one is all the more surprised at seeing no support for the atomic view from Āgamas like the *Kāmika* which recognise the *dāsamārga* (as evidenced by Appayya's own quotation therefrom in the present work). This much at least seems certain that there is a very real difference in Śrīkaṇṭha's system between Brahman and the *jīva*. The difference is as great as that between the *aṇu* and the *vibhu*. To say that it is a difference of degree cannot serve to explain it away. And the difficulty is all the more significant, if we remember that the Viśiṣṭādvaitin is always prepared to admit *some* community of nature of between the two.

It is said that though the text *That Thou art* is mentioned in introducing the *sūtra* I, 3, 43 (about deep sleep and departure), no dualistic interpretation is offered of it in the commentary on that *sūtra*. But no dualistic interpretation is necessary for the purpose of that *sūtra*. A doubt is created by such texts as *That Thou art* as to the identity of Brahman and the *jīva*. That doubt is set at rest by appeal to other texts which make clear the difference between this self and another Self which mounts it, embraces it and so on. The difference between the two selves being thus established, a dualistic interpretation of the other text does not become necessary, though it may not be inappropriate. The need, such as it is, is certainly met later by the interpretation given in the *aṃśa* section (II, 3, 42, *et seq*).

If now, we turn to Śrīkaṇṭha's conception of release, we do not find Appayya's case any stronger. We may, for our purpose,

1. For the Siddhāntin's criticism of the doctrine of atomicity of the finite self, see *Śivajñāna-Siddhiār*, IV, 2, and Umāpati's *Pauṣkara-bhāṣya* pp. 27v, 275. The latter says that the texts about departure etc., (whereon the view of atomicity is based) refer to the *puryaṣṭaka*,—the subtle body composed of the internal organs and the subtle elements.

admit that the passages about *niranvaya-upāsakās* are genuine; even then, they would seem to admit of being interpreted otherwise than as referring to knowers of *nirguṇa*-Brahman. Before considering this aspect of the question, however, it will be interesting to examine Appayya's exposition of the similarity between Śaṅkara and Śrīkaṇṭha as to the concept of release and the kind of meditation necessary therefor. It is contended that for Śaṅkara too, release is but the attainment of the nature of Īśvara, until final release comes about for all. This argument is developed with some elaboration and with reference to various statements made by Śaṅkara throughout his *bhāṣya.* Admitting the conclusion to be correct, one has still to remember that his conception is not identical with that of Śrīkaṇṭha; for, as Appayya himself points out in his *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha,*[1] Īśvarata attained by meditation on *saguṇa*-Brahman is not the same as Īśvaratva attained through knowledge of *nirguṇa*-Brahman, as preliminary to the final release of all. In the latter case, there is intuition of the One, Impartible Being that is Brahman, not in the former. *Saguṇa-vidyā* (in the sense of meditation) does not bring about the final destruction of ignorance or egoity; and as is but natural in the circumstances, equality with the Lord extend, not to all aspects. In respect of creatorship, etc., of the worldss the souls released by *saguṇa-vidyā* are not equal to the Lord. No such limitations are known to release through *nirguṇa-vidyā*. It is not evident from any indication given by Śrīkaṇṭha that he contemplated release in this sense, involving absolute equality with the Lord, without any reservations. His released souls can create not worlds, but only such objects as they desire for their enjoyment and bliss. It is evident, then, that there is a difference of considerable significance between the Śivādvaitin's conception of release and that of the advaitin. Nor is the difference one merely of degree; the difference of degree is so great that it involves a difference of kind, the difference between the wisdom of the fully released soul and the ignorance of the partially released soul.

1. *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha*, pp. 450–451.

In elaborating the advaitin's conception of release, however, Appayya seeks primarily to show not the identity of that concept with that which is the goal of *saguṇa-vidyā*, but the necessity for the advaitin to entertain and expound a concept of the *saguṇa*-Brahman. Our author cannot, therefore, be suspected of suppressing the truth or basing an argument on an insufficient analogy. But it must be said that *if he had developed the* contrast between the *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* conceptions of release, in the present work, as in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṅgraha* his other arguments in favour of his general position about Śrīkaṇṭha would have *lost some part of their* weight.

As for the mode of meditation, there can be no doubt that Śrīkaṇṭha's words are clear and emphatic on the need for contemplating the Lord as identical with the self. Appayya's interpretation is eminently sound, while his refutation of the Rāmānujīyas, who seek to bolster up their *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva* with the Jābala *text, is brilliant.* The dual statement with the change *in the forms of the subject* and the corresponding predicate (I am Thou, Thou art I) *is unintelligible, except* on *the* basis of full identity. But it may still be contended *that the* identity between Brahman and the *jīva* is only *imagined for the purpose* of contemplation. And it is in meeting this suggestion that Appayya's *case* appears comparatively weak. He points out truly enough that *the consciousness* of identity—what Śrīkaṇṭha calls "perfect-self-consciousness"—persists in release, even when the soul goes about singing as he pleases, "I am the food, I am the food, I am the food, I am the eater of the food, etc." The world, *it is* said, is realised as of one texture with Brahman, not as the body of Brahman. Such *arguments, it must* be confessed, are very interesting and all but conclusive. The difficulty, such as it is, is due to the fact that even an imagined identity is fruitful of certain results, and there seems to be no means of asserting that the very results contemplated may not follow therefrom.

The example usually given of imagined identity is the *Garuḍa-bhāvanā*, wherein *the* magician by contemplation *of* Garuḍa, acquires the distinctive *property of Garuḍa, viz.*, nullifying the effect

of snake-poison. In so far as there is this practical success, the identification, though imagined, must be taken to have been complete. May not the imagined identity of the *jīva* and Brahman have similar practical results? It seems mere dogmatism to deny the possibility of any practical results or of such results as the perception of the world as of one texture with Brahman; for, he who makes the assertion about such matters must claim something of omniscience. But it may be contended that the magician never becomes Garuḍa, the object of his contemplation, while in contemplation of Brahman, the object is to become Brahman. Such a contention would be irrelevant; for the *saguṇa*-Brahmavādin looks forward to the attainment of Īśvaratva, not to becoming Īśvara; and the magician certainly attains *garuḍatva.* It is true he does not become the bird Garuḍa, but the bird is not what he contemplates. He meditates on the presiding deity of the bird, and in so far as he succeeds in nullifying the effect of snake-poison, there is no reason to suppose that he does not become the deity.[1] The *jīva* may be only a part (*aṁśa*), may be external to the Lord, as it were, and yet through contemplation of imagined identity may acquire release, and the powers of the Lord in respect of wisdom and enjoyment. The identity is but partial, but that may well serve for the perfection aimed at, which is also partial.

In saying all this, one need not hold the notion of imagined identity to be intelligible in itself. One may indeed go further and say that identity is capable of being imagined in part only because of the perfect identity of the self with all that is, i.e. with Brahman. To say that the identity contemplated is not between the magician and a bird, but between him and a deity is not to solve the problem, but to make it more mysterious. We do know he does not become the bird, but we do not know and cannot say whether he has or has not become the deity, for, we know little of the deity. There is also the difficulty that while the Śaiva-Siddhānta notion of the self will permit of such imaginary identification, Śrīkaṇṭha's conception offers many difficulties.

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1. See further *Drāviḍa Māpāḍiyam*, p. 315.

According to the former, the soul in itself is pervasive, not atomic. It is also *sat-asat* capable of identifying itself either with the Lord who is *sat* or with the material universe which is *asat*, according as one or the other is contemplated. For Śrīkaṇṭha the soul is atomic; and so far as we know, any such notion as *sat-asat* would have been scouted by him as self-contradictory and unintelligible. That he took those attributes to be contradictory is evident from what he says in the commentary on II, 2, 31 (in discussing Jainism).

It must, however, be confessed that while all this reasoning and much more may have been self-evident to Appayya, there is not sufficient indication to impute the same knowledge to Śrīkaṇṭha. Except as culminating in pure-non-dualism, Śivādvaita may be riddled with inconsistencies, but this of itself is no proof that Śrīkaṇṭha was either aware of or desired that culmination.

Again, though by released souls, the world is perceived *as one with* Brahman, not *as the body of* Brahman, it must be remembered that the very same passage (from the commentary on the *vikārāvarti-sūtra*)[1] goes on to speak of Brahman as the harmony of Śiva and Śakti; and as Śakti is spoken of as the seat of Śiva, the body of Śiva and so on, all reference to the notion of a body cannot be taken to have been excluded. Further, the intelligence of Brahman and the released souls is said to be such as perceives diversity in the universe. In commenting on the *Taittrīya* text "He enjoys all desires along with Brahman, the *vipaścit*",[2] Śrīkaṇṭha explains *vipaścit* to mean "he, whose intelligence perceives diverse kinds of things".[3] The commentator thus seems to postulate a richness and a diversity in the intelligence of Brahman and the released souls, a diversity alien to the contemplation or the realisation of him who knows *nirguṇa*-Brahman.

As for the statements about *niranvaya-upāsakas*, the very word *upāsaka* would seem to be a stumbling-block to Appayya's inter-

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1. IV, iv, 19.
2. *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, II, 1.
3. Commentary on III, ii, 16.

pretation. The word *vidyā* signifies either knowledge or meditation, according to the context. No such variable meaning seems to attach to *upāsanā*. The non-related (*niranvaya*) too would seem to be an object of meditation. Hence, one would be justified in seeking to understand that term in some sense other than *nirguṇa*-Brahman. And such a reference seems not impossible to trace, especially, if we turn to the āgamas for guidance.

The *Sarva-jñānottara-āgama*, is, as its name implies, the culmination of all wisdom. The doctrine expounded herein is taught by Śiva not to other sages as in the rest of the Āgamas, but to his own son, Subrahmaṇya; that is taken to be a mark of the higher grade of the wisdom inculcated. Unlike the main body of Śaiva doctrine, it distinguishes four principles instead of three, Śiva the fourth being other than *Pati* (the Lord), *Paśu* (the bound soul) and *Pāśa* (the bonds). *Pati* is the Lord who engages in the five-fold activity of creation, sustentation, destruction, concealment and the bestowal of grace, in relation to the world. Śiva is unconnected with the world. In the language of advaita, *Pati* is *saguṇa*-Brahman or Īśvara, while Śiva is *niṣprapañca* Brahman. The description of Śiva approximates to that of *nirguṇa*-Brahman, for, He is said to be stainless, (*nirañjanaḥ*, *nirāmayaḥ*), free from colour (class?) and form (*varṇarūpa vivarjitaḥ*) and so on. But He is not to be identified with *nirguṇa*-Brahman, for, there is some positive characterisation too of Śiva, as omniscient (*sarvajñaḥ*), omnipresent (*sarvagaḥ*), peaceful (*śāntaḥ*), the Self of all (*sarvātmā*) and so on. Thus, though He is higher than *Pati*, who is the Being that brings about creation and destruction (*sṛṣṭi-saṃhāra-kārakaḥ*) and is otherwise known as Sadāśiva. He is not identical with the characterless Brahman of the advaitin. And the doctrine propounded cannot be identified with pure advaita either, for, so far as one can judge, this seems to be epecifically mentioned and condemned. "Some, with confused minds" it is said, "declare the doctrine of mere non-difference."[1]

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1. See verse 24 of the *Tripadārtha-paṭala*; and on the whole of this topic, see pp. 3 and 4 of Muthiah Pillai's edition of this Āgama. Some of the negative characterisations are striking in their resemblance to the advaitin's conception of *nirguṇa*-Brahman. Śiva is thus said to be above speech, thought and

The meditation prescribed in this Āgama is that of non-difference (*advaita-bhāvanā*). "He who thinks 'I am the self; Śiva, the Supreme Self is, verily, different' or he who, because of delusion, meditates thus does not attain Śivatva. Abandon the thought of difference, 'Śiva is other than myself'; contemplate (them) always as not two, (but) in the form 'I alone am that which is Śivā"'. We have not, in this particular verse, a dual statement, as in the *Jābāla-śruti*; but what is here said is identical with that part of the *Jābāla* statement—the part, "I am, verily, Thou"—which is significant for pure-non-dualism.[1] Neither the Āgamic nor the Vedānta statement is reconcilable with the conception of the finite and the Supreme Self being related as the body and the embodied.

The conception of Śiva who is unrelated to the creation etc., of the world (*sṛṣṭisaṁhāra-varjitaḥ*), who is to be attained by meditation of perfect identity, would thus seem to have been entertained by a non-advaitic system such as that propounded by the *Sarva-jñānottara*. It may be that the claims of logical consistency or metaphysical intelligibility do not allow one to rest for long in this half-way house, but force one on inevitably to pure-non-dualism. But the traveller may be too tired to go on or may not even realise that his resting place is only a half-way house. In such a case, it is highly speculative to impute either a knowledge or the attainment of a higher goal. It Śrīkaṇṭha is really responsible for the passages about *niranvaya-upāsakās* he need not have meant a reference to any others except the devotees of Śiva, as distinguished from *Pati* or Sadāśiva. The devotees of the latter attain release through the path of the gods; the devotees of Śiva, who is higher than *Pati*, must necessarily have some

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name (*vāṅ-mano-nāma-varjitaḥ*) the 'knowledge that is devoid of characteristic marks (aliṅgam), imperishable (*akṣaram*), above sense-objects (*viṣayātītam*) unattainable (*agocaram*), indubitable (*asamdehyam*), and so on. See *Śivānanya-sākṣātkāra-paṭala*'.

1. Verses 12 and 13 of the *Śivānanya-sākṣātkāra-paṭala*. The Tamil translation published by Mr. P. Muthiah Pillai declares the non-difference from the aspects of both Siva and the self. *śivane nān, nāne śivan*, Śiva alone is myself, I alone am Śiva"; see p. 48 of his edition.

distinct fruit; since the attainment of release is common to both classes of devotees, the distinction can be only in respect of the path. Those who contemplate identity with Śiva have no need to go along the path of the gods. Nor does it require much thought to realise that Śrīkaṇṭha—the pupil of Śvetācārya who taught the harmonious sense of the various Āgamas (*nānāgama-vidhāyin*),—must have been familiar with an Āgama of such importance as the *Sarvajñānottara*.

But the suggestion has to face at least one difficulty with indifferent success. For him who knows *nirguṇa*-Brahman, it may be shown by the sheer weight of logic that departure is neither possible nor necessary; whereas, in the case of the devotee of Śiva, recourse has to be had to conjectural arguments.[1] We thus seem to be reduced to the necessity of choosing between two possibilities, neither of which has clear advantages over the other, in respect of consistency with the position expounded by Śrīkaṇṭha, while one of them, however, has the merit of being in itself more consistent logically. And Appayya has laboured, not without success, to show that this logical self-consistency does not demand failure to harmonise with positions like Śrīkaṇṭha's apparent Viśiṣṭādvaita, that the latter is, indeed, the first step on which one rises to the former, as the second step. But when all this is admitted, one has yet to beware of confounding logical with actual perfection. The vision of the critic may be fuller and more perfect than that of the philosopher who propounded the system; and the fact that the latter has here and there made statements that may possibly bear a deeper significance is not adequate proof of that significance having been intended. Though, as Appayya shows, our author has introduced, at least in one place, a view acceptable to himself, with the words "Some say", it does not

1. The Āgamas do distinguish between release immediately on the dissolution of the physical body, and release which comes only at the close of all the enjoyment that has been earned. The former is the privilege of preceptors (ācāryas), and those purified by the ceremony of *dīkṣā* (dīkṣitas). See particularly *Mokṣa-kārikā*, v. 117. It would thus appear that even on Āgamic basis, and without any thought of *nirguṇa*-Brahman, one may speak of a mode of release, which does not involve departure on the path of the gods.

follow that in every case, the view so introduced is really Śrīkaṇṭha's own. And though Appayya does not demand the latter of us, his arguments demand very little less. For, between the passage about the Self of Bliss being understood as *Cit-śakti*, and the passages about *niranvaya-upāsakas* there is this significant difference: while the identification of *Cit-śakti* and the *ānandamaya* self is explicitly affirmed in the commentary on I, 1, 2, there is no such affirmation in the present case. We have indications scattered throughout the exposition without a doubt, but scattered in such a fashion that one realises their significance only when they are strung together,, as they are by Appayya. When, added to this, there is the explicit condemnation of Advaita along with *Bhedābheda-vāda* in the section II, 3, 42 *et seq*, it seems exceedingly improbable that Śrīkaṇṭha intended pure-non-dualism as the culmination of his system. But it is also evident that such a culmination may be worked up to with the materials derived almost entirely from Śrīkaṇṭha's exposition. To have exhibited this successfully is the great merit of Appayya's work.

A brief mention has to be made of a school of thought which attempts to reverse the relation of the *saguṇa* and the *nirguṇa-vidyā*, as understood by Appayya. Devotion to *saguṇa*-Brahman, it is ordinarily thought, brings about mental purity, firmness, and the capacity to concentrate on *nirguṇa*-Brahman. *Saguṇa-vidyā* is the preparation for *nirguṇa-vidyā*. According to the Śaiva Siddhānta, however, *nirguṇa-vidyā* is a preparation for *saguṇa-vidyā*. The outlook of the average man is materialistic, He identifies himself with the presentations and experiences of the external world; he wrongly imagines himself as enjoying and sorrowing. His knowledge at this stage is called *pāśa-jñāna.* When this stage is passed, and the the Self is realised as free from these extraneous qualities, as different from matter to which alone both enjoyment and suffering belong, we have the *nirguṇa-vidyā*, the knowledge that the self is above and other than what has the guṇas (i.e., matter). With this, however, we have but *paśu-jñāna*, which is not the goal of knowledge. Puruṣa (Spirit) is above and other than the twenty-four principles of matter (*prakṛti-tattva* and subordinate tattvas). But above the Puruṣa

there are other categories, and above them all, there is Śiva. The advaitin does not recognise these categories nor the Supreme Being who is above them. If the materialist erroneously identifies Spirit with matter, the advaitin no less erroneously identifies it with himself, forgetting the possibility of higher truths and reaches of experience. Both views are partial, though the advaitin's view marks a distinct advance in the progress to truth. The materialist identifies Reality with what is seen, the advaitin identifies it with the seer, but above both and including both these is the revealer, but for whom neither would be, He who is neither subject nor object, but in whom subject and object live and move and have their being. This is Śiva, the Supreme Being, the Resplendent Abode of all auspicious qualities, the ever-gracious, ever-merciful Lord, who engages in creation as a sport so that souls may be rid of their beginningless taint of impurity, through the accumlation of merit and demerit and the enjoyment thereof. This knowledge is the *saguṇa-vidyā* of the Siddhānta and the Āgamānta, a knowledge which is not opposed to, but is rather the fulfilment of the Vedānta.

The view thus presented is based on the triple distinction of the revealer, the seer, and what is seen (*darśayitā*, *dṛk*, and *dṛśya*), a distinction at least as old as the *Śiva-jñāna-bodha*.[1] It obtains further support from the distinction between Vedas and Āgamas, (as general and special doctrine), a distinction known at least to Tirumūlar, if not to earlier writers. This distinction of doctrine is analogous in some ways to that between the Old and the New Testament as pointed out by Dr. V. V. Ramaṇa Śāstrin. Umāpati, writing in the beginning of the 14th century, says that the Āgamas are for perfected souls, the Vedās for the rest; the distinction is thus allied to that between *pakva* and *apakvādhikāra*. These suggestions which exhibit the Siddhānta as a fulfilment of the Advaita-Vedānta, have been specially stressed by some present-day writers.[2]

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1. See *Sūtra*, XI.

2. See, in particular, Sentinathier, *Mahā-Ugra-Vīrabhadrāstram*, and *Ambalava-Nāvala-Parāśakti*. Introduction to his edition of Umāpati's *Pauṣkara-bhāṣya*; also Schomerus, pp. 322-325, 332, 387. The first of these erra egregi-

Attractive as such a hypothesis is, to the theist, it has to face insuperable difficulties. For one thing, the *nirguṇa-brahma-vādin* declares the world to be illusory. In passing beyond that stage of knowledge, it is not conceivable that we shall arrive at a stage of knowledge, where the world ceases to be illusory. The perceiving self may possibly be declared to be also illusory from a higher point of view, but from no higher point of view can the partial or defective cease to be *as such* partial or defective. If the Siddhānta is a fulfilment of the Advaita-Vedānta, we may expect to find in the former the doctrine of the illusoriness of the world; but we do not find any such doctrine. The world, it is true, is said to be an evolute not of *Cit-śakti*, but of *māyā-śakti*, but *māyā* does not mean illusion for the siddhāntin, as it does for the advaitin: and though, in release, the world as such *counts* for nothing, it can hardly be said to *be* nothing.

Further, the advaitin maintains that in his concept of *nirguṇa*-Brahman, all distinctions are transcended. It is superior to the differences of the seer and the seen; it is itself seer and seen as also what reveals. It is, therefore, unjustifiable in the first place to identify that Brahman with the seer, the bare subject, and thereupon, in the second place, to seek to re-introduce distinctions already transcended. The attempt is due to a failure to comprehend the *nirguṇa-vidyā*. Āgamānta, thus presented, would seem to fall short of the Advaita Vedānta, which appears to have a legitimate claim to be the fulfilment of the former.

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ously in claiming Appayya as an adherent of this school of thought, in the face of the plain drift of the *Ānanda-laharī*, the *Śivādvaita-Nirṇaya* and repeated statements in the *Śiva-tattvaviveka*, the *Śivārkamaṇidīpikā* and so on, to the effect that reality ultimately is *nirguṇa*. Sentinathier makes short work of all such passages, declaring them to be interpolations, one and all; this method of escape, however, hardly commends itself to the conscientious student of any system.

The following Manuscripts have been utilised in the preparation of this edition:

1. A paper Ms. in Nāgari characters, from the Library at Adyar, No. VIII, E. 24; referred to as "A".

2. A palm leaf Ms. in Malayālam characters also from the same Library, No. XXXIV C 1; referred to as "Mal".

3. A paper Ms. Nāgari characters, from the Oriental Manuscripts Library at Mysore, No. C. 1170; referred to as "My".

4. A Nāgari transcript (No. 454) of a Ms. in Telugu characters (No. 9768), from the Palace Library at Tanjore; referred to as "T".

5. An incomplete paper Ms. in Nāgari script, from the Oriental Manuscripts Library, Egmore; referred to as "O".

The editor takes this opportunity of expressing his grateful thanks to the Hon. Director of the Adyar Library, to the authorities of the University of Mysore, to the Curator, Government Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras, to the Hon. Secretary of the Tanjore Palace Library, and to Prof. P. P. S. Śāstri, Editor of the Descriptive Catalogue of the Tanjore Palace Library. The portion of the work dealing with the discourse between Suvarcalā and Śvetaketu was not clear in any of the Mss. But the discussions and the relevant passages from the *Mahābhārata* are repeated in almost the same words in *Brahmavidyābharaṇam*, pp. 108–109. This proved invaluable in making out a clear and correct text.

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2.321 Connection with bodies does not involve defect, as in the case of the *jīva,* the distinction being made clear by texts from the *antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa,* the *Atharvaśirasi* and the *S'vetāśvatara.*

2.322 Conformity with other texts may not be purchased by sacrificing the truth of any. Texts about the formlessness of Brahman should be understood as comparing Him to what is formless, i.e., *ākāśa.*

2.323 The analogy of the governor of a prison does not hold since suffering is due to control by karma, and not to the intrinsic nature of things.

2.324 The subjects of injunctions and prohibitions are the various individuals connected with their respective bodies; the denotative function of terms like Brāhmin etc., being thus fulfilled, they have no further reference to Īśvara whose immanence is known only from *S'ruti.*

2.325 The text *satyam jñānam,* etc., does not delimit the concept of Brahman to pure intelligence, any more than the words "golden crown" rule out the possibility of its being set with stones. Texts which declare omniscience, omnipotence, etc., have also to be respected as authoritative. These texts are abundant and are further supported by *Upabrāhmaṇas.*

2.326 The non-attachment of defects to Brahman, though immanent in the universe, is shown by *S'ruti* through two illustrations.

2.38 III, 2, 21 *et seq* establishes Brahman's possession of the two-fold characteristics, with special reference to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text, *neti, neti.*

2.331 *Prima facie* view that the negation relates to both the sensible and super-sensible worlds, previously declared to be modes of Brahman.

2.332 Refutation of the above: These modes, being known only from *Śruti*, their declaration would be purportless, if the negation be taken to apply to them in entirety. Hence, the negation is only of the declared this-muchness.

2.333 Conclusion supported by consideration of the succeeding passages of the *Śruti* concerned.

2.3331 Attempt to harmonise the residual sentences with the negation of both the modes.

2.3332 Refutation of the above. Brahman is not an object of perception like the thisness of the rope, whereon snake, garland, etc., are super-imposed.

2.3333 Devout meditation on Brahman which is said to confer equality with Brahman brings about not only knowledge of Him, but also distinctive lordly powers, as in the case of Kṛṣṇa, Agastya, Viśvāmitra, and others. Hence, in view of the text about equality, Brahman's lordship of the world must also be admitted.

2.334 The world may be understood to be of the form of Brahman in other ways than *adhyāsa*.

2.3341 Relation of a substance etc., to its states.

2.3342 Or of a genus to its species.

2.3343 Or of substance to attribute, the soul to the body.

2.34 The texts which deny defects consequent on embodiment would be purportless, if Brahman were not embodied.

2.4 III, 3, 39 shows that the physical attributes of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, are true and eternal, not fictitious and impermanent.

2.41 *Prima facie* view that the only form of Śiva is that of Bliss.

2.42 The siddhānta that the physical form and other attributes are true because of purportful repetition by *Śruti.*

2.421 Objection: repetition in different *śākhās* cannot serve as a mark of significance.

2.422 Reply: since *guṇopasaṁhāra* secures contemplation of all qualities wherever mentioned, their repetition even in different śākhās cannot but be purportful.

2.43 Texts declaring absence of qualities indicate absence only of undesirable qualities.

2.5 III, 3, 40 shows that Brahman *saguṇa, saprapañca,* etc., and that there is no higher *nirguṇa* Brahman.

2.51 *Prima facie* view based on texts like *brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati.*

2.52 Refutation of the above: qualities are declared of the faultless one who attains equality with Brahman; hence, negation can apply only to objectionable qualities. And *eva* in *brahmaiva bhavati* must be iaken to mean *iva.*

2.6 The view that departure on the *arcirādimārga* is unnecessary for *niranvayopāsakas,* being introduced by the words "Some say", does not represent Śrīkaṇṭha's own final position.

2.7 The identity with the Supreme indicated in the *sāstradṛṣṭi-sūtra* (II, 1, 31) is but imagined, as that between Garuḍa and him who incants the Garuḍa spell.

2.81 Difficulties due to statements in I, 1, 2 and II, 1, 15 about Brahman being the object of perception in *san ghaṭaḥ*, etc. The relationship implied can only be super-imposition.

2.811 Support for the above view from the interpretation of the *yadā tama* hymn in I, 2, 9 *et seq.*

2.812 Further support for that view in declarations as to finite intelligence and happiness being fragments of Brahman's Intelligence and Bliss.

2.82 Refutation of the above view: Brahman is not the object of perception—III, 2, 22. The statements in I, 1, 2 and II, 1, 15, relate to the attributive aspect of Brahman, i.e., *Cit-śakti.*

2.821 Objection: IV, 4, 10 *et seq* declares the bliss of the liberated one to be the unlimited Bliss of Brahman, not a mere fragment thereof. This is not consistent with difference between Brahman and the *jīva.*

2.822 Reply: There is no inconsistency since *Cit-śakti* which is the Supreme Energy and Transcendent Bliss of Śiva is of the form of the entire world, intelligent and non-intelligent, and is non-different therefrom.

2.823 The view of identity between Brahman and the *jīva* has been explicitly refuted in II, 3, 42 *et seq.*

3.1 Statement of the Siddhānta: Pure non-dualism is Śrīkaṇṭha's final view.

3.11 Support for the above from the *aniyama* section (III, 3, 31).

3.12 Further support from IV, 2, 8 *et seq.*

3.121 Perliminary view in that section—that for the enlightened one there is no departure. Texts about departure &c., relate to those knowers of Brahman, who seek liberation by degrees.

3.122 Refutation of that view: the attainment even of the ever-present Brahman can come about only by stages; nor is there any difficulty in respect of this going, since a subtle body continues to exist. The text *na tasya prāṇā utkrāmanti* really means *na tasmāt*, etc.

3.1221 Objection: the ground of departure is the body, not the finite self, as implied in *na tasmāt*, etc.

3.1222 The finite self, not the body, is mentioned as related to *prāṇa*; if a ground of departure has to be understood, the former is preferable. The interpretation is supported by the Mādhyandina reading.

3.123 But rising and departure do not apply to those who know Brahman without attributes.

3.124 The text *na tasya prāṇā*, etc., is intended to state some special feature of the enlightened soul and is hence inconsistent with rising and departure from the body, which hold of the unenlightened. Nor do principles of interpretation demand a different sense, the sense being determined by the *upakrama*, as in the story of Prajāpati's gift of horses.

3.125 The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text IV, 4, 6, also supports this view. Attainment (*apyeti*) does not necessarily imply distinction, since it means identification like the word *gamaya* in *tamaso mā jyotir gamaya*, etc.

3.126 The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text IV, 4, 7 also supports this view.

3.127 The Mādhyandina text should be interpreted in the light of the Kāṇva, not *vice versa*; for, non-departure of the vital airs is made clear by the words "they remain even here" uttered in reply to Ārtabhāga's question.

3.1271 Objection: Ārtabhāga's third question relates to the unenlightened one, as seen from his fourth and fifth questions.

3.1272 Reply: Mere proximity of questions relating to the *avidvān* cannot counter-act the clear indication of characteristic marks pertaining to the *vidvān*. Nor is there unity of context, as seen from the diversity and indirectness of the questions, which were designed to perplex and humble Yājñavalkya.

3.13 Support for the view of Pure non-dualism from IV, 3, 1.

3.131 The *prima facie* view of that section set out.

3.132 The conclusion of that section: the path of light etc., applies to all modes of meditation.

3.133 The paths described in the various vidyās are identical.

3.134 The *sāman* verses lead up to Brahman, as accessories to meditation, not as constituting a path.

8.135 The text "by the very same rays he goes up (*Ch.*, VIII, 6, 5)" does not exclude other stages of the path.

3.136 Nor does the *tvarā vacana* (*Ch.*, VIII, 6, 5) exclude earlier stages on the path.

3.137 *But* the path of light is not for *niranvayopāsakas*.

3.138 Even views acceptable to the *bhāṣyakāra* are introduced with the words "Some say" as in I, I 13 *et seq.*

3.14 I, 1, 29 *et seq* accepts non-difference in meditation, between Brahman and the *jīva.*

3.15 IV, 1, 3 also establishes that non-difference.

3.151 *Prima facie* view in the above section.

3.152 Final view.

3.153 The two-fold statement of the *Jābāla-śruti* that is cited here *tvam vā ahamasmi, aham vai tvamasi* cannot be justified except on the basis of identity. So also of the *Aitareya* text *yosau so'ham* etc.

3.154 Interpretation of *tat tvam asi* compatible only with identity, not the *śarīra-śarīri-bhāva.*

3.155 Nor is the non-difference barely imagined as seen from I, 1, 31; IV, 1, 3; and IV, 4, 19. The consciousness of identity persists even when the soul in release sings as he pleases *ahamannam, ahamannam* etc.

3.16 The commentary on I, 4, 6 shows indirectly that non-difference is acceptable to the *bhāṣyakāra.* The Sāṁkhya cannot claim that *Kaṭha,* III, 15 declares of the unevolved that it is to be known, since that verse relates to *Prājña* as seen from *Kaṭha,* III, 13. But *Prājña* in *Kaṭha,* III, 13 refers to the *jīva*; and its citation would be inappropriate except on the basis of identity of the *jīva* and Parameśvara.

3.161 Objection: even on the hypothesis of identity there is a recognition of distinction of topics as relating to the finite or the Absolute. Hence, the reference to the *jīva,* in any case, is inappropriate.

3.162 Reply: *Śruti* has examples of a reply being given about Brahman, when the question is about the *jīva,* e.g., Yama's answer to the third question of Naciketas, which certainly relates to the departed

jīva. It is equally certain that the reply relates to Brahman. There would be lack of congruity between question and answer, but for the non-difference of Brahman and the *jīva*.

3.1621 Objection: the question does not relate to the finite self, since Naciketas has already faith in its existence. Even on the basis non-difference, the reply should not go beyond the terms of the question. In truth, the question relates to the released souls, that being the sense of *preta*.

3.1622 The difficulty about a question being barred by prior knowledge applies even to the released souls, of whose existence and nature Naciketas has knowledge, as seen from his question about the fires. If partial knowledge alone be admitted, that may hold in the case of the *mṛta-jīva* too. The reply goes beyond the question on either interpretation of *preta*.

3.17 The commentary on I, 1, 1 rests on non-difference, it being said that in view of the many apparent differences between the two, their identity is a matter for legitimate inquiry, but not to be discredited.

3.18 The *jīva* is admitted to be non-different from *Cit-śakti* and *Cit-śakti* to be non-different from Brahman.

3.181 Objection: *Cit-śakti* is non-different even from the inert world, but Brahman is not non-different from the latter. Hence, non-difference from *Cit-śakti* can establish not pure, but only qualified non-dualism. Further, Brahman's non-difference from *Cit-śakti* is only figurative, the two being really different, as support and what is supported, adobe and what abides, etc.

3.182 Reply: The doctrine of attributeless Brahman is not opposed to the doctrine of transformation. The latter is helpful to the doctrine of illusion, as is seen from the *Śāṅkara-bhāṣya* and also the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*. Śrīkaṇṭha too makes judgments like *san ghaṭaḥ* rest on the reality not of the world, but of Brahman.

3.183 Further, the non-difference of *Cit-śakti* from Brahman is declared in many places, e.g., I, 1, 23; I, 3, 16; I, 2, 1; III, 3, 11–14.

3.1831 *Prima facie* view in III, 3, 14, that the sheaths of *anna*, *prāṇa* etc., should in all cases be contemplated.

3.1832 Refutation: their contemplation serves no purpose; they are mentioned only to indicate Brahman's superiority to all else.

3.1833 The sheaths of food etc., are not to the thought of as the cave wherein Brahman is present, because each of them is spoken of as a self; and no other self but Śiva is to be contemplated for release.

3.18331 Objection: the exclusion enjoined in "abandoning all else" applies to Umā also, the expression "self" in the "Self of Bliss" being common to the selves of food etc., as well.

3.18332 Reply: the Self of Bliss is the Supreme Self, the expression being used in that sense elsewhere even in the *Ānanda-Vallī*, in the statement "From the Self, ether originates."

3.18333 Further Objection: *Cit-śakti* being identical with the entire world—*cetana* and *acetana*—, the other intelligent beings, like Brahmā and others are also non-different from Brahman, and should be so contemplated.

3.18334 Reply: not so, since then the exclusion enjoined by *Śruti* would have no application at all, its logical reference being to such intelligent beings as are mentioned in the context, viz., Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, and Indra.

3.18335 Objection: the Self of Bliss is Śiva, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, not *Cit-śakti*. Reply: that Self is *Cit-śakti*, according to the second of the interpretations given; and that this is the one acceptable to him appears from I, 1, 2. Further, the former identity being evident from the first chapter, there is no need to reiterate it in Chapter III.

3.1834 Non-difference of *Cit-śakti* and Śiva is established in I, 3, 12. *Prima facie* view that the world led up to by the *Sāman* verses is *Viṣṇu-loka*, and that the person seen is Viṣṇu.

3.1835 Refutation of the *prima facie* view: between Viṣṇu and Śiva, there is a difference not of substance, but of state.

3.18351 Objection: the refutation goes beyond the doubt which is about the worlds of Viṣṇu and Śiva. Further, Viṣṇu is directly identical not with Śiva but with *Cit-śakti*, being a mode thereof.

3.18352 Re-interpretation of the commentary: the "supreme abode of Viṣṇu" is *Śiva-Cit-śakti*, and it is the identity of this with Śiva that is asserted.

3.18353 Another interpretation: expressions like "the supreme abode of Viṣṇu etc.," refer to Śiva, proceeding on the basis of non-difference between Viṣṇu and Śiva. Even thus, non-difference of *Cit-śakti* from Śiva is secured.

3.184 *Cit-śakti* as non-different from Brahman recognised by the *Saṁkṣepa-śārīraka* and *Pañcapādikā*.

3.185 Justification of the treatment of them as different in the *dahara-vidyā*, *Gārgībrāhmaṇa* etc., also of the statement in I, 1, 2 as to the Self of Bliss being figuratively spoken of as Brahman.

3.19 The above arguments indicate the conclusion that for Śrīkaṇṭha, Brahman is *nirguṇam*, *nirūpam*, *niṣprapañcam*, etc.

3.191 There is not in Śrīkaṇṭha's system anything analogous to the *viśeṣa* of the Madhvas; nor would such a principle help, for, if it did the work of Difference, it would be Difference itself, and Difference is unacceptable to Śrīkaṇṭha.

3.192 From non-difference follows the illusory nature of the non-intelligent world.

3.1921 Nor is empirical difference irreconcilable with this doctrine of illusory manifestation.

3.1922 Nor does it follow that the *cetana-prapañca* is also *vivarta*, as, then, there would be no experience of release.

3.1923 The statement in section I, 4, 23 *et seq* that *Cit-śakti* transforms itself into beings intelligent and non-intelligent signifies not that intelligent beings are not eternal, but that there is transformation for them in the way of contraction and expansion of knowledge and happiness.

3.2 Reason for a fresh commentary though subscribing to pure non-dualism: intuition of the non-specific Brahman can be gained only through concentrated meditation; and concentration is gained by the Grace of God, through worship.

3.21 Objection: inculcation of devotion and worship does not justify condemnation of the Supreme truth. Reply: such condemnation is justifiable

as seen from the procedure of sages like Āpastaṃba.

3.211 Āpastaṃba's condemnation of *sannyāsa* in the *Kalpa-sūtras*.

3.212 Untenability of Āpastaṃba's condemnation in the light of his own statements. Object of that condemnation is to secure dull-witted people in the practice of house-hold virtues, so that they may thereby acquire the strength of mind necessary for renunciation.

3.213 Similar condemnation inspired by a like purpose in Chapter XVIII of the *S'ānti-parva.*

3.214 Condemnation of early renunciation in the *Manu-smṛti* should be similarly explained.

3.215 Śrīkaṇṭha's *saguṇa* interpretation of Vedānta texts and the concealment of their *nirguṇa* bearing are conceived in the like spirit. His interpretation has the merit of not going against the truth, but expounding an intermediate aspect of the final truth.

3.22 Objection: if Śrīkaṇṭha acknowledged *nirguṇa*-Brahman, he should have recognised that alone to be the purport of the *sūtras*, as shown by Śaṅkara. Reply: Śaṅkara himself has shown the existence of a reference in the *sūtras* to *saguṇa* Brahman, e.g., in sūtras 1, 2, 3, 4, 10 and 11 of Chapter I, pāda 1, and also in the introduction to I, 1, 12: Ś. So also in the rest of the sūtras, synthesis is exhibited of some with *nirguṇa* and some others with *saguṇa* Brahman.

3.23 Objection: if Śaṅkara too has exhibited the *saguṇa* bearing of the Sūtras, where was the necessity for Śrīkaṇṭha's commentary? Reply: the fresh

commentary goes further than Śaṅkara's in determining the form and nature of *saguṇa*-Brahman.

3.231 Śaṅkara himself gives clear indications of his own view that *saguṇa*-Brahman is Śiva, a being other than Viṣṇu (I, 3, 14: Ś).

3.232 Or Saṁhāra Rudra (III, 3, 32: Ś).

3.233 Vācaspati Miśra who knew what the Bhagavatpāda had at heart, identified *saguṇa*-Brahman with Śiva, in his preliminary invocation.

3.234 All such indications are far too subtle for the average devotee. The specific nature of *saguṇa*-Brahman should be determined by examining and discounting references to deities other than Śiva; this is what Śrīkaṇṭha does.

3.235 Objection: the need for a fresh commentary shows Śaṅkara's discussion of the *saguṇa* interpretation to have been in vain. Reply: not so, for these implications had neccessarily to be recognised in demonstrating that *Śruti* references were to Brahman, not to the finite self or *pradhāna*, and in exhibiting the nature of the fruit of Brahman-knowledge. This fruit is the attainment of the nature of Īśvara i.e., *saguṇa* Brahman.

3.2351 That Śaṅkara holds release to be of the above nature, until the final liberation of all, is seen from I, 3, 19: Ś;

3.2352 I, 4, 16;

3.2353 II, 3, 43, *et seq*: Ś;

3.2354 III, 2, 3, Ś;

3.2355 IV, 4, 7: Ś.

3.2356 Objection: if the enquiry into *saguṇa* implications is necessarily involved in the other inquiry, why

promise it, as it were, by framing the definition of Brahman in I, 1, 2: Ś, so as to apply to both forms? Reply: the object of the promissory statement is to show that there is a *saguṇa* interpretation for the sūtras, in their entirety. This is indicated clearly in I, 1, 3: Ś alone, on the *sthālīpulāka-nyāya*, a principle followed by the author of the *Kalpataru* in commenting on IV, 1, 16: Ś.

3.241 Objection: Śrīkaṇṭha for his *saguṇa* interpretation relies not only on the *saguṇa* contexts, but draws on *nirguṇa* contexts also, making it appear that the *nirguṇa* doctrine has no basis at all. Hence, his commentary is opposed to the doctrine of *nirguṇa* Brahman.

3.242 Reply: even Śaṅkara has to speak of Brahman's characteristic marks in establishing his doctrine of the characterless Brahman. The texts about the latter have an intermediate reference to the former.

3.2421 Objection: but Śrīkaṇṭha twists even *nirguṇa* texts with much effort, to suit his doctrines.

3.24211 Interpretations of the *vācārambhaṇa-śruti*—first interpretation.

3.24212 The same—second interpretation.

3.24213 Doctrine of difference expounded in III, 2, 11 *et seq.*, and also in I, 3, 44; II, 1, 22; and III, 4, 8.

3.24214 Declarations of non-difference are explained as referring to non-otherness, as between the pervader and the pervaded.

3.24221 Explanation of the above as not inconsistent with pure non-dualism. II, 1, 22 implies that the bonds of agency etc., are illusory. II, 1, 23 only removes the erroneous notion engendered by

II, 1, 15 that even the inert world is non-different from Brahman. 1, 3, 43 and 44 refer to the superiority of Brahman, not to His difference from the finite self.

3.24222 The interpretation set out in II, 3, 42 *et seq* favouring difference is negatived by the interpretation favouring non-difference in IV, 1, 3.

3.242221 Objection: such negation, being self-contradictory, is inconceivable. Non-difference must be only imagined for purposes of meditation.

3.242222 Reply: the interpretation offered in II, 3, 42, *et seq* is opposed to the *Jābāla-śruti* cited in IV, 1, 3, to the drift of the commentary on IV, 1, 3, and to the commentary on III, 3, 14. Nor can both interpretations be accepted, they being contradictory.

3.242223 Non-difference is not merely imagined; the exeperience thereof persists even in release, as shown by the commentary on IV, 4, 19.

3.242224 Objection: the notion of the relationship of body and the embodied is of no value either in the knowledge of *nirguṇa*-Brahman or in meditation on *saguṇa*-Brahman. Why then should it have been propounded?

3.242225 Reply: that notion is for those of least capacity who are qualified only for the *dāsa-mārga*.

3.242223 The interpretation of the *vācārambhaṇa-śruti* serves only to strengthen faith in *saguṇa*-Brahman. Further, the *aśmādi-sūtra* (II, 1, 23) makes it clear that in the view of the commentator, the inert world is not non-different from Brahman, and that, consequently, it is to be understood as fictitiously imposed on Brahman.

·4 *Vivarta-vāda* is the view of the *sūtrakāra* too, as seen from *Suvarcalā-Śvetaketu-Upākhyāna* in the *Mokṣa-dharma-parva* of the *Mahābhārata*.

·4.1 Support for the above view from another context in the *Mokṣa-dharma* and the *Viṣṇu-purāṇa*.

·5 The qualified-non-dualism of others is not susceptible of being interpreted as favourable to pure non-dualism. Śrīkaṇṭha alone has provided a commentary suitable to all three grades of capacity.

॥ श्रीरस्तु ॥

शिवाद्वैतनिर्णयः

अप्पय्यदीक्षितकृतः

॥ ओम् ॥

श्रीकण्ठशिवाचार्याः
सिद्धान्तं [1]निजगदुः शिवाद्वैतम् ।
तत्किं विशिष्टमभि[2]हित-
मविशिष्टं वेति चिन्तयामोऽत्र ॥

आरम्भणाधिकरणादिभाष्यगतैः विशिष्टाद्वैतादिव्यवहारैराद्यपक्षोऽभिमत इति, अनियमाधिकरणादिभाष्यगतैः निरन्वयोपासकानामिहैव मुक्तिरित्यादिव्यवहारैः द्वितीयपक्षोऽभिमतः इति च प्रतीयते । न च द्वावपि पक्षौ परम[3]-सिद्धान्तमर्हत इति अनयोरेकः परमसिद्धान्तो निर्णेतव्यः । तदर्थमिह विचारः क्रियते ।

इदमिह तावत् प्रतिभाति । आचार्यैः ब्रह्ममीमांसाभाष्ये यत्र 2
यत्र शिवाद्वैतं निरूपितमनूदितं वा तत्र सर्वत्र विशिष्टाद्वैतमित्येव व्यवहारो दृश्यते ।

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1. जगदुः (T. My.) 2. अभिमत (T.)
3. सिद्धान्तमावम (T.) सिद्धान्तमावं भजते (My.)

2.1 यथा तावदारम्भणाधिकरणे "ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोर्न वयमत्यन्तभेदवादिनो घटपटयोरिव तदनन्यत्वपरश्रुतिविरोधात्। न चात्यन्ताभेदवादिनः। न वा शुक्तिरजतयोरिवैकतरमिथ्यात्ववादिनः, तत्स्वाभाविकगुणभेदपरश्रुतिविरोधात्। न च भेदाभेदवादिनः, वस्तुविरोधात्। किं तु शरीरशरीरिणोरिव गुणगुणिनोरिव च विशिष्टाद्वैतवादिनः" इति। तथा च भोक्त्रापत्त्यधिकरणे "यदुक्तम् पूर्वत्र चिदचित्प्रपञ्चविशिष्टः शिव एवाद्वितीयः कार्यं कारणं च भवति इति विशिष्टशिवाद्वैतम्" इति।

2.21 शुद्धाद्वैतं तु ईक्षत्यधिकरणे शङ्कोत्तराभ्यां निराकृतम्। "ननु 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्, एकमेवाद्वितीयम्' इत्यादिना सद्रूपं वस्तु निर्विशेषमेवावधारणादवगम्यते। कारणावस्थमेतत्कथं सूक्ष्मप्रपञ्चविशिष्टमित्युच्यते" इति [1]शङ्काग्रन्थः। "सदेवेत्यवधारणेन न विशेषनिषेधः, किं तु असत्कारणत्वनिषेधः, 'असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत्। ततो वै सदजायत' इति श्रवणादसत्कारणत्वस्य भ्रान्तिप्रसक्तिसत्वात्। किञ्च 'सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्' इत्यत्र कथं निर्विशेषत्वं ब्रह्मणः? 'आसीत्' इति हि क्रियाविशेषः, 'अग्र' इति कालविशेषः, 'एकमेव' इत्यवधारणमधिष्ठात्रन्तरनिषेधपरम्', 'अद्वितीयम्' इति जगदुपादानत्वमुच्यते। अत एव सर्वज्ञमनन्तशक्तिविशिष्टं च; कथं सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तित्वविशेषमन्तरेण जगदुभयकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणो भवति?" इति परिहारग्रन्थः।

2.22 सद्ब्रह्मपदशक्तिपर्यालोचनयापि विशिष्टाद्वैतं तत्रैवाधिकरणे समर्थितम्। "प्रकृतिप्रत्ययात्मकस्य सत्पदस्य नैकवस्तुपरत्वं युक्तम्, प्रकृत्या प्रत्ययेन च तस्य वस्तुद्वयप्रतिपादनपरत्वात्। तथा अभियुक्तसूक्तिः—

शक्तिः शिवश्च सच्छब्दप्रकृतिप्रत्ययोदितौ।
तौ ब्रह्मसामरस्येन समस्तजगदात्मकौ॥

इति। स्थूलसूक्ष्मचिदचित्प्रपञ्चरूपशक्तिविशिष्टः परमेश्वर एव कार्यकारणरूपः सत्पदविषय इति।" अत्र ब्रह्मेत्येकवचनम्—शक्तिशिवयोः प्रत्येकं न शक्यता,

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1. इति तत्र (T.)

किं तु शक्तिविशिष्टशिव एव—इति ज्ञापनार्थम् । यथा "व्यक्त्याकृतिजातयः पदार्थः" इति न्यायसूत्रे—व्यक्त्याकृतिजातीनां न प्रत्येकम्, जात्याकृतिविशिष्टव्यक्तिरूपेण—इति ज्ञापनार्थमेकवचनम् । समस्तजगदात्मकाविति विशेषणं तु सद्ब्रह्मशब्दयोः शक्तिविशिष्टशिववाचकत्वमात्रेण न विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धिः तटस्थस्य वियदादिप्रपञ्चस्य सद्भावादिति शङ्कानिराकरणाय तस्य शक्त्यंशतया शक्तिशिवाभ्यामपृथक्सिद्धिप्रदर्शनार्थम् । तदेतत्स्थूलसूक्ष्मेत्याद्यग्रिमभाष्येण स्पष्टीकृतम् । तत्र सत्पदस्य दर्शितोऽर्थः समान एव ब्रह्मपदस्यापि ; प्रस्तुतत्वासत्पदार्थनिर्णयस्य तन्मात्रग्रहणम् ।

अत एव भूमाधिकरणे सह भूमशब्देन ब्रह्मशब्दस्यार्थे सर्वप्रपञ्चस्यान्तर्भावो दर्शितः । तत्र हि "यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्यद्विजानाति स भूमा" इति भूमलक्षणवाक्येन कथं भूम्न्यनुभूयमानेऽन्यस्य दर्शनाद्यभाव उच्यते, प्रपञ्चस्य सतो दर्शनादीनां परिहर्तुमशक्यादितीमामाशङ्काम् "प्रपञ्चे सत्येव कथं मुक्तात्मनामपुरुषार्थस्य तस्य दर्शनं परिह्रियते" इति वाक्येनोद्भाव्य प्रपञ्चस्य सत्यत्वेऽपि तस्य भूमशब्दार्थान्तर्भूततयैव दर्शनगोचरता भवति न तदन्यतयेति समर्थनेन च तत्परिहारो दर्शितः—"न हि मुक्तानां प्राकृतप्रपञ्चो दर्शनविषयः किं तु निरतिशयानन्दस्वरूपं ब्रह्मैव प्रपञ्चाकारेण दर्शनगोचरो भवति" इति । तदनन्तरं भूमशब्दसमानार्थब्रह्मशब्दार्थान्तर्भावेनैव प्रपञ्चस्य मुक्तं प्रति दर्शनविषयता भवतीति प्रतिपादयन्ती श्रुतिस्तत्र संमतित्वेनोदाहृता । "तथा हि श्रुतिः 'एतत्ततो भवति आकाशशरीरं ब्रह्म'" इति; एतत् परिदृश्यमानं प्रपञ्चजालं मुक्तं प्रति ततो मुक्त्यनन्तरं परमाकाशरूपशक्तिविशिष्टं ब्रह्म भवति ; तथाभूतब्रह्मात्मनैव दर्शनगोचरो भवति । अयमर्थः पूर्वप्रकृतोपन्यासपूर्वकमुत्तरभाष्येण दर्शितः, "'आप्नोति स्वाराज्यम् । आप्नोति मनसस्पतिम्' इत्यादिना मुक्तात्मना प्रस्तुतः । तस्य 'वाक्पतिः' इत्यादिना स्वाधीनाप्राकृतविशुद्धवागिन्द्रियादिसंबन्ध उक्तः । तस्य पुनस्तद्दशावस्थाप्राप्त्यनन्तरं एतत् दृश्यमानं प्राकृतप्रपञ्चजालं आकाशशरीरं ब्रह्मैव भवतीति तात्पर्यरहस्यार्थः" इति । 2.221

चतुर्थाध्यायेऽपि "भावे जाग्रद्वत्" इति सूत्रभाष्ये "ननु मुक्तस्य यदि प्राकृतवस्तुदर्शित्वरूपभोक्तृत्वं तदा तस्यापुरुषार्थप्रपञ्चदर्शिनो न संसारदुःखानुषङ्गाभावसिद्धिरिति चेन्न, मुक्तस्यापुरुषार्थरूपेण प्रपञ्चदर्शनाभावात् । 2.222

मुखेन ब्रह्माकारं हि दृश्यते विश्वमेतत्" इति शङ्कोत्तराभ्याम्, तदनन्तरम् "तथा हि श्रूयते—" इत्यारभ्य "एतत् ततो भवति" इत्यादिश्रुत्युदाहरणेन तद्व्याख्यानेन चायमर्थः प्रपञ्चितः। सदादिशब्दानां शक्तिविशिष्टशिववाचकत्वमात्रेण कथं विशिष्टाद्वैतसिद्धिः, तटस्थस्य प्रपञ्चस्य सद्भावात्—इति [1]शङ्कायां परिहारः "समस्तजगदात्मकौ" इति संमति[2]श्लोकेन सूचितः। समस्तस्य जगतः शक्ति[3]परिणामत्वसमर्थनेन प्रकृत्यधिकरणादिषु कृतेन स्पष्टीकृतः। एवं विशिष्टाद्वैत एव सर्वत्र प्रतिपाद्यमाने कः प्रसङ्गः शुद्धाद्वैताङ्गीकारशङ्कायाः?

2.3 किञ्च निर्दोष[4]कल्याणविशिष्टं सप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपम्, न तु निर्विशेषं इति [5]व्यवस्थापनार्थतयैव "न स्थानतोऽपि" (ब्र. ३. २. ११) इत्याद्यधिकरणद्वयं प्रवर्तितम्। तत्रैवमाद्यमधिकरणम्। ब्रह्म निर्विशेषं सविशेषं वेति प्रथमः संशयः। तदर्थम् "यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्" इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रतिपन्नं ब्रह्मणः पृथिव्याद्यवस्थानतच्छरीरत्वतन्नियन्तृत्वादिकमतात्त्विकं तात्त्विकं वेति संशयः। तदर्थं तस्य तात्त्विकत्वे ब्रह्मणः तत्प्रयुक्तदोषाः प्रसज्येरन् न वा इति संशयः।

2.31 एवं सति पूर्वः पक्षः। ब्रह्मणः वस्तुतः पृथिव्याद्यवस्थानतच्छरीरत्वादिसद्भावे यथा जीवस्य जागरस्वापनसुषुप्तिमूर्च्छामरणावस्थासु सूक्ष्मस्थूलशरीरावस्थितिनिबन्धना दोषाः तथा ब्रह्मणोऽपि स्युः शरीरावस्थितेरविशेषात्, "देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि" (ब्र. ३. २. ५) इति सूत्रे संसारदोषाणां शरीरसंबन्धनिबन्धनत्वस्योक्तत्वात्, मलमूत्रमांसपूयशोणितादिकर्दमितेषु शरीरेषु रौरवादिष्विव [6]अवस्थानस्य अतिहेयतायाः सर्वैरङ्गीकार्यत्वाच्च।

2.311 न च यथा राज्ञो विषये वसतां राजाज्ञया सुखदुःखभाक्त्वमस्तीति तस्मिन् सतोऽपि राज्ञो न तद्भवति, एवमिहापि स्यात् इति वाच्यम्। न हि राजविषयवासमात्रं राजाज्ञानुवृत्तिप्रयुक्तदुःखभाक्त्वे निमित्तम्, किं तु राजाज्ञाविषयत्वविशेषितम्। राजा हि न राजाज्ञाविषयः। अतो युक्तं राज्ञः स्वविषय-

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1. शङ्कया (T ; My)
2. श्लोकवाक्येन (T ; My)
3. परिणामवत्त्व (T)
4. कल्याणगुण (T ; My)
5. व्यवस्थापनार्थं तयैव (My)
6. अवस्थानस्यातिहेयतया सर्वैः (T)

वासित्वेऽपि स्वाज्ञानुवृत्तियुक्तदुःखास्पृष्टत्वम् । शरीरप्रयुक्तदुःखभाक्त्वे तु शरीरे वासमात्रं निमित्तम् । अतो यथा पूतिगन्धादियुक्तकारागृहप्रयुक्तदुःखभाक्त्वे कारागृहावस्थितिमात्रं निमित्तमिति तत्कारागृहे निक्षिप्तस्येव स्वेच्छया तन्नियन्तृत्वेन तत्रावस्थितस्यापि भवति, एवं देहप्रयुक्तदुःखं इह बद्धस्येव तत्र तन्नियन्तृतया-स्थितस्यापि भवेदेव ।

न च दुःखस्य कर्माधीनत्वात् सत्यपि ब्रह्मणः शरीरे निवासे कर्म- 2.312
रहितस्य तस्य शरीरवासप्रयुक्त दुःखं न भवेदिति वाच्यम् । कर्माण्यपि हि दुःखविशेषानुगुणदेवमनुष्यपशु[1]पक्षिशरीरमापाद्य तदनुप्रविष्टं जीवं दुःखं भोजयन्ति । ईश्वरस्य विनापि तत्तत्कर्मभिः तेन तेन शरीरेण शरीरित्वं स्यात् तदा कर्माभावोपन्यासेन किं [2]समाहितं भवेत् ? न खलु राजापराधेन कारागृहे निबद्धस्य भवत् तद्गतदुर्गन्धादिप्रयुक्तं दुःखम् नियन्तृतया कारागृहमनुप्रविष्टस्य अधिकारिपुरुषस्य राजापराधाभावमात्रेण न भवतीति वक्तुं शक्यम् ।

किञ्च ब्रह्मणः सर्वशरीरकत्वे विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्राह्मणादिशब्द- 2.313
विषयत्वस्यापि अवर्जनीयतया तस्य विधिनिषेधोल्लङ्घनप्रयुक्तपापावश्यंभावेन कर्म-वश्यतयापि दुःखभाक्त्वं स्यादेव । अपहतपाप्मत्वादिश्रुतेः ब्रह्मणः कर्मवश्यता न प्रसज्यत इति चेत्, किं सा श्रुतिः ब्रह्मणः सर्वशरीरकत्वस्य तात्त्विकत्वाभ्युपगमे ततः समापतत् तस्य विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्राह्मणादिशब्दविषयत्वं कर्मवश्यतापादकं निरोद्धुमीष्टे ? अतः तात्पर्यवद्विधिनिषेधवाक्यविरोधात् सा श्रुतिः प्रशंसार्थं अर्थ-वादमात्रं स्यादिति तत्प्रामाण्यमिच्छता तन्निर्वाहार्थमपि पृथिव्याद्यवस्थानतच्छरीर-त्वादिकं अतात्त्विकम् अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणवाक्यादिभिः प्रशंसार्थं कल्पितमित्येव समर्थनीयम् । एवं सति "अस्थूलमनणु अह्रस्वमदीर्घम्" इत्यादि ब्राह्मण-वाक्यानाम् "ततो यदुत्तरतरं तदरूपमनामयम्" इति शरीरराहित्येनैव निर्दोषत्वं प्रतिपादयतः श्वेताश्वतरमन्त्रस्य च सामञ्जस्यं संभवति । तस्मात् ब्रह्मणः पृथि-व्याद्यवस्थानतच्छरीरकत्वतन्नियन्तृत्वतन्नियमनोपयोगिसर्वज्ञत्वसर्वशक्तिकत्वादिकं — सर्वं कल्पितमिति । अथ निर्विशेषं ; "सत्यं ज्ञानम्" इति श्रुतेश्चिन्मात्ररूपा-मेवाभ्युपगन्तव्यमिति ।

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1. पक्षिसरीसृपादिशरीरसंबन्धमापाद्य (T)   2. समीहितम् (T)

2.32 अत्र सिद्धान्तः—स्वतो निर्दोषस्य ब्रह्मणः पृथिव्याद्यवस्थानतोऽपि दोषाः न प्रसज्यन्ते। सर्वत्र हि श्रुतिषु स्मृतिषु च "एष आत्मा अपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युः विशोको विजिघत्सो विपिपासः सत्यकामः सत्यसङ्कल्पः,"

अनादिमलसंश्लेषप्रागभावात्स्वभावतः।
अत्यन्तपरिशुद्धात्मा शिव इत्यभिधीयते॥

अस्ति कश्चिदपर्यन्तरमणीयगुणाश्रयः।
सर्वलोकस्य निर्माता पशुपाशविलक्षणः॥

इत्येवमाद्यासु निरस्तसमस्तदोषकलङ्कं निरतिशयमङ्गलगुणास्पदं चेत्येवमुभयलिङ्गं ब्रह्म प्रसिद्धम्। अतः शरीरसंबन्धेन प्रसज्जतां पाप्मजरामरणशोकादिदोषाणामभावस्य तत्तद्दोषपरिपन्थिसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादिगुणजातस्य च श्रवणात् न दोषापादनमिह प्रभवति।

2.321 तथापि जीववत् स्वतोऽपहतपाप्मत्वादियुक्तस्यापि ब्रह्मणः शरीरसंबन्धदशायां तत्प्रयुक्ता दोषाः स्युः इति चेन्न; तत्परिहारार्थमेव अन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणे "यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्" इत्यादिपर्यायेषु प्रतिपर्यायम् "एष त आत्मा अन्तर्याम्यमृतः" इति अमृतशब्देन दोषाभावप्रतिपादनात्, अथर्वशिरसि च "सोऽन्तरादन्तरं प्राविशत्' इति शिवस्यान्तर्यामिभावेन सर्वानुप्रवेशवर्णनानन्तरं तत्प्रयुक्तसर्वात्म्यावलम्बनेषु देवकृतशिवस्तुतिमन्त्रेषु "यो वै रुद्रः स भगवान् यश्च ब्रह्मा तस्मै वै नमो नमः" यश्च विष्णुः यश्च महेश्वरः इत्यादिषु प्रतिपर्यायं तत्तच्छरीरसम्बन्धप्रयुक्तदोषपरिहारार्थमेव तद्विरोधिनः समग्रैश्वर्यादिगुणजातस्य भगवच्छब्देन प्रतिपादनाच्च, "द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया" इति मन्त्रे जीवब्रह्मणोरेकशरीरसम्बन्धे सत्यपि तत्प्रयुक्तफलभोक्तृत्वविशेषस्य प्रतिपादनाच्च।

2.322 तथाप्यरूपत्वादिवाक्यैरापतन्निर्विशेषत्वं कथं वारणीयमिति चेत् इत्थम्; श्रुत्योर्विरोधे सति नैकस्याः श्रुतेरतात्त्विकविषयत्वकल्पनेनार्थापलापो न्याय्यः। किन्तु "तुल्यं च साम्प्रदायिकम्" इति न्यायात् उभयोरपि तात्त्विकविषयसमर्पणेनानुग्रहो न्याय्यः; तथा च ब्रह्मणः शरीरसम्बन्धप्रतिपादकैरेव श्रुतिवाक्यैः तस्य तत्प्रयुक्तदोषासम्बन्धप्रतिपादनात्; "आकाशो ह वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म तदमृतं स आत्मा" इति श्रुतौ परमाकाशस्य नाम-

रूपपरिणामितया तादात्म्येन तन्निर्वोढृत्वप्रतिपादनानन्तरं ब्रह्मणः प्रकृते नामरूपे प्रत्यात्मत्वमुक्त्वापि "ते यदन्तरा" इति तदस्पर्शप्रतिपादनस्य आकाशाद्ब्रह्मण ताभ्यां तादात्म्यं नास्ति किन्तु शरीरशरीरिभावमात्रमिति प्रतिपादनद्वारा, "तादात्म्ये हि तदीयदोषाणां प्रसक्तिः शङ्क्यतापि। न त्वेतदस्ति। शरीरशेषाणां तु नात्मनि प्रसक्तिरस्ति" इत्यस्यार्थस्य विभावनाच्च। तदनुसारेण अरूपत्वश्रुतीनाम् "अरूपतुल्यं ब्रह्म। यथा स्वशरीरमाकाशादिकं शरीरावस्थितिप्रयुक्तदोषैः न स्पृश्यते एवं ब्रह्मापि" इत्येवंपरतया योजनं युक्तम्।

न च कारागृहप्रविष्टनियन्तृपुरुषदृष्टान्तेन ब्रह्मणो नियन्तृतयापि 2. 323
शरीरेष्ववस्थाने तत्प्रयुक्तदुःखादिकनवश्यं भवेदिति न्यायानुगृहीतानां अरूपश्रुतीनां प्राबल्यात् तद्विरोधेन रूपवत्त्वश्रुतय एव यथाकथंचिन्नेतव्या इति शङ्कनीयम्। यतः कर्माधीनमेव अर्थानां दुःखजनकत्वं न वस्तुस्वभावप्रयुक्तम्। पुत्रदारादीनां शीतोष्णादीनां च समयभेदेन मलमूत्रादीनां जातिभेदेन च सुखःदुःखकरत्वदर्शनात्;

"तदेव प्रीतये भूत्वा पुनर्दुःखाय जायते।

तदेव कोपाय यतः प्रसादाय च जायते।

तस्माद्दुःखात्मकं नास्ति न चकिंचित्सुखात्मकम्।" इति स्मरणाच्च।

यत्तु परमेश्वरस्य सर्वशरीरकत्वे विधिनिषेधवाक्यगतब्राह्मणादिशब्दानां 2. 324
तत्पर्यन्तत्वेन तस्यापि विधिनिषेधोल्लङ्घनप्रयुक्तपापस्यावश्यंभावितया तत्कृतदुःखभाक्त्वं स्यादिति, तत्तुच्छम्। लोकवेदसाधारणप्रसिद्धिबाहुल्यात् ब्राह्मणादिशब्दैः प्रथमोपस्थितानां तत्तच्छरीराभिमानिजीवानामेवान्वयेन झटिति वाक्यार्थबोधनिष्पत्तौ सत्यां तावतैव वाक्यप्रामाण्यस्य चरितार्थतया ईश्वरस्य सर्वान्तर्यामित्वम्, अन्तर्यामिणं प्रति नियम्यानां शरीरत्वम्, शरीरवाचिशब्दानां शरीरिपर्यन्तत्वं च, श्रुतिन्यायाभ्यामवगन्तव्यमपेक्ष्य विलम्बितोपस्थितिकस्य तस्य ईश्वरस्यान्वयेन पुनर्वाक्यार्थबोधान्तरानुदयात्। अत एव "त्रिः प्रथमामन्वाह। त्रिरुत्तमाम्" इत्यत्र प्रथमोत्तमशब्दाभ्यां शीघ्रोपस्थितिकयोः प्रथमचरमस्थानयोरेव वाक्यार्थान्वयः, न तु प्रथमचरमस्थानानुवचनीययोः "प्रवो वाजा," "आजुह्योता"दित्यृचोर्विलम्बितोपस्थितिकयोरितीष्यते।

2.325 सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्येनापि ब्रह्मणो न ज्ञानमात्ररूपत्वसिद्धिः। तद्वाक्यावैयर्थ्यहेतोर्ज्ञानरूपत्वस्येव "यः सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्," "सर्वेश्वरश्शम्भुराकाशमध्ये" इत्यादिवाक्यावैयर्थ्यहेतोः सर्वज्ञत्वादिविशेषस्याप्यङ्गीकार्यत्वात्, द्विविधयोरपि वाक्ययोः श्रुतित्वाविशेषात्, ज्ञानरूपत्वविशेषान्तरवत्त्वयोर्विरोधाभावेनात्र व्यवस्थापकन्यायानपेक्षणाच्च। यदि सत्यज्ञानादिवाक्यम्—ज्ञानमात्ररूपं ब्रह्म—इति ब्रूयात्, तदा खलु विरोधः स्यात्। नत्वेवमाह; किन्तु ज्ञानरूपं ब्रह्मेत्येतावन्मात्रमाह। तत्तु श्रुत्यन्तरप्राप्तविशेषवत्त्वेन न विरुध्यते; न हि स्वर्णमयं किरीटमिति वाक्यप्राप्तं स्वर्णरूपत्वं प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणेनोपरि प्रत्युप्तरत्नवत्त्वेन विरुध्यते। किञ्च अत्यल्पमिदमुक्तम्—कानिचिद्वेदान्तवाक्यानि ब्रह्मणः सार्वज्ञ्यादिविशेषान् बोधयन्ति—इति; कृत्स्नोऽपि ब्रह्मपरो वेदान्तराशिस्तस्य विशेषवत्तां दर्शयति, न हि तादृशः कश्चित् वेदान्तेषु ब्रह्मणि प्रवृत्तः शब्दोऽस्ति, यः प्रवृत्तिनिमित्ततया कस्यचिद्दोषस्याभावं कञ्चन कल्याणगुणं वा न समर्पयेत्। वेदान्तोपबृंहणप्रवृत्तैः मुनिभिरप्युभयलिङ्गं ब्रह्म समर्थ्यते इति प्रसिद्धमेव।

2.326 न केवलमुभयलिङ्गत्वश्रुतिस्मृतिबलाद्ब्रह्मणः पृथिव्यादिस्थितावपि तत्प्रयुक्तदोषाप्रसङ्गः, किन्तु श्रुत्युदाहृतदृष्टान्तसामर्थ्येनापि। एवं हि दृष्टान्तमुदाहरति श्रुतिः—

"आकाशमेकं हि यथा घटादिषु पृथक् भवेत्।
तथात्मैको ह्यनेकस्थो जलाधारेष्विवांशुमान्॥" इति।

अत्राद्यदृष्टान्तेन "यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन्" इत्यादिश्रुतिसिद्धा सर्वत्र स्थितिरुपपादिता। तेन कथमेकस्यामूर्तस्य बहुषु स्थितिः कृत्स्नैकदेशवृत्तिविकल्पपराहतत्वादिति शङ्का निवारिता। द्वितीयदृष्टान्तेन तेषु स्थितस्यापि तेष्वनवस्थितस्याकाशस्येव तत्प्रयुक्तदोषास्पर्श उपपादितः। तेन तच्छरीरकं कथं तत्प्रयुक्तदोषभाक् न भवेदिति शङ्का निवारिता। कर्मवश्यत्वतदभावाभ्यां विशेष इति श्रुतेरभिप्रायः। न चेदमाशङ्कनीयम्—अम्बुनि सूर्यस्तत्रानवस्थित एव तत्र स्थित इव [1]गृह्यते। तथा परमात्मनो वस्तुतः पृथिव्यादावनवस्थितस्य स्थितत्वेनाग्रहणात्, वस्तुतः पृथिव्यादौ स्थित इत्येवाभ्युपगमात्, न ब्रह्मणः सूर्यस्ये-

1. दृश्यते (My)

वोपाधिप्रयुक्तदोषास्पृष्टत्वमुपपद्यते—इति । यथा जलसूर्यस्य जलोपाधिप्रयुक्तवृद्धिह्रासादिभाक्त्वं वस्तुतो न भवति, एवं ब्रह्मणः पृथिव्याद्यन्तरवस्थितिप्रयुक्तं गुणदोषभाक्त्वं न भवतीति तत्प्रयुक्तगुणदोषभाक्त्वाभावमात्रे दृष्टान्तोऽयम् "जलाधारेष्विवांशुमान्" इति । दृष्टान्तद्वयग्रहणसामञ्जस्यात् एवमवगम्यते । सूर्यस्याम्बुनीव ब्रह्मणः पृथिव्यादिष्वनवस्थितिपर्यन्तविषयविवक्षायां हि [2]प्रथमश्रुतदृष्टान्तोपमर्दः स्यात् । न च सर्वात्मना दृष्टान्तदार्ष्टान्तिकयोः साम्येन भाव्यमित्यस्ति नियमः, लोकवेदयोः विवक्षितांशसाम्यमात्रेण दृष्टान्तीकरणदर्शनादिति ।

इत्थम् "न स्थानत" इत्यादिभिः दशभिः सूत्रैः ब्रह्म सविशेष 2.33
निर्दोषकल्याणगुणास्पदमिति समर्थनार्थं एकमधिकरणं कृतम् । तदनन्तरं तदेवाक्षेपसमाधानाभ्यां दृढीकृतम् । "प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः ।" (ब्र. ३. २. २१) इत्यादिभिर्नवभिः सूत्रैरधिकरणान्तरं कृतम् । तत्र पूर्वाधिकरणसमर्थितं ब्रह्मण उभयलिङ्गत्वं उपपद्यते न वेति संशयः । तदर्थं बृहदारण्यके "द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्तं चामूर्तं च" (बृ. २. ३. १.) इत्यदिना ब्रह्मणः पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वाकाशरूपमूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चात्मकं रूपमुक्त्वा "अथात आदेशो नेति नेति" (बृ. २. ३. ६.) इति क्रियमाणो निषेधः प्रकृतमूर्तामूर्तब्रह्मरूपविषयः यद्ब्रह्मणो मूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चात्मकमुक्तं रूपं तद्वस्तुतो नास्तीति, अथवा ब्रह्मणः प्रकृतमूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चात्मकरूपवत्त्वमेव न भवति, अधिकमपि गुणजातमस्तीत्येवं प्रकृतैयत्ताविषयः इति संशयः ।

तत्र पूर्वः पक्षः—"नेति नेति" इत्यत्र इतिशब्देन परामृष्टस्य नञा
निषेधः इति तावन्निर्विवादम् । इतिशब्दः प्रकारवाची पूर्वप्रकृतं प्रकारं परामृशेत् । 2.331
पूर्वं च मूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चात्मकं ब्रह्मणः प्रकारद्वयं प्रकृतम् । अतस्तन्निषिध्यत इति युक्तम् । नेति नेतीति वीप्सायां द्विरुक्तिः पूर्वप्रकृतस्य रूपद्वयस्य साकल्येन निषेधप्रत्यायनार्था । अथवा एकेन मूर्तस्य अन्येनामूर्तस्य च प्रपञ्चस्य निषेध इति द्विरुक्तिसाफल्यम् । प्रकृतैयत्ता निषिध्यत इति तु न युक्तम्, रूपद्वयवत्तस्याः प्रकृतत्वाभावात् । रूपद्वयनिषेध इव तन्निषेधे द्विरुक्तिसाफल्याभावाच्च इति ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—प्रमाणान्तराप्रतिपन्नतया पूर्ववाक्ये श्रुत्यैव विहितंब्रह्मणो 2.332
[1]मूर्तामूर्तवैशिष्ट्यं तदनन्तरवाक्येन निषेद्धुं न शक्यते, पूर्वापरविरोधापत्तेः ।

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1. मूर्तामूर्तस्वरूपत्वे (My)

2-शि

षोडशग्रहणाग्रहणवत् वस्तुनि विकल्पायोगात् । अतः पूर्वं मूर्तामूर्तरूपवैशिष्ट्योक्त्या बुद्धिस्थः प्रकृतरूपैतावत्त्वात्मकः प्रकारो निषिध्यते—इति युक्तम् ।

2.333 ततः तदनन्तरमेव, "नह्येतस्मादिति नेत्यन्यत् परमस्ति । अथ नामधेयं सत्यस्य सत्यम्" इति "प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम्" (बृ २. ३. ६.) इति वाक्यशेषो भूयो गुणजातं ब्रवीति । अत्र प्रथमवाक्येन इति नेति प्रकृतेयत्ताविशेषगोचरत्वेनोक्तादेतस्मात् ब्रह्मणः परमुत्कृष्टमन्यन्नास्तीति स्वाधिकराहित्यगुण उच्यते । "अथ नामधेयम्" इत्यादिवाक्येन ब्रह्मण उत्कृष्टाभावेऽपि मूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चशरीरकत्वेन तदुभयनियन्तुस्तस्य समाः सन्त्येव । अस्ति हि भूतदर्शनां योगसिद्धानां मुक्तानां च ब्रह्मवदेव तदुभयशरीरकत्वेन तन्नियन्तृत्वमिति शङ्कानिरासार्थं ब्रह्मणः "सत्यस्य सत्यम्" इति नामविधानपूर्वकं तन्निर्वचनं क्रियते । तत्र प्राणशब्देन प्राणाधिष्ठातारो जीवा लक्ष्यन्ते । ते तावत् सत्यभूताः अविकाराः, वियदादिवत् स्वरूपान्यथाभावरूपोत्पत्त्यभावात् । तेषामप्युत्कृष्टं सत्यं ब्रह्म जीववत् ज्ञानसङ्कोचविकासात्मिकाया अप्युत्पत्तेरभावात् । अतो योगिनां मुक्तानां च ज्ञानविकासानन्तरं तात्कालिकप्रपञ्चनियन्तृत्वसद्भावेऽपि प्राक् ज्ञानसंकोचकाले तन्नास्ति । अतः सार्वदिकसर्वप्रपञ्चनियन्तृ ब्रह्मैवेति न तत्समः कोऽपि जीवोऽस्तीत्यभिप्रायः । यद्वा कृत्स्नेनापि वाक्यशेषेण समराहित्यमेव बोध्यते ; अधिकराहित्यं तु कैमुतिकन्यायेन सिध्यति । अस्मिन् पक्षे प्रथमवाक्यस्यैव योजना—इति नेति निषेध्येयत्ताप्रतियोगिभूतात् मूर्तामूर्तप्रपञ्चात् परं उत्कृष्टं ब्रह्मैव, ततोऽन्यत् नियन्तृतयास्मात् प्रपञ्चादुत्कृष्टं नास्तीति । यद्वा इति नेति प्रकृतेयत्तानिषेधगोचरात् एतस्मात् ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत् परं नियन्तृत्वेन प्रपञ्चादुत्कृष्टं नास्तीति योजना । अस्मिन् योजनाद्वये नान्यपदवैयर्थ्यशङ्केति विशेषः ॥

2.3331 नन्वयं वाक्यशेषः प्रकृतरूपद्वयनिषेधपक्षेऽपि सङ्गच्छते । कथम् ? इति नेति निषिद्धरूपद्वयात् एतस्मात् ब्रह्मणोऽन्यत् अन्यतया प्रतिभासमानं परं नास्ति वस्तुतो व्यतिरिक्तं नास्तीत्याद्यवाक्यस्यार्थः । तद्दृढीकरणार्थं द्वितीयवाक्यम् । तत्र प्राणशब्देनेन्द्रियवाचिना तद्विषया लक्ष्यन्ते । तेन "सन् मृत्पिण्डः सन् घटः सत् कपालं, सत् चूर्णम्" इत्यादि[1]प्रत्ययविषयात् मृत्पिण्डघटकपालादयो व्यावर्तमानसत्याः, ब्रह्म तु सर्वेष्वप्येतेषु प्रत्ययेषु सदिति प्रत्ययवेद्यमनु-

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1. प्रत्यक्ष (My)

गतं सत्यम्। व्यावर्तमानाश्चानुवर्तमाने कल्पिता दृष्टाः। यथा रज्वा इदमंशे (रज्जाविदमंशे?) स्रक्सर्पभूदलनादयः। अतो व्यावर्तमाना घटादयः केवलं प्रतिभासतः सत्या इति तेषामुत्कृष्टं सत्यं पारमार्थिकं ब्रह्मेति तस्यार्थः।

एवमितिशब्दस्य प्रकृतरूपद्वयपरामर्शित्वस्वारस्यानुसारेण वाक्यशेष- 2. 3332
स्यार्थो वर्णयितुं शक्यत इति नान्यथार्थवर्णनं युक्तमिति चेत्, स्यादेवम्, यदि रज्जोरिदमाकारेणेव ब्रह्मणः सद्रूपेण प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वमुपपद्येत; न तु तदुपपद्यते। "न सन्दृशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम्" इत्यादिश्रुतिर्हि ब्रह्माव्यक्तं प्रत्यक्षाद्यगोचरमाह। ब्रह्मस्वरूपं तु संराधने सम्यक् दृढभक्तिपूर्वकं ध्यानयज्ञेनाराधने सति प्रसन्नं सत् स्वात्मानं संराधकाय प्रकाशयति। तदिदम्—

"नायमात्मा प्रवचनेन लभ्यो
न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन।
यमेवैष वृणुते तेन लभ्य-
स्तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम्॥"

"अयं तु परया भक्त्या दृश्यते नान्यथा क्वचित्।
हरिश्चाहं च रुद्रश्च तथान्ये च सुरासुराः॥
तपोभिरुग्रैरद्यापि तस्य[2] दर्शनकाङ्क्षिणः।"

इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यामत्रगम्यते। एवं संराधनं ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारस्य कारणमुक्तम्।

तत्कार्ये तु ज्ञानानन्दादिवत् जगदैश्वर्यस्याप्यवैशेष्यम्। यथा तेषां 2. 3333
ज्ञानानन्दादेः ब्रह्मज्ञानानन्दतो विशेषाभावः तथा तेषां जगदैश्वर्यस्यापि ब्रह्मणो जगदैश्वर्याद्विशेषाभावो भवति। अत एव भगवतः कृष्णस्योपासनाकर्मण्यभ्यासात् चिरनिरन्तरैकाग्र्यात् ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारेण तद्वत् जगदैश्वर्यप्राप्त्या अर्जुनाय तत्प्रकाशनं गीतासु दृश्यते। अगस्त्यविश्वामित्रादीनां च जलनिधिपानस्वर्गान्तर-

2. यस्य (My)

करणादिसामर्थ्यप्रकाशनं पुराणेषु दृश्यते । न चैतदसंभावितम् ; लोकेऽपि हि गरुडमन्त्रोपासकानां गरुडभावनया तदसाधारणस्य दर्शनमात्रेण विषसंहरणसामर्थ्यस्य[1] कियतो धर्मस्य प्राप्तिर्दृश्यते, तथा ब्रह्मभावनयापि ब्रह्मासाधारणकियद्धर्मप्राप्तिः युक्तैव[2] । एवं ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य संराधनं कारणम्, तदैश्वर्यादिप्राप्तिः कार्यमिति स्थिते "सन् घटः" इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षे क्लृप्ततत्कार्यकारणयोरदर्शनादिहेतोः "नेति नेति" इत्यत्र प्रकृतेयत्तानिषेधः न तु प्रकृतरूपद्वयनिषेधः इत्यप्यवगम्यते । कथम्? ब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारवतां यदैश्वर्यमाविर्भवति तद्ब्रह्मसाम्यरूपमिति वक्तव्यम्, "निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति" इति श्रुतेः । अतः यथा तेषामाविर्भवज्ज्ञानानन्दरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणः स्वीक्रियते, एवं जगदैश्वर्यमपि तस्याङ्गीकर्तव्यम्; अन्यथा परमसाम्यासिद्धेः । सर्वैरपि गुणैः किञ्चित्किञ्चित्साम्यं हि परमसाम्यम्, न तु येनकेनचिद्गुणेन किञ्चित् साम्यमात्रम् । तस्मात् ब्रह्मोपासीनानामपि तदसाधारणज्ञानानन्दैश्वर्याद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणाविर्भावदर्शनात् अनन्तेन कल्याणगुणेन ब्रह्मणो योगे न विवादावकाशः । तस्मादुभयलिङ्गमेव ब्रह्म ।

2.334 ननु "द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे" इत्यादिनोक्तं प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वं ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोराध्यासिकसंबन्धेन निर्वाह्यम्, विधान्तरेण तन्निर्वाहासंभवात् । ततश्च "नेति नेति" इत्यध्यस्तप्रपञ्चनिषेध इत्येव युक्तमिति चेन्न, आध्यासिकसम्बन्धं विना प्रकारान्तरेण प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मरूपत्वनिर्वाहसंभवात् ।

2.3341 तथाहि—रूपशब्दोऽत्र स्वरूपपरो न धर्मपरः । ततश्च "एक एव रुद्रः" "सर्वो वै रुद्रः" इत्येकत्वबहुत्वव्यपदेशात् । अहेरेकस्य कुण्डलभावर्जुभाववक्रभावाद्यनेकसंस्थानविशेषवत् ब्रह्मण एव "द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे" इत्यादिनोक्तः पृथिव्यादिरूपोऽनेकः संस्थानविशेष इत्युपपद्यते ।

2.3342 अथवा ब्रह्मप्रपञ्चयोर्भेद एवास्तु, तथापि "ब्रह्मणो रूपे" इति ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वोक्तिरुपपद्यते । "सर्वं खल्विदं ब्रह्म" (छा. ३. ४) इति श्रुतेः सर्वस्यापि ब्रह्मस्वरूपैकजातियोगात् । दृश्यते हि प्रभाप्रभावतोर्भेदेऽपि तेजस्स्वरूपैकजातियोगात्—सर्वमिदं तेज स्वरूपम्—इति व्यवहारः ।

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1. रूपस्य (My)   2. युक्तरूपा (My)

अथवा मा भूदिदं पक्षद्वयम्; आद्यपक्षे हि ब्रह्मणः परिणामित्वं 2.3343
जडत्वं चेति दोषद्वयं स्यात्; द्वितीयपक्षेऽपि तत्स्यात्, ब्रह्मत्वजात्याश्रयत्वेन प्रपञ्चोऽपि ब्रह्मेत्यभ्युपगमात्। तथा च पक्षद्वयेऽपि ब्रह्मणो निर्दोषत्वप्रतिपादकसकलश्रुतिविरोधो भवेत्। अतः पूर्ववदेवात्राप्युपपादनीयम्। पूर्वत्र हि "अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्" (ब्र. २. ३. ४२) इत्यधिकरणे प्रभाजातिगुणशरीरवदपृथक्सिद्धविशेषणतैकस्वभावतया विशिष्टैकदेशत्वेन ब्रह्मांशत्वमुक्तं चेतनवर्गस्य। एवमचेतनवर्गस्याप्यस्तु; तदेव ब्रह्मणो रूपमित्यनेनोच्यत इति न कश्चिद्दोषः। एवं च "यस्य पृथिवी शरीरम्" (बृ. ३. ७. ३) इत्यादिश्रुत्या

"विद्याविद्यात्मकं सर्वं विश्वं विश्वगुरोर्विभोः।
रूपमेव न सन्देहो विश्वं तस्य वशे यतः॥"

इत्यादिपुराणवचनैश्चिदचिद्वस्तुने ब्रह्मशरीरत्वोक्तिरपि एतदेकार्था भवति।

"नास्य जरयैतज्जीर्यति।" "अस्थूलमनण्वह्रस्वम्" इत्यादिश्रुतिषु 2.34
ब्रह्मणो जरादिप्रतिषेधादपि प्रपञ्चशरीरकत्वमनुमतमवसीयते। तस्मिन् सत्येव हि ब्रह्मणः तत्प्रयुक्तदोषप्रसक्तौ तत्प्रतिषेधश्रवणमुपपद्यते। तस्मान्निर्दोषं सगुणं सप्रपञ्चं ब्रह्मेति। एवमधिकरणद्वयेन ब्रह्मणः सगुणसप्रपञ्चत्वव्यवस्थापनानन्तरं एवंभूतात् ब्रह्मणः परमुत्कृष्टं तत्त्वान्तरं नास्तीति "परमतस्सेतून्मानसम्बन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः" (ब्र. ३. २. ३०) इत्यधिकरणेन पूर्वोत्तरपक्षाभ्यां समर्थितम्।

अपि च शिवस्य गुणविग्रहादिकं सत्यं नित्यं च, न तु कल्पितमनित्यं चेति निर्णयार्थं तृतीयाध्याय एव "आदरादलोपः" (ब्र. ३. ३. ३९.) 2.4
इत्यधिकरणं कृतम्। तदित्थम्—शिवस्य नीलकण्ठत्वादिविशिष्टो विग्रहः सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादिगुणगणश्च कदाचिल्लुप्यते नवेति कल्पिताकल्पितत्वाभ्यां संशये पूर्वः पक्षः।

आनन्दरूपः शिवस्य विग्रह इति "आकाशशरीरं ब्रह्म", 2.41
"आनन्दरूपममृतं यद्विभाति" इत्यादिश्रुत्यनुसारादिष्यते। न चानन्दस्य वक्षःकण्ठहस्ताङ्गुल्यादिरूपेण स्थौल्यकार्श्ये संभवतः। तत्संभवाङ्गीकारे तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदि आनन्दमयस्य ब्रह्मणः "तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः, मोदो दक्षिणः

पक्षः, प्रमोद उत्तरः पक्षः, आनन्द आत्मा, ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा" इत्याम्नातं प्रियशिरस्कत्वादिकमपि तात्त्विकं स्यात्। तथा सति "प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे" (ब्र. ३. ३. १२) इति प्राक् सूत्रितं विरुध्येत। अतो विग्रहस्तावत् कल्पितः तत्सहपाठान्निर्गुणश्रुतिविरोधाच्च गुणगणश्चापि कल्पित इति।

2.42 सिद्धान्तस्तु—नीलकण्ठत्वोमापतित्वसत्यसङ्कल्पादीनां अभ्यासेनादरावगमात् विग्रहगुणगणयोस्तात्त्विकत्वमवसीयते। श्रुतिशरणैः खलु यथाश्रुत्येवाभ्युपगन्तव्यम्, श्रुतिप्रामाण्यात्। आनन्दात्मनैव परमाकाशस्य उपचयापचयवान् परिणामो युज्यते। प्रियशिरस्त्वादिकं तु न तथा, तात्पर्यग्राहकप्रमाणाभावात्, अन्नमयादिषु कल्पितैः पक्षपुच्छादिभिः सहपाठाच्च कल्पितमित्यवगम्यते। तथा क इह[1] तात्पर्यग्राहकोऽभ्यास इति चेदुच्यते। सवितृमण्डलविद्यायाम् "नमो हिरण्यबाहवे हिरण्यवर्णाय हिरण्यरूपाय हिरण्यपतयेऽम्बिकापतय उमापतये" इति उमापतित्वस्य शब्दभेदेनाभ्यासः; श्रीरुद्रोपनिषदि "नमो नीलग्रीवाय च शितिकण्ठाय च" इति नीलकण्ठत्वस्य तथाभ्यासः; दहरविद्यायां कैवल्योपनिषदि—

"उमासहायं परमेश्वरं प्रभुं
त्रिलोचनं नीलकण्ठं प्रशान्तम्।"

इति समाम्नातयोरुमासहायत्वत्रिलोचनत्वयोः; तस्यामेव दहरविद्यायां तैत्तिरीयोपनिषदि "पुरुषं कृष्णपिङ्गलम्। ऊर्ध्वरेतं विरूपाक्षम्" इति कृष्णपिङ्गलविरूपाक्षशब्दाभ्यासः। एवं दहरविद्यादिष्वाम्नातानां सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादीनां शाण्डिल्यविद्यादिषु पुनराम्नानमभ्यासः।

2.421 ननु शाखाभेदेन पुनराम्नानं कथमभ्यासः? शाखाभेदेन हि तत्तदध्येतृप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पुनराम्नानम्; विद्याभेदे पुनर्वचनं तत्तद्गुणप्राप्त्यर्थम्, विद्यान्तरगुणानां विद्यान्तरेऽनुपसंहारतः प्राप्त्यभावात्। शाखैक्ये विद्यैक्येऽपि केषाञ्चिद्गुणानां पुनर्वचनं परस्पराम्नातगुणोपसंहारोपयुक्तविद्यैक्यसिद्धिहेतुप्रत्यभिज्ञानार्थम्।

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1. क इह तदा (T).

एवं प्रयोजनान्तरार्थानि पुनराम्नानानि न तात्पर्यग्रहणाभ्यासरूपतां भजन्त इति चेदुच्यते।

"आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य" (ब्र. ३. ३. ११) इत्यधिकरणे तावदयमर्थः स्थितः। सत्यज्ञानानन्दादयो गुणाः, नीलकण्ठत्वोमासहायत्वादिविशिष्टः परमानन्दात्मको विग्रहविशेष इत्येते सर्वे परब्रह्मणः शिवस्य स्वरूपलक्षणान्तर्गतत्वात् सर्वासु परविद्यासु उपसंहार्याः। तेषां ब्रह्मविष्ण्वादिसकलेतरविलक्षणत्वेनानुभवारूढतया तत्प्रतिपत्तावपेक्षितत्वादिति। तदनन्तरप्रवृत्ते प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यधिकरणे च ये सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादयो मुक्तप्राप्या गुणाः तेऽपि सर्वासु परविद्यासु यथोपासनं फलमिति न्यायेनापेक्षितत्वादुपसंहार्या इति निरूपितम्। तत्रोभयत्रापि अपेक्षितत्वमेव विद्याभेदेऽपि उपसंहारे मूलभूतो न्याय इति। अनेनैव न्यायेन यज्ञादीनां शमादीनां उद्धूळनत्रिपुण्ड्रयोर्विद्यानामावृत्तेः, आप्रायणं तदनुष्ठानस्य पूर्वोत्तरपापविनाशाश्लेषयोः अर्चिरादिपर्वविशेषाणां चेत्येवमादीनां कासुचिदेव विद्यासु श्रुतानामपि सर्वासु परविद्यासु आपतन्ती प्राप्तिः तत्र तत्र संभावितशङ्काविशेषनिराकरणपूर्वकं सर्वापेक्षाधिकरणादिषु समर्थिता। एवं च सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वादिगुणगणामेकत्राम्नानेऽपि सर्वासु परविद्यासु संभवत्प्राप्तिकानां विद्यान्तरेषु पुनराम्नानं अनन्यप्रयोजनत्वात् तात्पर्यग्राहकाभ्यासरूपतयैवावतिष्ठते। तस्मादभ्यासेनादरावगमादलोपो विग्रहगुणगणयोः। 2.422

2.43 निर्गुणश्रुत्यादिकं तु सगुणश्रुत्यादिविषयपरिहारेण हेयगुणादिराहित्यविषयतयावतिष्ठते, पदाहवनीयन्यायेन श्रुतिद्वयप्रामाण्यलाभाय विषयव्यवस्थाकल्पनौचित्यात् इति।

2.5 एवं नित्यनिर्मलगुणविग्रहविशिष्टं शिवरूपमेव ब्रह्म मुक्तप्राप्यम्, न तदुत्तीर्णं निर्विशेषं मुक्तप्राप्यं ब्रह्मास्तीति निर्णयार्थम् "उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात्" (ब्र. ३. ३. ४०) इति तदनन्तराधिकरणं कृतम्। तदित्थम्—मुक्तप्राप्यं ब्रह्म शिवादन्यत्, उत शिव एवेति संशयः। तदर्थं मुक्तिः निर्विशेषब्रह्मसादृश्यापत्तिः इति संशयः।

2.51 तत्र पूर्वः पक्षः—नीरूपं निर्विशेषं च परं ब्रह्मेति परःशताः श्रुतयः प्रतिपादयन्ति। तद्भावापत्तिर्मुक्तिरिति च "ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति" "स यो ह वै तत्परमं ब्रह्म वेद ब्रह्मैव भवति" इति सावधारणा श्रुतिः

प्रतिपादयति । अतो रूपवान् सगुणः शिवो न परं ब्रह्म, नापि तत्साहश्यापत्तिः परमुक्तिरिति ।

2.52 सिद्धान्तस्तु—उक्तरूपः शिव एव परं ब्रह्म ; तत्सादृश्यापत्तिरेव च परमुक्तिः । दहरपुण्डरीकादिषु तदुपासनेन तस्मिन्नुपस्थिते=उपासकेन प्राप्ते सति, अतः=तत्प्राप्त्यनन्तरभाविस्वरूपाभिनिष्पत्तेरेव हेतोः, तस्य=जक्षणादि-विहारस्य, "एष सम्प्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात् समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते । स उत्तमः पुरुषः" (छा. ८. १२.३) "स तत्र पर्येति जक्षन् क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा ज्ञातिभिर्वा" इत्यादिश्रुतावुक्तत्वात्, "निरञ्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति" इति श्रुतौ निरञ्जनस्य ब्रह्मसाम्यापत्तिप्रति-पादनाच्च । न हि परमुमुक्तेरन्यत्र स्वरूपाभिनिष्पत्तिः अञ्जनाख्यमलापगमो [1]वास्ति । रूपगुणनिषेधश्रुतयः शिवे परब्रह्मणि रूपगुणवत्येव हेयरूपगुण-निषेधपरा[2] । "ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति" "ब्रह्मविद्ब्रह्मैव भवति" इति च श्रुत्योरेवकारः साम्यश्रुत्यनुसारात् इवार्थः । अन्धा भवत्यपि रोदितीव[3] विनाश-मेवापीतो भवति" इति सुषुप्तविषयश्रुतावेवकारस्येवार्थत्वदर्शनात् । अथवा—ज्ञानविकासेन ब्रह्मत्वं[4] प्राप्नुवन्नेव ब्रह्म प्राप्नोति, यः परं ब्रह्म वेद सः स्वयमपि ज्ञानविकासेन बृहत्त्वशाल्येव भवति, इति तयोः श्रुत्योरर्थ इति । एवं सगुणं सविग्रहं सप्रपञ्चं सविशेषमेव ब्रह्म, न तु निर्विशेषमिति स्वयं बहुषु प्रदेशेषु व्यवस्थापनेन तदर्थं सूत्रारूढतया अनेकाधिकरणप्रवर्तनेन च विशिष्टाद्वैतमेव प्रयत्नेन परमसिद्धान्तं व्यवस्थापितवतां श्रीकण्ठाचार्याणां मते[5] कः शुद्धाद्वैतं परमसिद्धान्त इति कथनस्यावकाशः ?

2.6 यत्तु अनियमाधिकरणादिषु निरन्वयोपासकानां अत्रैव मुक्तिरिति निर्गुणनिष्ठानामर्चिरादिगत्यनपेक्षमुक्त्यभिधानम्, तत् "केचिदाहुः" इत्युपक्रमात् मतान्तरोपन्यासपरमिति तत्र तत्र स्पष्टमेव ।

2.7 यच्च "शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्" (ब्र. १. १. ३१) इत्या-दिसूत्रेषूपासकस्य शिवाभेदभावना मुक्तिहेतुरिति प्रतिष्ठापनम्, तदारोपिता-

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1. मलापकर्षोऽस्ति (O)
2. परतया नेयाः (My)
3. भवत्यपरोदीतिव (O)
4. बृहत्त्व (O)
5. मते न शुद्धाद्वैतं (T)

भेदभावनापरम् । अत एव "प्रकाशादिवच्चावैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात्" (ब्र. ३. २. २४) इति प्रकृतैतावत्त्वाधिकरणसूत्रभाष्ये—

"दिव्यं ददामि ते चक्षुः पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम् ।" (भ. गी. ११. ८)

इत्यादिषु कृष्णादीनां तदैक्यभावनया तदैश्वर्यप्रकाशनं दृश्यते । ब्रह्मभावाभ्यासेन विश्वामित्र-अगस्त्यादीनां स्वर्गान्तरकरणजलधिकबलनादिसामर्थ्यम्, लोके च मन्त्रिणां गरुडासाधारणधर्मप्राप्तिः इति आरोपितविषयगरुडैक्यभावनादृष्टान्तेन शिवैक्यभावनाया आरोपितविषयत्वमाविष्कृतम् । सुदर्शनाचार्यैरपि तात्पर्यसंग्रहे गरुडैक्यभावनादृष्टान्त एवोपात्तः—

"ब्रह्मोच्यते परमसौ परमं च तत्त्वं
ज्योतिः परं च परमेश्वर पद्मनाभः ।
त्वद्भावनैकरसिकस्त्वदनन्यभावा-
न्मन्त्री यथा गरुडभावनया गरुत्मान्" ॥ इति ।

(श्रुतिसूक्तिमाला, ४२)

तदनुवर्तिनां श्रीकण्ठाचार्याणामपि तथैव मतमिति युक्तम् ।

ननु यदि भाष्यकाराणां विशिष्टाद्वैते दृष्टिः जीवब्रह्मभेदे च[1], तदा 2.81
"सन् घटः, सन् पटः" इति सर्ववस्तुष्वनुस्यूततया सद्रूपस्य ब्रह्मणः सर्वोपादानत्वं न सिध्यति । "मृदुपरक्तं हि घटादिकं मृदुपादानमिष्यते" इति जन्माद्यधिकरणे, "मृदयं घट इत्यत्र यथा मृद्व्याप्तिर्घटे दृश्यते, तथा ब्रह्मेदं जगदिति ब्रह्मव्याप्तिः न दृश्यत इति चेत्, 'सन् घटः' 'सन् पटः' इति सर्वत्र दृश्यत एव सद्रूपस्य ब्रह्मणो व्याप्तिः" इत्यादिना आरम्भणाधिकरणे च, "सन् घटः" इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्य सद्रूपब्रह्मविषयत्वं यदुक्तं तन्न घटते । इदं हि वचनमनुवर्तमाने सद्रूपे ब्रह्मणि व्यावर्तमानं घटपटादिकं कल्पितं रज्जिवदंश इव सर्पादिकमिति प्रपञ्चमिथ्यात्वयुक्तेरवकाशप्रदानार्थम् । न च ब्रह्मण उपादानत्वोपपादनार्थमिदं वचनम्, कण्ठतस्तथैवोक्तत्वादिति शङ्क्यम्; ब्रह्मणः कार्याभिन्नपरिणाम्युपादानत्वमभिमतं चेत् खलु तदुपपादनार्थम्—मृद्घटः, मृन्म-

1. जीवब्रह्माभेदे च दृष्टिरिति यदुच्यते तदा (My)

णिकम्—इत्यादिवत् कार्योपादानाभेदावगाहि प्रत्यक्षमुदाहरणीयम्; न च तथाभूतं ब्रह्मणः प्रपञ्चोपादानत्वमाचार्याणामभिमतम्, तस्य प्रकृत्यधिकरणे निराकृतत्वात्। अतो रज्जौ—अयं सर्पः, इदं मूदलनम्—इत्यादिधीवत् कल्पिततादात्म्यावगाहिप्रत्यक्षस्येदं व्याजान्तरेणोदाहरणमित्येव युक्तम्।

2. 311 तथात्राधिकरणे "यदा तमो" मन्त्रपूर्वार्धव्याख्यानावसरे "ननु नित्यप्रकाशे शिवे परब्रह्मणि सत्यपि कथं तमोमयं जगदिति चेन्न। स्वयंप्रकाशस्य शिवस्य सर्वसाक्षिणः का हानिः? नामरूपशून्यतया ग्रहणायोग्येषु विषयेषु विहतकरणशरीरशक्तीनां जीवानां प्रपञ्चग्रहणं नास्ति, मलतिरोहितस्वज्ञानतया[1] शिवस्य स्वप्रकाशरूपस्यापि पूर्वमिव दर्शनं नास्ति। तस्मात् निरस्तसमस्तकार्यविशेषतया[2] परमसुषुप्तिमयी महावस्था तम इत्युच्यते" इति शङ्कोत्तराभ्यां तमःशब्दं [3]प्रळयकालवर्तिजीवगताज्ञानपरं व्याख्याय प्रकृत्यधिकरणे तन्मन्त्रोत्तरार्धव्याख्यानावसरे "तत्कालतमोऽपनोदिनी महास्फुरत्तारूपा[4] परमा प्रज्ञा ज्ञानशक्तिः[5] प्रसृता" इति शिवचिच्छक्तेः जीवगताज्ञानरूपपूर्वार्धोक्ततमोऽपनोदकत्वम्, तदुपपादनार्थं महास्फुरत्तारूपेति सर्वजीवगतघटपटादिविषयस्फुरणरूपत्वं च यदुक्तम्, यच्चारम्भणाधिकरणे "सच्चिद्रूपेण शिवेन यदि न व्याप्तं जगत्, तदा सत्तास्फूर्तिभ्यां विनाकृतं कथम्—अस्ति, स्फुरति—इति च दृश्येत? अवस्त्वेव भवेत्" इति—घटो मम स्फुरति—इत्यादिजीवधीष्वनुभूयमानस्य स्फुरणस्य ब्रह्मचिद्रूपत्वमाविष्कृतम्, यच्च "'एष ह्येवानन्दयाति' इति जीवान् प्रत्यानन्दहेतुरानन्दमयः श्रूयते, स्वयं प्रचुरानन्दो हि परानानन्दयति" इत्यानन्दमयाधिकरणे, "'को ह्येवान्यात्कः प्राण्यात्, यदेष आकाश आनन्दो न स्यात्, एष ह्येवानन्दयाति', 'रसो वै सः, रसं ह्येवायं लब्ध्वानन्दी भवति' इति सर्वानुभवविषयत्वमस्याः श्रूयते। तथा च 'स एको मानुष आनन्दः' इत्यारभ्य 'स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः' इति ब्रह्मपर्यन्तमुपाधितिरोधानादानन्दाविर्भावस्तारतम्येन श्रूयते" इति, "अभावं बादरिः" इत्यधिकरणे च—अहं

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1. स्वज्ञानकरणतया (Śrikaṇṭha Bhāṣya)
2. विशेषज्ञाना (Do)
3. प्रळयकालप्रवृत्त (T ; A)
4. स्फुरणरूपा (Śrikaṇṭha Bhaṣya, Mysore edition)
5. प्रज्ञाशक्तिः (Do)

सुखी—इति जीवैरनुभूयमानस्य सुखस्य ब्रह्मानन्दरूपपरब्रह्मस्यांशरूपत्वमुक्तम्-इदमपि सर्वं न घटते। इदं हि जीवानां ब्रह्माभेदोपपादनार्थम्, भेदपक्षे तदनुपपत्तेः। अन्यज्ञानेनान्येषां स्फुरणवत्त्वस्यान्यानन्देनान्येषां सुखित्वस्य चायोगात् इति चेत् उच्यते—"सन् घटः" इत्यादि प्रत्यक्षं विशेष्यांशरूपब्रह्मविषयमिति 2.82
नाचार्याणां मतम्। "अथात आदेशो नेति नेति" इति वाक्यश्रुतप्रतिषेधप्रतियोगिविचारार्थं प्रवृत्ते प्रकृतैतावत्त्वाधिकरणे "ननु 'सन् घटः' 'सन् पटः' इत्यादिष्वनुवृत्तं सद्रूपं ब्रह्म सत्यम्, अन्यव्यावर्तमानं घटादिकं नेति नेतीति प्रतिषेधति श्रुतिः" इत्याशङ्कोत्तरत्वेन "तदव्यक्तमाह हि" (ब्र. ३. २. २२) इति सूत्रमवतार्य "ब्रह्मस्वरूपं प्रत्यक्षादिना प्रमाणान्तरेण नाभिव्यज्यते, 'न सन्दृशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्चनैनम्' इत्यादिना यतः श्रुतिराह: अतः प्रत्यक्षादिना सिद्धा सत्ता न ब्रह्म" इति तैरेव तत्सूत्रतात्पर्यस्य विवृतत्वात्। अतः प्रागुदाहृतं जन्माद्यधिकरणारम्भणाधिकरणश्रुतं वाक्यद्वयं विशेषणांशरूपब्रह्मविषयं योज्यम्, तस्य समस्तप्रपञ्चाकारेण परिणामित्वस्याङ्गीकृतत्वेनाभेदप्रत्यक्षोदाहरणेन तदुपपादनस्योचितत्वात्। न च तस्येक्षत्यधिकरणभाष्ये ब्रह्मसत्तारूपत्वेनोक्ततया स्वयं सद्रूपत्वेन तस्यानुभवोक्तिरयुक्तेति वाच्यम्, ब्रह्म प्रति ज्ञानानन्दादिरूपस्य तस्य स्वयमपि ज्ञातृत्वानन्दित्वादिवत् ब्रह्म प्रति सत्तारूपस्य तस्य स्वयं सद्रूपत्वस्याप्युपपत्तेः। यत्तु स्फुरणवैषयिकानन्दयोर्जीवगतयोर्ब्रह्मज्ञानानन्दांशत्वमुक्तम्, तत् जीवब्रह्मभेदेऽप्युपपद्यते, तत्तत्कर्णपुटावच्छिन्नस्य नभसः दिग्रूपस्य देशस्य वा तत्तज्जीवासाधारणश्रोत्रत्ववत्तत्तदन्तःकरणवृत्त्यभिव्यक्तस्य ब्रह्मज्ञानानन्दांशस्य तत्तज्जीवासाधारणस्फुरणसुखरूपत्वस्याङ्गीकारसम्भवात्।

ननु "अभावं बादरिः" इत्यधिकरणे[1] तत्तदन्तःकरणवृत्त्यवच्छेदमनपेक्ष्यानवच्छिन्नस्यैव परिपूर्णस्य ब्रह्मानन्दस्य मुक्तानुभाव्यपरमपुरुषार्थरूपत्वमुक्तम्। तत्र हि "परप्रकृतिरूपा परमसत्ताप्रकाशानन्दसमरसा परा शक्तिर्हि ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपतया परमाकाश उच्यते, या मुक्तानां परमेश्वरस्य च साक्षादर्थक्रियाहेतुः परम्परया त्वन्येषाम्" इति प्रस्तुत्य, "तथा हि 'को ह्येवान्यात्कः प्राण्यात्'" इत्यादिना "आनन्दाविर्भावतारतम्येन श्रूयते" इत्यन्तेन—परम्प- 2.821

1. रित्याद्यधिकरणे (My)

रया त्वन्येषाम्—इति संक्षिप्तमर्थं विविच्य, "निरुपाधिकतया ब्रह्मणि मुक्ते च परिपूर्णो वर्तते स आनन्दः, 'श्रोत्रियस्य चाकामहतस्य' इति श्रवणात्" इति सन्दर्भेण—या मुक्तानां परमेश्वरस्य च साक्षादर्थक्रियाहेतुः—इति भागस्यार्थो विवेचितः। तदनन्तरं च "यदकामहतः श्रोत्रियो मुक्तस्तदा कथं मानुषानन्दप्रभृतीनां प्राजापत्यानन्दान्तानां उपाधिविशेषवशात्तारतम्येनाभिव्यज्यमानब्रह्मानन्दांशरूपाणां अकामहतश्रोत्रियानुभाव्यत्वमभिहितम्" इत्याशङ्कापरिहाराय शुक्तम्—"ब्रह्मार्पणबुद्ध्या निष्कामानुष्ठिताग्निहोत्रादिकर्मा विद्वानकामहतः श्रोत्रियः, तस्य मुक्तस्य ब्रह्मणश्च तुल्य एवानन्दः; तस्य योगातिशयेन तत्तद्भूमिमधिरूढस्य पूर्वत्र पूर्वत्र भूमावभ्यासः स्वल्प इति तदनुसारेण तत्तद्भूमौ तदीयानन्दाविर्भावस्य मानुषाद्यानन्दसाम्यकृतिरिति न विरोधः" इति।
तदेतत्कथं *जीवब्रह्माभेदपक्षे सङ्गच्छते? अन्यानन्दस्य हि स्वकीयकिञ्च*दवृत्त्यवच्छेदेन स्वासाधारणतामानीतस्यानुभाव्यपरमपुरुषार्थरूपत्वं न युज्यते—
2. 322 इति चेत्तदपि [1]सङ्गच्छत एव। परब्रह्मणः शिवस्य परमानन्दरूपा परा शक्तिर्हि सकलचिदचित्प्रपञ्चाकारा भाष्यकारैरिष्यते। तथा च तस्याः सर्वानपि जीवान् प्रति तत्तत्स्वरूपाभेदात् स्वरूपानन्दत्वं तत्तच्चिच्छक्तिरूपधर्माभेदात् धर्मानन्दत्वमप्यस्ति। तथापि मलावृतान् संसारिणः प्रति तत्तदात्माभेदेन तत्तद्धर्माभेदेन स्वरूपमात्रेण वा सा न भासत इति तत्तदन्तःकरणवृत्तिविशेषावच्छेदकृततारतम्यवता लेशरूपेण सा पुरुषार्थः। मुक्तान् प्रति तु त्रिविधेनापि प्रकारेण भासत इत्यखण्डेन परिपूर्णरूपेणेति विशेषः। एवं[2] ब्रह्मण इव मुक्तानामपि सा [3]धर्मभूतानन्दरूपतया पुरुषार्थो भवतीत्येतत् भाष्येऽपि स्फुटीकृतम्। निष्कलङ्कनिरुपाधिकतया ब्रह्मणि मुक्तेषु च परिपूर्णो वर्तते स आनन्द इति। तस्माज्जीवब्रह्माभेदेऽपि ब्रह्मानन्दस्य जीवान् प्रति पुरुषार्थत्वमुपपद्यत इति न तदनुसारेण भाष्यकारैः कण्ठतः प्रसाधितस्य जीवब्रह्माभेदस्य भङ्गः शङ्कनीयः।

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1. युज्यत एव (My; O)
2. अत एव (My; O)
3. सावत्य (O)

प्रसाधितः खलु साक्षादंशाधिकरणे; तत्र हि "ब्रह्मैव सत्योपाधिवशात् मिथ्योपाधिवशाद्वा जीवभावमापद्यते" इति पूर्वपक्षं कृत्वा तन्निरासपूर्वकं विशिष्टरूपब्रह्मैकदेशविशेषणत्वात्मकं ब्रह्मांशत्वं जीवस्य स्थापितम् । अज्ञानोपाधिना सत्योपाधिना वा ब्रह्मैव जीवभावमापद्यत इति पूर्वपक्षनिरासार्थत्वेन "आभास एव च", "अदृष्टानियमात्", "अभिसन्ध्यादिष्वपि चैवम्", "प्रदेशादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात्" (ब्र. २. ३. ४९–५२) इति तदधिकरणान्तर्गतं सूत्रचतुष्टयं योजितम् । तस्मात् चिदचित्प्रपञ्चाकारशक्तिविशिष्टं ब्रह्मेति विशिष्टाद्वैतपक्ष एव आचार्याणां परमसिद्धान्तः न तु निर्गुणं नीरूपं निष्प्रपञ्चं[1] ब्रह्मेति शुद्धाद्वैतपक्ष इति । 2. 823

एवमापाततः प्रतिभानेऽपि सूक्ष्मदृष्ट्या भाष्यच्छायापरामर्शे शुद्धाद्वैतमेव तेषां परमसिद्धान्तः । 3. 1

तथा हि — "अनियमस्सर्वेषामविरोधः शब्दानुमानाभ्याम्" (ब्र. ३. ३. ३२) इति सूत्रम् "येषु ब्रह्मोपासनेषूपकोसलविद्यादिष्वर्चिरादिगतिः श्रुता, सा तेष्वेव नियता; नोपासनान्तरेषु भवति, अश्रुतत्वात्" इति पूर्वपक्षनिरासार्थत्वेन प्रथमं भाष्ये योजितम्— "येषु श्रुतार्चिरादिगतिः सा तेष्वेवेति न नियमः; अपि तु सर्वेषां ब्रह्मोपासनानां भवत्येव; तथा सत्येव 'तद्य इत्थं विदुर्ये चेमे अरण्ये श्रद्धां सत्यमुपासते,' 'अग्निर्ज्योतिरहः शुक्लः' इत्यादिश्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यामविरोधो भवति" इति । तदनन्तरमिदं भाष्यम्—"केचिदाहुः —अनियमः, सर्वेषामुपासकानामर्चिरादिगतौ नियमाभावः, तथासति श्रुतिस्मृतिभ्यामविरोधः" इति । इदं यद्यपि मतान्तरोपन्यासत्वेन प्रतिभाति, तथापि तदनन्तरम् "तत्रापि न दोषः, निरन्वयोपासकानां तदपेक्षाभावात्' इति तस्यापि सौत्रयोजनान्तरस्य निर्गुणोपासकानामर्चिरादिगत्यपेक्षाभावेन स्वाभिमतहेतुनैवादुष्टत्वोपपादनात् । आद्यसूत्रयोजना सकलसगुणोपासनासाधारण्यार्था, द्वितीया निर्गुणोपासनायामपि तत्प्राप्तौ ततो व्यावर्तनार्था, इति योजनाद्वयमपि वर्णकद्वयरूपेण स्वपक्षतयाङ्गीकृतमित्युन्नीयते । 3. 11

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1. इदं अद्वैतमेव परमसिद्धान्त इति स्थापनम् । प (O)

3.12 तथा "तदापीतेः" (ब्र. ४. २. ८) इत्यधिकरणावसानेऽप्येतन्मतान्तरमुपन्यस्तम्। तदधिकरणमेवम्—"समाना चासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं च"
3.121 (ब्र. ४. २. ७) इति पूर्वाधिकरणोपपादितोत्क्रान्तिस्तत्पूर्विका गतिश्च विदुष उपपद्यते नवेति संशये सति, नोपपद्यते,

"यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते॥"

इति विदुषोऽत्रैव ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरिति श्रवणात्। "तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रद्योतते। तेन प्रद्योतेनैष आत्मा निष्क्रामति" इत्यादिना "इति नु कामयमानः" इत्यन्तेनोत्क्रान्तिप्रकारं देहान्तरपरिग्रहं यावत्कर्मावसानं[1] तेन देहान्तरेण कर्मफलभोगं पुनः कर्मार्जनायैतल्लोकप्राप्तिं उक्तस्योत्क्रान्त्यादिप्रकारादेः अविद्वद्विषयत्वं चोक्त्वा "अथाकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम आत्मकाम आप्तकामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति अत्रैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति" इति विदुष उत्क्रान्तिप्रतिषेधात्। न च विदुष एव "तद्य इत्थं विदुः" इत्यादिश्रुतिषु अर्चिरादिगतिः, "तयोर्ध्वमायन्नमृतत्वमेति" इत्यादिश्रुतिषूत्क्रान्तिश्च श्रूयत इति शङ्क्यम्। "अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य प्रयतो वाङ्मनसि संपद्यते। मनः प्राणे प्राणस्तेजसि तेजः परस्यां देवतायाम्" इति श्रुतौ विदुषो देहपातसमय एव वागादिमनःप्राणभूतसूक्ष्माणां परस्यां देवतायां परब्रह्मणि लीनत्वस्योक्तत्वेन तस्येन्द्रियमनःप्राणभूतसूक्ष्मापेक्षा गतिर्नोपपद्यत इति उपपत्तिराहित्येन च अत्रैव ब्रह्मप्राप्तिश्रुतेरुत्क्रान्तिप्रतिषेधश्रुतेश्च प्रबलतया तदनुसारेण गत्युत्क्रान्तिश्रुत्योः क्रममुक्त्यर्थब्रह्मविद्विषयत्वस्य वक्तव्यत्वात्। न च "अस्य सोम्य पुरुषस्य" इत्यादिश्रुतौ वागादीनां परस्यां देवतायां वृत्तिलयो विवक्षितो न स्वरूपलयः, विद्वदविद्वत्साधारणस्य प्रायणस्य निरूप्यमाणत्वेनाविदुषो वागादीनां ब्रह्मण्यपि स्वरूपलयस्य वागादीनां मनःप्रभृतिषु स्वरूपलयस्येवासम्भावितत्तया तद्विषये संपद्यत इति शब्दस्य वृत्तिलयार्थत्वेन तस्य पुनरर्थान्तरग्रहणायोगाच्चेति वाच्यम्। उदाहृतश्रुतेः सद्विद्यारूपविद्याप्रकरणाम्नातत्वेन तस्यां निरूप्यमाणस्य प्रायणस्य विद्वदेकविषयत्वात् संपद्यत इत्यस्य मनः-

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1. कर्मसाधनं (O)

प्रभृतिष्वन्वीयमानस्य वृत्तिलयार्थत्वेऽपि[1] "स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत्" (ब्र. २.३.४) इति न्यायेन परस्यां देवतायामन्वीयमानस्यौचित्यात् स्वरूपलयार्थत्वोपपत्तेश्चेति पूर्वः पक्षः ।

सिद्धान्तस्तु —सर्वत्र परब्रह्मणः सत्त्वेऽपि देशविशेषस्थितस्य तस्य 3.122
प्राप्तौ सत्यामेव देहबन्धविगमः । तत्प्राप्तिपर्यन्तं देहबन्धोऽनुवर्तते, विरजानदीमतिक्रम्य परब्रह्मलोकप्राप्तौ सत्यामेव कर्मबन्धक्षयोक्त्या तावत्पर्यन्तं तन्मूलसूक्ष्मदेहानुवृत्त्यवगमात् । अतस्तत्र तत्रार्चिरादिगतिश्रवणं मुक्तिफलप्राप्त्यर्थमेव, मुक्तिफलकविद्याप्रकरणाम्नानात्, तदपेक्षितत्वाच्च । यदुक्तं वागादीनां परस्यां देवतायां स्वरूपतो विलीनत्वात् विदुषो गतिर्नोपपद्यत इति तन्न । यतः शरीरपातानन्तरमपि विदुषः सूक्ष्मदेहोऽनुवर्तते ; चन्द्रसंवादादिवाक्यरूपप्रमाणात् तथोपलब्धेः । श्रूयते हि पर्यङ्कविद्यायां देवयाने पथि विदुषश्चन्द्रमसा संवादः— "ये वै के चास्माल्लोकात् प्रयन्ति, चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति" इत्युपक्रम्य "एतद्वै स्वर्गस्य लोकस्य द्वारं यश्चन्द्रमाः । तं यः प्रत्याह तमतिसृजते, अथ य एनं न प्रत्याह तमिह वृष्टिर्भूत्वा वर्षति । स इह कीटो वा पतङ्गो वा शकुनिर्वा शार्दूलो वा मत्स्यो वा अनड्वान्वा[2] पुरुषो वान्यो वैतेषु स्थानेषु प्रत्याजायते यथाकर्म यथाविद्यं तमागतं पृच्छति कोऽसीति । तं प्रति ब्रूयात्" इत्यादि । अतस्तदनुरोधात् "अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवति" इत्यमृतत्ववचनममृतत्वप्राप्तेरासन्नत्वमात्रं ब्रवीतीति योजनीयम् । न तु देहसम्बन्धोपमर्देन तदानीमेवामृतत्वं ब्रवीतीति । अस्य सूक्ष्मशरीरस्य क्वचिद्विद्यमानत्वोपपत्तेश्च तदुपमर्देनामृतत्वं ब्रवीतीति न योजनीयम् । "उपलभ्यते ह्युत्क्रामतो विदुषोऽपि क्वचित्सूक्ष्मदेहगुण ऊष्मा, न स स्थूलदेहगुणः अन्यत्रानुपलम्भात्" । यदुक्तम् "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इति विदुषः प्राणानामुत्क्रान्तिः प्रतिषिध्यते—इति, तन्न । तत्र हि शारीराज्जीवात् प्राणानामुत्क्रान्तिः प्रतिषिध्यते नतु शरीरात्, तस्येत्यस्याकामयमान इति प्रकृतजीवपरत्वात् ॥

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1. वृत्तिलक्षणयार्थान्तरत्वेऽपि (My)
2. परश्वा वा is the reading adopted by Max Müller and Dr. S. K. Belvalkar. Both these translate it as *serpent*, though neither seems sure of it. The Adyar Ms. of the present work adopts the same reading.

3. 122 ननु तस्येति षष्ठ्या प्राणानां सम्बन्धित्वेन जीवो निर्दिष्टः, न तूत्क्रान्त्यपादानत्वेन। तदपादानं तु शरीरमेव, जीवात् प्राणानामुत्क्रान्तेरप्रसक्त्या तत्प्रतिषेधायोगादिति चेन्न। अपादानापेक्षायां अश्रुताच्छरीरात् सम्ब-
3. 1222 न्धितया श्रुतस्य जीवस्यैवापादानत्वेनापि ग्राह्यत्वात् प्राणानां जीवसम्बन्धितयैव प्रज्ञातानां तत्सम्बन्धकथने प्रयोजनाभावेन सम्बन्धमात्रवाचिन्याः षष्ठ्याः—नटस्य शृणोति—इत्यादाविवापादानस्वरूपविशेषपरत्वौचित्यात्। स्पष्टश्चैकेषां माध्यन्दिनानां शाखायां जीवस्यैवापादानभावः। "न तस्मात्प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इत्यादिवचनेष्वत्रैव ब्रह्मसम्पत्तिवचनेन प्राणानामपि तस्मिन्नेव काले विदुषो जीवात् विश्लेषप्रसक्तिसत्त्वात्। स्मर्यते च विदुषोऽपि मूर्धन्यनाड्योत्क्रान्तिः—

"ऊर्ध्वमेकः स्थितस्तेषां यो भित्त्वा सूर्यमण्डलम्।
ब्रह्मलोकमतिक्रम्य तेन याति परां गतिम्"[1]॥

इति। एवमिदमाधिकरणम् "तदापीतेः संसारव्यपदेशात्", "सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धेः", "नोपमर्देनातः", "अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरूष्मा", "प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न, शारीरात् स्पष्टो ह्येकेषाम्", "स्मर्यते च" (ब्र. ४. २. ८–१३) इति षड्भिः सूत्रैः वर्णितम्।

3. 123 एवं ब्रह्म विदुषो गत्युत्क्रान्तिव्यवस्थापनेन निर्गुणब्रह्मविदोऽत्रैव-ब्रह्मसम्पत्तिर्व्यावर्तिता स्यादिति शङ्कापरिहारायानियमाधिकरणावसाने लिखितं मतान्तरमेतदधिकरणावसानेऽपि लिखितम्—"केचिन्निरन्वयोपासकानामिह शरीरपात एव मुक्तिरिति अर्चिरादिगतिमनियतामाहुः" इति।

3 124 एतन्मतं परिगृहीतवतामाचार्याणामयमाशयः—"इति नु कामयमानः" इति अविद्वद्विषयं परिसमाप्य, "अथाकामयमानः" इति विद्वद्विषये विशेषाभिधानं प्रतिज्ञाय "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इति यदुच्यते तद्विदुषः प्राणानां यदपादानमुत्क्रमणं प्रागुक्तं तदपादानस्यैवोत्क्रमणस्य प्रतिषेधपरमिति विद्वद्विषयविशेषाभिधानप्रतिज्ञानतात्पर्यस्वारस्येन प्रतीयते। अविदुषश्च प्राणानां शरीरापादानकमेवोत्क्रमणं प्रागुक्तम्। "तमुत्क्रामन्तं प्राणोऽनूत्क्रामति, प्राणम-

1. स. याति परमां गतिम् (My)

नूत्क्रामन्तं सर्वे प्राणा अनूत्क्रामन्ति" इति। अत्र जीवस्य यत उत्क्रमणमुक्तं तत एवोत्क्रमणं मुख्यप्राणस्येन्द्रियाणां च विवक्षितमिति जीवानूत्क्रमणोक्त्याव-सीयते। जीवस्य तु शरीरादेवोत्क्रमणमुक्तमिति निर्विवादम्। एवं "न तस्य प्राणाः" इति वाक्यस्य शरीरापादानकोत्क्रमणप्रतिषेधपरत्वे स्वरसतः प्रतीयमाने केन हेतुना तस्य तत्त्यक्तव्यम्? न तावत् प्राणसम्बन्धितया श्रुतस्य जीवस्यैव तदुत्क्रमणापादानतयापि ग्रहणे संभवति मनस्यविपरिवर्तमानस्यापादानान्तरस्य कल्पनं न युक्तम्—इति न्यायानुसारेण, पूर्वसन्दर्भमारभ्य शरीरस्य तदापादान-त्वेन विपरिवर्तमानत्वात्। "प्रजापतिर्वरुणायाश्वमनयत् स स्वां देवतामार्च्छत्स पर्यदीर्यत स एतं वारुणं चतुष्कपालमपश्यत् तन्निरवपत्ततो वै स वरुणपाशाद्-मुच्यत।" इत्युपक्रमच्छायया अश्वदातुः वारुणचतुष्कपालेष्टिर्विधास्यत इत्य-स्मिन्नर्थे मनसि विपरिवर्तमाने "वरुणो वा एतं गृह्णाति योऽश्वं प्रतिगृह्णाति यावतोऽश्वान् प्रतिगृह्णीयात् तावतो वारुणान् चतुष्कपालान् निर्वपेत्' इति तदनन्तरावगते विधिवाक्ये साक्षादधिकारिसमर्पकतया श्रुते "योऽश्वं प्रतिगृह्णाति" इति शब्दे सत्यपि प्रतिगृहीतुरधिकारित्वं नेष्यते; इह जीवस्यापादानत्वप्रति-पादकशब्दरहितस्य केवलन्यायमात्रेणापादानत्वकल्पनं नेष्टव्यमिति किमु वक्तव्यम्! नापि तदनन्तरसन्दर्भानुसारेण। तदनन्तरं हि "ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति" इति, 'तदेष श्लोको भवति—

यदा सर्वे प्रमुच्यन्ते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः।
अथ मर्त्योऽमृतो भवति अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते॥ इति

तद्यथा अहिनिर्ल्वयनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीतैवमेवेदं शरीरं शेते। अथाय-मशरीरोऽमृतः प्राणो ब्रह्मैव तेज एव" इत्येतावान् वाक्यसन्दर्भः श्रूयते।

तत्र प्रथमवाक्यं तावत् नित्यसिद्धब्रह्मभावाभिव्यक्तिं विदुषः प्रति- 3.125
पादयत्तस्य स्थानविशेषप्राप्त्यर्थं गत्यपेक्षाभावात् तद्गत्युपयोगि प्राणानामुत्क्रमणं नापेक्षितमिति शरीरापादानकतदुत्क्रमणप्रतिषेधार्थग्रहण एवानुकूलम्, न तु जीवप्राणाविश्लेषरूपार्थग्रहणे। न च "ब्रह्माप्येति" इति वचनं ब्रह्मणो विदुषश्च प्राप्यप्राप्तृभावेन भेदं प्रतिपादयतीति तस्य तद्ब्रह्मभावाभिव्यक्तिपरं न भवति; अतो "ब्रह्मैव सन्" इत्यत्रैवकार इवार्थ इति ज्ञानविकासेन ब्रह्मसदृशो

भवन्नेव ब्रह्म प्राप्नोतीति तदर्थो ग्राह्य इति वाच्यम्। अप्येतिशब्दो हि न प्राप्त्यर्थः, किन्तु लयार्थः। लयश्च तस्य प्राणेन्द्रियमनोविशिष्टं स्थूलरूपं विहाय शुद्धेन सूक्ष्मरूपेण तादात्म्याभिव्यक्तिरेव। यदि चायं प्राप्त्यर्थः स्यात्, तदाप्यत्र तादात्म्याभिव्यक्तिरेव तदर्थः पर्यवस्यति। बृहदारण्यक एव "असतो मा सद् गमय तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमय मृत्योर्मामृतं गमय" इति मन्त्रान् पठित्वा "स यदाहासतो मा सद्गमयेति मृत्युर्वा असत्सदमृतं मृत्योर्मामृतं गमयामृतं मा कुर्वित्येवैतदाह, तमसो मा ज्योतिर्गमयेति, मृत्युर्वै तमो ज्योतिरमृतं मृत्योर्मामृतं गमय अमृतं मा कुर्वित्येवैतदाह, मृत्योर्मामृतं गमयेति नात्र तिरोहितमिवास्ति" इति तन्मन्त्रत्रयव्याख्यानरूपब्राह्मणे गमयेति प्रापणार्थशब्दानां ऐक्यसम्पादनार्थत्वेन व्याख्याततयान्यत्रापि तत्समानार्थवाक्येषु प्राप्त्यर्थशब्दानामैक्याभिव्यक्तिपरत्वावसायात्।

3. 126 तथा श्लोकरूपं द्वितीयवाक्यमपि शरीरापादानकोत्क्रमणप्रतिषेधरूपार्थग्रहण एवानुकूलमिति स्पष्टमेव। न च तत्र "अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते" इति वर्तमानसामीप्ये वर्तमानप्रत्यय इति "अत्र" इति ब्रह्मप्राप्तिशैघ्र्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थोऽर्थवाद इति योजनीयम्, मुख्यार्थग्रहणस्यैवोचितत्वात्। तृतीयवाक्यमपि विदुषा त्यक्तस्य शरीरस्य वल्मीकादनपसृतेन सर्पेण त्यक्तमहिकञ्चुकं वल्मीकगतं दृष्टान्तं प्रतिपादयत्तदर्थग्रहण एवानुकूलम्। चतुर्थवाक्यमपि त्यक्तशरीरस्य मुक्तस्य विदुषः सर्वप्राणनहेतुपरब्रह्मभावं तदुपपत्त्यर्थं "तेज एव" इति विशुद्धज्ञानरूपत्वं च प्रतिपादयत्तत्रैवानुकूलम्। अतो न वाक्यशेषानुसारेणापि "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इत्यस्य स्वारसिकार्थत्यागो युक्तः।

3. 127 ननु माध्यन्दिनशाखायाम्, उदाहृतवाक्यस्थाने "न तस्मात्प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इति पाठो दृश्यते। अतस्तदनुसारेण काण्वशाखायामपि तस्येति षष्ठ्याः सम्बन्धसामान्यवाचिन्याः अपादानत्वरूपसम्बन्धविशेषपर्यवसानकल्पनं युक्तम्। एवं च यद्यपि "न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इति प्रथमवाक्ये विदुषः शरीरपाते अविद्वदपेक्षया विशेषाभिधानं न लभ्यते, तथाप्यग्रे ब्रह्मप्राप्त्युक्त्या विशेषाभिधानं लभ्यत इति तन्मात्रविषया विशेषाभिधानप्रतिज्ञेति कथञ्चिद्योजनीयमिति चेन्नैवम्। "न तस्मात्प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति" इत्येतदनन्तरम् "अत्रैव

[1]समवनीयन्ते" इति प्राणानाम् "अत्र ब्रह्म समश्नुते" इति श्लोकार्थानुगुण्येनात्रैव लयश्रवणात्, तदनुसारेण तस्मादिति पदस्य शरीरशरीरिणोरभेदोपचारेण शरीरपरतया नेतव्यत्वात्। अत एवार्तभागप्रश्ने "यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते उदस्मात्प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो न इति" प्रश्ने, उत्तरे "नेति होवाच याज्ञवल्क्योऽत्रैव [2]समवनीयन्ते; स उच्छ्वयत्याध्मायत्याध्मातो मृतः शेते" इति प्राणोत्क्रान्त्यपादानस्याध्मानेन वायुपूरणेन दृतिवदुच्छ्वयनस्य शरीरधर्मस्य कीर्तनं दृश्यते।

नन्वार्तभागप्रश्नोत्तरे न विद्वद्विषये, उत्तरसन्दर्भविरोधात्; उत्तरसन्दर्भे हि "यत्रास्य पुरुषस्य मृतस्याग्निं वागप्येति वातं प्राणश्चक्षुरादित्यं मनश्चन्द्रं दिशः श्रोत्रं पृथिवीं शरीरमाकाशमात्मा ओषधीः लोमानि वनस्पतीन् केशा अप्सु लोहितं च रेतश्च निधीयते, क्वायं तदा पुरुषो भवति" इति पुनरार्तभागप्रश्ने याज्ञवल्क्येनार्तभागेन च रहसि संमन्त्रणेन पुण्यपापरूपं कर्म तदाश्रयत्वेन निश्चितमित्याम्नायते, तदनन्तरसन्दर्भे श्रुत्यैव तथा प्रतिपादनात्। 3. 1271
तत्र हि श्रूयते—"तौ होत्क्रम्य मन्त्रयाञ्चक्राते, तौ ह यदूचतुः कर्म हैव तदूचतुः, अथ यत् प्रशशंसतुः कर्म हैव तत् प्रशशंसतुः, पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पापः पापेन" इति। न च "अपपुनर्मृत्युं जयति" इति पूर्ववाक्ये संसारतरणरूपफलमुच्यते; तेन प्रकृतविद्वद्विषयत्वमुत्क्रान्तिप्रतिषेधस्यावसीयत इति वाच्यम्। "अग्निर्वै मृत्युः सोऽपामन्नम्" इत्यपामग्न्यन्नत्वोपासनमुक्त्वा हि तस्य फलम् "अपपुनर्मृत्युं जयति" इत्युच्यते। तस्मादग्निजय एवात्राप मृत्युजयो[3] न संसारतरणम्। अतोऽस्य वाक्यस्यापि अविद्वद्विषयत्वादविदुषश्च शरीरात्प्राणानामुत्क्रान्तेरवश्यंभावात् जीवात् तेषामुत्क्रान्तिप्रतिषेध एव तदर्थो ग्राह्यः। इतश्चैतदेवम् "यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते" इति पूर्ववाक्ये पुरुषशब्देन प्रकृतो जीव एव "उदस्मात्प्राणाः क्रामन्ति" इत्यत्र सर्वनाम्ना परामर्शनीयः। न च तत्र पुरुषशब्दस्य शरीरपरत्वं शङ्कनीयम्, "यत्रास्य पुरुषस्याग्निं वागप्येति" इत्युत्तरसन्दर्भे "पृथिवीं शरीरम्" इति प्रकृतपुरुषसम्बन्धित्वेन शरीरस्य पृथक् कीर्तनात्। न च "आकाशमात्मा" इत्यात्मापि पृथक् कीर्तित इति वाच्यम्,

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1. समवलीयन्ते (O) 2. समवलीयन्ते (O)
3. जय एवात्र मृत्युजय (A)

तत्रात्मशब्दस्य "आनन्द आत्मा" इत्यत्रेव मध्यावयववाचित्वेन [1]हृदयावकाश-परत्वात् ।

3. 1272 एवं च "स उच्छ्वयति" इति वाक्ये तच्छब्दः शरीरशरीरिणोर-भेदोपचारेण शरीरपरतया नेतव्य इति चेन्मैवम्, अविद्वद्विषये जीवप्राणविश्लेष-स्याप्रसक्तत्वेन तत्प्रतिषेधस्यायुक्ततया प्रश्नोत्तरयोर्विद्वद्विषयत्वस्यावश्यवक्तव्यत्वात् । ननु पूर्वोक्तप्रश्नोत्तराणामविद्वद्विषयत्वेन अनयोरपि प्रश्नोत्तरयोरविद्वद्विषयत्वस्या-वश्यवक्तव्यत्वात् जीवप्राणविश्लेषप्रसक्तिर्यथाकथंचित्संपादनीयेति चेन्न; अविद्वद्वि-षयप्रश्नोत्तरसांनिध्यमात्रेण विद्वद्विषयत्वलिङ्गबाधायोगात् । आर्तभागप्रश्नपरम्परायां "कति ग्रहाः कत्यतिग्रहाः" इत्याद्यः प्रश्नः, "यदिदं सर्वं मृत्योरन्नं कास्वित्सा देवता यस्या मृत्युरन्नम्" इति द्वितीयः, "यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते उदस्मात्प्राणाः क्रामन्त्याहो न" इति तृतीयः, "यत्रायं पुरुषो म्रियते, किमेनं न जहाति" इति चतुर्थः, यत्रास्य पुरुषस्य मृतस्याग्निं वागप्येति" इत्यादिः पञ्चमः—इति प्रश्नानामेकविषयत्वाभावेनैकरूपप्रायपाठासिद्धेश्च । तथापि तृतीयादिप्रश्नानां म्रियमाणपुरुषवृत्तान्तगोचरत्वेनैकविषयत्वात् चतुर्थपञ्चमयोरिव तृतीयस्यापि प्रश्न-स्याविद्वद्विषयत्वं वक्तुं युक्तम्, तत्सन्निधिबलादिति चेदुच्यते । अश्वलप्रभृतिभिः याज्ञवल्क्येन सह मत्सरतो विजिगीषुकथायां प्रवृत्तैस्तमप्रतिभायां पातयितुं[2] प्रायेण निगूढाः प्रश्नाः कृताः । यथा आर्तभागेनैव तावत् "कति ग्रहाः कत्यतिग्रहाः" इति यज्ञवृत्तान्तविषय इव प्रश्नः कृतः । अध्यात्मप्रसङ्गान्तर्गतत्वान्नायं यज्ञवृत्तान्त-विषय इति प्रष्टुः कौटिल्यमवगम्य "प्राणवाग्जिह्वाचक्षुःश्रोत्रमनोहस्तत्वचो ग्रहाः । अपाननामरसरूपशब्दकामकर्मस्पर्शाः अतिग्रहाः" इत्युत्तरमुक्तम् । तथा लाह्यायनिना "क पारिक्षिता अभवन्" इत्यप्रसिद्धार्थेन पारिक्षितशब्देन प्रश्नः कृतः । "यत्राश्वमेधयाजिनो अभवन्" इति तदर्थं विवृण्वतैव याज्ञवल्क्येनोत्तर-मुक्तम् । तथा गार्ग्या "अहं वै त्वा याज्ञवल्क्य यथा काश्यो वा वैदेहो वा उग्रपुत्र उज्ज्यं धनुरधिज्यं कृत्वा द्वौ बाणवन्तौ सपत्नातिव्याधिनौ हस्ते कृत्वो-पोत्तिष्ठेत्, एवमेवाहं त्वा द्वाभ्यां प्रश्नाभ्यामुपोदस्थां तौ मे ब्रूहि" इति प्रश्न-

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1. हृदयाकाशपरत्वात् (A)
2. तमप्रतिभामापादयितुं (My); भामापा (O)

वाक्यच्छाययैव मत्सरविवरणं कृतम्। एवं चात्र तृतीयप्रश्नस्याविद्वद्विषयचतुर्थपञ्चमप्रश्नसन्निधिरपि त्रयाणामेकविषयत्वव्यामोहजननार्थत्वेनान्यथासिद्धो नार्थव्यवस्थापनक्षमः; नतरां ग्रहातिग्रहमृत्युभक्षकदेवतारूपपरस्परभिन्नविषयाद्द्वितीयप्रश्नप्रतिपक्षितः; नतमां तृतीयप्रश्नगतविद्वद्विषयत्वलिङ्गबाधित इत्येषा दिक्। तस्मात्सगुणब्रह्मविद्यामात्रव्यवस्थितोत्क्रान्तिपूर्विकार्चिरादिगतिः, न विशुद्धब्रह्मविद्यासाधारणीति। अस्मिन्मते सूत्रयोजनाप्रकारस्तु शाङ्करभाष्यदर्शित एवाचार्याणामभिमत इति द्रष्टव्यम्।

तथा "अर्चिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः" (ब्र. ४. ३. १) इत्यधिकरणा- 3.13
वसानेऽप्येतन्मतान्तरमुपन्यस्तम्। तदधिकरणमेवम्—मूर्धन्यनाड्या निष्क्रान्तस्य विदुषः परब्रह्मप्राप्तिरर्चिरादिनैकेन मार्गेण उत मार्गान्तरेणापीति संशये
पूर्वः पक्षः; मार्गान्तरेणापि ब्रह्मप्राप्तिरस्ति। न खलु "अन्तरेण तालुके, य एष 3.131
स्तन इवावलम्बते, सेन्द्रयोनिः, यत्रासौ केशान्तो विवर्तते, व्यपोह्य शीर्षकपाले" इति व्याहृतिविद्यायां श्रुतानि तालुकान्तरावलम्बमानावयवकेशान्तशीर्षकपालरूपाणि मार्गपर्वाण्यर्चिरादिमार्गे श्रूयन्ते। शैब्यप्रश्ने "स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकम्" इति सामवेदपठितानां साम्नामेव ब्रह्मलोकपर्यन्तं प्रापकत्वं श्रूयते। दहरविद्यायां "यत्रैतदस्माच्छरीरादुत्क्रामत्यथैतैरेव रश्मिभिरूर्ध्वं आक्रमते" इति सूर्यरश्मीनामेवेतरव्यवच्छेदेन प्रापकत्वं श्रूयते। तथान्यत्र "स यावत् क्षिप्येन्मनस्तावदादित्यं गच्छति" इति त्वरावचनादादित्यप्राप्तेरर्चिरादिपूर्वपर्वानपेक्षत्वं प्रतीयते। एवं च यथाम्नानं प्रकरणभेदेन च व्यवस्थितेन तेन तेन मार्गेण ब्रह्मप्राप्तिः, न त्वर्चिरादिनैकेनैवेति।

सिद्धान्तस्तु—प्रसिद्धस्तावदर्चिरादिमार्गः सर्वविद्यासाधारण इति। 3.132
छान्दोग्ये पञ्चाग्निविद्यायाम् "तद्य इत्थं विदुर्ये चेमे अरण्ये श्रद्धां तप इत्युपासते" इति, तथा बृहदारण्यकेऽपि "ये चामी अरण्ये श्रद्धां सत्यमुपासते" इति श्रवणात्॥

ननु यासु विद्यासु न कश्चिदपि मार्गः श्रूयते, तद्विषयमिदम्— 3.133
उपासते—इति विद्वदनुकीर्तनं भविष्यति। [1]भवेदेतदेवं यदि मार्गैक्यमशक्योप-

1. भवेदेवम् (T; My)

पादनं स्यात्; शक्यते हि तदुपपादयितुम्। तथाहि—व्याहृतिविद्यायां स्तना-कृतिनेन्द्रस्य जीवस्य परमेश्वरस्य वा स्थानभूतावयवेन निर्गत्य केशान्तस्थानस्थ शिरःकपालस्यातिलङ्घनं यदुक्तं तन्मूर्धन्यनाड्या निष्क्रमणमेव। तदनन्तरम् "भूरित्यग्नौ प्रतितिष्ठति, भुव इति वायौ, सुवरित्यादित्ये" इति यदग्न्यादीनामनु-कीर्तनं तदर्चिरादि [1]मार्गपर्वभूतानामेव। तत्र यदग्न्यादिषु प्रतिष्ठितत्वश्रवणं तत्तेषु कियत्कालं विश्रान्तिरस्तीत्यभिप्रायेण। व्याहृतिविद्यायाम्—महः—इति चतुर्थव्या-
3.134 हृतिरूपस्य ब्रह्मण इव व्याहृतित्रयरूपाणामग्न्यादीनामप्युपास्यत्वमस्तीति तद्ब-लात्तेषां लोकेषु विश्रान्तिवचनं युक्तम्। "स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकम्" इत्यत्र "यः पुनरेतं त्रिमात्रेणोमित्येतेनैवाक्षरेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत" इत्येक-मात्रद्विमात्रप्रणवसाधनकोपासनानुकीर्तनानन्तरं त्रिमात्रप्रणवसाधनकोपासनाविधा-नात्तत्र प्रणवमात्राणां ऋग्यजुस्सामरूपतया प्रतिपादितत्वाच्च विद्यासाधनप्रण-
3.135 वत्रितये त्रिमात्रस्य तृतीयमात्रारूपाण्येव सामानि विद्यासाधनतया ब्रह्मप्रापकत्वे-नानुकीर्तनानि, न तु मार्गतया। "अथैतैरेव रश्मिभिः" इत्यत्रावधारणं रश्मि-विज्ञानार्थप्राप्ततद्योगव्यवच्छेदानुवादकम्, न त्वर्चिरादीनां व्यवच्छेदकम्;
3.136 एकस्य वाक्यस्य रश्मिप्रापणे तदितरव्यवच्छेदे च तात्पर्यासंभवात्। त्वरावचनं पितृयाणापेक्षयोपपन्नम्, न पूर्वपर्वाणि व्यवच्छिनत्ति। नापि विदुषामेव मार्गान्त-रमवधित्वेनापेक्ष्यते। एवं मार्गैक्योपपादने संभवति लाघवन्यायानुगृहीतसामान्य-मुखप्रवृत्तश्चाग्निविद्यावाक्यातिलङ्घनं न युक्तमिति।

3.137 एवमर्चिरादिगतेः सकलब्रह्मविद्यासाधारण्यव्यवस्थापनात् निर्गुण-ब्रह्मविदोऽत्रैव ब्रह्मसंपत्तिर्व्यावर्तिता स्यादिति शङ्कापरिहारार्थमेतदधिकरणा-वसानेऽपि तन्मतान्तरमुपन्यस्तम्—"निरन्वयोपासकानां नार्चिरादिरिति केचित्" इति तस्मिन् मते "अर्चिरादिना तत्प्रथितेः" (ब्र. ४. ३. १) इतीदं सूत्रं प्रथितग्रहणात् प्रायोऽभिप्रायं नेतव्यम्। अवश्यं च प्रायोऽभिप्रायमिदमिति सर्वैरपि वक्तव्यम्, हिरण्यगर्भपर्यन्तानां देवानां स्वस्वलोकेषु स्थित्वैव मुच्यमाना-नामर्चिरादिमार्गासंभवात्। न च भुवि विद्यामनुष्ठाय मुच्यमानानां मनुष्याणा-मयमेक एव मार्ग इति नियमो विवक्षित इति वाच्यम्। मधुविद्योपासकानां

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1. तदग्न्यादीनामर्चि (O)

वसुरुद्रादित्यमरुत्साध्यगणपद्प्राप्तिपूर्विकायां मुक्तौ वस्वादिपदपूर्वकमार्गान्तरावश्यंभावादित्याचार्याणामभिप्रायः। एवं यत्र यत्राधिकरणे ब्रह्मविदो गतेरुत्क्रान्तेर्वा व्यवस्थापनं क्रियते, तत्र सर्वत्रापि तस्य तस्याधिकरणस्य सकलब्रह्मवित्साधारण्याशङ्कापरिहारार्थमस्य मतस्योपन्यासात्. अनियमाधिकरणे स्वयमप्यस्योपपादनाच्चात्राचार्याणां तात्पर्यातिशयोऽवगम्यते। न च सर्वत्रापि "केचित्" इत्युपन्यासादनभिमतत्वं शङ्कनीयम्, स्वयमिदानीं सगुणविद्यानिष्ठ एव न तु निर्गुणविद्यानिष्ठ इति द्योतनार्थत्वेनैतस्यान्यथासिद्धतया ततः स्वयमुपपादनाभ्यस्तोपन्यासाभ्यामवगतस्य तस्मिन् मते तात्पर्यातिशयस्यापह्नोतुमशक्यत्वात्। आनन्दमयाधिकरणे आनन्दमयः परं ब्रह्म तत्प्रतिष्ठारूपं पुच्छब्रह्म तु तद्वाचकं प्रणवाख्यं शब्दब्रह्मेत्यस्मिन्नर्थेऽधिकरणशरीरं योजयित्वा तदनन्तरं "केचिदाहुः" इति मतान्तरत्वेनोपन्यस्तस्य "आनन्दमयश्चिच्छक्तिः तत्प्रतिष्ठारूपं पुच्छब्रह्म तु परं ब्रह्म" इति पक्षस्य, जन्मादिसूत्रे (ब्र. १. १. २) "'यः खलु अन्योऽन्तरात्मानन्दमयः' इति प्रस्तुत्य 'सैषानन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति' इत्यारभ्याभ्यासात् निरतिशयशिरस्कत्वेन 'स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः' इति निरूपितः परब्रह्मधर्मत्वेन. स एव 'आनन्दो ब्रह्म' इति प्रचुरत्वात् ब्रह्मत्वेनोपचर्यते। तादृशानन्दभोगरसिकं ब्रह्म नित्यतृप्तमित्युच्यते" इति स्वमततयोपन्यासदर्शनेनाभिमतपक्ष एव केचिदित्युपन्यास इत्याचार्यशैलीदर्शनाच्च।

एवं निर्विशेषब्रह्मविद्याभ्युपगमानुगुण्येन विद्यायां जीवब्रह्माभेदविषयत्वाभ्युपगमोऽपि "प्राणस्तथानुगमात्" (ब्र. १. १. २९) इत्यधिकरणे दृश्यते। 3.14
तत्र हि "प्राणोऽस्मि प्रज्ञात्मा, तं मामायुरमृतमित्युपास्व" इति मुक्त्यर्थमुपास्यतया इन्द्रेणोपदिष्टः प्राणः परमात्मा, नत्विन्द्र इति निर्णीय, कथं तर्हि "प्राणोऽस्मि" इति "मामुपास्व" इति चोपदेश इत्याशङ्कापरिहारार्थस्य "शास्त्रदृष्ट्या तूपदेशो वामदेववत्" इति सूत्रस्य "य आत्मनि तिष्ठन्" इत्यादिशास्त्रेण स्वान्तर्यामिणं परमात्मानमवगम्य, "तन्नामरूपाभ्यां व्याक्रियते" इत्यादि शास्त्रेणाहमादिशब्दानां स्वान्तर्यामिपरमात्मपर्यन्तत्वं चावगम्य तद्दृष्ट्यायमिन्द्रेण कृतः—प्राणोऽस्मि इत्युपदेश इत्येकमर्थमुक्त्वा स्वात्मपरमात्माभेदविषयया "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यादिशास्त्रजन्यदृष्ट्या वा तथोपदेश इत्यर्थान्तरमुक्तम्—"अथवा वेदान्तविज्ञानोपलब्धया ब्रह्मात्मसामरस्यभावनया ब्रह्मभाव-

मुपगतस्य विगलितमनुष्यादिदेहविषयकल्पिताहंभावसंकोचस्य संपन्नविश्वाकारपराहंभावस्य वामदेवस्य सर्वगतत्वावगमान्मनुसूर्यादिप्रपञ्चभावोक्तिः । एवमिन्द्रस्यापीति निश्चीयते " इति ।

3.15 इत्थं निर्गुणविद्यायामभेदभावनासंभवे [1]सगुणविद्यायां सा न संभवति ; सगुणस्य परमेश्वरस्य जीवस्य च सर्वज्ञत्वकिञ्चिज्ज्ञत्वादिविरुद्धधर्मयोगकृतभेदसत्वादित्याशङ्क्य व्यावहारिकभेदसत्त्वेऽपि तात्त्विकाभेददृष्ट्या तदभेदभावना कार्येति एतदर्थत्वेन " आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च " (ब्र. ४. १. ३.)
3.151 इत्यधिकरणं प्रवर्तितम् । तदित्थम्–ब्रह्मोपासनमुपासकेन स्वात्मभिन्नतया कार्यम्, उत स्वात्माभिन्नतयेति संशये पूर्वः पक्षः—" विश्वाधिको रुद्रो महर्षिः " " अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् " इत्यादिश्रुतिसूत्रेषु प्रत्यगात्मनः पशोर्जीवात्पत्युः परब्रह्मणोऽर्थान्तरत्वेन निरूपितत्वात् सर्वज्ञत्वादिना जीवस्य ब्रह्मभावाघटनाच्च ब्रह्मोपासनं स्वभिन्नत्वेनैव कार्यम्—इति । सिद्धान्तस्तु—यद्यपि जीवादधिकमेव
3.152 शिवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म, तथाप्युपासिता " अहं ब्रह्मास्मि " इति तदुपासीत, यतः पूर्वेऽप्युपासितारः " त्वं वा अहमस्मि भगवो देवते अहं वै त्वमसि " इत्यात्मेत्येवावगच्छन्ति । न च तत्र शरीरशरीरिभावनिबन्धनं सामानाधिकरण्यम् । तदा हि " अहं वै त्वमसि " इति निर्देश एवोपपद्यते, त्वं शब्दनिर्दिष्टे परमेश्वरे स्वशरीरकत्वपर्यन्तस्याहंशब्दस्य वृत्तिसंभवात् । " त्वं वा अहमस्मि " इति निर्देशस्तु नोपपद्यते, अहंशब्दनिर्दिष्टे परमेश्वरशरीररूपे स्वस्मिन् परमेश्वरवाचिनः त्वंशब्दस्य वृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । शरीरवाचिनां हि शरीरिपर्यन्तत्वं व्युत्पत्तिसिद्धम्, न तु शरीरिवाचिनां शरीरपर्यन्तत्वम् । न च वाक्यद्वयेऽपि त्वंशब्दौ प्रस्तुतगुणविशिष्टपरमेश्वरविषयौ, अहंशब्दौ स्वशरीरकत्वविशिष्टतद्विषयाविति वाक्यद्वयमप्येकरूपार्थपरमिति वाच्यम्, तदानीं " त्वं वा अहमस्म्यहं वै त्वमसि " इति व्यवस्थितयुष्मदस्मच्छब्दपौर्वापर्यास्यसिशब्दप्रयोगकृतवाक्यद्वयवैलक्षण्यवैयर्थ्यापत्तेः, एकेनैव वाक्येन स्वान्तर्यामिणः परमेश्वरस्य चाभेदसिद्ध्या वाक्यान्तरवैयर्थ्यापत्तेश्च । न चाभेदधीदार्ढ्यार्थं वाक्यद्वयम्, जीवपरमेश्वरयोरिवान्तर्यामिपरमेश्वरयोः भेदभ्रान्त्यभावेन तद्दार्ढ्योपादनस्यानपेक्षितत्वात् । अतः कर्मव्यतीहारेण स्वस्मिन्

1. संभवेपि (O)

परमेश्वराभेदः परमेश्वरे स्वाभेदश्च भेदाभेदशङ्कानिरासेन भेददार्ढ्यार्थं विधित्सितोऽत्रेत्यवसीयते। एवं "त्वोऽहं सोऽसौ, योऽसौ सोऽहम्" इति ऐतरेयवाक्येऽपि।

एवमवगच्छतश्चोपासकानर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि परंब्रह्मस्वरूपतयाऽनुगृह्णाति। 3.154
"ते च पुनः स्वात्मतया ग्राहयन्ति परानपि शिष्यान् 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यादिना"। तत्त्वमसीति वाक्येऽपि सामानाधिकरण्यं शरीरशरीरिभावनिबन्धनं न भवति। यतस्तत्र त्वंशब्दनिर्दिष्टे तच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टप्राग्वर्णितजगत्कारणत्वाद्युपलक्षितपरमेश्वराभेदो बोध्यत इत्यसिशब्दयोगादवगतेः त्वंशब्दः संबोध्य जीवमात्रपर; न तु तदन्तर्यामिपर्यन्तः, संबोध्यं प्रति स्वात्मन इव स्वान्तर्यामिणः स्वानुभवेन वा प्राचीनोपदेशेन वा प्रसिद्धत्वाभावेन तस्य तं प्रत्युद्देश्यतानर्हत्वात्; प्रकृतस्य सद्रूपस्य परमेश्वरस्य कथञ्चित्स्वान्तर्यामितया प्रागुपदिष्टत्वसमर्थने तत्र तद्भेदशङ्कानुदयेन पौनःपुन्येन तद्बोधनानपेक्षणादिति।

न च प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हीत्यधिकरणभाष्ये (ब्र. ३. २. २१) ब्रह्माभेद- 3.155
भावनायां गरुडाभेदभावनायाः दृष्टान्तीकरणात् तद्वदारोपितविषयत्वमेव ब्रह्माभेदभावनाया भाष्याभिमतम्, न तु तात्त्विकाभेदविषयत्वमिति शङ्कनीयम्, शास्त्रदृष्टिसूत्रे (ब्र. १. १. ३१) ब्रह्मात्मसामरस्यभावनया, ब्रह्मभावमुपगतस्येत्युक्त्या, आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्तीत्यधिकरणे (ब्र. ४. १. ३.) "उपासितुरर्थान्तरत्वेऽपि तानुपासितॄननुगृह्णाति स्वस्वरूपतया परं ब्रह्म" इत्युक्त्याचाभेदस्य तात्त्विकत्वावगमात्। न ह्यभेदस्य तात्त्विकत्वाभावे वस्तुतस्तद्भावप्राप्त्युक्तिरुपपद्यते। उपासितुरर्थान्तरत्वेपीत्यनुवादस्तु व्यावहारिकभेदसद्भावेपीत्येतदर्थः पूर्वपक्षबीजशङ्कानिराकरणार्थ इति न विरोधः। अत एव निखिलभ्रान्त्यादिहेतुपुण्यपापक्षयपूर्वकं परमशिवलोके तत्सायुज्यं प्राप्तस्यापि शिवाहंभावानुवृत्तिः विकारावर्तिसूत्रभाष्ये (ब्र. ४. ४. १९) प्रतिपादिता "सदाशिवादीनामविकारिणां ब्रह्मान्तानां मण्डलेषु स्वेच्छया सञ्चरमाणः कामान्नी कामरूपी विगलितमनुष्यादिदेहाभिमानोऽसङ्कुचितशक्तित्रयव्यापारः परमानन्दप्रकाशविभूतिमयशिवशक्तिसामरस्यपरब्रह्मरूपैकरसप्रपञ्चावगाहिनं परिपूर्णमहंभावं प्रकटमनुभवति। तथाहि—'अहमन्नमहमन्नमहमन्नम्। अहमन्नादोऽहमन्नादोऽहमन्नाद' इति भोग्यभोक्त्रादिसकलप्रपञ्चात्मभावपरिपूर्णाहम्भावनास्यावगम्यते' इति। यद्यपि शिवसायुज्यप्राप्तस्य

चिच्छक्तिविकासो न जगद्व्यापकतावस्थापन्नस्य प्रपञ्चनियमनशक्त्युन्मीलनात्, सर्वशरीरकस्य सतः सकलभोग्यभोक्तृशरीरकत्वप्रयुक्तः पराहम्भावः शिवाभेदभावनामनपेक्ष्य स्वतोऽपि संभवति, "असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिरेकः" (ब्र. २. ३. ४८) इत्यादिसूत्रभाष्येषु तस्य तथाभूतस्यापि पराहम्भावस्य सतो दर्शितत्वात्, तथापि सूत्रभाष्ये न विवक्षितः सः, किन्तु ब्रह्मण एव परोऽहम्भावः "परब्रह्मस्वरूपैकरसप्रपञ्चावगाहिनम्" इत्यहंभावविशेषणस्वारस्यात्। तत्र हि प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मस्वरूपान्तर्गतिरेवोक्ता, न तु स्वशरीरत्वम्। आदेहपातं शिवाहम्भावभावनादार्ढ्यवतश्च
3.16 मुक्तस्य यथेष्टगानसमयेष्वपि तदनुवृत्तिरेव वक्तुमुचिता।

एवमभेदभावनाप्रदर्शकभाष्यैः स्वाभिमतत्वेनाविष्कृतो जीवब्रह्माभेदः "वदतीति चेन्न प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात्" (ब्र. १. ४. ५) इत्यानुमानिकाधिकरणसूत्रभाष्येऽपि कयाचिदुक्तिभङ्ग्याविष्कृतः। तत्राधिकरणे "महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः" इति कठवल्लीमन्त्रश्रुतमव्यक्तं साङ्ख्याभिमतं प्रधानमित्युदाहृतश्रुतिमूलः साङ्ख्यसिद्धान्त इति पूर्वपक्षनिराकरणार्थं प्रवृत्तेन "ज्ञेयत्वावचनाच्च" (ब्र. १. ४. ४) इति गुणसूत्रेण सिद्धान्ते हेत्वन्तरमुक्तम्। यदीदमेव वाक्यं साङ्ख्यमतस्य मूलमभविष्यत्तदा प्रकृतिपुरुषविवेकज्ञानात्[1] कैवल्यमिति वदतः साङ्ख्यस्याभिमतं प्रधानस्य मुमुक्षुज्ञेयत्वमप्यत्रावक्ष्यत। तदत्र नोच्यते। अतो नैतन्मूलकं साङ्ख्यं मतमिति श्रद्धेयम्; न हि यन्मूलमेव यच्छास्त्रं तत्र तच्छास्त्रवर्णितं नोक्तमिति युच्यत इति।

नन्वसिद्धं ज्ञेयत्वावचनम्, "अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपम्" इति मन्त्रेण कठवल्लीश्रुतिर्हि शब्दादिहीनस्य महत्तत्वात् परस्याव्यक्तस्य ज्ञेयत्वं वदतीति पुनः साङ्ख्यशङ्कामनूद्य तन्निराकरणार्थं "वदतीति चेत्" (ब्र. १. ४. ५) इति सूत्रम्। तेन मन्त्रेण परमेश्वर उच्यते न प्रधानम्, परमेश्वरस्यैव प्रकरणादिति तन्निराकरणप्रकारप्रदर्शनार्थं प्राकरणिके परमेश्वरविषये मन्त्रे उदाहरणीये

"यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी प्राज्ञस्तद्यच्छेत् ज्ञान आत्मनि।
ज्ञानमात्मनि महति नियच्छेत् तद्यच्छेच्छान्त आत्मनि॥"

इति मन्त्र उदाहृतो भाष्ये। एवं हि तस्य सूत्रस्य भाष्यम्—

1. विवेकदोषज्ञानात् (T)

" अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं
तथारसं नित्यमगन्धवच्च यत् ।
अनाद्यनन्तं महतः परं ध्रुवं
निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्प्रमुच्यते ॥ "

इत्यप्रेतनमन्त्रोऽस्यापि ज्ञेयतां वदतीति चेन्न, 'यच्छेद्वाङ्मनसी प्राज्ञः' इति प्राज्ञस्यैव पूर्वं प्रकृतत्वात्" इति । अत्र सूत्रे प्राज्ञशब्दोपादानादस्मिन् मन्त्रे यः प्राज्ञशब्दोदितः तस्येदं प्रकरणमिति भाष्यवाक्यस्य स्वरसतोऽर्थः प्रतीयते । अस्मिन् मन्त्रे प्राज्ञशब्देन मुमुक्षुर्जीव उक्तः, तं प्रत्येव वाङ्मनसादिनियमनविधानस्यार्थवत्त्वात् । परमात्मनश्चात्र प्रकरणमिष्टम्;

" महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः ।
पुरुषान्न परं किञ्चित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥ "

इति तस्यात्र प्राधान्येन प्रतिपिपादयिषितत्वात् । एवं चात्र यदि भाष्यकाराणां जीवपरमात्मनोरभेदो हृदयस्थो न भवेत्, तदा परमात्मपरेण शब्देन प्रकरणिन्युदाहरणीये जीवपरेण शब्देन तदुदाहरणमसमञ्जसमेव स्यात् ।

नन्वेवमपि कथं नासमञ्जसम्, जीवपरमात्मनोर्वास्तवाभेदाभ्युप- 3.161
गन्तृभिरपि व्यावहारिकेण तयोर्विभागेन वेदान्तेष्विदं जीवप्रकरणमिदं परमात्म-
प्रकरणमिति व्यवस्थितेरभ्युपगतत्वादिति चेदुच्यते । कठवल्लीषु 3.162

" येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्ये अस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके ।
एतद्विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः ॥ "

इति मृतजीवविषयप्रश्ने नचिकेतसा कृते

" तं दुर्दर्शं गूढमनुप्रविष्टं गुहाहितं गह्वरेष्ठं पुराणम् ।
अध्यात्मयोगाधिगमेन देवं मत्वा धीरो हर्षशोकौ जहाति ॥ "

इति वैवस्वतेन परमात्मविषयं तदुत्तरमुक्तम् । तथा हि—प्रश्नस्य तावन्मृतजीवविषयत्वं सुदृढम्; प्रेतशब्दस्य तत्र रूढत्वात्;

"इमा रामाः सरथाः सतूर्या न हीदृशा लम्भनीया मनुष्यैः ।
आभिर्मत्प्रत्ताभिः परिचारयस्व नचिकेतो मरणं मानुप्राक्षीः ॥"

इति वैवस्वतेन तदीयप्रश्नस्य मृतजीवविषयत्वस्फुटीकरणात्, "यस्मिन्निदं विचिकित्सन्ति मृत्यो यत्साम्पराये महति ब्रूहि नस्तत्" इति पुनः नचिकेतसा मरणविषयत्वेनामङ्गलतया वैवस्वतेन निन्दितस्यैव स्वप्रश्नस्य निर्णेयत्वेन पृष्ठत्वात्, तदनन्तरं वैवस्वतेन

"न साम्परायः प्रतिभाति बालं प्रमाद्यन्तं वित्तमोहेन मूढम् ।
अयं लोको नास्ति पर इति मानी पुनः पुनर्वशमापद्यते मे ॥"

इति "नायमस्तीति चैके" इति पक्षदूषणपूर्वकमेवोत्तरस्य चोपक्रान्तत्वात्, अग्रे च

"हन्तत इदं प्रवक्ष्यामि गुह्यं ब्रह्म सनातनम् ।
यथा च मरणं प्राप्य आत्मा भवति गौतम ॥

योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः ।
स्थाणुमन्येऽनुसंयन्ति यथाकर्म यथाश्रुतम् ॥"

इति साक्षान्मृतजीववृत्तान्तविषयोत्तरदर्शनाच्च । तथा तं दुर्दर्शमित्याद्युत्तरं परमात्मविषयमित्यपि सुदृढम् । प्रश्नानन्तरं वैवस्वतेन—

"देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं पुरा न हि सुविज्ञेयमणुरेष धर्मः ।
अन्यं वरं नचिकेतो वृणीष्व मामोपरोत्सीरति मा सृजैनम् ॥"

इति प्रश्नस्योत्तरमतिगहनार्थविषयं वक्तुं दुःशकमित्युक्तत्वात् । ततो नचिकेतसा

"देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं किल त्वं च मृत्यो यत्र सुविज्ञेयमात्थ ।
वक्ता चास्य त्वादृगन्यो न लभ्यो नान्यो वरस्तुल्य एतस्य कश्चित् ॥"

इति पृष्टमेवोपदेष्टव्यमिति प्रार्थिते वैवस्वतेन पुनस्तस्याधिकारदार्ढ्यपरीचिक्षिषया

"शतायुषः पुत्रपौत्रान् वृणीष्व बहून् पशून् हस्तिहिरण्यमश्वान् ।
भूमेर्महदायतनं वृणीष्व स्वयं च जीव शरदो यावदिच्छसि ॥".

इत्यारभ्य " नचिकेतो मरणं मानुप्राक्षीः " इत्यन्तेन पृच्छ्यमानार्थापेक्षया पुत्रादिसंपत्तेर्महापुरुषार्थतयोक्तत्वेऽपि नचिकेतसा

" श्वो भावा मर्त्यस्य यदन्तकैतत्सर्वेन्द्रियाणां जरयन्ति तेजः ।
अपि सर्वं जीवितमल्पमेव "

इत्यादिना " अभिध्यायन्वर्णरतिप्रमोदानतिदीर्घे जीविते को रमेत " इत्यन्तेन विषयान् श्वस्स्थायित्वेऽपि सन्दिग्धत्वेन सर्वेन्द्रियतेजःक्षपयितृत्वेन निन्दित्वा, चिरजीविकामपि ब्रह्मादिकीटान्तसकलप्राणिवर्तिनः सर्वस्यापि जीवितस्याल्पकालत्वेन निन्दित्वा, प्राक्पृष्टमेवोपदेष्टव्यमिति दृढं प्रार्थिते तस्याधिकारस्थैर्यमुपलभ्य निश्रेयसमभ्युदयं च पुरुषार्थानुबन्धि फलद्वयं श्रेयःप्रेयश्शब्दाभ्यां प्रविभज्य तदुभयं विविञ्चन्—धीरः श्रेयो वृणीते, मन्दस्तु प्रेयः—इत्याद्युक्त्वा नचिकेतसो वरं प्रशस्य, " विद्याभीप्सिनं नचिकेतसं मन्ये न त्वा कामा बहवो लोलुपन्तः " इति विद्याभीप्सुत्वेन तदुपयोगिदृढवैराग्यवत्त्वेन च नचिकेतसं प्रशस्य, " न साम्परायः " इत्यादिना देहात्मवादनिराकरणपूर्वकम्

" श्रवणायापि बहुभिर्यो न लभ्यः
शृण्वन्तोऽपि बहवो यं न विद्युः ।
आश्चर्यो वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्धा
आश्चर्यो ज्ञाता कुशलानुशिष्टः ॥ "

इत्युपदेष्टव्यस्यात्मनो दुरधिगमत्वमुक्त्वा वैवस्वतेन " तं दुर्दर्शम् " इत्यादेरनुक्रान्तत्वाच्च । एवं जीवविषयप्रश्नस्य परमात्मविषयोत्तरदर्शनात् जीवब्रह्मणोरभेदः श्रुत्यभिप्रेत इति उन्नीयते । अन्यथा प्रश्नोत्तरयोः वैयधिकरण्यापत्तेः ।

ननूत्तरं परमात्मविषयमस्तु, प्रश्नो मृतजीवास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषय इत्येतदनुपपन्नम्, नचिकेतसः प्रागेव तदस्तित्वविश्वासवत्वात् । अन्यथा पितुः क्रतुवैकल्यदोषपरिहारार्थं " तत कस्मै मां दास्यसि " इति वचनस्य " मृत्यवे त्वा ददामि " इत्युक्तवतः पितुरनृतदोषपरिहारार्थं स्वयं मृत्युलोकगमनस्य " सस्यमिव मर्त्यः पच्यते सस्यमिवाजायते पुनः " इति तदीयस्य वचनस्य स्वर्गफलकामिविद्यावरणस्य चानुपपत्तेः । वस्तुतो जीवपरमात्माभेदसत्त्वेऽपि मृतजीवास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषयप्रश्ने तन्मात्रस्यैव निर्धारणीयतया परमात्मतत्प्राप्त्युपायाद्युपदेशानुप- 3. 1621

पत्तेश्च। जीवपरमात्माभेदवादिमतेऽप्यार्तभागप्रश्नपञ्चाग्निविद्यादिश्रुतेषु जीववृत्तान्तविषयप्रश्नेषु तन्मात्रविषयाणामेवोत्तराणां संप्रतिपन्नत्वात्। तस्मात् प्रश्नोत्तरसामानाधिकरण्यान्यथानुपपत्त्या जीवब्रह्माभेदसिद्धिरिति दुराशां विसृज्य प्रश्नोऽत्र मुक्तजीवास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषयो वर्णनीयः, "न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्ति" इति वाक्ये मुक्तौ प्रेत्यशब्दप्रयोगदर्शनात्; प्रकर्षेणेतः पुनरावृत्तिरहितां गतिं प्राप्त इति प्रेतशब्दस्य मुक्ते वृत्त्युपपत्तेश्च। एवं च मुक्तेः परमपदारूयपरमात्मलोकप्राप्तिरूपत्वात्तदर्थमुत्तरे परमात्मनिरूपणम् "सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्" इति तदीयपरमपदप्राप्तिनिरूपणं तदुपायनिरूपणं चेति सर्वं सङ्गच्छत इति चेत्

3.1622 मैवम्, प्रश्नस्य मुक्तवृत्तान्तविषयत्वकल्पनेऽपि स्वर्गसाधनाग्निविद्यावरणानुपपत्तेस्तुल्यत्वात्। तत्र हि स्वर्गशब्देनार्चिरादिमार्गेण सकलपुण्यपापक्षयपूर्वकं प्राप्यः शङ्कितमुक्तप्राप्यपरमपदत्वाभिमत एव लोक उच्यते।

"स्वर्गे लोके न भयं किञ्चनास्ति न तत्र त्वं न जरया बिभेति।
उभे तीर्त्वा अशनाया पिपासे शोकातिगो मोदते स्वर्गलोके॥"

इति स्वर्गलोकमहिमवर्णनपूर्वकम्—

"स त्वमग्निं स्वर्ग्यमध्येषि मृत्यो प्रब्रूहि तं श्रद्दधानाय मह्यम्।
स्वर्गलोका अमृतत्वं भजन्त एतद्द्वितीयेन वृणे वरेण॥"

इति तत्साधनाग्निविद्योपदेशस्य वृतत्वात्, वैवस्वतेन च तदुपदेशानन्तरं तत्फलवर्णनप्रस्तावे "स मृत्युपाशान्पुरतः प्रणोद्य शोकातिगो मोदते स्वर्गलोके" इति तत्फलस्वर्गप्राप्तेः सकलसंसारपाशनिवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वेन विशेषितत्वाच्च। यदि हितैषिवचनादिलब्धस्य मुक्तास्तित्वविश्वासस्य दृढीकरणाय विशेषान्तरज्ञानाय च तद्विषयप्रश्न उपपद्यत इति समर्थ्येत, तदेवमेव मृतास्तित्वविषयप्रश्नोऽपि समर्थयितुं शक्यत इति प्रेतशब्दरूढ्या "मरणं मानुप्राक्षीः" इत्याद्युत्तरसन्दर्भस्वारस्येन च प्राप्तं मृतजीवास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषयत्वं त्यक्तुं न युक्तम्। इदानीमपि हितैषिवचनविश्वासेन पारलौकिककर्मानुष्ठाननिष्ठा एव—किमवलम्बनो देहात्मवादः? कथं च तन्निरसनम्?—इति जिज्ञासमाना दृश्यन्ते। वेदाध्ययनानन्तरं वैदिककर्मानुष्ठानवद्भिः पठितव्येषु शास्त्रेषु देहात्मवादः तन्निराकरणनिबन्धनं च दृश्यते। तथापि प्रश्नस्य मृतजीवास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषयत्वे तदस्तित्वमात्रमुत्तरे वक्तव्यमिति

परमात्मस्वरूपतत्प्राप्त्युपायादिनिरूपणं न सङ्गच्छत इति चेन्न, तस्य मुक्तजीवास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषयत्वे तदस्तित्वमात्रमेव वक्तव्यमिति तन्निरूपणासाङ्गत्यस्य परपक्षेऽपि तुल्यत्वात्। न हि मृतवृत्तान्तविषये पितृयाणमार्गादिनिरूपणे तत्प्राप्यचन्द्रनिरूपणं तत्प्राप्त्युपायनिरूपणं वा दृश्यते। यद्युत्तरे परमात्मतत्प्राप्त्युपायनिरूपणदर्शनात्तावत्पर्यन्तं मुक्तास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषयप्रश्नस्य तात्पर्यं कल्प्यते, तदोत्तरे जीवपरमात्माभेदनिरूपणदर्शनात् प्रेतशब्दस्वारस्याद्यनुरोधेन मृतास्तित्वनास्तित्वविषयस्यैव सतः प्रश्नस्य तदभेदपर्यन्तमपि तात्पर्यं कल्प्यताम्। अस्ति हि तदभेदनिरूपणमपि—

"यदेवेह तदमुत्र यदमुत्र तदन्विह।
मृत्योस्स मृत्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पश्यति॥"

इत्यादिप्रदेशेषु। न च वाच्यं इह देहे विद्यमानस्यामुत्रादित्यमण्डलादिस्थाने विद्यमानस्य च परमेश्वरस्यैव नानात्वं निषिध्यते, न तु देहे विद्यमानस्य जीवस्यादित्यमण्डलादौ सतः परमेश्वरस्य च भेदो निषिध्यत इति, स्थानभेदेन परमेश्वरे भेदप्रसक्त्यभावात्। तथा "अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषः" इति मन्त्रेण जीवब्रह्मैक्यप्रतिपादनानन्तरं विरुद्धधर्मवतोस्तयोः कथमैक्यमिति शङ्कायाम्

"यथोदकं दुर्गे वृष्टं पर्वतेषु विधावति।
एवं धर्मान् पृथक् पश्यंस्तानेवानुविधावति॥"

इति मन्त्रेण जीवे ब्रह्मणि च पृथग्व्यवस्थिता धर्मा अभेदविरोधिनः सन्तीति पश्यतस्तथैव पृथग्धर्मवत्तया संसारोऽनुवर्ततेति दोष उक्तः। इत्थमनेन प्रकारेण जीवपराभेदप्रकरणमिदम्, न केवलस्य जीवस्य परस्य वा प्रकरणमिति सूचयितुमेव परमात्मपरेण शब्देन प्रकरणिन्युदाहरणीयेऽपि, यदभिन्नतया प्रकरणी प्रतिपिपादयिषितः तत्परेण शब्देन तस्योदाहरणं सूत्रकृता कृतमित्यभिप्रेत्य प्रकरणिविषयमन्त्रान्तरोदाहरणसंभवेऽपि "प्राज्ञो हि प्रकरणात्" (ब्र. १.४.५) इति सूत्राक्षरानुगुण्येन प्राज्ञशब्दवन्मन्त्रो भाष्यकारैरुदाहृतः। इत्थमनयोक्तिभङ्ग्या श्रुतिसूत्राभिमतिद्योतनपर्यन्तजीवपराभेदाभिमतिराविष्कृता।

3.17 तथा प्रथमाधिकरणेऽपि "'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इति श्रुतिः अयमिति प्रत्ययेन प्रत्यक्षसिद्धमेवात्मानं ब्रह्मेत्युपदिशति। [1]अतः कुतोऽत्र सन्देहः" इति शास्त्रविषयत्वाभिमते ब्रह्मणि सन्देहाभावोपपादनेन कृतस्य शास्त्रानारम्भपूर्वपक्षस्य सिद्धान्ते जीवब्रह्माभेदाभिनिविष्टभाष्यकारान्तरवत् तयोर्भेदमव्यवस्थाप्य "यत् 'अयमात्मा ब्रह्म' इत्यादिश्रुतिरमुमेवाहङ्कारबद्धं संसारिणं ब्रह्मेत्यभिधत्ते; तत एव सन्देहः; निरस्तसमस्तोपप्लवकलङ्कनिरतिशयज्ञानानन्दशक्तिमहिमातिशयवत्त्वं हि ब्रह्मत्वम्; अनाद्यज्ञानवासनावष्टम्भविजृम्भितविचित्रकर्मफलभोगानुगुणबहुशरीरप्रवेशनिर्गमव्यापारपरवशनिस्सीमतापसहिष्णुत्वं तु जीवत्वम्; कथमेतयोः परस्परविलक्षणयोरेकभावमाहुः श्रुतय इति संशयः किं न स्यात्" इति भेदाभेदश्रुतितात्पर्यसन्देहापादितविषयसन्देहोपपादनेन जीवब्रह्माभेदाप्रत्याख्यानदृष्टिराविष्कृता।

3.18 किं बहुना, भाष्ये ब्रह्मचिच्छक्तेः सकलप्रपञ्चाकारत्वेन तदभिन्नत्वं प्रायः सर्वत्राप्युद्घोषितम्। तथैव चिच्छक्तेः ब्रह्माभिन्नत्वमपि सर्वत्रोद्घोषितम्। तत एव जीवब्रह्माभेदः परमसिद्धान्तः सिध्यन् कथं निवारयितुं शक्यते।

स्यादेतत्। चिच्छक्तेः सकलप्रपञ्चाकारत्वं यदुक्तं तद्विशिष्टाद्वैतस्यैवानु-
3.181 कूलम्, तेन चेतनप्रपञ्चस्येव वियदाद्यचेतनप्रपञ्चस्यापि तदभेदेन सत्यत्वप्राप्तेः। यदि चेतनवर्गस्य चिच्छक्त्यभिन्नत्वेनाचेतनवर्गस्य तद्विवर्तत्वेन च तस्याः सकलप्रपञ्चाकारत्वमुच्येत, तदा खलु शुद्धाद्वैतसिद्धिः स्यात्; न त्वेवमुक्तम्। प्रपञ्चपरिणामितयैव तस्याः सर्वप्रपञ्चाकारत्वं प्रकृत्यधिकरणादिषु व्यवस्थापितम्। चिच्छक्तेः ब्रह्माभिन्नत्वं तु नोक्तम्। यत्र क्वचिदुक्तमपि औपचारिकम्। अत एव जन्माद्यधिकरणे भृगुवल्ल्याम् "आनन्दो ब्रह्म" इति सामानाधिकरण्यमौपचारिकमित्युक्तम्। "यः खलु 'अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः' इति प्रस्तुत्य 'सैषानन्दस्य मीमांसा भवति' इत्यारभ्याभ्यासात् निरतिशयानन्दशिरस्कत्वेन 'स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः' इति निरूपितः परब्रह्मधर्मत्वेन, स एव 'आनन्दो ब्रह्म' इति प्रचुरत्वात् ब्रह्मत्वेनोपचर्यते" इति। ब्रह्मचिच्छक्त्योर्भेदस्तु बहुषु स्थलेष्वाविष्कृतः। यथाक्षराधिकरणे तावत्—"अम्बरान्तधृतेः" [ब्र. १.३.९] इति सौत्रहेतुव्याख्यानसमये "एतस्मिन् खल्वक्षरे गार्गि आकाश ओतश्च प्रोतश्च" इति गार्गिब्राह्मणश्रुताक्षराकाशशब्दोदितयोः ब्रह्मचिच्छक्त्योराधाराधेयभावेन आविष्कृतः। दहराधिकरणे [ब्र. १.३.१३] "दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तर आकाशस्तस्मिन्

यदन्तस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम्" इति दहराकाशतदन्तर्वर्तितयोक्तयोः चिच्छक्तिपरब्रह्मणो-रासनासनिभावनिर्देशेन भेद आविष्कृतः । "आकाशो ह वै नाम नामरूपयो-र्निर्वहिता, ते यदन्तरा तद्ब्रह्म, तदमृतं स आत्मा' इति छान्दोग्यवाक्यश्रुतस्या-काशशब्दस्य "आकाशोऽर्थान्तरत्वादिव्यपदेशात्" [ब्र. १.३.४२] इत्यधिकरणे चिच्छक्तिपरत्वेनास्फुटीकृतस्यापि जन्माद्यधिकरणे "आकाशशरीरं ब्रह्म" इति श्रुतिव्याख्यानावसरे परप्रकृतित्वं चिदाकाशस्य "सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि आकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते" "आकाशो ह वै नाम नामरूपयोर्निर्वहिता" इत्यादि-श्रुतिसिद्धमिति वाक्ये तत्परत्वं स्फुटीकृतमिति । तत्राकाशब्रह्मशब्दोक्तयो-श्चिच्छक्तिपरब्रह्मणोर्नामरूपनिर्वोढृत्वतदस्पृष्टत्वनिर्देशेन भेद आविष्कृतः । प्रकृत्य-धिकरणे [ब्र. १.४.२३] च "अज्ञानविकारास्पदहेयप्रपञ्चरूपेण प्रकृतिभावेन कथं वर्तते ? निरस्तसमस्तदोषलवकलङ्को निस्सीममङ्गलगुणरत्नाकरो निरङ्कुश-नित्यसिद्धवैभवः प्रपञ्चातीतः परमशिवः" इत्याशङ्कोत्तरत्वेनावतारितस्य "परिणा-मात्" [ब्र. १.४.२७] इति सूत्रस्य व्याख्यानावसरे "नित्यशुद्धानन्दस्य निरति-शयमङ्गलस्वभावस्यापि निमित्तस्य परमशिवस्य प्रकृतित्वेन जगदाकारत्वं युक्तमेव, चिदचिदाकारेण परिणामात्" इति सौत्रहेतुवचनस्य शब्दार्थं प्रदर्श्य "हन्त ! कारणाविकाररूपो हि परिणामः, पूर्वरूपपरित्यागेन रूपान्तरापत्तिः परिणामः इति कथं परमेश्वरोऽनर्थधर्मात् परिभूयते इति चेत्" इति तत्र शङ्कामुद्भाव्य, "यथा निमित्तस्य प्रकृतित्वेऽपि न विकारादिस्पर्शः, तथा परिणामः संभवति" इति गूढाभिसन्धितयोत्तरमुक्त्वा, "कोऽयमपूर्वः परिणामः ? कुतूहलिनो वयं तच्छ्रवणे, विविच्यताम्" इति पुनराकाङ्क्षामुद्भाव्य, "शृणु विवेचयामः" इति तदुत्तरोक्तिं प्रतिज्ञाय, यदात्तमोमन्त्रार्थविवरणपूर्वकं "शिवस्य परब्रह्मणः प्रज्ञारूपचिच्छक्ति-द्वारकः परिणामस्तु न स्वरूपतो निर्विकारत्वस्य विरोधी" इति प्रतिपादनात्त-लब्धया परिणामित्वापरिणामित्वव्यवस्थया तयोर्भेद आविष्कृतः। तयोरभेदाङ्गीकारे च चिच्छक्तेरङ्गीकृतं विकारित्वं ब्रह्मण एवाङ्गीकृतं स्यादिति तस्य निर्विकारित्व-सिद्धान्तविरोधोऽपरिहार्यः । तस्मात्सार्वत्रिकेण चिच्छक्तेः प्रपञ्चाकारत्वव्यवहारेण न जीवब्रह्माभेदसिद्धिः । क्वाचित्केनानियमाद्यधिकरणाद्युदाहृतलिङ्गेन तत्सिद्धिरिति दुराशामात्रम्; सूत्रारूढतया बहुषु स्थलेषु दूषितस्यार्थस्य क्वाचित्कलिङ्गदर्शन-मात्रेण निर्वोढुमशक्यत्वादिति चेत् ।

उच्यते — परिणामित्वादिनिरूपणस्यानियमाधिकरणादिप्रतिपन्ननिर्वि-
3.182 शेषब्रह्मवादाभ्युपगमेन विरोधे हि सति कथञ्चन मतान्तरानुवादत्वादिकल्पनेन स उपेक्षणीयो भवेत्। न तु तस्य तेन विरोधोऽस्ति। तथाहि—परिणामित्वनिरूपणं विवर्तवादस्यानुकूलमेव। प्रपञ्चं ब्रह्मणि तत्परिणामि(म?)त्वप्रदर्शनेन प्रसज्य तत्प्रतिषेधे हि तस्य ब्रह्मविवर्तत्वं सिध्यति। अत एव "तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेय" इति श्रुतौ प्रथमं प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मणि परिणामि(म?)त्वप्रदर्शनम्। शाङ्कर-भाष्येऽपि श्रुत्यनुसारेण प्रथमं भोक्त्रापत्यधिकरणे (शा. भा. २. १. १३) प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्मपरिणामत्वं प्रदर्श्य तदनन्तरमारम्भणाधिकरणे (शा. भा. २. १. १४) तत्प्रतिषेधेन तस्य ब्रह्मविवर्तत्वमुपपादितम्। पुनश्चोपसंहाराधिकरणे (शा. भा. २. १. २४) कृत्स्नप्रसक्त्यधिकरणे च (शा. भा. २. १. २६) प्रपञ्चस्य ब्रह्म-परिणामत्ववाद एव संभावितदोषप्रतिक्षेपेण बुद्धिसंवादमानीतः। सङ्क्षेपशारीर-केऽपि भाष्यानुसारेण परिणामि(म?)त्वप्रदर्शनस्य विवर्तवादानुकूलत्वं प्रपञ्चेन व्यवस्थापितम्—

"आरम्भसंहतिविकारविवर्तवादा-
नाश्रित्य वादिजनता खलु वावदीति।
आरम्भसंहतिमते परिहृत्य वादौ
द्वावत्र संग्रहपदं नयते मुनीन्द्रः॥

तत्रापि पूर्वमुपगम्य विकारवादं
भोक्त्रादिसूत्रमवतार्य विरोधनुत्यै।
प्रावर्तत व्यवहृतेः परिरक्षणाय
[1]धर्मादिगोचरविधावुपयोगहेतोः॥

साक्षादिहाभिमतमेव विवर्तवाद-
माहत्य सूत्रयति[2] पूर्वमपेक्षमाणः।
आरम्भणादिवचनेन विवर्तवादं
शक्नोति वक्तुमुदिते परिणामवादे॥

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1. कर्मादि (Ānandāśrama edn.)
2. सूचयति (Ānandāśrama edn.)

आरुह्य भूमिमधरामितराधिरोढुं
शक्येति शास्त्रमपि कारणकार्यभावम् ।
उक्त्वा पुरा परिणतिप्रतिपादनेन
संप्रत्यपोहति विकारमृषात्वसिद्ध्यै ॥

विवर्तवादस्य हि पूर्वभूमिः
वेदान्तवादे परिणामवादः ।
व्यवस्थितेऽस्मिन् परिणामवादे
स्वयं समायाति विवर्तवादः ॥

उपायमातिष्ठति पूर्वमुच्चै-
रुपेयमाप्तुं जनता यथैव ।
श्रुतिर्मुनीन्द्रश्च विवर्तसिद्ध्यै
विकारवादं वदतस्तथैव ॥

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अहं प्रजायेय बहु स्वयं स्या-
मित्यादिनादौ परिणाममुक्त्वा ।
विकारमिथ्यात्वमथ ब्रुवाणा
विवर्तवादं श्रुतिराननाय ॥"

इत्यादिभिः श्लोकैः । आचार्यैरपि भाष्ये परिणामवादप्रपञ्चनं विवर्त-[1]वादाभ्युपगमानुकूलतयेत्यस्य ज्ञापकत्वेन "सन् घटः" इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षस्य प्रपञ्च-सत्यत्वविषयताव्यवच्छेदाय उपादानतादात्म्यरूपं विषयान्तरं प्रदर्शितम् । तस्माद्वि-वर्तवादाभ्युपगमानुकूलतयैव परिणामित्वव्यवस्थापनं कृतमिति युक्तमेव ।

यत्तु चिच्छक्तेः ब्रह्माभिन्नत्वं नोक्तमित्युक्तं तदसिद्धम्, बहुषु स्थलेषु 3.183
तदुक्तिदर्शनात् । तथाहि— "आकाशस्तल्लिङ्गात्" इत्यधिकरणे (ब्र. १. १. २२)

1. वादानुकूल (My)

"अस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाश इति होवाचेति" वाक्यप्रतिपाद्य आकाशो भूताकाशो न भवति, किन्तु परमेश्वर इति सिद्धान्तव्यवस्थापनानन्तरम्, "ननु भूताकाशस्याकाश इति स्ववाक्ये भूतपदग्रहणं किमर्थम्" इति शङ्कामुद्भाव्य, "परमाकाशस्य परप्रकृतिरूपस्य सर्वभूतकारणत्वसद्भावात् सप्रयोजनम्" इति तस्य फलमुक्त्वा, "तर्हि परमाकाशस्यापि सर्वभूतकारणत्वसंभवे अयमाकाशः परमेश्वर इति कथं निर्णयः" इति पुनः शङ्कामुद्भाव्य, "तदभेदात्" इत्युत्तरमुक्तम्। दहराधिकरणे (ब्र. १. ३. १३.) "दहरोऽस्मिन्नन्तराकाशस्तस्मिन्यदन्तस्तद-न्वेष्टव्यम्" इति छन्दोगैराम्नातो दहराकाशः परमेश्वर इति सिद्धान्तव्यवस्थापना-नन्तरम्, "य एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिन् शेते सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः" इत्यादिश्रुत्यन्तरानुसाराद्दहराकाशस्यान्तरुपासनीयः परमेश्वरो भवितुमर्हति, कथं दहराकाशः परमेश्वर इत्युक्तम्, इति शङ्कामुद्भाव्य, "अत्रापि दहराकाशमध्यवर्ती [1]परमेश्वर उपास्यः। किन्तु दहराकाशे परमेश्वरधर्माणां अपहतपाप्मत्वादीनां सम्बन्धप्रतीतेः दहराकाशत्वमप्यस्य चिदम्बररूपतया" इति परिहारः कृतः। "सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्" इत्यधिकरणे (ब्र. १. २. १) ब्रह्मणः सर्वशब्दवाच्य-त्वव्युत्पादनावसरे "श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणाभियुक्तसूक्तिप्रामाण्यात् सकलचिदचि-त्प्रपञ्चमहाविभूतिरूपा महासंविदानन्दसत्ता देशकालादिपरिच्छेदशून्या स्वाभाविकी परमशक्तिः परब्रह्मणः शिवस्य स्वरूपं च गुणश्च भवति। तद्व्यतिरेकेण ब्रह्मणः सर्वज्ञत्व-सर्वशक्तित्व-सर्वकारणत्व-सर्वनियन्तृत्व-सर्वोपास्यत्वसर्वानुग्राहकत्व-सर्व-पुरुषार्थहेतुत्वादिकं सर्वगतत्वं च न संभवति। किञ्च, महेश्वरशिव-महादेवरुद्रादिपरमाख्यानामभिधेयत्वं च न संभवति" इति चिच्छक्तेः परब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वं तस्यास्तदीयसकलगुणरूपतया तद्धर्मत्वं चोक्तम्। तथा आध्यानाधिकरणेऽपि (ब्र. ३. ३. १४) चिच्छक्तेः ब्रह्मस्वरूपाभिन्नत्वं समर्थितम्। तथा हि—"आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य" इत्यधिकरणे (ब्र. ३. ३. ११)—यन्निरतिशयज्ञानानन्दादिगुणजातं नीलकण्ठत्वादिविशिष्टविग्रहवैशिष्ट्यं च ब्रह्मणः स्वरूपलक्षणं तत्सर्वास्वपि विद्यासु प्रकरणभेदेऽप्युपसंहार्यम्, तेन हि ब्रह्मविष्ण्वादिसकलेतरविलक्षणं ब्रह्म शृङ्गग्राहिकयानुभवारूढं भवति, यथा प्रकृष्ट-

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1. न परमेश्वर उपास्यः—अयं पाठो मुद्रितश्रीकण्ठभाष्येषु दृश्यते; शिवाद्वैतनिर्णयमातृ-कासु आनन्दलहर्यां च नञ्रहित एव पाठो दृश्यते; द्वितीयः समीचीनः प्रतिभाति।

प्रकाशेन सकलग्रहनक्षत्रतारकादिविलक्षणं चन्द्रमण्डलम्, अतश्चन्द्रदर्शनेषु सर्वेषु प्रकृष्टप्रकाशानुवृत्तिवत्सर्वासु ब्रह्मविद्यासु ज्ञानानन्दादिगुणविग्रहविशेषानुवृत्तिरुचिता—इति प्रसाधितम्। तदनन्तरम् "प्रियशिरस्त्वाद्यप्राप्तिरुपचयापचयौ हि भेदे" इत्यधिकरणे (ब्र. ३. ३. १२) "सह ब्रह्मणा विपश्चिता", "यस्सर्वज्ञः सर्ववित्" इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धब्रह्मधर्मनिरतिशयज्ञानोपसंहारे तदवान्तरविशेषसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वाद्युपसंहारवत् "अन्योऽन्तर आत्मानन्दमयः। तस्य प्रियमेव शिरः" इत्यादिश्रुतिप्रसिद्धब्रह्मधर्मनिरतिशयानन्दोपसंहारे तदवान्तरविशेषप्रियशिरस्त्वाद्युपसंहारः कार्य इत्याशङ्क्य,—प्रियादीनामानन्दविशेषत्वेऽपि तेषां शिरस्त्वादिकं विद्याविशेषे ब्रह्मानन्दस्य निरतिशयत्वप्रतिपत्तिसौकर्यार्थं कल्पितम्, न तु तात्त्विकम्; ब्रह्मानन्दस्य तत्त्वतः शिरःप्रभृतिमत्त्वे हि कचित्स्थौल्यं कचित् कार्श्यमित्यानन्दाकार एव तस्योपचयापचयौ प्रसज्येयाताम्; पुच्छपुच्छवद्भावादीनां तात्त्विकत्वे भेदश्च प्रसज्यते, अतः सर्वज्ञत्वसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वाप्तकामत्वादयो ये ज्ञानानन्दविशेषा अनपायित्वेन ब्रह्मधर्मसदृशाः[1] ब्रह्मसादृश्यरूपतया मुक्तप्राप्यफलरूपाश्च तेषामेव सर्वासु विद्यासूपसंहारो न प्रियशिरस्त्वादीनाम्—इति प्रसाधितम्।

तदनन्तरम् "आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्" इत्यधिकरणे (ब्र. ३. 3. 1831
३. १४) यद्यप्यानन्दमयशब्दोक्तस्य ब्रह्मधर्मस्य निरतिशयानन्दस्य सर्वासु परविद्यासूपसंहारे तदीयं प्रियशिरस्त्वादिकं तस्य निरतिशयत्वप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं कल्पितत्वान्नोपसंहार्यम्, तथाप्यन्नमयादिकोशचतुष्टयान्तरत्वमुपसंहार्यमेव, अकल्पितत्वादिति पूर्वपक्षमुद्भाव्य सिद्धान्तितम्।

अन्नमयादिकं विद्यासु नानुसन्धेयम्, प्रयोजनाभावात्। न मुक्तिः 3. 1832
प्रयोजनम्, तस्याः सर्वेतरपरित्यागपूर्वकशिवध्यानसाध्यत्वात्। किमर्थं तर्हि अन्नमयादिकीर्तनम्? आध्यानार्थम्, आभिमुख्येनादरणेन ध्यानमाध्यानम्, आदरश्च सर्वोत्कृष्टत्वप्रतिपत्तौ भवतीति तत्प्रतिपत्तिसौकर्यार्थमन्नमयादिकीर्तनम्। अतो भक्त्यतिशयसिद्धिप्रयोजनसर्वोत्कृष्टत्वप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं दृढभक्त्यतिशयपूर्वकर्तव्याद्विद्यानुष्ठानात् प्रागेवोत्कर्षावधित्वेनान्नमयादिकमनुसन्धेयम्।

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1. सदृशाः (A)

3.1833 नन्वन्नमयादिकं न केवलमुत्कर्षावधित्वेनानुसन्धेयम्, किन्तु ध्यानकालानुसन्धेयान्तरत्व[1]गुणावधित्वेनापि, गुहात्वेन निरूपितत्वात्; अतो दहरविद्यायां ब्रह्मपुरमध्यवर्तिदहरपुण्डरीकाभ्यन्तरत्वेन ब्रह्मानुसन्धानार्थं ब्रह्मपुरदहरपुण्डरीकानुसन्धानमिवान्नमयाद्यनुसन्धानं ध्यानकाले नियतम्—इति चेन्न, तेषु प्रतिपर्यायमन्योऽन्तर आत्मेत्यात्मशब्दश्रवणात्। यद्यन्नमयादयः शरीरप्राणमनोबुद्धिरूपा अचेतनास्स्युः, तदा तेषां ध्यानकाले ब्रह्मपुरादिवदनुसन्धेयता स्यात्। नत्वेवम्; ते ह्यन्नाद्यधिष्ठातारो ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रेश्वररूपाः चेतनविषयाः, ये अथर्वशिखायाम् "ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रेन्द्रास्ते संप्रसूयन्ते" इति शिवसृष्टत्वेनोक्ताः ये च तदनन्तरम्, "कारणं तु ध्येयः सर्वैश्वर्यसंपन्नः सर्वेश्वरः शम्भुराकाशमध्ये" इति शिवध्यानं विधाय "शिव एको ध्येयः शिवङ्करः सर्वमन्यत्परित्यज्य" इति मुमुक्षुकर्तव्यनिरन्तरशिवविषयचिन्तासन्ततिरूपध्यानकाले परित्याज्यत्वेन ध्यानाद्बहिर्भावनीयत्वेनोक्ताः। कुतः? इह प्रतिपर्यायम् "अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा" इत्यात्मशब्दात्, एतमन्नमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रामति" इत्यादिवाक्येषु ब्रह्मप्राप्तेः पूर्वं क्रमप्राप्यदेवताविशेषप्रतिपादनाच्च। एवं च यद्यपि "यो वेद निहितं गुहायाम्" इति श्रुत्युक्तगुहासन्निहितत्वानुसन्धानसिध्यर्थं गुहातद्वद्भाववर्णनार्थसिद्धोत्कर्षप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं च तेषामनुसन्धानमावश्यकम्,—अत एव "ब्रह्मविदाप्नोति परम्" इति श्रुत्युक्तं फलं प्राप्नुवतस्तदनुसन्धानफलतया क्रमेण तेषां प्राप्तिः "एतमन्नमयम्" इत्यादिवाक्येषु श्रूयते—तथापि गुहातद्वद्भावकृतोत्कर्षः त्रिपुरसंहरणादिकथादिकृतोत्कर्षवत् उपासनारम्भात् प्रागेवावगन्तव्यः। गुहासन्निहितत्वानुसन्धानोपयोगिनस्तेषामनुसन्धानस्य प्रतिदिवसं कार्यत्वेऽपि शिवध्यानारम्भात् प्रागेव क्रमेण तेषां प्राप्तिन्यायेन पूर्वपूर्वपरित्यागपूर्वकं तदनुसन्धानं कार्यम्, "सर्वमन्यत्परित्यज्य" इति परित्यागस्य विहितत्वात्, तस्य चोत्तरोत्तरस्मिन् पूर्वपूर्वोपसंहरणेन क्रमकर्तव्यतया शिवागमेषु प्रसिद्धत्वात्, योगयाज्ञवल्क्ये ध्यानाध्याये ब्रह्मादीनां क्रमेण अनुसन्धानं विधाय तदनन्तरम्—

"एवदुक्तं भवत्यत्र गार्गि ब्रह्मविदां वरे।

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1. आन्तरपरत्व

ब्रह्मादिकार्यरूपाणि स्वे स्वे संहृत्य कारणे ।
युक्तचित्तस्तदात्मानं योजयेत्परमेश्वरे ॥"

इति तत्रैव प्रतिपादितत्वाच्च । एवं च शिवध्यानारम्भसमये गुहारूपत्वेन वर्णितानन्नमयप्राणमयमनोमयविज्ञानमयशब्दोक्तान् ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रेश्वरान् विज्ञानमयशब्दस्यार्थर्वशिखायां ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रेन्द्रा इतीन्द्रशब्दस्य च शिवागमयोगयाज्ञवल्क्याद्यनुसारात् ईश्वरसदाशिवोभयपरतया ब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रेश्वरसदाशिवान् वा क्रमेणानुसन्दधान एव पूर्वपूर्वमुत्तरोत्तरस्मिन् सदाशिवं शिवासनरूपे परमव्योम्नि च प्रलीनं भावयित्वा परमव्योमवर्तिं शिवैकविषयचित्तसन्ततिरूपध्यानं कार्यम्; न तु शिवध्यानकाले तस्यान्नमयाद्यान्तरत्वमपि ध्यातव्यम् ।

नन्वेवं सति उमासहायत्वमपि तस्य ध्यातव्यं न स्यात्, सर्वेतरपरित्यागविधिविरोधात्, "सर्वमन्यत्परित्यज्य" इत्यन्यशब्देनैव प्रकृतब्रह्मविष्णुरुद्रेन्द्रग्रहणसंभवे अधिकस्य सर्वशब्दस्य शिवेतरसर्वदेवतापरित्यागसिद्ध्यर्थत्वात् । न चानन्दमयशब्दोक्तचिच्छक्त्यात्मिकाया उमायाः शिवाभिन्नत्वपरित्यागविधेर्न तद्विषयत्वप्रसक्तिरिति वाच्यम्, अन्नमयादिषु श्रुतस्यात्मशब्दस्यानन्दमयेऽप्यविशेषेण तद्वदानन्दमयात्मनोऽपि जीवत्वौचित्यादिति चेत्— 3. 18331

मैवम्; यत आनन्दमये आत्मग्रहणं परमात्मविषयं न त्वन्नमयादिष्विव जीवात्मविषयम्, उत्तरत्रान्नमयादिकमुपसंक्रान्तस्येवानन्दमयमुपसंक्रान्तस्योपसंक्रमितव्यान्तरोक्त्यभावेन तत्प्राप्तेर्मुक्तित्वावगमात् । तथा च—"आत्मा जीवे धृतौ देहे स्वभावे परमात्मनि ।" इति जीवपरसाधारणत्वेनानुशिष्टस्यात्मशब्दस्य यथार्हमर्थग्रहणं युक्तम् । न चानन्दवल्ल्यामात्मशब्दस्य जीवविषयत्वं नियतं दृष्टमिति प्रायपाठः शङ्कनीयः, "आत्मन आकाशस्संभूतः" इत्यत्र जगत्कारणविषयस्य जीवविषयत्वायोगेन परमात्मविषयत्वस्यावश्यवक्तव्यतया तद्वदानन्दमयेऽपि तस्य परमात्मविषयत्वोपपत्तेः प्रायपाठबाधकस्य लिङ्गस्योभयत्राप्यविशिष्टत्वात् । तस्मादुमायाः शिवाभिन्नत्वात् तद्ध्यानकाले तदनुसंधानं न विरुध्यते । 3. 18332

नन्वेवमानन्दमयशब्दोक्तायाः सकलचेतनाचेतनप्रपञ्चाकारत्वेनाभ्युपगतायाः शक्तेः शिवाभेदे तदभिन्नानां सर्वेषामपि चेतनानां शिवाभेदस्यानि- 3. 18333

वारणीयत्वात् अन्नमयादिशब्दोक्तानां ब्रह्मादीनां पूर्वापरवाक्ययोः परमात्मपरतया वल्लेनात्मशब्देनान्वयादपि शिवाभेदप्रतीतेः तेषामप्युमावदेव शिवध्यानकालेऽनुसन्धानमविरुद्धमिति चेत्—

3. 18334 न, "शिव एको ध्येयशिवङ्करः सर्वमन्यत्परित्यज्य" इति शिवस्यैव ध्येयत्वावधारणात्; तस्यावधारणस्य प्रकृतब्रह्माद्यविषयत्वे हि कस्तस्य विषयः स्यात्? नाचेतनवर्गः प्रकृतब्रह्मादिव्यतिरिक्तचेतनवर्गो वा, अन्यशब्दस्य सर्वनाम्नः शब्दशक्तिस्वाभाव्यात्। इषौ कानिचिद्वैशेषिकाङ्गानि विधाय तदनन्तरमाम्नाते "समानमितरच्छ्येनेन" इति वाक्ये श्रुतस्येतरशब्दस्य प्रतियोगिभूतेषु वैशेषिकाङ्गसादृश्येन वैशेषिकाङ्गपरत्ववत् प्रतियोगिभूताशिवसदृशचेतनान्तरपरत्वस्य, तत्रापि बुद्धिस्थब्रह्मादिचेतनपरत्वस्यावश्यंभावात्, सर्वशब्दसमभिव्याहारानुसारेण चेतनान्तरसाधारण्येऽपि बुद्धिस्थब्रह्मादिपरत्वस्यावर्जनीयत्वात्, चेतनान्तराणामपि ब्रह्मादिवच्छिवाभिन्नत्वेन तद्विषयत्वेऽप्यनुपपत्तितौस्थ्याच्च। तस्माद्वस्तुतः शिवाद्भिन्नस्य चेतनस्य परित्यागोऽत्र न विधेयः; किन्तु शिवात् भेदेन प्रतीयमानस्य। अत एव ब्रह्मविद्यासु शिवोऽहमस्मीति शिवाभेदेनानुसन्धेयस्य स्वात्मनो न परित्याग इति प्रतिपर्यायम् "अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा" इति श्रवणादन्नमयादीनां शिवात् परस्परस्माच्च भेदप्रतीतेरनिवार्यस्तेषां परित्यागः। उमायास्तु यद्यपि "परमे व्योमन्" इति आसनासनिभावेन "स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः" इति धर्मधर्मिभावेन भेदः प्रतीयते, तथाप्यासनरूपेण निरतिशयानन्दरूपेण च सा भेदप्रतीतिः; नत्वम्बिकात्मकचेतनरूपेण; तेन तु रूपेणाभेद एव प्रतीयते। "पुरुषं कृष्णपिङ्गलम्" इत्यस्य सर्वविद्यासूपसंहृतेरानन्दाधिकरणे (ब्र. ३. ३. ११) समर्थितत्वेन तत्र कृष्णपिङ्गलमित्यनेन शिवस्यैवाम्बिकामूर्त्या कृष्णवर्णत्वं पुरुषमूर्त्या रुक्मवर्णत्वमिति शिवशक्त्यभेदगर्भीकरणात्। तस्मादुमाया इव शिवध्यानकाले नान्नमयादीनामनुसन्धानं कार्यमिति। एवमेतदधिकरणम् "आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात्", "आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात्", "अन्वयादिति चेत् स्यादवधारणात्" इति चतुर्भिः सूत्रैः (ब्र. ३. ३. १४–१७) प्रवर्तितम्।

3. 18335 अत्रानन्दमयरूपा चिच्छक्तिः परमात्मा शिवः एव, न ततो भिद्यत इत्ययमर्थः तृतीयसूत्रार्थत्वेनाचार्यैर्भाष्ये वर्णितः। न च तद्भाष्यमानन्दमयः परमात्मा शिव इति आनन्दमयाधिकरणप्रथमपक्षमाश्रित्यानन्दमयस्य परमात्मत्व-

साधनपरम्, नत्वानन्दमयश्चिच्छक्तिरिति तदधिकरणद्वितीयपक्षमाश्रित्य चिच्छक्तेः परमात्माभेदसाधनपरमिति वाच्यम्, प्रथमपक्षाश्रयणे आनन्दमयः परमात्मेत्यस्यानन्दमयाधिकरण (ब्र. १. १. १३.) एव सिद्धत्वेनात्र तत्साधनस्यानपेक्षितत्वात्; आनन्दमयाधिकरणे द्वितीयः पक्ष एव भाष्यकाराभिमत इति जन्मादिसूत्रेण (ब्र. १. १. २) स्पष्टमवगतत्वाच्च। तस्मादाध्यानाधिकरणे (ब्र. ३. ३. १४–१७) भाष्यकारैः शक्तेः शिवाभेदः प्रसाधित इत्येतत्समञ्जसमेव।

तथा "ईक्षतिकर्मव्यपदेशात् सः" (ब्र. १. ३. १२) इत्यधिकरणेऽपि तस्याः शिवाभेदो वर्णितः। तत्र हि "एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदोङ्कारः" इत्यादौ सत्यकामप्रश्नोत्तरसन्दर्भेण एकमात्रप्रणवोपासनस्य तत्प्रथममात्रात्मकऋक्प्रापणीयमनुष्यलोकप्राप्तिफलं द्विमात्रप्रणवोपासनस्य द्वितीयमात्रात्मकयजुःप्रापणीयान्तरिक्षलोकप्राप्तिफलं चाभिधाय यदाम्नायते "यः पुन रेतं त्रिमात्रेण ओङ्कारेण परं पुरुषमभिध्यायीत * * यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यते एवं हवै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्तः स सामभिरुन्नीयते ब्रह्मलोकं स एतस्माज्जीवघनात् परात्परं पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते:" इति, तत्र ब्रह्मलोकः परब्रह्मणः शिवस्य लोकः तस्मिन्नीक्षणीयः पुरुषः शिव इति सिद्धान्तोऽभिमतः। तदर्थमिह—ब्रह्मलोको=विष्णुलोकः, "ऋग्भिरेतं यजुर्भिरन्तरिक्षं सामभिर्यत्तत् कवयो वेदयन्ते" इत्युक्तार्थसंग्राहके तदनन्तरमन्त्रे "तद्विष्णोः परमं पदं सदा पश्यन्ति सूरयः" इति मन्त्रेण विष्णुलोके प्रतिपन्नस्य विद्वदनुभवविषयत्वस्य तस्मिन् ब्रह्मलोके प्रत्यभिज्ञायमानत्वात्; अतस्तस्मिन्निरीक्षणीयः पुरुषो विष्णुरेव—इति पूर्वपक्षमुपन्यस्य सिद्धान्ते तदनुवादपूर्वकं तन्निरास इत्थं कृतः— "यदुक्तं तद्विष्णोः 3. 1835
परमं पदमिति तत्र प्रपञ्चाकारत्वमन्तरेण यन्निरतिशयानन्दस्वभावं विष्णोः परमं पदं रूपं तदेव शिवाभिधेयं परं ब्रह्मेत्यविरोधः; यतो विष्णुशिवयोरुपादाननिमित्तयोरवस्थाभेदमन्तरेण स्वरूपभेदो नास्ति" इति।

3. 1834 (margin beside "तथा ईक्षतिकर्म…")

अत्र शिवलोके तद्विष्णोरिति मन्त्रार्थप्रत्यभिज्ञानसङ्घटनार्थं तस्य मन्त्र- 3. 1835
शिवलोकविषयत्वमेव वक्तुं युक्तम्; न तु शिवविषयत्वम्। अत एव— "सोऽध्वनः पारमाप्नोति तद्विष्णोः परमं पदम्" इति कठवल्लीमन्त्रस्य शिवलोकविषयत्वम् "कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः" इत्यधिकरण (ब्र. ४. ३. ६) भाष्ये वर्णितम्। तद्विष्णोरिति मन्त्रस्यैतद्भाष्यदर्शितार्थावलम्बनेन शिवविषयत्व-

मुपपादयितुमप्यशक्यम् । न हि प्रपञ्चाकारेणावस्थितस्य विष्णोः शिवः साक्षात्स्वरूपमिति भाष्यकारसिद्धान्तः । किन्तु शिवशक्तिरूपः परमानन्दः तस्य साक्षात्स्वरूपमिति तस्य शिवशक्त्यवस्थारूपत्वमेव हि प्रकृत्यधिकरण (ब्र. १. ४. २३) भाष्यादिषु प्रतिपादितम् ।

3. 18352 तस्मादित्थमस्य भाष्यस्यार्थो वर्णनीयः—"प्रपञ्चाकारत्वमन्तरेण यन्निरतिशयानन्दस्वभावं विष्णोः परमं पदं रूपम्" इत्यनेन जगदाकारपरिणतविष्ण्ववस्थाप्रकृतिभूता चिच्छक्तिरुच्यते । सैव परमशिवलोकतयापि[1] वर्तत इति तेन तद्विष्णोरिति मन्त्रस्य शिवलोकविषयत्वं दर्शितं भवति । "तदेव शिवाभिधेयं परं ब्रह्म" इति तस्याः शिवस्वरूपाभिन्नत्वमुच्यते । ननु प्रत्यभिज्ञानविरोधपरिहारार्थं तद्विष्णोरिति मन्त्रस्य शिवलोकाकारतापन्नचिच्छक्तिविषयत्वमात्रं वक्तव्यम्, चिच्छक्तेः शिवस्वरूपाभिन्नत्ववचनं तत्र नोपयुज्यते—इत्याशङ्क्य शङ्काविशेषनिरासेन तदुपयोगं सूचयितुम् "यतो विष्णुशिवयोः" इत्यादि वाक्यम् । इयमत्र शङ्कोत्तिष्ठति—विष्णोः परमं रूपं शिवशक्तिरित्ययुक्तम्, पुराणेतिहासादिषु विष्णोः शिवाभिन्नत्वस्यैव बहुधा प्रतिपादितत्वादिति । नचायं परिहारोऽनेन वाक्येन सूचितः—यतो विष्णोः शिवात् स्वरूपभेदो नास्ति. तत एव विष्ण्ववस्थाप्रकृतिभूतायाः शक्तेरपि शिवात् स्वरूपभेदो नेष्यते, कूर्मपुराणादिषु शिवस्य शक्तेर्विष्णोश्चैक्यप्रतिपादनदर्शनाच्चेति ।

3. 18353 यद्वा "तदेव शिवाभिधेयं परं ब्रह्म" इति भाष्यवाक्यस्यायमभिप्रायः—पुराणेतिहासादिषु सकलवेदान्तप्रतिपाद्यं सर्वकारणं मुक्तप्राप्यं परं ब्रह्म विष्णोरेव रूपमिति विष्णोः परमं पदमिति विष्ण्वाख्यं परमं पदमिति च तत्र तत्र प्रतिपाद्यते । यथा महाभारते मोक्षधर्मे नारदोपाख्याने श्रूयते—नारदो हिमवत्पार्श्वे काञ्चन कन्यां तस्या जृम्भणसमये तन्मुखान्निर्गतान् [2]रत्नबिन्दु-[3]चिताङ्गान् आदित्यसदृशाकारं शिरसा मणिं धारयतः पुरुषान् तां प्रदक्षिणीकृत्य पुनरपि तामेव प्रविष्टांश्च दृष्ट्वा प्रणम्य सविनयं "का त्वम्, के ते त्रयः पुरुषाः,

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1. लोकतया विवर्तत इति एतेन (My, O).
2. रक्त (T)
3. विचित्राङ्गान् (My ; O)

तेषां गात्रेषु बिन्दवः के, मूर्धसु ज्योतिः किम्" इति पृष्ठा "सावित्र्यहम्, ते पुरुषाः त्रयो वेदाः, तद्गात्रेषु बिन्दवो यज्ञतत्फलरूपाः वेदार्थाः, मूर्धसु ज्योतिः वेदान्तप्रतिपाद्यं दिव्यं किमपि महज्ज्योतिः, तत्तु मयापि दुर्विज्ञानम्" इत्युक्तः तज्ज्योतिः किमिति निर्णयार्थं वर्षशतं भगवन्तं विष्णुमाराध्य ततः प्रसन्नं पुरस्तादाविर्भूतं भगवन्तमालोक्य सहर्षं प्रणम्य

"विवक्षितं जगन्नाथ मम ज्ञातं त्वयाच्युत ।
तत्प्रसीद हृषीकेश श्रोतुमिच्छामि तद्धरे ॥"

इति पृष्ट्वा

"यद्दृष्टं मम रूपं तद्वेदानां शिरसि त्वया ।
निर्द्वन्द्वा निरहङ्कारा यतयश्शुद्धलोचनाः ।
ते मां पश्यन्ति सततं तान् पृच्छ यदिहेच्छसि[1] ॥"

इत्येवं भगवतोपदिष्ट इति । तत्र मम रूपमित्यभेददृष्ट्या शिवस्वरूपमेवोच्यते । अत एव मम रूपमित्युक्त्वापि तत्र प्रष्टव्यरहस्यांशसद्भावमभिप्रेत्य "तान् पृच्छ" इत्युक्तम् । अत एव "पश्य मे योगमैश्वरम्" इति "परमं रूपमैश्वरम्" इति च गीतासु भगवता स्वकीयत्वेन प्रदर्श्यमाने रूपे स्वयमेवैश्वरत्वविशेषणं दत्तम् । एवं "विष्णोः परमं पदम्" इति, "विष्वाख्यं परमं पदम्" इति च भारतादिषु तस्य प्रतिपादनमपि विष्णुशिवयोरभेददृष्ट्या प्रवृत्तं शिवपर्यवसायि द्रष्टव्यमिति । अस्मिन्नपि पक्षे तेन[2] ईक्षत्यधिकरणवाक्येन चिच्छक्तेः शिवाभेदो वर्णितो भवत्येव, चिच्छक्त्यवस्थाविशेषरूपस्य विष्णोः शिवाभेदे चिच्छक्तेस्ततो भेदायोगात् ।

एवं परमेश्वरस्य चिच्छक्तिसद्भावः तस्याः परमेश्वराभिन्नत्वं तथात्वेऽपि तस्यास्तद्धर्मत्वमित्येतत्सर्वमद्वैतप्रधानेऽपि शास्त्रे निरूपितम् । तथाहि 3. 184
संक्षेपशरीरके—

1. यदि चेच्छसि (My, T) ; यदि वेच्छसि (O)
2. तेन तेन (T)

"चिच्छक्तिः परमेश्वरस्य विमला चैतन्यमेवोच्यते
सत्यैवास्य जडा परा भगवतः शक्तिस्त्वविद्योच्यते[1] ।
संसर्गाच्च मिथस्तयोर्भगवतः शक्त्योर्जगज्जायतेऽ-
सच्छक्त्या सविकारया भगवतः चिच्छक्तिरुद्रिच्यते ॥

इत्येवं कथयन्ति केचिदपरे श्रद्धालवस्तत्पुनः
कस्यांचिद्भुवि संमतं च विदुषां नेष्टं च भूम्यन्तरे ।
कर्मोपास्तिविधानभूमिषु तथा तत्संमतं निर्गुणे
तत्त्वे तत्परवेदवाक्यविषये स्वालोचिते नेष्यते[2] ॥"

एवं पञ्चपादिकायामपि—"आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वं चेति सन्ति धर्माः अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात् पृथगिवावभासन्ते[3]" इत्युक्त्या अयमेवार्थस्सूचितः ।

3. 185 एवं स्वरूपाभिन्नाया एव चिच्छक्तेः व्यवहारदशायां धर्मत्वमप्यस्तीति गार्गिब्राह्मणदहरविद्यादिषु धर्मधर्मिभावादिभेदनिर्देशोऽपि युज्यत एव । यत्तु जन्मादि सूत्रे (ब्र. १. १. २) "स एवानन्दो ब्रह्मेति प्रचुरत्वात् ब्रह्मत्वेनोपचर्यते" इत्युक्तम्, तत्प्रायः आनन्दवल्ल्याम् "स एको ब्रह्मण आनन्दः" इति, "आनन्दं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान्" इति च ब्रह्मधर्मत्वेनोक्तत्वात् व्यावहारिकधर्मत्वोक्तिप्रकरणे सामानाधिकरण्यमौपचारिकं नेतव्यमित्यभिप्रायेण, न तु सर्वथैव भेदाभिप्रायेण । एवम् "तद्गुणसारत्वात्तु तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत्" इति सूत्रे (ब्र. २. ३. २९) धर्मज्ञानवाचकशब्दानां धर्मिण्यौपचारिकत्वोक्तिरपि नेतव्या ।

3. 19 एवं च ब्रह्मचिच्छक्तेः सकलचेतनाचेतनप्रपञ्चाकारत्वं तस्या एव ब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वं तदीयसकलगुणगणरूपत्वं ब्रह्मणो निर्विकारत्वमिति अर्थचतुष्टयमाचार्यैरभ्युपगतं निर्गुणं निष्प्रपञ्चं जीवाभिन्नं शुद्धाद्वैतरूपं ब्रह्मेति तेषां पर-

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1. अविद्यात्मिका (Anandāśrama)
2. Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka, Ch III, v. 228, 229.
3. Pañcapādikā, p. 4. (Vizianagaram Samskrit Series).

मसिद्धान्त इति अमुमर्थं दृढमवगमयत्येव । तथा हि—चिच्छक्तेर्ब्रह्माभेदे तस्या एव तदीयसकलगुणात्मत्वे च ब्रह्मणः स्वभिन्ना गुणा न सन्ति; किन्तु स्वयमेव कल्पितभेदेन गुणवदप्यवभासते; वस्तुतो निर्गुणमेव ब्रह्म—इत्येतत्तावत् सिध्यति । नह्यभेदे मुख्यो गुणगुणिभाव उपपद्यते । न चाभेद इव[1] मुख्यगुणगुणिभावोपपादको भेदोऽप्याचार्यैरङ्गीकृत इति वक्तुं शक्यते; आरम्भणाधिकरण (ब्र. २. १. १५) भाष्यादिषु विरोधेन भेदाभेदपक्षस्य प्रतिक्षिप्तत्वात् ।

न च मध्वमत इवाचार्याणां मते गुणगुणिनोः भेदाभावेऽपि भेद- 3. 191
प्रतिनिधिर्विशेषोऽभ्युपगतोऽस्ति । न वा तेनापि मुख्यगुणगुणिभावनिर्वाहः, तस्य माध्वैरपि भेदकार्यव्यवहारमात्रनिर्वाहकतयाभ्युपगतत्वेन ततो भेदावभासतदभिलापमात्रसिद्धेः । विशेषस्य भेदनिर्वाह्यसकलकार्यनिर्वाहकत्वे विशेष इति पर्यायेण भेदस्यैवाङ्गीकारापत्तेः । अत एवानुव्याख्यानाख्ये मध्वग्रन्थे—[2] "भेदो नाशे भवेत्तथा" इति, सत्सु तन्तुषु विनश्यतां पटादीनां तन्तुभ्यो भेदेऽभ्युपगते, तद्व्याख्याने न्यायसुधायाम्[3] "यथा भेदसाधकानां व्यपदेशभेदादीनां विशेषाश्रयणेनैवान्यथासिद्धिरुक्ता, तथा सत्यपि तस्मिन्नसत्त्वस्यापि विशेषेणैव निर्वाहः क्रियताम्; किं भेदाभेदाभ्युपगमेन?" इति शङ्कां कृत्वा, "विशेषस्य भेदकार्यव्यवहारमात्रनिर्वाहकत्वेनासत्त्वं[4] प्रत्यनिर्वाहकत्वात् सकलभेदकार्यकारित्वे विशेषो भेद एव स्यात्, न तत्प्रतिनिधिः स्यात्" इति परिहारः कृतः[5] । तस्माद्गुणविषये तावत् "अपृथक्त्वेऽपि चैतन्यात्पृथगिवावभासन्ते" इति पञ्चपादिकोक्तपक्ष एवाभिमत इत्येतत् सुदृढमेव ।

तथा सकलप्रपञ्चाकारायः चिच्छक्तेः ब्रह्माभेदाभ्युपगमेन वियदादि- 3. 192
प्रपञ्चः तद्विवर्त इति सिद्ध्यति । अन्यथा वियदादेरनित्यस्य तत्परिणामत्वाभ्युपगमे तदभिन्नस्य ब्रह्मणो निर्विकारत्वाभ्युपगमविरोधापत्तेः ।

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1. वत् (T, My, and O)
2. Anuvyākhyā II, 2, p. 25 (Sarvamūla edn.)
3. अत्र न्यायसुधा—"स्यादेत् । यथा भेदादीनाम्" इत्यादिः ।
4. "विनाशं प्रति" इति न्यायसुधा ।
5. न्यायसुधा, अ. २ पा. २. १३७.

ननु ब्रह्मचिच्छक्त्योः तात्त्विकाभेदेऽपि गार्बिब्राह्मणदहरविद्यानन्दवल्ल्यादिसिद्धस्य धर्मधर्मिभावासनासनिभावादेः निर्वाहार्थं व्यावहारिको भेदोऽप्यवश्यमभ्युपगन्तव्य इति, तत एव चिच्छक्तेः परिणामित्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि ब्रह्मचिच्छक्त्योः निर्विकारत्वसविकारत्वव्यवस्था घटते; जीवब्रह्मणोरभेदेऽपि कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादि तदभावव्यवस्थावदिति चेत्, तथापि परममुक्तिदशायां व्यावहारिकभेदनिवृत्त्या जीवगतकर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिवत् वियदादिप्रपञ्चस्यापि निवृत्तेरवश्यं वक्तव्यत्वात् तस्य ब्रह्मविवर्तत्वसिद्धिरनिवार्या। तस्मात् संक्षेपशारीरकोक्तरीत्या भाष्ये परिणामवादालम्बनं व्यवहारदृष्टौ कर्मोपासनादिनिर्वाहार्थं तत्त्वदृष्टौ तत्प्रतिषेधापेक्षिततत्प्रसक्त्यर्थं चेति ब्रह्मणो निष्प्रपञ्चत्वपक्ष एवाभिमत इत्यपि सुदृढम्।

3. 1922 चिच्छक्तेः सकलाचेतनप्रपञ्चाकारत्ववत् सकलचेतनप्रपञ्चाकारत्वस्याप्युक्तत्वेऽपि चेतनप्रपञ्चस्य वियदादिवत्तद्विवर्तत्वं न सिध्यति; तथा सति तस्य तत्त्वज्ञानान्निवृत्त्या मुक्तिफलभाक्त्वाभावप्रसङ्गात्, नित्यस्य तस्य ब्रह्माभेदे ब्रह्मभेदे ब्रह्मनिर्विकारत्वविरोधप्रसङ्गाच्च[1]।

ननु प्रकृत्यधिकरणे "परिणामात्" इति सूत्रे (ब्र. १. ४. २७) चिदचिदाकारेण परिणामादिति व्याख्यातम्। परिणामत्वोक्तौ च विवर्तवादः स्वयमेवापततीत्युक्तम्। सत्यम्। तथापि चिदंशे परिणामत्वोक्तिश्चिद्वर्गस्य ब्रह्मचिच्छक्तिनित्यावस्थात्वमात्रपरा, चिद्वर्गस्यापि स्वचिच्छक्तिद्वारा ज्ञानसुखसंकोचविकासादिपरिणामोऽस्तीति तदभिप्राया वा, यतः स्वरूपतश्चिद्वर्गस्य नित्यत्वं व्यवस्थापितम् "नात्मा श्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताभ्यः" (ब्र. २. ३. १८) इत्यधिकरणे। तस्मान्निर्गुणं निष्प्रपञ्चं जीवाभिन्नं शुद्धाद्वैतरूपं ब्रह्मेति आचार्याणामभिमतमित्येतत्सुदृढमेव।

नन्वेवं व्यवहारदशायां मुक्तिदशायां चाचार्याणां मतस्याद्वैतवादिमताविशेषे किमर्थं पृथग्भाष्यारम्भ इति चेदुच्यते। निर्विशेषब्रह्मसाक्षात्कारात् खलु ब्रह्मभावावाप्तिः। तत्साक्षात्कारस्तन्निदिध्यासनलभ्यः। तस्मिन्नतिसूक्ष्मे निदिध्यासनयोग्यं बुद्धिस्थैर्यं ये न लभन्ते, तेषां तत्र बुद्धिस्थैर्यं दृढभक्तिपूर्वकचिरनिरन्तरो-

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1. विरोधप्रसङ्गः (A; O)

पासनाराधितस्यानन्तकल्याणगुणदिव्यविग्रहविशिष्टस्य तस्यैव प्रसादाल्लभ्यम्
"स नो बुध्या शुभया संयुनक्तु" इति श्रुतेः, "ईश्वरात् ज्ञानमन्विच्छेत्"
इति स्मृतेश्च । अत एवाहुः खण्डनकाराः—

"ईश्वरानुग्रहादेषा पुंसामद्वैतवासना ।
महाभयकृतत्राणा द्वित्राणां यदि जायते[1] ॥" इति ।

ईश्वरप्रसादश्च तदुपासनालभ्यः,

"यथान्तरोपचारेण नरः स्त्रीषु प्रसीदति ।
तथान्तरेण ध्यानेन प्रसीदति महेश्वरः ॥"

इति पुराणवचनात् । अतश्चिरकालं तदेकनिष्ठतोपयोगिभक्त्यतिशयसिद्धये तदेव परं ब्रह्म नातः परमस्य तात्त्विकं रूपमस्तीति प्रतिपादयद्भिराचार्यैस्तदानुगुण्येन वेदान्तवाक्यानां ब्रह्मसूत्राणां च योजनाप्रदर्शनार्थमिदं भाष्यं प्रवर्तितम् ।

ननु तस्मिन् भक्त्यतिशयसिध्यर्थं श्रुतिस्मृतिपुराणप्रति[2]पन्नतदीयमहि- 3.21
मविशेषप्रख्यापनमेव युक्तम्; न तु ततः परस्य वस्तुसतो न्यायानुगृहीतवेदान्तार्थत्वेन स्वाभिमतस्य महापुरुषार्थप्राप्त्यर्थमवश्योपादेयस्य तदीयरूपान्तरस्य दूषणमिति चेदुच्यते । पूर्वेषामपि ऋषीणामियं शैली दृष्टा; यत् पूर्वं कस्यचिदनुष्ठानेन यत्राधिकारः प्राप्यः तत्रैव पूर्वानुष्ठानेन दृढाधिकारसिध्यर्थं तत्रानभिमतमपि श्रुतिन्यायविरोधेन दूषणं प्रदर्श्य तत्र पुरुषस्य प्रथमप्रवृत्तिं निरुध्य पूर्वानुष्ठेये व्यवस्थापनम् ।

यथा कल्पसूत्रे श्रुतिस्मृतिविरोधप्रदर्शनेन संन्यासं दूषयित्वा तत्र 3.211
प्रथमं प्रवृत्तिं निरुध्य तदधिकारिविशेषणदृढवैराग्योपयोग्यन्तःकरणशुद्ध्यर्थं यज्ञादिकर्मानुष्ठानवतो गार्हस्थ्यस्य शंसनेन तत्र पुरुषव्यवस्थापनम् । तथा हि आपस्तम्बाचार्यैः—"अथ पुराणे श्लोकावुदाहरन्ति—

1. Khaṇḍana khaṇḍa-khādya, para 163, v. 25
2. प्रमित (A, Mal.)

अष्टाशीतिसहस्राणि ये प्रजामीषिर ऋषयः ।
दक्षिणेनार्यम्णः पन्थानं ते श्मशानानि भेजिरे ॥

अष्टाशीतिसहस्राणि ये प्रजां नेषिर ऋषयः ।
उत्तरेणार्यम्णः पन्थानं ते अमृतत्वं हि कल्पते ॥

इत्यूर्ध्वरेतसां प्रशंसा । अथापि सङ्कल्पसिद्धयो भवन्ति । यथा वर्षं प्रजादानं दूरेदर्शनं मनोजवतां यच्चान्यदेवं युक्तम् । तस्माच्छ्रुतितः प्रत्यक्षफलत्वाच्च विशिष्टानाश्रमानेतानेके ब्रुवते । त्रैविद्यवृद्धानां तु वेदाः प्रमाणमिति निष्ठा । तत्र यानि श्रूयन्ते व्रीहियवपश्वाज्यपयःकपालपत्नीसम्बन्धान्युच्चैर्नीचैः कार्यमिति तैर्विरुद्ध आचारोऽप्रमाणमिति मन्यन्ते । यत्तु श्मशानमुच्यते नानाकर्मणामेषोऽन्ते पुरुषसंस्कारो विधीयते । अतः परमनन्त्यं फलं स्वर्ग्यशब्दं श्रूयते । अथाप्यस्य प्रजातिममृतमाम्नाय आह—प्रजामनु प्र जायसे, तदु ते मर्त्यामृतमिति । अथापि स एवायं विरूढः पृथक् प्रत्यक्षेणोपलभ्यते । दृश्यते चापि सारूप्यं देहत्वमेवान्यत् । ते शिष्टेषु कर्मसु वर्तमानाः पूर्वेषां साम्परायेण कीर्तिं स्वर्गं च वर्धयन्ति । एवमवरोऽवरः परेषाम् । आभूतसंप्लवात्ते स्वर्गजितः । 'पुनः सर्गे बीजार्था भवन्ति' इति भविष्यत्पुराणे । अथापि प्रजापतेर्वचनम्—त्रयीं विद्यां ब्रह्मचर्यं प्रजातिं श्रद्धां तपोयज्ञमनुप्रदानम् । य एतानि कुर्वते तैरित्सह स्मो रजो भूत्वा ध्वंसतेऽन्यत्प्रशंसन्निति । तत्र ये पापकृतः त एव ध्वंसन्ति; यथा पर्णं वनस्पतेः । न परान् हिंसन्ति । नास्यास्मिन् लोके कर्मभिस्सम्बन्धो विद्यते, तथा परस्मिन् कर्मफलैः । तदेतेन वेदितव्यम् । प्रजापतेर्ऋषीणामिति सर्गोऽयम् । तत्र ये पुण्यकृतः तेषां प्रकृतयः पराज्वलन्त्यः उपलभ्यन्ते । स्यात्तु कर्मावयवेन तपसा वा कश्चित् सशरीरोऽन्तवन्तं लोकं जयति सङ्कल्पसिद्धिश्च स्यात्, न तु तज्ज्यैष्ठ्यमाश्रमाणाम्" [1]इति महता यत्नेन पूर्वोत्तरपक्षाभ्यां संन्यासस्य यज्ञादिकर्मविधयाकसकलवेदविरुद्धत्वेनाप्रामाणिकत्वं प्रदर्श्य, गृहस्थस्य श्मशानभावत्वदूषणममृतत्वाभावकृतं तन्न्यूनत्वं च श्रुतिन्यायाभ्यां परिहृत्य, प्रजापतिवचनो-

1. आपस्तम्बधर्मसूत्रम्, II, 9, 23, 24

दाहरणेनाश्रमान्तरं सर्वात्मना निन्दित्वा, पुत्रपौत्रादिकृतसत्कर्मभिः पित्रादीनां स्वर्गोऽस्ति चेत्तत्कृतदुष्कर्मभिस्तेषां नरकोऽपि स्यादिति शङ्कां युक्त्या परिहृत्य, सङ्कल्पसिद्धित्वादिकं कर्मतपस्साध्यं[1] गृहस्थेनान्येन वा येन-केनापि संपादयितुं शक्यत इत्याश्रमान्तरस्य तत्कृतमुत्कर्षमप्यपास्य, यज्ञादि-कर्मानुष्ठानवतो गार्हस्थ्यस्य प्रशंसनेनादृढवैराग्याणां मन्दाधिकारिणामन्तः-करणशुद्ध्या क्रमेण दृढवैराग्यसिद्ध्यर्थं गार्हस्थ्ये तद्व्यवस्थापनं कृतम्। तेषु सूत्रेषु अथापीत्यस्य अपि चेत्यर्थः। अमृतत्वं हि कल्पत इति अमृतत्वाय कल्पन्त इत्यर्थः। अनन्त्यं स्वर्ग्यमिति यकारोपजनः छान्दसः। देहत्वमेवान्यदिति देह एवान्य इत्यर्थः। ते स्वर्गजितः पुनः सर्गे बीजार्था भवन्तीति पुत्रपौत्रादिकृतैः पारलौकिकैः सत्कर्मभिः आप्रलयं स्वर्गं लब्धवन्तः ते पुनः सर्गादौ जगत्सृष्ट्यर्थाः प्रजापतयो भवन्तीत्यर्थः। तैरित्सह स्मः, तैरेव सह वसामः, त्रयं विद्यादिधनवतामेव[2] अस्मल्लोकप्राप्तिरित्यर्थः। नास्यास्मिंल्लोक इति, अस्य इत्येकवचनं बह्वर्थं। एषां पित्रादीनां इहलोके पुत्रादिकृतैः दुष्कर्मभिः परलोके तत्फलैश्च सम्बन्धो नास्तीत्यर्थः।

अत्र तैर्विरुद्ध आचारो अप्रमाणमिति संन्यासाश्रमस्य मूलप्रमाण- 3.212
राहित्यवचनम्, तस्य प्रत्यक्षजाबालादिश्रुतिसिद्धत्वादयुक्तम्; स्वयं च प्रागाप-स्तम्बाचार्यैः "चत्वारो आश्रमाः गार्हस्थ्यं आचार्यकुलं मौनं वानप्रस्थमिति। तेषु [3]यथोपदेशमव्यग्रो वर्तमानः क्षेमं गच्छति" इत्याश्रमान्तराणामपि सद्भावोऽ-ङ्गीकृतः। यथोपदेशमित्युक्त्या सर्वेष्वपि मूलमप्यङ्गीकृतम्। गार्हस्थ्याद्यनुक्रमणे-नैव चतुष्ट्वसिद्धेः चत्वार इत्युक्तिः ऐकाश्रम्यपक्षनिराकरणार्था। एवं स्ववचनविरुद्धं चेदं तैर्विरुद्ध आचारो अप्रमाणमिति वचनम्। "ततः परमनन्त्यं फलं स्वर्ग्यशब्दं श्रूयते" इति यदुक्तम्, तदपि काशकुशावलम्बनम्; तथाभूतश्रुतिवाक्यसद्भावे तस्य "अक्षय्यं ह वै चातुर्मास्ययाजिनः सुकृतं भवति" इत्यादिवदर्थवादमात्र-त्वात्। एतेन "प्रजामनु प्र जायसे" इत्यादिश्रुतिवाक्यान्तरोदाहरणमपि व्याख्यातम्। पितापुत्रयोरैक्ये युक्त्युदाहरणं त्वतिमन्दम्। न हि देहयोः-

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1. कर्मभिःसाध्यं (O)
2. विद्या अध्ययनादिमतामेव (T)
3. तेषु सर्वेषु — इति धर्मसूत्रपाठः (ध. सू. २. ९. २१.)

सादृश्यमात्माभेदनियतम् । तथा पुत्रादिदुष्टकर्मभिः पित्रादीनां नरकप्राप्त्यभावः वचनमपि "पितृभिस्सह मज्जति" इत्यादिवचनविरोधाच्चिन्त्यम् । प्रजापतेर्ऋषीणामित्यादियुक्तिस्तु "तेषां तेजोविशेषेण प्रत्यवायो न विद्यते"[1] इति स्वयमेवापस्तम्बाचार्यैः प्राक् फल्गूकृता । इदं सर्वमापस्तम्बाचार्यैरज्ञानेनाग्रहेण वा नोक्तम् । किन्तु संन्यासफलश्रवणमात्रसन्तुष्टा मन्दाः तदुचितदृढवैराग्याभावेऽपि हठात् प्रवृत्ताः पुनः निर्वोढुं अशक्नुवन्तः पतेयुः ; ते तथा मापप्तन्निति तदनुग्रहार्थितया "किन्नु मलं किमजिनं किमु श्मश्रूणि किन्तपः पुत्रं ब्राह्मण इच्छध्वं स वै लोकोऽवदावदः"[2] इत्यादिश्रुतिशैलीं दृष्ट्वा तत्प्रपञ्चनं कृतम् ।

3. 213 तथा महाभारतेऽपि शान्तिपर्वणि संन्यासोद्युक्तम्,

"अथैककालिको वाहमेकैकस्मिन् दिनक्षये ।
चरन् भैक्षन् मुनिर्मुण्डः क्षपयिष्यने कलेवरम् ॥"

इति संन्यासानुज्ञां प्रार्थयमानं युधिष्ठिरं प्रति श्रीकृष्णेन संन्यासार्थं भ्रात्राद्यनुज्ञाप्रार्थनया वैराग्यस्यादार्ढ्यमवबुध्य तद्दार्ढ्यार्थमन्तःकरणशुद्धये तं यज्ञादिषु प्रवर्तयितुकामेन स्वयमृष्यादिद्वारा च संन्यासस्य बहुधा दूषणं कृतम् । तत्र जनकोपाख्यानगते,

"पन्थानं पावनं हित्वा जनको मौड्यमास्थितम् ।
तं ददर्श प्रिया भार्या भैक्षवृत्तिमकिञ्चनम् ॥"

इति श्लोके पावनमिति विशेषणेन दृढान्तःकरणशुद्ध्युपयोगिनं कर्ममार्गं विसृज्य हठान्मोक्षाश्रमग्रहणमयुक्तमिति विभावितम् ।

3. 214 तथा मनुस्मृतौ च—

"ऋणानि त्रीण्यपाकृत्य मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत् ।
अनपाकृत्य मोक्षं तु सेवमानो व्रजत्यधः ॥"

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1. ध. सू. २. ६. १३.
2. Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, II, pp. 836, 837 (Ānandāśrama ed.)

इति अदृढवैराग्यपुरुषापेक्षयैव "यदहरेव विरजेत्तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत्, गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा" इति, "ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत्" इति च प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिमनादृत्य तदर्थोल्लङ्घनमिव कृतम् ।

इत्थमेवाचार्यैरपि शुद्धब्रह्मावाप्तिरूपमहाफलश्रवणमात्रमन्तुष्टस्तत्प्राप्त्यर्थं 3. 215
तन्निदिध्यासनसाक्षात्कारजननसमर्थचित्तैकाग्र्यरहितो मन्दः तदुपयोगिनं सगुणोपासनामार्गमपहाय शुद्धब्रह्मविषयेषु श्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनेषु हठात्प्रवृत्तः तदुचितं चित्तैकाग्र्यमनधिगच्छन् उभयभ्रष्टो मा भूदिति तदनुजिघृक्षया तं निर्गुणविषयप्रवृत्तेः प्रच्याव्य सगुणोपासनास्वेव स्थिरया भक्त्या प्रवर्तयितुं वेदान्तानां सगुणे समन्वयः प्रदर्शितः । न चेदं तत्र समन्वयप्रदर्शनम्, कल्पसूत्रे "प्रजामनु प्रजायसे" इत्यादिवाक्यस्य पुत्रसन्तानो गृहस्थस्यामृतत्वमित्यर्थप्रदर्शनमिवात्यन्ततात्पर्याविषये तात्पर्यप्रदर्शनम्, निर्गुणप्रकरणाम्नातानामपि "एतस्यैवाक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः", "सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः सर्वस्याधिपतिः" इत्यादिवाक्यानां निर्गुणप्रतिपत्त्युपायतया प्रतिपाद्यमाने सगुणेऽप्यवान्तरतात्पर्यसत्त्वात् । "ततः परं विशुद्धं तत्त्वान्तरं नास्ति" इति तु तथाभूतमन्दाधिकारश्रद्धार्थं तद्बुद्धिसंवादकैर्न्यायैस्तथोपपाद्य कल्पसूत्रे सन्न्यसनमिव [1]तन्निगूहितमिति सर्वमुपपद्यते ।

ननु मन्दाधिकारिणः प्रति प्रस्थानान्तरं कर्तव्यं चेत् स्वतन्त्रमेव कर्तुमुचितम्, न तु ब्रह्मसूत्रारूढम्, ब्रह्मसूत्राणां विशुद्धब्रह्मविचारार्थत्वात्; विशुद्धं ब्रह्म आचार्यैरभ्युपगतमित्यङ्गीकारे शङ्करभगवत्पाददर्शितस्य तेषां तद्विचारार्थत्वस्यापि अङ्गीकर्तव्यत्वादिति चेत्सत्यम् । शङ्करभगवत्पादैरेव तेषां सूत्राणां विश्वतोमुखत्वं सूत्रलक्षणप्राप्तं भूषणमिति सगुणब्रह्मविचारार्थत्वमप्याविष्कृतम् । तथा हि—प्रथमसूत्रभाष्य एव तावत् "अस्ति तावद्ब्रह्म नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावं सर्वज्ञं सर्वशक्तिसमन्वितं च । ब्रह्मशब्दस्य हि व्युत्पाद्यमानस्य नित्यशुद्धत्वादयोऽर्थाः प्रतीयन्ते" इति विशुद्धे सगुणे च ब्रह्मणि ब्रह्मशब्दस्य व्युत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनेन तत्र विचार्यतया ब्रह्मशब्दस्य तदुभयपरत्वं सूचितम् । तेन विशुद्धब्रह्मवत् सगुणमपि ब्रह्मात्र स्वरूपप्रमाणसाधनफलैः सह विचार्यमित्याशय आविष्कृतः ।

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1. निगहित (My)

तदनुकूलतया जन्मादिसूत्रे (शा. भा. १. १. २) जगदभिन्ननिमित्तोपादानस्वरूपं जगत्कारणत्वं विशेषणतया सगुणस्योपलक्षणतया शुद्धस्य च लक्षणमित्यभिप्रेत्य द्वयोरपि लक्षणमुखेन स्वरूपनिर्णयः कृतः। शास्त्रयोनिसूत्रस्य (शा. भा. १. १. ३) सगुणस्य जगत्कारणत्वाक्षिप्तसर्वज्ञत्वद्रढीकरणार्थतयैकां योजनां प्रदर्श्य सगुण-निर्गुणसाधारण्येन लक्षितस्य ब्रह्मणः शास्त्रप्रमाणकत्वसमर्थनार्थतया योजनान्तरं च दर्शितम्। समन्वयसूत्रे (शा. भा. १. १. ४) पूर्वसूत्रोक्तं ब्रह्मणि शास्त्रस्य प्रामाण्यमुपपादयितुं वेदान्तरूपस्य तस्य सगुणनिर्गुणसाधारण्येनैव तस्मिन् तात्पर्येणान्वयो वर्णितः। स च—

सगुणवाक्यमपीह समन्वितं
भवति निर्गुणवस्तुनि सर्वशः।
न खलु निर्गुणवस्तुसमन्वयं
न सहते सगुणस्य समन्वयः॥

सत्यासत्यवपुस्तथाहि सगुणं ब्रह्मास्य विद्या तथा
तद्वत्तद्विषयस्य वेदवचसस्तात्पर्यमेवंविधम्।
तेनावान्तरमस्य वेदवचसस्तात्पर्यमन्यादृशं
चान्यन्निर्गुणवस्तु तत्त्वविषयं सङ्कल्प्यते भागशः॥"

इति संक्षेपशारीरकोक्तरीत्या निर्गुणे सर्वेषां वेदान्तवाक्यानां महातात्पर्ये-णान्वयरूपः सगुणे त्ववान्तरतात्पर्येणेति व्यवस्थया पर्यवस्यति। निर्गुणप्रक-रणाम्नातानामपि वाक्यानां तत्तदन्तर्गतपदप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तगुणविशिष्टे सगुणे अवान्तरपारार्थ्यं युज्यत एव। ईक्षत्यधिकरणे [शा. भा. १. १. ५] वेदान्तानां साङ्ख्याभिमतप्रधानकारणत्वपरतां निरस्य सगुणनिर्गुणसाधारण्येनैव ब्रह्मकारणत्व-परता प्रसाधिता। अत एव तत्र स्वाप्ययसूत्रपर्यन्तं [शा. भा. १. १. ९] सद्विद्यादिनिर्गुणप्रकरणगतानि वाक्यान्युदाहृत्य गतिसामान्यसूत्रभाष्ये [शा. भा. १. १. १०] सगुणनिर्गुणसाधारण्येन चेतनकारणत्वे सर्ववेदान्तानामैककण्ठ्यं प्रदर्श्य श्रुतत्वाच्चेति सूत्रभाष्ये (शा. भा. १. १. ११) सगुणस्य परमेश्वरस्य महिमनिरूपणार्थं प्रवृत्तायां श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषदि समाम्नातः—

" न तस्य कश्चित्पतिरस्ति लोके
न चेशिता नैव च तस्य लिङ्गम् ।
स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो
न चास्य कश्चिज्जनिता न चाधिपः ॥"

इति मन्त्र उदाहृतः । तदनन्तरमानन्दमयाधिकरणावतरणे (शा. भा. १. १. १२) कृत्स्नस्याध्यायशेषस्य सगुणनिर्गुणोभयपरतयैव समुत्थानं वर्णितम्, "द्विरूपं हि ब्रह्मावगम्यते, नामरूपविकारोपाधिकं तद्विपरीतं च सर्वोपाधिवर्जितम्" इत्यादिना "एवमेकमपि ब्रह्मापेक्षितोपाधिसम्बन्धं निरस्तोपाधिसम्बन्धं चोपास्यत्वेन ज्ञेयत्वेन च वेदान्तेषूपदिश्यत इति परो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते" इत्यन्तेन। तदनन्तरम्, यथा "आनन्दमयोऽभ्यासात्" (शा. भा. १. १. १२), "भूमा संप्रसादादध्युपदेशात्" (शा. भा. १. ३. ८), "अक्षरमम्बरान्तधृतेः" (शा. भा. १. ३. १०), "अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः" (शा. भा. १. २. २१), "शब्दादेव प्रमितः" (शा. भा. १. ३. २४), "सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन" (शा. भा. १. ३. ४२), इत्यादिसूत्रैः सत्यज्ञानानन्ताखण्डानन्दरूपे प्रतिषिद्धस्थूलत्वादिसर्वधर्मे प्रत्यगभिन्ने ब्रह्मणि वेदान्तानां समन्वयः प्रदर्शितः, एवम् "अन्तस्तद्धर्मोपदेशात्" (शा. भा. १. १. २०) "सर्वत्र प्रसिद्धोपदेशात्" (श. भा. १. २. १), "दहरउत्तरेभ्यः" (शा. भा. १. ३. १४) इत्यादिसूत्रैरुपासकानुग्रहार्थं दिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहयुक्ते सत्यकामत्वसत्यसङ्कल्पत्वाद्यनन्तकल्याणगुणशालिनि सविशेषेऽपि ब्रह्मणि तेषां यथार्हं समन्वयः प्रदर्शितः। अविरोधाध्यायेऽपि "तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः" [शा. भा. २. १. १४] इत्यादिसूत्रैर्निर्विशेष इव "न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात्" [शा. भा. २. १. ४], "न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात्" [शा. भा. २. १. ३२.], "वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति" [शा. भा. २. १. ३४] इत्यादिसूत्रैर्जगदुपादनत्वजगत्स्रष्टृत्वसर्वभूतानुग्राहकत्वसर्वभूतदयालुत्वादिगुणशालिनि सविशेषेऽपि ब्रह्मणि समन्वयस्य विरोधपरिहारो दर्शितः। साधनाध्यायेऽपि "आनन्दादयःप्रधानस्य" [शा. भा. ३. ३. ११], "अक्षरधियां त्ववरोधः सामान्यतद्भावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम्" [शा. भा. ३. ३. ३३] इति निर्विशेषे ब्रह्मणि ज्ञानार्थ-

मानन्दादीनामस्थूलत्वादीनामिव "कामादीतरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः" [शा. भा. ३. ३. ३९] इत्यादिभिर्बहुभिः सूत्रैरुपासनार्थं सविशेषेऽपि ब्रह्मणि सत्यकामत्वादिगुणानामुपसंहारो वर्णितः। फलाध्याये "आवृत्तिरसकृदुपदेशात्" [शा. भा. ४. १. १], "आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च" [शा. भा. ४. १. ३], "आसीनः संभवात्" [शा. भा. ४. १. ७], "यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात्" [शा. भा. ४. १. ११], "तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात्" [शा. भा. ४. १. १३] इत्यादिसूत्रैर्निर्गुणे श्रवणादीनाम्, सगुणे उपासनानां चावृत्तिः कार्या इत्येवमादयः केचिदर्थाः सगुणनिर्गुणयोस्तन्त्रेण प्रथमपादे निरूपिताः। द्वितीयपादे सगुणोपासनफलप्राप्त्यर्थं विदुष उत्क्रान्तिप्रकारो निर्गुणज्ञानफलप्राप्त्यर्थमुत्क्रान्त्यपेक्षाभावश्च वर्णितः। तृतीयपादे सगुणब्रह्मविदामर्चिरादिमार्गः तेन मार्गेण प्राप्यं सगुणं ब्रह्मेत्ययमर्थो निरूपितः। चतुर्थे पादे "संपद्याविर्भावः स्वेन शब्दात्" (शा. भा. ४. ४. १) इत्यादिभिस्त्रिभिरधिकरणैर्निर्गुणब्रह्मवित्प्राप्यफलस्वरूपम् "सङ्कल्पादेव तु तच्छ्रुतेः" (शा. भा. ४. ४. ८) इत्यादिभिरधिकरणैः सगुणोपासकप्राप्यफलस्वरूपं च विवेचितम्।

3. 23 नन्वेवमुक्तरीत्या सूत्राणां सगुणब्रह्मविचारार्थत्वमप्यस्तीत्याविष्कुर्वद्भिः शङ्कराचार्यैरेव सगुणमपि ब्रह्म स्वरूपप्रमाणसाधनफलैः विचारितं चेत् किमर्थं सगुणविषये श्रीकण्ठाचार्यैः भाष्यान्तरं कृतम्? सूत्राणां कार्त्स्न्येन सगुणपरत्वयोजनया सगुणे भक्त्यतिशयसिद्ध्यर्थं चेत् निर्गुणे विश्वासातिशयासिद्ध्यर्थं शङ्कराचार्यैस्तेषां कार्त्स्न्येन निर्गुणपरत्वयोजना किमिति न कृतेति चेदत्र ब्रूमः—शङ्कराचार्यैः सगुणब्रह्मसद्भावमात्रं निरूपितम्, न तु तत्परमशिव इति विष्णवादिदेवतान्तरत्वशङ्कानिरासेन निर्णीतम्।

3. 231 यद्यपि—दहराधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. ३. १४) "परमेश्वर एवात्र दहराकाशो भवितुमर्हति, न भूताकाशो जीवो वा" इति सिद्धान्तमुपक्रम्य "'यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्म पुरे' इति पूर्ववाक्ये ब्रह्मशब्देन जीव उच्यते, तस्य देहरूपपुरस्वामित्वात्, अतः प्राक् प्रकृतः स एव दहराकाशो भवितुमर्हति" इति शङ्कापरिहारपरभावे, "अथवा जीवपुर एवास्मिन् ब्रह्म सन्निहितमुपदेक्ष्यते, यथा सालग्रामे विष्णुः सन्निहितः" इति विष्णोर्दहराकाशतया निर्णिनीषितस्य

सगुणब्रह्मणश्चोपमानोपमेयभावनिर्देशादिह निरूप्यमाणं सगुणं ब्रह्म न विष्णुरूपमिति सूचितम् ; दहराधिकरण एव "यद्यप्याकाशशब्दो भूताकाशे रूढः, तथापि तेनैव तस्योपमा नोपपद्यते" इति भूताकाशस्तु सत्यामप्याकाशशब्दप्रसिद्धौ उपमानोपमेयभावाद्यसंभवान्न गृहीतव्य इति च तत्पूर्वापरग्रन्थयोः "यावान्वा अयमाकाशः तावानेषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशः" इत्युपमानोपमेयभावनिर्देशेन दहराकाशस्य भूताकाशभिन्नत्वव्यवस्थापनात् । तस्य न्यायस्य मध्यवर्तिग्रन्थेऽप्यव्याहतं प्रवृत्तेः ।

तथा यावदधिकाराधिकरण (शा. भा. ३. ३. ३२) भाष्ये, "अपा- 3. 232
न्तरतमा नाम वेदाचार्यः पुराणऋषिर्विष्णुनियोगात् कलिद्वापरयोः सन्धौ कृष्णद्वैपायनस्संबभूव । सनत्कुमारोऽपि ब्रह्मणो मानसः पुत्रः स्वयं रुद्राय वरप्रदानात् स्कन्दत्वेन प्रादुर्बभूव" इत्युक्तिभङ्ग्या विष्णोरप्यपकृष्टत्वेन विभावितः संहाररुद्रोऽत्र निर्णिनीषितं सगुणं ब्रह्म न भवतीति तु कैमुतिकन्यायेन सूचितम् । संहाररुद्र एव हि—

"त्वामेव पुत्रमिच्छामि त्वया वा सदृशं विभो ।"

इति प्रार्थयमानं ब्रह्माणं प्रति वरप्रदानात्तत्पुत्रत्वेन प्रादुर्भूतः कुमारसंभवोपाख्यानविषय इति पुराणेषु प्रसिद्धम् । एवं विष्णुरुद्रभिन्नत्वेन सूचितं सगुणं ब्रह्म त्रिमूर्त्युत्तीर्णः परमशिव इत्यपि अन्तरादित्यविद्याद्यधिकरणेषु निर्णिनीषिते सगुणब्रह्मणि प्रायः परमशिववाचकपरमेश्वशब्दप्रयोगेण सूचितम् ।

भगवत्पादहृदयाभिज्ञैराचार्यवाचस्पतिमिश्रैरपि शास्त्रोपक्रमे—

"षड्भिरङ्गैरुपेताय विविधैरव्ययैरपि ।
शाश्वताय नमस्कुर्मो वेदाय च भवाय च ॥"

इति वेदभवशब्दाभ्यामौचित्यात् प्रमाणप्रमेयभावेनान्वितयोः नमस्कार्यत्वेन निर्देशात् षडङ्गदशाव्ययरूपकल्याणगुणगणविशिष्टत्वेन भवशब्दवाच्यत्वेन च प्रसिद्धः परमशिव एवात्र शास्त्रे निरूपणीयं सगुणं ब्रह्मेति सूचितम् ।

तथापि तत्तदधिकरणविषयवाक्यानां देवतान्तरपरत्वनिरासेन तत्र 3. 234
व्यवस्थापितम् । अतिगूढत्वेन सूचनामात्रेण श्रोतृणां हृदयसाक्षिकं प्रत्ययो न

भवतीति तदर्थं त्रिमूर्त्युत्तीर्णः परमशिव एवात्र शास्त्रे प्रतिपाद्यं सगुणं ब्रह्म, दहरशाण्डिल्योपकोसलवैश्वानरादिविद्याविध्युक्तप्रकारेण तस्यैवोमासहितस्योपासनं कार्यम्, सगुणोपासनाभिरर्चिरादिमार्गेण प्राप्यं च स्थानं तदीयदिव्यलोकरूपमेवेत्यस्मिन्नर्थे वेदान्तानां न्यायतः सामरस्यमुपपादयितुमाचार्यैः पृथक् भाष्यमारब्धम् ।

3. 235 नन्वेवं सति शाङ्करभाष्ये सगुणब्रह्मनिरूपणं व्यर्थमवश्यारब्धव्येनानेनैव भाष्येण

" निर्विशेषं परं ब्रह्म साक्षात्कर्तुमनीश्वराः ।
ये मन्दास्तेऽनुकम्प्यन्ते सविशेषनिरूपणैः ॥

वशीकृते मनस्येषां सगुणब्रह्मशीलनात् ।
तदेवाविर्भवेत्साक्षादपेतद्वै[1]तकल्पनम् ॥ "

इति कल्पतरूक्तस्य तन्निरूपणप्रयोजनस्य सिद्धेरिति चेच्छृणु तस्यापि साफल्यम् । निर्गुणब्रह्मनिरूपणार्थमेव शङ्करभगवत्पादैः भाष्यं प्रवर्तितम् । तन्निरूपणं तत्तदधिकरणविषयवाक्यानां जीवाद्यन्यपरत्वशङ्कारूपपूर्वपक्षनिरासपूर्वकं कार्यम् । तन्निरासश्च सर्वकर्तृत्वसर्वपालयितृत्वसर्वप्रशास्तृत्वसर्वसंहर्तृत्वादिलिङ्गैः कार्यः । तत्रेयं शङ्का भवेत्—प्रतिषिद्धसर्वधर्मस्य शुद्धचिन्मात्ररूपस्येह निरूपणीयस्य ब्रह्मणः के धर्माः, यैः ब्रह्मलिङ्गत्वाभिमतैः जीवादिपूर्वपक्षनिरासः क्रियत इति । तत्रायं परिहारो वाच्यः — वस्तुतो निर्धर्मकस्यापि ब्रह्मणः सन्ति व्यवहारदशायां कल्याणगुणरूपाः बहवो धर्माः । तदुपहितं तदेव निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म सविशेषमित्यप्युच्यते[2] । तस्य सविशेषस्य दहरशाण्डिल्यवैश्वानरविद्याद्युपास्यस्य धर्माः निर्विशेषप्रकरणेऽपि तत्प्रतिपत्त्युपायत्वेन तत्स्मृत्यर्थत्वेन च ये उपादीयन्ते तैर्जीवादिपूर्वपक्षनिरासः क्रियत इति तदुपयोगितयास्मिन्नपि शास्त्रे सविशेषब्रह्मप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं तद्विषयाणि वाक्यान्युदाहृत्य तन्निरूपणं कार्यम् ।

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1. अभेदोपाधिकल्पनम् (My)
2. उपचर्यते इति (My)

फलप्रतिपत्त्यर्थमपि तन्निरूपणं कार्यम्। तथा हि—यद्यपि तत्त्वदृष्ट्या तत्त्वज्ञानफलं निर्विशेषब्रह्मभावाप्तिः, तथापि तदेव निर्विशेषं ब्रह्म यावत्सर्वमुक्ति सगुणेश्वरभावमापद्यावतिष्ठत इति व्यवहारदृष्ट्या सत्यकामत्वादिगुणकपरमेश्वरभावापत्तिरूपमपि भवति तत्फलम्। अत एव प्रथमाध्याये दहराधिकरणे दहराकाशो वाक्यशेषश्रुतैः सत्यकामत्वादिगुणैः परमेश्वर इति प्रसाध्य, प्रजापतिविद्यायाम्, "य आत्माऽपहतपाप्मा विजरो विमृत्युर्विशोको विजिघित्सो विपिपासः सत्यकामस्सत्यसङ्कल्पः" इति जीवेऽपि तेषां गुणानां श्रवणात् न तेषां परमेश्वरलिङ्गत्वमित्याशङ्कामुद्भाव्य, तन्निरासार्थं प्रवृत्तस्य "उत्तराच्चेदाविर्भूतस्वरूपस्तु" (शा. भा. १. ३. १९) इति सूत्रस्य, मुक्तौ जीवस्य परमेश्वरभावापत्त्यैव सत्यकामत्वादिगुणाविर्भावो न तु तद्भिन्नावस्थतयेति न तेषां ब्रह्मलिङ्गत्वे काचिदनुपपत्तिरिति तात्पर्यमुक्तम्, "तस्मादविद्याप्रत्युपस्थापितमपारमार्थिकं जैवं रूपं कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वरागद्वेषादिदोषकलुषितमनेकानर्थयोगि, तद्विलयनेन तद्विपरीतमपहतपाप्मत्वादिगुणकं पारमेश्वरं रूपं विद्यया प्रतिपद्यते" इति 3. 2351

प्रथमाध्याय एव जगद्वाचित्वाधिकरणेऽपि (शा. भा. १. ४. १६) बालाक्यजातशत्रुसंवादस्योपक्रमोपसंहाराभ्यां परब्रह्मपरत्वव्यवस्थापनप्रस्तावे "तथोपसंहारस्यापि निरतिशयफलश्रवणात् ब्रह्मविषयत्वं दृश्यते, 'सर्वान् पाप्मनोऽपहत्य सर्वेषां भूतानां श्रैष्ठ्यं स्वाराज्यमाधिपत्यं पर्येति। य एवं वेद'" इत्युक्त्या मुक्तिफलस्य सगुणेश्वरभावापत्तिरूपत्वं दर्शितम्; परमेश्वरादन्यत्र सर्वभूताधिपत्यासंभवात्। 3. 2352

तथा द्वितीयाध्यायेऽपि अंशाधिकरणे (शा. भा. २. ३. ४३) "जीवस्येश्वरांशत्वाभ्युपगमे तदीयेन संसारदुःखभोगेनेश्वरस्यापि दुःखित्वं स्यात्। यथा लोके हस्तपाद्याद्यन्यतमांशगतेन दुःखेनांशिनो देवदत्तस्यापि दुःखित्वं तद्वत्। अतश्च तत्प्राप्तानां महत्तरं दुःखं प्राप्नुयात्। अतो वरं पूर्वावस्था संसार एवास्त्विति सम्यग्ज्ञानानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गः" इति शङ्काग्रन्थेन प्रसिद्धेन बिम्बप्रतिबिम्बभावेन कृतासाङ्कर्यमवलम्ब्य समाहितेन मुक्तस्येश्वरभावापत्तिराविष्कृता। न च तत्रेश्वरशब्दः कथंचन शुद्धचैतन्यपरो योजनीयः। यतः "परात्तु तच्छ्रुतेः" इति तत्पूर्वाधिकरणे (शा. भा. २. ३. ४१, ४२) जीवस्याविद्यावस्थायां कर्तृत्वमीश्वरापेक्षमिति प्रसाध्य, "नन्वेवमीश्वरस्य कारयितृत्वे सति वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये 3. 2353

स्याताम्" इति शङ्कोत्तरत्वेन "कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः" (शा. भा. २. ३. ४२) इति तदीयगुणसूत्रस्यावतारितत्वात्तदधिकरणं सगुणेश्वरविषयमिति तदनन्तरप्रवृत्तमंशाधिकरणमपि तद्विषयमेव। तदुपक्रमे "जीवेश्वरयोरुपकार्योपकारकभाव उक्तः। स च सम्बद्धयोरेव दृष्टो लोके। यथा स्वामिभृत्ययोः। यथा वा अग्निविस्फुलिङ्गयोः। ततश्च जीवेश्वरयोरप्युपकार्योपकारकभावाभ्युपगमात् किं स्वामिभृत्यवत्संबन्धः, आहोस्विदग्निविस्फुलिङ्गवदित्यस्यां विचिकित्सायामनियमो वा प्राप्नोति; अथवा स्वामिभृत्यप्रकारेष्वीशित्रीशितव्यभावस्य प्रसिद्धत्वात्तद्विध एव सम्बन्धः प्राप्नोति" इति पूर्वपक्षप्रवर्तनेन तस्याधिकरणस्य पूर्वाधिकरणसमानविषयत्वस्फुटीकरणात्।

3. 2354 तृतीयाध्यायेऽपि सन्ध्याधिकरणे (शा. भा. ३. २. १) परमेश्वराभिन्नस्य जीवस्यैश्वर्यवशात् स्वप्ने साङ्कल्पिकी रथादिसृष्टिर्भविष्यतीति शङ्कोत्तरत्वेनावतारितस्य "पराभिध्यानात्तु तिरोहितं ततो ह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययौ" (शा. भा. ३. २. ५) इति सूत्रस्य तात्पर्यकथनावसरे "जीवेश्वरयोः सत्यप्यंशांशित्वे प्रत्यक्षमेव जीवस्येश्वरविपरीतधर्मत्वम्। किं पुनर्जीवस्येश्वरसमानधर्मत्वं नास्त्येव? न नास्त्येव; विद्यमानमपि तत्तिरोहितं अविद्यादिव्यवधानात्। तत्पुनस्तिरोहितं सत्परमेश्वरमभिध्यायतो यतमानस्य जन्तोः विधूतध्वान्तस्य तिमिरतिरस्कृतेव दृक्छक्तिरौषधवीर्यादीश्वरप्रसादात्संसिद्धस्य कस्यचिदेवाविर्भवति" इति ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण मुक्तस्य सगुणेश्वरभावापत्तिराविष्कृता; केवलचिन्मात्ररूपतापत्तौ सत्यसङ्कल्पादिधर्माविर्भावासंभवात्।

3. 2355 चतुर्थाध्याये तु "स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते" इति मुच्यमानविषयायां श्रुतौ केन रूपेणाभिनिष्पत्तिः विवक्षितेति बुभुत्सायाम् "ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः" (शा. भा. ४. ४. ५) इति सूत्रेण यत् ब्राह्मं रूपमपहतपाप्मत्वादि सत्यसङ्कल्पत्वावसानं सर्वज्ञत्वसर्वेश्वरत्वादि तेनाभिनिष्पत्तिः "य आत्मापहतपाप्मा" इत्याद्युपन्यासेन "स तत्र पर्येति जक्षत् क्रीडन् रममाणः स्त्रीभिर्वा यानैर्वा" इत्याद्यैश्वर्यावेदनेन चेति जैमिनिमतम् "चितितन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः" (शा. भा. ४. ४. ६) इत्यनन्तरसूत्रेण "एवं वा अरे अयमात्मानन्तरोऽबाह्यः कृत्स्नः प्रज्ञानघन एव" इत्यादिश्रुत्या चैतन्यमात्रमात्मनः स्वरूपमित्यवगतेस्तन्मात्रेणाभिनिष्पत्तिरिति मतान्तरं चोपन्यस्य तदनन्तरपठितस्य

"एवमप्युपन्यासात् पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः" (शा. भा. ४. ४. ७) इति सिद्धान्तसूत्रस्य "एवमपि पारमार्थिकचैतन्यस्वरूपत्वाभ्युपगमेऽपि व्यवहारापेक्षया पूर्वस्याप्युपन्यासादिभ्योऽवगतस्य ब्राह्मस्यैश्वर्यरूपस्याप्रत्याख्यानादविरोधं बादरायण आचार्यो मन्यते" इति तात्पर्यकथनेन मुक्तस्य निरतिशयैश्वर्यशालिनी सगुणेश्वर-भावापत्तिरिततरां स्पष्टीकृता । निर्गुणब्रह्मवादे तद्भावापत्तिरेव मुक्तिरिति वक्तव्ये कथं सगुणेश्वरभावापत्तिरेव मुक्तिरुच्यत इति शङ्का च समाहिता:; वस्तुदृष्ट्या मुक्तस्य चैतन्यमात्रत्वेऽपि बिम्बभूतपरमेश्वरभावं प्राप्तस्य तस्य परमेश्वरवदेव बद्धपुरुषव्यवहारदृष्ट्या यावत्सर्वमुक्ति निरतिशयमैश्वर्यं पारमेश्वरत्वेन प्रसिद्धं अन्यच्च सकलं धर्मजातं संभवतीति । तदेवं निर्विशेषनिरूपणार्थब्रह्मलिङ्गप्रदर्शनोप-योगितया तत्त्वज्ञानप्राप्यफलरूपसगुणेश्वरमहिमप्रपञ्चनोपयोगितया च प्रायः सक-लसगुणविद्याप्रकरणाम्नाताः सर्वेऽपि परमेश्वरस्य कल्याणगुणाः प्रदर्शनीया जाता इति निरूपणीयबाहुल्यान्निर्गुणनिरूपणप्राधान्येन प्रवृत्तेऽपि भगवत्पादीये भाष्ये सगुणप्रसङ्ग एव भूयान्, निर्गुणविचारो निरूपणीयबाहुल्याभावात् स्वल्पश्च दृश्यते । यथा चतुर्ष्वपि वेदेषु सर्वप्राण्यनुग्रहार्थं ब्रह्मभावाप्तिरूपमहापुरुषार्थप्रति-पादनैदम्पर्येणैव प्रवृत्तेषु तदुपयोग्यन्तःकरणशुद्धिजनककर्मनिरूपणार्थ एव भूयान् प्रपञ्चः । ब्रह्मनिरूपणार्थो वेदान्तभागस्तु निरूपणीयबाहुल्याभावात् स्वल्पः ।

नन्वेवं सगुणविचारस्य निर्गुणविचारार्थत्वे निर्गुणविचारप्रतिज्ञयैव 3. 2356
सगुणविचारः साधनफलविचारवदर्थात् कर्तव्यत्वेन सिध्यतीति किमर्थं सगुण-विचारस्यापि प्रतिज्ञातत्वसिध्यर्थं प्रथमसूत्रगतस्य विचार्यपरब्रह्मशब्दस्य सगुण-साधारण्यम् "अस्ति तावत्" इत्यादिभाष्येणोक्तमिति चेत्, ब्रह्मसूत्राणां साक-ल्येन सगुणपरतया योजनान्तरमप्यस्तीति सूचनार्थं तदर्थप्रतिज्ञोपयोगितया तदुक्तमित्यवेहि । तद्योजनान्तरं कथमित्याकाङ्क्षायां समासभेदाश्रयणादिनेति स्थालीपुलाकन्यायेन क्वचिद्दर्शयितुमेव शास्त्रयोनिसूत्रे[1] (शा. भा. १. १. ३) वर्णकद्वयं कृतम् । कल्पतरुकारैरपि भाष्यकारीयं शास्त्रयोनि[2]सूत्रस्य सगुणनिर्गुणो-भयपरतया योजनाद्वयं स्थालीपुलाकन्यायावलम्बनेन प्रवृत्तमिति[3] प्रदर्शयितुमेव

1. योनित्वमात्र (O)
2. योनित्व (O)
3. प्रवृत्तं न तु तन्मात्रनिष्ठमिति (O)

स्वयमपि "अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्" इति सूत्रस्य (शा. भा. ४. १. १६) सगुणनिर्गुणोभयपरयोजनाद्वयं भाष्यसूचितं स्फुटीकृतम्। तैः खलु अग्निहोत्रादि तु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात्" इति सूत्रस्य[1]—अग्निहोत्रादिकं तस्मै "तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाघयोः" इति सूत्रे (शा. भा. ४. १. १३) तदधिगम-शब्देन प्रस्तुताय निर्विशेषब्रह्मापरोक्षज्ञान[2]रूपाय कार्यायैव, "विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन" इत्यादिश्रुतिदर्शनात्। समस्तकर्मबृन्ददाहकत्वेन कर्मजातिविरोधिनोऽपि तस्य ज्ञानस्य नित्ययज्ञादिकर्मविशेषकार्यत्वं नायुक्तम्, समस्तवनदाहकस्यापि दवदहनस्य नित्ययज्ञादिकर्मविशेषकार्यत्वं नायुक्तम्, समस्तवनदाहकस्यापि दवदहनस्य वनान्तर्गतवेण्वादिकार्यत्वदर्शनात्—इति निर्गुणविषयमेकं योजनं प्रदर्शितम्। अग्निहोत्रादिकं तस्य सगणब्रह्माधिगमस्य कार्यायैव, सगुणविदां केकयादीनां यज्ञाद्यनुष्ठानदर्शनात्; निर्गुणविद्याफलस्येव सगुणविद्याफलस्य कर्मकार्यत्वं[3] नायुक्तम्, ब्रह्मलौकिकभोगरूपस्य तस्य सातिशयत्वदर्शनात्—इति सगुणविषयं योजनान्तरं प्रदर्शितम्। एवं जिज्ञासासूत्रे (शा. भा. १. १. १) विचार्यत्वस्य ब्रह्मशब्दस्य सगुणसाधारण्यप्रदर्शनेन क्वचित्सगुणनिर्गुणोभयविषय-योजनाद्वयप्रदर्शनेन च शङ्कराचार्यैः सूचितमेव। सर्वेषां ब्रह्मसूत्राणां सगुणपरं योजनान्तरमुपासकानुग्रहार्थमाविष्कर्तुमेव श्रीकण्ठाचार्यैः भाष्यं प्रवर्तितम्।

2, 241 नन्वेवं निर्गुणब्रह्माभ्युपगमाविरोधेन शङ्कराचार्याभिमत एव[4] सगुण ब्रह्मनिरूपणप्रकारः[5] श्रीकण्ठाचार्यैराविष्कृतश्चेत्तन्मते यानि सगुणब्रह्मविषयत्वेन संप्रतिपन्नानि वेदान्तवाक्यानि तान्येवाधिकरणेषु उदाहृत्यैतैर्देवतान्तर[6] परत्वादि-निरासपूर्वकं स्वाभिमतसगुणेश्वरपरतया निर्णेयानि स्युः। तैर्येष्वधिकरणेषु यानि वेदान्तवाक्यानि सद्विद्यानन्दवल्लीप्रतर्दनाख्यायिकाकठवल्ल्यन्तर्यामिब्राह्मणमुण्डक-भूमविद्यादीनि निर्गुणविषयत्वेन निर्णीतानि[7] तान्येव तेष्वधिकरणेष्वेतैः सगुण-

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1. तैः खल्वग्निहोत्रादिकम् etc. (O
2. निर्विशेषापरोक्षज्ञान (O)
3. विद्याकर्मकार्यत्वं (A); विद्याफलकर्मकार्यत्वं (O)
4. चार्यमत एव (O)
5. (O) omits सगुण—प्रकारः
6. इतरदेवतान्तर (O)
7. वर्णितानि (O)

विषयतया निर्णीतानि इति सर्वत्रापि दृश्यते। तान्यपि सगुणविषयाणि चेत्तेषां किंप्रमाणमूलो निर्गुणाभ्युपगम इति श्रद्धेयम्? तस्मान्निर्गुणप्रस्थानविरोध्येवेदं भाष्यं प्रवर्तितमिति प्रतिभातीति चेदुच्यते[1]।

चेतनाचेतनात्मकं सर्वं जगत् ब्रह्मचिच्छक्तिरूपम्, सा च ब्रह्मणः 3. 242
स्वरूपभूता तदभिन्ना[2] तदीयसकलमङ्गलगुणरूपा च, ब्रह्म च वस्तुतो निर्विकारमिति—सन् घटः — इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मसत्ताविषयम्, — स्फुरति घटः — इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मस्फुरणविषयम्, — अहं सुखी — इत्यादिप्रत्यक्षं ब्रह्मानन्दलेशविषयमिति च शुद्धाद्वैतसिध्युपयोगिनीमद्वैतमर्यादामेव स्वसिद्धान्ततयाङ्गीकृतवताम्; "निरन्वयोपासकानामिहैव मुक्तिः" इति मतम्, तद्विरोध्यर्थप्रसङ्गे सर्वत्राप्युपदिष्टवतां तच्च स्वयमेवोपपादितवतां श्रीकण्ठाचार्याणां निर्गुणं निष्प्रपञ्चं सकलजीवाभिन्नं शुद्धाद्वैतरूपं ब्रह्मेति परमसिद्धान्त इत्ययमर्थः कथमपि प्रत्याख्यातुं न शक्यते, तत्प्रत्याख्याने तदीयबहुसिद्धान्तव्याकोपप्रसङ्गात्। तथा शुद्धब्रह्माभ्युपगमे च शङ्कराचार्यैस्तद्विषयत्वेन निर्णीतानि सद्विद्यादीनि वेदान्तवाक्यान्येव मूलप्रमाणानि। तेषां यत्सगुणे समन्वयनिरूपणं तन्निर्गुणे तात्पर्यन्नास्तीत्यभिप्रायेण न भवति, किन्तु सगुणेऽपि तात्पर्यमस्तीत्यभिप्रायेण। अस्ति हि सद्विद्यादिनिर्गुणप्रकरणगतानामपि गुणपुरस्कारेण प्रवृत्तानां सन्दर्भाणां तत्तद्गुणविशिष्टे सगुणेऽप्यवान्तरतात्पर्यम्, यदवलम्बनेन शाङ्करभाष्येऽपि ब्रह्मलिङ्गोपन्यासः। तथा हि—ईक्षत्यधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. १. ५) प्राथमिकमीक्षणलिङ्गम्; आनन्दमयाधिकरणे "तद्धेतुव्यपदेशाच्च" इति सूत्रोपात्तम् (शा. भा. १. १. १४) "इदं सर्वमसृजत, यदिदं किञ्च" इति वाक्योक्तं सर्वस्रष्टृत्वलिङ्गम्; "प्राणस्तथानुगमात्" इत्यधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. १. २८) अनुगमहेतुकोडीकृतम् "एष लोकाधिपतिरेष लोकपालः" इत्यादिवाक्योक्तेशितृत्वादि[3] लिङ्गम्; "अत्ता चराचरग्रहणात्" इत्यधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. २. ९) सौत्रहेतूपात्तम् "यस्य ब्रह्म च क्षत्रं चोभे भवत ओदनः" इति विषयवाक्योक्तं ब्रह्मक्षत्रोपलक्षितसर्वप्रपञ्चसंहर्तृत्वलिङ्गम्; "अन्तर्याम्यधिदैवादिषु तद्धर्मव्यपदे-

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1. O omits उच्यते
2. स्वरूपभुत भिन्ना (O)
3. रक्षितृत्वादि (O)

शात्" इत्यधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. २. १८) सौत्रहेतूपात्तम् "[1]यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयति" इत्यादिवाक्योक्तं सर्वान्तर्यामित्वादिलिङ्गम्; "अदृश्यत्वादिगुणको धर्मोक्तेः" इत्यधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. २. २१) सौत्रहेतूपात्तम् "यस्सर्वज्ञस्सर्ववित्" इत्यादिवाक्योक्तं सर्वज्ञत्वादिलिङ्गम्; भूमाधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. ३. ८. ९), "धर्मोपपत्तेश्च" इति गुणसूत्रोपात्तम् "आत्मनः प्राणः" इत्यादिवाक्योक्तं सर्वकारणत्वादिलिङ्गम्; अक्षराधिकरणे "सा च प्रशासनात्" (शा. भा. १. ३. ११) इति गुणसूत्रोपात्तम् "एतस्यैवाक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचन्द्रमसौ विधृतौ तिष्ठतः" इत्यादिवाक्योक्तं प्रशासितृत्वलिङ्गम्; सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्यधिकरणे "पत्यादिशब्देभ्यः" इति गुणसूत्रोपात्तम् (शा. भा. १. ३. ४३) "सर्वस्य वशी सर्वस्येशानः सर्वस्याधिपतिः" इत्यादिवाक्योक्तं सर्वाधिपतित्वादिलिङ्गम्; "जगद्वाचित्वात्" इत्यधिकरणे (शा. १. ४. १६) सौत्रहेत्वाक्षिप्तम् "यो वै बालाक एतेषां पुरुषाणां कर्ता यस्य वै तत्कर्म स वै वेदितव्यः" इति वाक्योक्तं सकलजगत्कर्तृत्वलिङ्गम्; "वाक्यान्वयात्" इत्यधिकरणे (शा. भा. १. ४. १९) अन्वयशब्देन क्रोडीकृतम् "अस्य महतो भूतस्य निश्वसितमेतद्यदृग्वेदो यजुर्वेदः" इत्यादिवाक्योक्तं सकलनामरूपप्रपञ्चस्रष्टृत्वं चेत्येवं निर्गुणविषयेष्वधिकरणेषु सगुणब्रह्मधर्मरूपाणां लिङ्गानामुपन्यासो दृश्यते। तेन निर्गुणप्रकरणगतानामपि तत्तल्लिङ्गप्रतिपादकवाक्यानां तत्तद्विशिष्टे सगुणरूपेऽस्त्यवान्तरतात्पर्यमित्यवसीयते। तदवलम्बनं श्रीकण्ठाचार्याणां तत्र तत्राधिकरणे तस्य तस्य विषयवाक्यस्य सगुणे परमेश्वरे समन्वयकथनम्। महातात्पर्यविषये निर्गुणे समन्वयाकथनं तु तत्प्रच्छादनेन सगुणे भक्त्यतिशयसिद्ध्यर्थमित्युक्तमेव।

3. 2421 ननु निर्गुणे समन्वयाकथनमुक्तरीत्या भवत्वविरुद्धम्। निर्गुणप्रकरणगतानां सगुणवाक्यानां यदेकवाक्यतया महातात्पर्येण निर्गुणपर्यवसायित्वं समर्थनीयम्, तेषां साक्षान्निर्गुणविषयाणामपि वाक्यानां प्रयत्नेन सगुणे योजनं कृतं दृश्यते; यथा तावदीक्षत्यधिकरणे (ब्र. १. १. ५)—"एकमेवाद्वितीयम्" इति वाक्यस्य, यथा वा भूमाधिकरणे (ब्र. १. ३. ७, ८) "यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति" इत्यादिवाक्यस्य, यथा वा आरम्भणाधिकरणे [ब्र. २. १. १५]

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1. यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् यः पृथिवी &c (O)

"यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्" इति वाक्यस्य। तत्राद्ययोर्वाक्ययोः यत्सगुणपरतया योजनं कृतम्, तत्पूर्वपक्ष एवोदाहृतम्। तृतीयस्य त्वित्थं योजनाद्वयं दर्शितम्—"विकारो नामधेयं च वाचारंभणं वाचायः अभिलापार्थक्रियारूपव्यवहारस्य निष्पादकं भवति। मृद्द्रव्यस्यैव घटाद्यवस्था, घटादिनामधेयं चार्थक्रियाभिलापरूपव्यवहारनिष्पत्तये भवतीति यावत्। वस्तुतो घटादिकमपि मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यं प्रामाणिकम्, मृद्व्यतिरेकेण घटभावादर्शनात्। अथवा वाचारम्भणं विकारः, विकारो घटो वाचारम्भणं घटोऽयमिति वाचारंभविषयमात्रम्। मृद्द्रव्यमेव, व्यवहारसिध्यर्थं जायमानावस्थान्तरम्, न तु मृदो द्रव्यान्तरम्; मृत्तिकेत्येव नामधेयं सत्यम्। घटादिकं मृत्तिकेति कृत्वैव तत्र सर्वं मृद्घटादि[1]नामधेयं सत्यम्, सति प्रामाणिकेऽर्थे साधु, न तु द्रव्यान्तरमिति कृत्वा; यतो घटो मृदेवेति" इदं योजनाद्वयं कारणव्यतिरिक्तस्य कार्यस्य मिथ्यात्वप्रतिपादनपरा वाचारम्भणश्रुतिरिति पक्षप्रतिक्षेपार्थं सा श्रुतिः कार्यकारणयोः तात्त्विकाभेदप्रतिपादनपरेति दर्शयितुं कृतम्। तथाहि—प्रागेकविज्ञानेन सर्वविज्ञानं प्रतिज्ञाय तदुपपादनार्थम् "यथा सौम्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वं मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात्" इति दृष्टान्त उपन्यस्तः। तत्र नायं दृष्टान्त उपपद्यते। मृत्पिण्डस्य तद्विकाराणां घटशरावादीनां चार्थक्रियाभिलापभेदेनात्यन्तभिन्नतया मृत्पिण्डज्ञानेन तद्विकाराणां ज्ञातत्वायोगादित्याशङ्कायां घटमृत्पिण्डादिकार्यकारणभेदव्यवस्थापनेन दृष्टान्तोपपादनार्थं वाचारंभणश्रुतिः प्रवृत्त[2] इत्याचार्याणामभिमतम्।

तस्याः प्रथमयोजनायामयमर्थः—विकारः घटत्वपृथुबुध्नोदरत्वादिः, 3. 24211
नामधेयम्, तत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकं घटादिपदम्, तदुभयं वाचारंभणम्। वाचा=वाक् घटमानयेत्याद्यभिलापः; तेन तज्जन्यार्थक्रियापि लक्ष्यते। आरभ्यते निष्पाद्यते अनेनेत्यारंभणम् कारणम्। वाचाया आरंभणं विकारो नामधेयं च क्रमेणार्थक्रियाभिलापयोः कारणमिति यावत्। विकारनामधेयोभयवृत्तेरारंभणशब्दस्य

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1. मृद्घटादि is the reading of most Mss. of this work; but all editions of Śrīkaṇṭha Bhāṣya read मृत् पिण्डादि.

2. प्रवर्त्तते (O)

"नपुंसकमनपुंसकेनैकवच्चान्यतरस्याम्[1]" इति नपुंसकैकशेष एकवद्भावश्च। अनेनैतदुक्तं भवति–मृत्पिण्डतद्विकाराणां द्रव्यैक्येऽपि पिण्डत्वपृथुबुध्नोदरत्वाद्याकारभेदेन तत्प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तकनामधेयभेदेन चार्थक्रियाभिलापभेद इति।

ननु गोमहिषवद्द्रव्यभेदेनैव तद्भेदः किमिति नेष्यत इत्याशङ्क्योक्तं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्, घटशरावादिकमपि[2] मृत्तिकेत्येव प्रामाणिकम्, तदेव मृद्द्रव्यमिदानीं घटरूपमासीदित्यादिप्रत्यभिज्ञाप्रत्यक्षरूपेण गुरुत्वद्वैगुण्याभावादियुक्तिरूपेण च प्रमाणेन सिद्धम्। एवं प्रमाणसिद्धैक्यनिर्वाहायार्थक्रियाभिलापभेदस्य विकारनामधेयभेदोपाधिकत्वं[3] कल्पयितुं युक्तमिति भावः।

3.24212 द्वितीययोजनायां त्वयमर्थः—वाचारंभणं विकारः, घटशरावादिविकारो घटोऽयमिति व्यवहारविषयमात्रम्, न तु मृदो द्रव्यान्तरम्। ननु मृदो द्रव्यान्तराभावे मृदः पिण्डतादशायामप्रवृत्तं घटशरावादिनामधेयं कथं पश्चात्प्रवर्तेत—इत्याशङ्क्यामुक्तं नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव सत्यम्। मृन्नामधेयमिव घटशरावादिनामधेयमपि तद्द्रव्यं मृत्तिकेति कृत्वैव सति प्रामाणिकेऽर्थे साधु, न तु द्रव्यान्तरमिति कृत्वा, प्रत्यभिज्ञाविरोधादिना द्रव्यान्तरस्याप्रामाणिकत्वादिति। अस्मिन् पक्षे "सत्ये साधौ च सच्छब्दः" इति स्मृतेः प्रामाणिकार्थवाचिसत्यशब्दपर्यायात् सच्छब्दात्तत्र साधुरित्यर्थे यत्प्रत्ययः। आरम्भणशब्दो विषयभावेन निष्पादकं वदन् विषयत्वपर्यवसायी; तस्य पुल्लिङ्गविशेषणत्वेऽपि "द्विगुरेकवचनम्[4]" इतिवल्लिङ्गसामान्यविवक्षया नपुंसकनिर्देश इति विशेषः।

3.24213 एवं ब्रह्मणो निर्गुणत्वनीरूपत्वपराणां निष्प्रपञ्चत्वपराणां च वाक्यानां हेयगुणरूपराहित्यविषयतया सप्रपञ्चत्वविषयतया च "न स्थानतः" (ब्र. ३. २. ११) इत्याद्यधिकरणेषु योजनं कृतम्। किञ्च जीवस्य ब्रह्माभेदप्रमाणमूर्धन्यानि तत्त्वमस्यादीनि महावाक्यानि "इतरव्यपदेशाद्धिताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः" (ब्र. २. १. २१), "शेषत्वात् पुरुषार्थवादो यथान्येष्विति जैमिनिः"

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1. Panini, I, 2, 69.
2. सत्यमपि घटशरावादिकं (O)
3. नामधेयोपाधिकत्वं (My)
4. Panini, II, 4 1.

(ब्र. ३. ४. २) इत्यारम्भणाधिकरणपुरुषार्थाधिकरणगतपूर्वपक्षसूत्रभाष्ययोः जीव-ब्रह्माभेदपूर्वपक्षावलम्बनत्वेन[1] विलिख्य, "अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात्" (ब्र. २ १. २२), "अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात्" (ब्र. ३. ४. ८) इति तत्सिद्धान्तसूत्रभाष्ययोस्तत्त्वमसीत्यादिनैक्येनोपदेशान्न प्रत्यगात्मनोऽर्थान्तरभूतः परमेश्वरोऽस्तीति शङ्कोत्तरत्वेनावतारितस्य, "सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्योर्भेदेन", "पत्यादि-शब्देभ्यः", (ब्र. १. ३. ४३, ४४) इति तृतीयपादाकाशाधिकरणगुणसूत्रद्वयस्य भाष्ये च बहुतरभेदश्रुत्युदाहरणपूर्वकं तयोर्भेदव्यवस्थापनेन तान्यपि तयोरभेद-पराणि न भवन्तीति प्रत्याख्यानं कृतम् ।

"अंशो नानाव्यपदेशात्" (ब्र. २. ३. ४२) इत्याद्यधिकरणेषु ब्रह्मै-वोपाधिवशात् जीवभावमापद्यत इति पूर्वपक्षनिराकरणार्थं प्रवृत्ते "तत्त्वमसि", "अयमात्मा ब्रह्म" इत्यादिकात् व्यपदेशात्तयोः जीवब्रह्मणोः व्याप्यव्यापकभावे-नानन्यत्वमिति योगिशरीराणां व्यापनीयानां तद्व्यापकस्य योगिनश्च यथा व्याप्य-व्यापकभावेनापृथक्सिद्धरूपत्वमनन्यत्वं[2] तथा जीवानां ब्रह्मणश्चेति साक्षादपि महावाक्यानामन्यपरत्वेन योजनं कृतम् । इदं सर्वं शुद्धाद्वैताभ्युपगमविरुद्धमे-वेति चेत्— 3. 24214

एतदपि सर्वमविरुद्धं[3] यथा भवति तथोपपाद्यते । "अधिकं तु भेद-निर्देशात्" इति सूत्रं जीवब्रह्मभेदव्यवस्थापकं[4] न भवति; किन्तु किञ्चि-ज्ज्ञत्वसर्वज्ञत्वादिभेदानिर्देशात् सार्वज्ञ्यादिगुणैर्जीवादधिकं ब्रह्म, तथा च जीवे कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिबन्धः प्रातिभासिक इति जानतः तस्य [5]तदापादनप्रपञ्च-सृष्टिरनिष्टकारिणीति मूढस्य जीवस्येव तस्य भ्रान्तेरभावात् ।

"प्रतिबिम्बगताः पश्यन्नृजुवक्रादिकाः क्रियाः ।
पुमान् क्रीडेद्यथा ब्रह्म तथा जीवस्य विक्रियाः ॥"

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1. पक्षाधिकरणत्वेन (O)
2. अपृथक्सिद्धरूपत्वादनन्यत्वं (My)
3. अविरुद्धमेव (O)
4. व्यवस्थापरं (O)
5. आपादनि (O)

इत्युक्तन्यायेन[1] तस्य लीलार्थैव सा भवतीत्येतद्व्यवस्थापनपरम् । अन्यथा जीव-ब्रह्माभेदमवलम्ब्य शङ्कितस्य हिताकरणादिदोषस्य तयोर्भेदसाधनेनैव निराकरणीय-त्वादधिकमिति सौत्रप्रतिज्ञानमनुपयुक्तं स्यात् । यद्यपि "अश्मादिवच्च तदनुप-पत्तिः" [ब्र. २. १. २३] इति तदनन्तरसूत्रेण "अश्मकाष्ठलोष्टतृणादेरचेतनस्येव जीवस्याप्यज्ञत्वादिना सर्वज्ञत्वादियुक्तादीश्वरादत्यन्तविजातीयत्वश्रवणात् तयोरेक-भावानुपपत्तेः" इति तद्भाष्येण च जीवब्रह्मणोरभेदनिराकरणेन भेदव्यवस्थापनं कृतमित्याभाति, तथापि किञ्चित्सजातीयस्य जीवस्याप्यभेदो नोपपद्यते, किमुता-त्यन्तविजातीयस्याचेतनस्येति कैमुतिकन्यायेन जडवर्गस्य ब्रह्माभेदनिराकरणे तस्य तात्पर्यम् । अत एव तदनन्तरभाष्यम्[2]—"एवं चेतनस्याप्यधिकगुणवैषम्यादी-श्वरभावानुपपत्तिः, किमुताचेतनस्य स्वरूपविलक्षणस्येति तात्पर्यम्" इति । नच प्रपञ्चसृष्ट्या हिताकरणतादिदोषे जीवब्रह्माभेदमवलम्ब्य शङ्किते तयोः भेदस्या-भेदेऽपि न्यूनाधिकभावस्य वा[3] व्यवस्थापनेन तत्परिहारो वर्णनीयः, जडवर्गस्य ब्रह्माभेदनिराकरणं नात्रोपयुज्यत इति वाच्यम् ; अत्रानुपयोगेऽपि "तदनन्यत्व-मारंभणशब्दादिभ्यः" [ब्र. २. १. १५] इति सूत्रोक्तमनन्यत्वं जडवर्गस्य ब्रह्मा-भेदरूपं न भवतीति व्यवस्थापने तदुपयोगात् । अत एव "इतरव्यपदेशात" इत्यादीनि सूत्राणि (ब्र. २. १. २१-२३) भाष्यान्तरवदिह भाष्ये पृथगधिकर-णार्थतया न योजितानि । एवम् "अधिकोपदेशात्" इति पुरुषार्थाधि-करणसूत्रमपि (ब्र. ३. ४. ८) परमेश्वरो नाम कश्चन नास्ति, औपनिषदमात्म-ज्ञानं जीवगोचरमेव ज्ञानमिति पूर्वपक्षनिराकरणाय जीवाधिकः परमेश्वरोऽस्तीत्ये-तावन्मात्रप्रतिपादनपरम् । एवं सुषुप्त्युत्क्रान्त्यादिसूत्रद्वयमपि (ब्र. १. ३. ४३, ४४) जीवाधिकपरमेश्वरसद्भावमात्रपरम्, न भेदव्यवस्थापनपरम्[4] । अत एवैतेषां सूत्राणां भाष्येषु पूर्वपक्षे तदवलम्बनत्वेन लिखितानां[5] तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यानां भेद-परतया योजनं न[6] कृतम् ।

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1. इत्याद्युक्तन्यायेन (O)
2. भाष्ये (O)
3. O omits वा
4. मात्रप्रतिपादनपरं न भेदव्यवस्थापरम् (O)
5. लिखितानां (O)
6. O omits न

यद्यप्यंशाधिकरणभाष्ये (ब्र. २. ३. ४२) तेषां भेदपरतया योजनं 3. 24222
कृतमस्ति, तथापि तत् “आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च” (ब्र. ४. १. ३)
इत्यधिकरणभाष्येण प्रत्याख्यातम्, न स्वार्थसाधनक्षमम्। तत्र हि मुमुक्षुभिः
ब्रह्मोपासनं स्वशेषित्वादिप्रकारेण स्वभिन्नतयैव कार्यम्, न तु स्वात्मतयेति पूर्वपक्ष-
निराकरणार्थं प्रवृत्तं सिद्धान्तभाष्यम् “यद्यपि जीवादधिकमेव शिवाख्यं परं ब्रह्म,
तथाप्युपासिता—अहं ब्रह्मास्मि इति तदुपासीत, यतः पूर्वेऽप्युपासितारः—त्वं वा
अहमस्मि भगवो देवते अहं वै त्वमसि—इत्यात्मेत्येवावगच्छन्ति उपासितुरर्था-
न्तरत्वेऽपि तानुपासितॄननुगृह्णाति स्वस्वरूपतया परं ब्रह्म, ते च पुनः स्वात्मतया
ग्राहयन्ति च परानपि शिष्यान् तत्त्वमसीत्यादिना” इति। अत्र तत्त्वमस्यादि-
वाक्यानामभेदार्थत्वप्रदर्शनेन प्रागुक्तं शरीरशरीरि[1]भावतया कृतमपृथक्सिध्यर्थत्वं
प्रत्याख्यातमिति स्पष्टमेव। तदुपपादनार्थमेव “त्वं वाहमस्मि” इति जाबाल-
वाक्यमुदाहृतम्। यदि शरीरशरीरिभावनिबन्धनं सामानाधिकरण्यम्, तदा
“त्वं वा अहमस्मि” इति निर्देशो नोपपद्यत इति दर्शयितुं प्राक्प्रपञ्चितोऽयमर्थः।
तत्त्वमसिवाक्यस्याप्यभेद एव स्वारस्यमित्यपि प्रागेव प्रपञ्चितम्।

एतेनांशाधिकरणोक्तस्येदं प्रत्याख्यानं न भवति, सूत्रारूढेनाधिकरणेन 3. 242221
प्राग्व्यवस्थापितस्य स्वयमेव पश्चात् प्रत्याख्यानायोगात्। किन्त्वंशाधिकरणो-
क्तरीत्या दहरादिविद्यासु ब्रह्म स्वशरीरकत्वेन वानुसन्धेयम्, अहंग्रहाधिकरणो-
क्तरीत्या स्वाभिन्नत्वेन वेति भाष्याभिप्रायो वर्णनीयः। एवं च “ते च पुनः
स्वात्मतया ग्राहयन्ति परानपि शिष्यान् तत्त्वमसीत्यादिना” इत्यहंग्रहाधिकरण-
भाष्यवाक्यस्यापि। तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमभेदोपासनापरमित्येव तात्पर्यं वर्णनीयम्,
न तु तात्त्विकाभेदपरमिति, भेदाभेदयोः विरुद्धत्वात्—इति शङ्काऽपि निरस्ता,
जाबालवाक्यस्वारस्यविरोधेन, असिशब्दस्वारस्यविरोधेन, “निरवधिकपरमानन्द-
मयशिवत्वप्राप्तिर्मुक्तिः। शिवत्वप्राप्तिरात्मनः पशुत्वनिवृत्तिमन्तरेण न भवति।
पशुत्वनिवृत्तिश्च न तद्भावनां विना, अतो निरन्तरं शिवोऽहमिति भावनाप्रवाहेण
शिथिलितपाशतयापगतपशुभावः उपासकः शिव एव भवति” इत्येवं शिवाभेद-
भावनां विना न मुक्तिरिति व्यवस्थापनार्थाहङ्ग्रहाधिकरणभाष्यविरोधेन, मुक्त्यर्थे
शिवध्याने शिवादन्यत्वेन प्रतीयमानस्य सर्वस्यापि परित्याज्यत्वव्यवस्थापकाध्या-

1. भावकृत अपृथक्सिध्यर्थ (O)

याधिकरणभाष्यविरोधेन च तत्त्वमसिवाक्यस्यांशाधिकरणोक्तार्थे भाष्यकारसंप्रतिपत्तिकल्पनायोगात्, जीवस्य ब्रह्मणा सह भेदाभेदयोरिव तत्त्वमसिवाक्यस्यैकस्य द्वयोरर्थयोरपि विरुद्धत्वेन, अंशाधिकरणोक्तं भेदार्थकत्वमङ्गीकृत्य पुनरभेदोपासनरूपमर्थान्तरमपि भाष्यकारैरङ्गीकृतमिति कल्पनायोगाच्च ।

3.242223 ननु तर्हि मा भूत् तस्य शरीरशरीरिभावोऽर्थः, आरोपिताभेदोपासनारूप एक एवार्थोऽस्त्विति चेन्न, "परमानन्दप्रकाशविभूतिमयशिवशक्तिसामरस्यपरब्रह्मस्वरूपैकरसप्रपञ्चावगाहिनं परिपूर्णमहंभावं प्रकटमनुभवति" इति मुक्तवृत्तान्तविषयविकारावर्तिसूत्रभाष्ये, "निवृत्तब्राह्मणादिदेहाभिमानमयपशुभावस्य निरतिशयस्वरूपानन्दमयसाक्षिस्वप्रकाशशिवरूपपराहंभावापत्तिर्मुक्तिरिति सर्वश्रुतितात्पर्यात्" इत्यहंग्रहाधिकरणभाष्ये च मुक्तावपि ब्रह्माभेदज्ञानस्यानुवर्तमानतायाः प्रतिपादितत्वेन जीवानां चिच्छक्तिद्वारकब्रह्माभेदस्यानिवार्यत्वेनाभेदोपासनस्यारोपितविषयत्वकल्पनायोगात् ।

3.242224 नन्वंशाधिकरण [ब्र. २. ३. ४२] प्रतिपाद्यार्थनिर्वाहकतया तत्र स्वयं प्रदर्शितः शरीरशरीरिभावरूपोऽर्थः स्वयमेवान्यत्र प्रत्याख्यात इति कथमुपपद्यते ? न च वाच्यं शरीरशरीरिभावस्य तात्त्विकभेदगर्भत्वशङ्कामात्रं अभेदार्थप्रदर्शनेन प्रत्याख्यातम्, न तु शरीरशरीरिभावरूपोऽर्थ इति ; एकस्य वाक्यस्याभेदपरस्यातात्त्विकेऽपि शरीरशरीरिभावे तात्पर्यान्तरकल्पनायोगात् । न च मन्दाधिकारिणः प्रथमं सगुणेश्वरोपासनायां प्रवर्तयितुं तत्र भक्त्यतिशयसिद्ध्यर्थं निर्विशेषपरतत्त्वप्रच्छादनेन तदुपच्छन्दनायातात्पर्यविषयोऽप्यर्थो गुडजिह्विकान्यायेन प्रदर्शित इति वाच्यम् । सगुणोपासनापि हि शिवोऽहमित्यभेदेनैव कार्या । अतोऽत्र जीवब्रह्माभेदबोधकवाक्यानां स एवार्थः, तदभेदोपासनारूपो वार्थः प्रदर्शनीयः । उपासनाप्रतिकूलार्थप्रदर्शनं तु न युक्तमिति चेत् ।

3.242225 उच्यते—येषां मोक्षः परमपुरुषार्थ इत्यवगत्य प्राप्तुमभिलषतामपि साक्षान्मोक्षोपयोगितत्त्वावबोधार्थे श्रवणमननपूर्वके निर्विशेषनिदिध्यासने वा तदपेक्षिततत्त्वार्थचित्तैकाग्र्यादिसंपादनद्वारा तदुपयोगिनि दहरविद्यादिरूपे सविशेषोपासने वा सामर्थ्यादिरूपस्य लौकिकस्य शास्त्रीयस्य वाधिकारि[1]विशेषणस्य

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1. अधिकारेऽपि विरो (O)

वैकल्यान्नाधिकारपौष्कल्यम्; तानधिकृत्य प्रवर्तितोऽस्ति हि दासमार्गः पुराणेतिहासागमप्रसिद्धः; स यद्यपि तत्क्रतुन्यायेन गाणपत्यादिरूपः हिमगिरिकैलासादिस्थानगतशिवकैङ्कर्यप्राप्तिफलकः, तथापि तत्पदमाप्त्यनन्तरं तत्रैवोपासनादिक्रमेण मोक्षफलकोऽपि भवति। अत एव कामिके—

"मच्चिह्नधारिणो[1] लोके देशिका मत्परायणाः।
मदेकशरणास्तेषु योग्यं नैवान्यजन्तुषु॥

स्वाद्यानि खादनीयानि[2] पेयान्यन्यानि यानि च।
देयानि तानि वै शंभोरश्नीयाद्दासभावतः॥

दासमार्गप्रपन्ना ये शैवे पाशुपते स्थिताः।
तैरेव पेयं भोज्यं च घ्रातव्यं च मुमुक्षुभिः॥"

इति शिवप्रसादस्वीकरणयोग्यविवेचने दासमार्गप्रपन्नेषु मुमुक्षुत्वविशेषणम्। एवं चोपासनाद्यनधिकृताः स्थूलबुद्धयोऽस्मिन् दासमार्गे क्रममुक्तिफलके प्रवर्तनेनानुग्राह्या इति तत्र तेषां रुचिमुत्पादयितुं दासमार्ग एव सर्वस्यापि मोक्षशास्त्रस्यार्थ इति (तावदा ?) तदाचार्यैस्तेषु यदुक्तग्यमस्ति तदपि क्वचित् प्रदर्शनीयमित्यभिप्रेत्य तत्त्वमसीत्यादिवाक्यानां शरीरशरीरिभावरूपस्वस्वामिभावोऽर्थ इति मार्गान्तरमंशाधिकरणे कल्पितमिति न कश्चिद्विरोधः।

यत्त्वारम्भणादिश्रुतीनामर्थान्तरकल्पनं तदपि सगुणविषयभक्तिदार्ढ्यप्रयोजनकमित्यौपचारिकार्थवादमात्रम्। इदमप्यस्मादिसूत्रभाष्येण प्रागुदाहृतेन विभावितम्। तेन हि भाष्येण जडवर्गस्य ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं तदभेदरूपं न भवतीत्युक्तम्। तेन तदनन्यत्व [ब्र. २. १. १५] सूत्रोक्तं तस्य ब्रह्मानन्यत्वं ब्रह्मव्यतिरेकेण निर्वचनाक्षमत्वरूपमेव[3] पर्यवस्यति, तस्य ब्रह्माभेदाभावे ब्रह्माभिन्नचिच्छक्त्यभेदस्याप्यसंभवेन तस्य चिच्छक्तिपरिणामत्वोक्तेस्तद्विवर्ततायामेव पर्यव- 3. 24223

1. Kāmika, Uttara bhāga, p. 113 reads मद्देहधारिणो; Śivārcana Candrikā reads मल्लिङ्गधारिणो
2. स्वाद्यानि चादनीयानि (My), स्वाद्यानि चादनीयानि (Śivārcana Candrikā).
3. रूपमिव (O)

सानात्। अतो विकाराणामुपादाने कल्पितत्वं वाचारम्भणश्रुत्यर्थ इत्येव यथा-सूत्रकारमति भाष्यकाराभिप्रायः।

सूत्रकारस्य तथा मतिस्तु तेनैव प्रणीते महाभारते मोक्षधर्मेषु उपदिष्टेन सुवर्चलाश्वेतकतूपाख्यानेन विभाव्यते। एवं हि तत्रोपाख्यायते—देवलस्य कन्या सुवर्चला जन्मान्तरसंसिद्धतया सहजसिद्धब्रह्मतत्त्वावबोधा स्वसदृशं पतिमन्विच्छन्ती श्वेतकेतुमुद्दालकसुतं तथाभूतमवगम्य तं वृतवती, पित्रापि तस्मै दत्ता। ताभ्यां ब्रह्मतत्त्वावबोधवद्भ्यां दम्पतिभ्यां तदनुगुणयज्ञादिकर्माचरणयुक्त गार्हस्थ्यमाश्रित्य स्थितमिति। तत्र तयोरित्थं ब्रह्मोद्यकथारूपः संवादो वर्णितः—

"ततः कदाचिद्भर्तारं श्वेतकेतुं सुवर्चला।
पप्रच्छ को भवानत्र ब्रूहि मे तद्द्विजोत्तम॥

तामाह भगवान् वाग्मी त्वया ज्ञातो न संशयः।
द्विजोत्तमोऽहं सुभगे सत्यव्रतपरायणः॥

सा तमाहाहमात्मानं[1] पृच्छामि हृदि शायिनम्।
तच्छ्रुत्वा प्रत्युवाचैनां स न वक्ष्यति भामिनि[2]॥

मनसैव समायुक्तमात्मानं मन्यसे यदि।
तन्मिथ्यागोत्रसद्भावे वर्त्तते देहबन्धनः॥

अहमित्येव भावोऽत्र[3] त्वयि चापि समाहितः।
त्वमप्यहमहं सर्वमहमित्येव वर्त्तते॥

नात्र त्वत्परमार्थं[4] तद्यन्मां त्वमनुपृच्छसि[5]॥" इति।

अत्र सद्विद्यायां तत्त्वमसीत्यसकृत् पित्रोपदिष्टः श्वेतकेतुः कथमात्मानमवबुध्यत इति जिज्ञासमानया सुवर्चलया प्रथमम् "कस्त्वं द्विजोत्तम" इति प्रश्नः कृतः।

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1. माहमहात्मानं (Br. V. p. 104)
2. सर्वज्ञो मुनिपुङ्गवः (Do.)
3. इदमर्थं नास्ति (Do)
4. तत्परमार्थं (Do.; also O)
5. परिपृच्छसि (O)

तत्प्रश्नाभिप्रायमवगच्छतापि श्वेतकेतुना क्रमेण तमर्थं सा बोधनीयेति मत्वा तत्रोत्तरमुक्तम्—द्विजोत्तमेति संबोधयन्त्या त्वया ब्राह्मणोऽहमित्यवगत एव, किमत्र प्रष्टव्यम्—इति। ततः सुवर्चलया—देहोपाधिकत्वेनात्मनि कल्पितं प्रत्यक्षं ब्राह्मण्यं न पृच्छामि, किन्तु द्विजोत्तमोऽहमित्यहंशब्देन देहाद्विविक्तं हृदि वसन्तं यमात्मानं निर्दिशसि तं पृच्छामि—इत्युक्ते तत्रोत्तरमुक्तम्—अहंशब्दो मनःशबलितात्मस्वरूपे वर्तते। तत्तु मिथ्याभूतम्, तस्मिन्नेव ब्राह्मणकुलादिजननेन ब्राह्मणादिदेहशबले कल्पितरूपे ब्राह्मणादिशब्दो वर्तते। अतो ब्राह्मणरूपवत् कल्पितविषयत्वादहंभावोप्यात्मस्वरूपं जिज्ञासुभिः न प्रष्टुमर्हः। अयं चाहंभावस्तव मम च तिर्यक्पर्यन्तानां सर्वेषां च साधारण इत्ययं प्रश्नः परमार्थविषय[1]त्वाभावादात्मस्वरूपं जिज्ञासमानया त्वया कर्तुं नार्हः—इति। तदनन्तरम्—कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादियुक्तं अहमर्थं यदि कल्पितमवगच्छसि तर्ह्येवमवगच्छन् त्वं कथं तद्विरुद्धे कर्मानुष्ठाने प्रवर्तसे—इति प्रश्ने कृते, स्वानुपकारकेऽपि तस्मिन् लोकसंग्रहार्थं प्रवर्ते—इत्युत्तरमुक्तम्। तदनन्तरं सर्वैरात्मनि प्रयुज्यमानोऽहंशब्दोऽयं कथं तदर्थो न स्यादित्यभिप्रायेण शब्दार्थयोः सम्बन्धप्रश्ने कृते तयोर्नास्ति संयोगादिरूपः सम्बन्धः, किन्तु वाच्यवाचकभावरूप इत्युत्तरमुक्तम्। तदनन्तरं दम्पत्योरियं प्रश्नोत्तरपरम्परा—

सुवर्चला—

सदाहंकारशब्दोऽयं व्यक्तमात्मनि संश्रितः।
न वाचस्तत्र वर्तन्त इति मिथ्या भविष्यति॥

श्वेतकेतुः—

अहंशब्दो ह्यहंभावे नात्मभावे शुभव्रते।[2]
न वर्तन्ते परेऽचिन्त्ये वाचः सगुणलक्षणाः॥

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1. परमात्मविषय (O)
2. शुभप्रभे (Br. V. p. 105)

सुवर्चला—

अहंभावोऽत्र को नाम ह्यात्मभावस्तथैव च ।
तन्मे ब्रूहि यथान्यायमेवं चेन्मुनिसत्तम ॥

श्वेतकेतुः—

मृण्मयो हि घटाभासः तादृग्भाव इहेष्यते ।
अहंभावः परेऽचिन्त्ये ह्यात्मभावः परो महान् ॥[1]

तस्माद्वाचो निवर्तन्त[2] इति नैव विरुध्यते ॥

इति । अत्र शब्दार्थयोर्वाच्यवाचकभावः सम्बन्धोऽस्ति चेदहंशब्दः कथमात्मवाचको न स्यादिति प्रश्ने कृते, अहंशब्दो नात्मनि मुख्यवृत्त्या प्रयुज्यते, किन्त्वहमर्थे इत्युत्तरमुक्तम् । ततः को नामाहमर्थादन्य आत्मेति प्रश्ने कृते, मृदि घटाकार[3]वदात्मन्यहंभावः कल्पित इति तयोः विवेकं कृत्वा—कल्पिताकारो-[4]पधानेन प्रवर्तमानश्शब्दो न शुद्धाधिष्ठानपर्यन्तं प्रवर्तते, शुद्धशुक्तिस्वरूपे रजतशब्दवत् । अतः कर्तृत्वादिगुणकाहमर्थवाचकशब्दस्य शुद्धात्मनः सकाशान्निवृत्त्युक्तेः न कश्चिद्विरोध—इत्युपसंहृतम् । तदनन्तरं अहमर्थान्निष्कृष्ट आत्मैव सकलप्रपञ्चाधिष्ठानभूतं ब्रह्मेति सिद्धवत्कृत्य यथा आकाशे प्रपञ्चस्य दृश्यमानत्वेऽपि तदसङ्गित्वमाकाशस्य, एवं ब्रह्मणोऽपीत्यसङ्गित्वे ब्रह्मणः श्वेतकेतुनोपपादिते पुनरिमे प्रश्नोत्तरे—

सुवर्चला—

निर्विकारं ह्यमूर्तं च निरंशं सर्वगं तथा ।
दृश्यते च वियन्नित्यं तादृगात्मा न दृश्यते ॥

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1. महान् पर (Br. V. p. 105)
2. न वाचस्तत्र विद्यन्ते (Do., p, 105)
3. घटाभास (Do. p. 105)
4. कल्पिताभास (Do. p. 105)

श्वेतकेतुः—

त्वचा स्पृशति वै वायुमाकाशस्थं पुनः पुनः ।
तत्स्थं गन्धं तथा घ्राति ज्योतिः पश्यति चक्षुषा ॥

तमोरश्मिगणं चैव मेघजालं तथैव च ।
वर्षं तारागणं चैव नाकाशं दृश्यते पुनः ॥

आकाशस्याप्यथाकाशं सद्रूपमिति निश्चितम् ।
सदर्थे कल्पितं ह्येतत्तत्सत्यं[1] विष्णुरेव च ॥

यानि नामानि गौणानि ह्युपचारात्परात्मनि ।
न चक्षुषा न मनसा न चान्येन परो विभुः ॥

चिन्त्यते सूक्ष्मया बुध्या वाचा वक्तुं न शक्यते ।
एतत्प्रपञ्चमखिलं तस्मिन्नेव प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ इति ।

अत्र आकाशवत्प्रपञ्चाधिष्ठानं ब्रह्म कुतो न दृश्यत इति प्रश्ने, वाय्वादेराकाशस्थस्यैवानुभवोऽस्ति, न तु विविच्याकाशस्य; यदेवमाकाशे लौकिकेऽप्येषा गतिः तदा किमु वक्तव्यमाकाशादप्यतिसूक्ष्मे सद्रूपे ब्रह्मणि ? अतः सदर्थे कल्पितं सर्वम्; तदेव सत्यं व्यापकं च, गुणोपाधिना प्रवर्तमानाः सर्वे शब्दाः गुणेभ्यो निष्कृष्टे तस्मिन् तत्त्वावेदकप्रमाणैर्बोध्ये मुख्यवृत्त्या न प्रवर्तन्ते—इत्युत्तरमुक्तम् । अस्यां प्रश्नोत्तरपरम्परायाम्, "मृन्मयो हि घटाभासः" इति दृष्टान्तोक्त्या वाचारम्भणश्रुत्यर्थः, "सद्रूपमिति निश्चितम्" इति प्रकृतस्य जीवस्य सद्रूपत्वोक्त्या तत्त्वमसिवाक्यार्थः, "सदर्थे कल्पितं ह्येतत्तत्सत्यं विष्णुरेव च" इत्युक्त्या "ऐतदात्म्यमिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा" इति श्रुत्यर्थश्च निष्प्रपञ्चजीवाभिन्ननिर्विशेषब्रह्मसिद्ध्यनुकूलो दर्शित इति स्पष्ट एव[2] ।

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1. सर्वं तत्सत्यं (Br. V. p.) 105
2. स्पष्टैव अत्र सूत्रकारमतिः (O)

4. 1. किं च मोक्षधर्म एव प्रदेशान्तरेषु—

"निष्केवलं पदं देव काङ्क्षेऽहं परमं तव ।
एकीभावस्त्वया मेऽस्तु न मे जन्म भवेत्पुनः ॥

भेदवस्तुष्वभेदेन जानाति स यदा पुमान् ।
तदा पुनः परात्मासौ भवत्येव निरञ्जनः ॥"

इत्यादिभिरभेदः प्रतिपादितः ।

"न भूतसङ्घसंस्थानो देहोऽस्य परमात्मनः ।
देहवानिव यो विष्णुरसौ मायामयो हरिः ॥"

इत्यादिभिर्नीरूपत्वादिकं प्रतिपादितम् । विष्णुपुराणादिषु च—

"प्रत्यस्तमितभेदं यत्सत्तामात्रमगोचरम् ।
वचसामात्मसंवेद्यं तज्ज्ञानं ब्रह्मसंज्ञितम् ॥"

इत्यादिभिर्ब्रह्मणो निरस्तसमस्तभेदनिर्विशेषचिन्मात्ररूपत्वमुक्तम् । ततः शुद्धाद्वैतमेव सूत्रकाराभिमतमिति तदीयहृदयानुसारेण तत्र तत्र प्रदेशे भाष्यकारैः शुद्धाद्वैतस्य बहुधा विभावितत्वात् तदनुसारेणैव प्रदेशान्तरेषु विशिष्टाद्वैतप्रतिपादनस्यास्मदुक्तरीत्याभिप्रायो वर्णनीयः ।

यत्तु परेषां भाष्ये विशिष्टाद्वैतनिरूपणम्, यच्चान्येषां भाष्ये शुद्धाद्वैतनिरूपणम्, तत्तु तदवस्तुतत्त्वमित्यभिप्रायेण[1] । न तु श्रीकण्ठाचार्याणामिव तेषां शुद्धाद्वैतसंमतौ तात्पर्यं कल्पयितुं शक्यम्, श्रीकण्ठाचार्यैरिव तैः क्वापि शुद्धाद्वैतव्यञ्जकस्य प्राग्वर्णितस्यार्थस्य कुत्राप्यप्रतिपादितत्वात्; तच्छाष्यकारप्रभृतिभिरद्यतनपर्यन्तैः सर्वैरपि परैरन्यैश्च शुद्धाद्वैतनिराकरण एव सन्नह्यमानत्वाच्च । अतः प्रामाणिकानां निर्विशेषस्य परब्रह्मणः तत्त्वावबोधार्थम्, तस्यैव साधकानु-

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1. This is a conjectural reading, no Manuscript being clear. अपास्ततत्त्व or अपसृततत्त्व are, perhaps, better conjectures, corresponding more closely to the original, तदपसृतत्व.

ग्रहाय सविशेषरूपापन्नस्य निखिलकल्याणगुणगणदिव्यमङ्गलविग्रहविशेषविशिष्टस्य मध्यमाधिकारिकर्तव्याभेदोपासनार्थम् , अवमाधिकारिकर्तव्यस्वस्वामिभावोपासनार्थं च तस्य सर्वस्यापि यथावद्विशिष्य[1] प्रतिपादकं श्रीकण्ठाचार्याणामेव भाष्यं उपादेयमिति सर्वं समञ्जसम् ॥

इति श्रीमद्भारद्वाजकुलजलधिकौस्तुभश्रीमदद्वैतविद्याचार्य श्रीविश्वजिद्याजिश्रीरङ्गराजाध्वरिवरसूनोरप्पय्याख्यया प्रख्यातकीर्तेः साक्षादवतीर्णस्य फालाक्षस्य परमार्थपरशिवस्य लीलामात्रविरचितोऽयं शिवाद्वैतनिर्णयाख्यः

ग्रन्थस्संपूर्णः

सदाशिवपदाम्भोजन्यस्तधीरप्पदीक्षितः ।
श्रीकण्ठाभिमतं सर्वं सारमित्थं समग्रहीत् ॥[2]

—: * :—

1. विविच्य (O)
2. This couplet is found only in O.

ŚIVĀDVAITA NIRNAYA

Śrīkaṇṭha Śivācārya has expounded the doctrine of Śivādvaita; 1
we consider here whether it is qualified- or non-qualified- non-dualism that is there upheld. One is led to believe that the first position is what is accepted from the statements of qualified-non-dualism and so on in the *ārambhaṇa* (II, 1, 15 *et seq*) and other sections[1], and that the second position is what is accepted from statements like "for the devotees of the non-related, there is release even here," in the commentary on the *aniyama* section (III, 3, 32). Both of these positions cannot claim to be considered final; hence one of these two must be determined to be conclusive. The present inquiry is undertaken for that purpose.

This is what appears here at first sight. It is seen that 2
wherever Śivādvaita is dealt with or referred to by the *ācārya* in his commentary on the *Brahma-mīmāṁsā*, in all those places, (the position) is stated only as qualified-non-dualism.

Thus, for instance, in the *ārambhaṇa* section (it is said): 2.1
"We are not (among) those who maintain absolute difference between Brahman and the world, as between a jar and a cloth, that being opposed to the texts which declare their non-distinctness;

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1. The word *adhikaraṇa* has been throughout rendered by its nearest equivalent ":Section." An *adhikaraṇa* comprises one or more *sūtras* directed to the elucidation of a particular topic. It is divisible into five heads: the subject-matter, the doubt, the *prima facie* view, the refutation thereof and the final conclusion. This is the order in which they are enumerated by Śrīkaṇṭha in his commentary on I, 1, 1. The *Vedānta-sūtras* are cited throughout the present text and translation merely by numbers. When other works are quoted from, the name in full or in abbreviated form is always given along with the number of the page, verse, or *sūtra*. The *ārambhaṇa-adhikaraṇa* is directed to showing the non-otherness of effect from cause, the world from Brahman, with special reference to the *śruti* - *vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam, mṛttiketyeva satyam* (*Ch.*, VII, 1, 4)". Two interpretations of this text are offered by Śrīkaṇṭha. A discussion of them will be found later on in the text.

and we are not (of) those who maintain their absolute non-difference, nor do we declare the illusoriness of one of them, as in the case of silver and mother-of-pearl, that being opposed to the texts which declare difference between their natural qualities. Nor are we (of) those who posit both difference and non-difference, that (relationship) being opposed to fact. We are, however, of those who maintain qualified-non-dualism, as exists between body and the embodied or between a quality and the qualified". So too (it is said) in the *bhoktrāpatti* section (II, 1. 14): "what has been set out already as to Śiva alone, without a second—the Self qualified by the universe both intelligent and non-intelligent—becoming both cause and effect, that constitutes (the doctrine of) the qualified-non-dualism of Śiva."

2.21 The position of pure non-dualism is refuted through the statements of objection and reply in the *Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa* (the section beginning with *Ikṣaternāśabdam*, I, 1, 5). "Now, from (the words) 'Existence alone this was in the beginning, one only without a second' and so on, it is understood that the substance which is (but) of the nature of existence is free from qualification. because of the exclusion (implied by *alone* in *existence alone*). How may that causal condition be said to be qualified by the universe in a subtle form?". Such is the statement of the objection. "By the exclusion (implied) in *existence alone*, what is excluded is not qualification, but the causality of what is non-existent; for, there is possibility of confusion as to the causality of the non-existent, because of the declaration, 'Non-existence this was in the beginning; from that existence was born' (*Taitt.* II, 7). Further, how does Brahman's freedom from qualification result from (the text) 'Existence alone this was in the beginning, one only without a second'? 'Was' (refers to) a qualifying act; 'in the beginning' is a temporal qualification; the limitation 'one only without a second' excludes the existence of any other controller; the words 'without a second' declare the property of being the material cause of the world, and consequently, omniscience and omnipotence. How can Brahman become the cause of the world in both senses, in the absence of omniscience and omnipotence?". This is the statement of the reply.

Qualified-non-dualism is established in the very same section, in the consideration of the primary significance of the word *Sat* applied to Brahman. "It is not proper to take *Sat* which is of the form of both stem and suffix to indicate only one object; for through its stem and through its suffix it denotes two objects. Thus the dictum of the learned: 'the word *Sat* indicates *S'akti* and *S'iva* by means of the stem and suffix; they both are Brahman; through (their) harmony, they ensoul all the worlds.' It is Parames'vara alone, as qualified by *S'akti* of the form of the world subtle and gross, intelligent and non-intelligent, that is the object denoted by the word *Sat*." The use of "Brahman" in the singular in that context is for the purpose of reminding (one) that *S'akti* and *S'iva* should not be understood separately, but *S'iva* alone as qualified by *S'akti*; just as the singular (is used) in the *Nyāya-sūtra* "The meaning of a word is the individual, form, and genus (*N. S.*, II, 2, 65)" to remind (one) that the individual, the form, and the genus are not distinctly signified (as being other than) the nature of the individual as qualified by the genus and the form. The qualification "they ensoul all the worlds" dispels the doubt that qualified-non-dualism does not result merely from the fact that the word *Sat* meaning Brahman denotes *S'iva* qualified by *S'akti*, since there exists the inert world composed of ether etc.; (and thereby) it serves to show the inseparability of that (world) from *S'akti* and *S'iva*, through the element of *S'akti*. The same is made clear in the later portion of the commentary (beginning with) the words "gross, subtle," etc. The meaning of the word *Sat* as explained there applies equally to the word "Brahman." Since the determination of the meaning of *Sat* is under discussion, that alone is taken. 2.22

Hence it is that in the section about *bhūmā*, (1, 3, 8 and 9) in explaining the word "Brahman" along with *bhūmā*, all the worlds are shown to enter therein. Now, by the definition of *bhūmā* as "That wherein nothing else is seen, nothing else heard, nothing else known," how can it be declared that where the *bhūmā* is experienced, there is absence of all other perception? For, if the world exists, it is not possible to prevent the perception etc., thereof. (This objection is raised in the words "when 2.221

the world exists, how is it possible to prevent the perception by the released souls, of that which does not serve the goal of man?"; and the reply is shown by establishing that though the world is real it becomes the object of perception only as entering into what is signified by the word *bhūmā*, and not as separate therefrom. "This material world is not indeed what is perceived by the released souls. Brahman Himself, of the nature of unsurpassed Bliss, comes within the range of (their) perception, in the form of the world." Thereupon is cited with approval a text which declares that the world becomes an object of perception to liberated ones, only as entering into what is denoted by the word Brahman which is of the same significance as the word *bhūmā*. "So, indeed, *śruti* (says) 'then he becomes that, Brahman embodied in *ākāśa*;' to released ones, after their attainment of release, the variegated universe, the object of perception, becomes Brahman qualified by Energy (*Śakti*) of the form of Supreme Light (*paramākāśa*), and comes within the range of (their) perception only in the form of Brahman." This sense is explained later in the commentary, on an elucidation of what goes before in the context (of the *śruti*):[1] 'The released soul is praised in such words as 'he attains independence, he attains lordship of the mind (manas)' and so on. By (the words) 'lord of speech' and so on, is declared his possession of speech and other senses, pure, under his control and untainted by matter. On his attaining such a state, this visible variegated universe becomes Brahman Himself embodied in Light (*ākāśa*), this is the inner-significance (of the text)".

2.222 Again, in the fourth chapter, in commenting on the *sūtra* "*bhāve jāgradvat*, (if there is a body, then as in the waking state)" (IV, 4, 14), this sense is elaborated (1) by the (following) statement of objection and reply: "Now, if it be said that when (there is) enjoyment in the nature of perception of the things of this world by released ones, then by their experience of what does not serve the goal of man, the absence of the train of bondage

1. The text of the *śruti* is, *āpnoti svārājyam, āpnoti manasaspatim, vākpatiścakṣūṣpatiḥ, śrotrapatir vijñānapatiḥ, etat tato bhavati, ākāśa śarīram Brahma, satyātma prāṇārāmam, mana ānandam*" (*Taitt.* I, 6).

and suffering cannot be secured, no, (we reply), since there is no perception of the world by liberated ones in the form in which it does not serve the goal of man. This universe is indeed perceived as of the form of Brahman, by released ones"; (2) by his later citation of the text, "So, indeed, the *śruti*, 'then he becomes that'" and so on; and (3) by his explanation thereof.

The answer to the objection "since the inert world exists, how can qualified-non-dualism result from the mere fact that words like *Sat* denote *Śiva* as qualified by *Śakti*". is indicated in the verse (cited as) authoritative, in the words "they ensoul all the worlds". This has been made clear by its being established in the *prakṛty-adhikaraṇa* (I, 4, 23 *et seq*) and the following sections, that the entire universe is the transformation of *Śakti*. Qualified-non-dualism alone being thus expounded everywhere, how does the doubt arise as to the acceptability of pure non-dualism?

Further, the section *na-sthānatopi* and the following one set 2.3
out only to establish that the form of Brahman is characterised by stainless auspiciousness and exists in relation to the world and that it is not devoid of qualities. Thus (proceeds) the first of these sections: the initial doubt is whether Brahman is endowed with attributes or not. For that purpose, (there arises) the doubt whether, in the case of Brahman revealed by texts like "He who stands within the earth etc.," the predicates of (1) residence in the earth and so on, (2) the possession of these as his body, and (3) the controllership of these are true or untrue. For that, the (further) doubt (arises) "if the predicates are true, will the consequent defects (of such residence etc.,) affect Brahman or not?"

This being the position the *prima facie* view (is as follows): 2.31
If residence in the earth etc., embodiment therein and so on were true of Brahman, then just as for man there are defects bound up with the subtle and gross bodily conditions in the states of waking, dreaming, deep sleep, swoon and death, similarly would they (attach) to Brahman also; for, there is no difference (between the two) in respect of embodiment; because, (further) it is declared in the *sūtra-deha yogādvā so'pi* (or it, the concealment,

may be due to conjunction with the body)" (III, 2, 5) *that the* evils of transmigration are dependent on connection with the body; and (also) because, it is admitted by all that residence in bodies made filthy by (the presence of) faeces, urine, flesh etc, is as highly distasteful as residence in Raurava and other (hells).

2.311 Nor may it be said that while pleasure and pain are experienced by him who resides in a city belonging to a King, as a consequence of the King's orders, to the King himself, though resident therein, that does not occur, and that the same (difference) may hold here also. The cause of the suffering consequent on the operation of the King's orders, is not indeed, mere residence in the King's city; rather is it a special (consequence) of being subject to the King's orders. The King indeed is not subject to his own orders. Hence, it stands to reason that the King though resident in his own city is untainted by the suffering consequent on the operation of his own orders. In the case, however, of evils experienced in the body, residence in the body is itself the cause. Hence, just as of the suffering connected with an evil-smelling prison, the presence in the prison *is itself* the cause, affecting him who resides there, of his own will, as the governor thereof, in the same way as him who is cast in the prison cell, similarly the suffering consequent on the body will surely occur to him who is present therein as the controller, in the same way as to him who is bound therein.

2.312 Nor may it be urged that since suffering is controlled by *karma*, though Brahman may reside in the body, for Him who is free from *karma*, suffering consequent on bodily residence cannot come about. Even *karmas* only endow (different kinds of) bodies such as those of gods, men, cattle, birds, etc., suitable to the special varieties of suffering and cause the souls that enter therein to suffer. If for the Lord, embodiment in various bodies may come about irrespective of the suitable *karmas*, then, from the statement of the non-existence of *karma*, what (indeed) can be gained? It cannot, verily, be said that the suffering caused by evil smell etc., that may come to him who is cast in jail for transgressing the King's orders does not occur to the person in

authority that enters the jail as its governor, merely on the ground of his not having displeased the King,

Further, experience of suffering will certainly come to Brahman, since, as present in all bodies, He becomes the object of denotation of such terms as Brāhmin and so on, which enter into injunctive and prohibitory statements; and being, therefore, unavoidably affected by the sins resulting from the disregard of injunctions, He becomes subject to *karma*. If it be said that because of the text about freedom from sin etc., (*apahatapāpmatva* etc.,) there is no possibility of Brahman being subject to *karma*, (we ask) how can that text prevail against the conclusions that Brahman is the subject of denotation of terms like Brāhmin etc., entering into injunctive and prohibitory statements and that He is subject to *karma*, (conclusions) that result if we accept as true the presence of Brahman in all bodies? Hence, because of opposition to texts which are purportful only as enjoining and prohibiting (action), that (other) text may be (declared to be) mere *arthavāda*, whose object is praise of Brahman; desiring to conserve its truthful character, in order to maintain it, one can only show that statements in the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa* (*Bṛh.* III, 7, 1, *et seq*) about residence in the earth, embodiment therein etc., are not true, but are figuratively made for the purpose of praise. This being done, there results consistency with the *Brāhmaṇa* statement "neither gross nor small, neither short nor tall" (*Bṛh.* III, 8, 8) etc., and of the *S'vetāśvatara* hymn "What is higher than what is higher than the world, that is without form and without pain (*S'vet.* III, 10)," (texts) which predicate flawlessness only in the absence of the body. Therefore, Brahman's residence in the earth etc., His embodiment therein, His control thereof, the omniscience, omnipotence etc., needed for that control, all these are imagined. Brahman is free from qualifications; because of the text "Truth, knowledge, (*Taitt.* II, 1)" etc., only the form of Intelligence is to be admitted. 2.313

Here is the *siddhānta*: to Brahman in Himself flawless, even though present in the earth and so on, defects do not attach. The dual characteristics of the absence of the taint of any defect and the 2.32

presence of unsurpassed auspicious qualities are well known to belong to Brahman, from all texts, both *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, such as the following. "This Self, free from sin, old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, whose desires come true, whose purposes come true"; "the absolutely, innately pure Self is called Śiva, because of the non-existence of the beginningless taint of impurity"; "there is a certain abode of illimitable qualities, (who is) the controller of all the worlds, distinct from both the bound soul (*paśu*) and the bonds (*pāśa*)." No defect can thus result here (for Brahman), since we hear of the absence of sin, old age, death, grief, and so on, consequent on connection with a body, as also of the presence of a host of qualities, viz., the entertainment of purposes which come true and so on, which are opposed to those defects.

2.321 If it be said that even here, though naturally endowed like the finite self (*jīva*) with freedom from sin etc., the consequent defects may attach to Brahman, in the state of connection with a body, (we reply) not so. It is only to cure that (doubt), that in each hymn of the *Antaryāmi-brāhmaṇa*, (*Bṛh.* III, 7, 1, *et seq*), beginning with "He who stands within the earth", absence of defects is declared by the term "Immortal" in the statement "This Self, the internal ruler, immortal,"; in the *Atharvaśirasi*, after the description of the entry of Śiva into all things as their internal ruler, in the words "He entered within that which is within", by the gods who thereby understood the self-hood (of Śiva) in all things, the following words of praise are offered: "He who is Rudra and Brahmā, He is the Lord, to Him, verily, we bow", "He (who is Rudra) and Viṣṇu", and so on (*A. Śirasi*, II, 1-32); in each hymn thereof, it is only to remedy the defects that may follow from connection with the respective bodies (of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Maheśvara and others) that the entire host of lordly and other qualities, opposed to those defects, is predicated by the term Lord (*bhagavān*). Further, though Brahman and the *jīva* are connected with the same body, the difference in the enjoyment and non-enjoyment of the fruit of that (connection) is declared in the hymn "Two birds of beautiful plumage, inseparable friends" etc., (*Śvet.* IV, 6).

If it be asked "how is it possible, even then, to avert the distinctionlessness resulting from statements of formlessness and so on?", (we reply) thus: if two texts conflict, it is not meet to deny the significance of one of these by making it out to have an untrue purport. Rather is it proper to uphold both on the principle that "(all) traditional doctrine is equal (in authority)", by endowing both with true purport. Thus, the very texts which predicate Brahman's connection with bodies declare his non-connection with the defects resulting therefrom. In the text "What is known as *ākāśa* is, verily, the dispenser of names and forms: what is within that, that is Brahman, that is immortal, that is the Self, (*Ch.* VIII, 14, 1)," after declaring of the Supreme *ākāśa*, its controllership of name and form, because of its identity therewith as transforming itself into them, it is made out that, though immanence in name and form is mentioned of Brahman, yet by the statement of non-contact there with in (the text) "What is within," (it follows that) for Brahman there is no identity with them, as in the case of *ākāśa*, but rather the relationship only of body and the embodied; if, indeed, there were identity, there would be occasion to suspect (the presence of) the defects thereof; that, however, does not exist; there is no occasion for the presence of defects of the body in the embodied; thus is the meaning (of the text) explained: Following this, it is proper to understand the text about formlessness also in some such manner as that Brahman is comparable to what is formless, that just as *ākāśa* etc., which are bodiless are not affected by flaws due to presence in the body, so also Brahman (is unaffected) and so on. 2.322

Nor may it be objected that the texts which declare form should be re-interpreted in some fashion because of their opposition to the declarations of formlessness, which are important, on the ground that, as in the example of the governor who enters a prison, for Brahman present in the body, even if it be as controller, consequent suffering is bound to result; for, the production of suffering by things is due to control by *karma*, not to the nature of things, as is seen from wife and children, cold and heat, refuse and urine causing joy and sorrow, according to the difference in the time (of the experience) or the class of the 2.323

object. *Smṛti* too says "That which was pleasant, later becomes painful; what was agreeable becomes disagreeable; hence, nothing is essentially painful or pleasant."

2.324 As for the argument that, if Brahman be present in all bodies, because of His being denoted by terms entering into injunctive and prohibitory statements, there may be experience of suffering for Him also, as a consequence of sins due to the disregard of injunctions and prohibitions, necessarily attaching themselves to Him, that is futile. The understanding of the meaning of a sentence comes about quickly by relating terms like Brāhmin etc., only to what is primarily known thereby, i.e., the finite selves related to the respective bodies, in accordance with the preponderance of well-established usage common to both Vedic and wordly parlance; their function being thus fulfilled, there does not result a fresh understanding of the sense of the sentence through the relation of the purport of that very sentence indirectly to Īśvara, who is (only) remotely understood by having regard to what is derived from such doctrines of *Śruti* as those about Īśvara being the internal ruler of all, the controlled serving as bodies to the internal ruler, and terms denoting bodies having an extended application also to what is embodied. Hence, it is that in (the injunction) "the first is to be chanted thrice, the last thrice", in understanding the sentence, the terms *first* and *last* relate only to what is soonest understood. viz., the first and last places, not to what are understood later, as connected with the first or last places (in the particular sacrifice which is the model—the *Prakṛti* rite—), i.e., the *Ṛks* beginning with *pravovājā* and *ājuhotā*.

2.325 Now does it follow from the text about "Truth, Knowledge" (*Taitt*. II. 1) and so on, that the form of Brahman is Knowledge alone; for, as the form of Knowledge (is accepted) to safe-guard the non-futility of that text, the attributes of omniscience etc., should also be admitted in the interests of the non-futility of such texts as "He who knows all, he who understands all (*Mu.* I, 1, 9),", "the Lord of all, Śambhu, in the middle of *ākāśa* (*A. Śikhā*, III)", and so on, since there is no difference in the

revealed character of both kinds of texts. And there being no conflict between the form of Knowledge and the other attributes, there is no need to discriminate between the two. If the text "Truth, Knowledge" etc., (*Taitt.* II, 1), declared that Brahman is of the form of Knowledge alone, then, indeed, there would be opposition (between that and other attributes). But that is not what it says, but only this much, that Brahman is of the form of Knowledge: that, however, does not conflict with attributes known from other texts. The attribute of "being golden," known from the statement "a golden crown" does not indeed conflict with attribute of "being set with gems" known by perception. Further, the statement that few Vedānta texts predicate the attributes of omniscience etc., of Brahman, is too trifling; the entire host of Vedānta texts about Brahman shows His possession of attributes. There is not, indeed, any expression about Brahman in the Vedānta from the use of which does not result the absence of some defect or the presence of some auspicious attribute. It is well-known that the two-fold characteristics of Brahman are also established by sages who produced the Upabrāhmaṇas of the Vedānta.

The non-attachment of defects to Brahman, though present in 2.326
the earth etc., is established on the strength not only of the declarations of His two-fold characteristics by *S'ruti* and *Smṛti* but also of the illustrations cited by *S'ruti.* Thus (run) the illustrations cited by *S'ruti*: "Just as the one *ākāśa* becomes manifold in jars etc., so also the one Self is present in the many, as the Sun in sheets of water." By the first of the similes is taught immanence in all (things) as derived from texts like "He who stands within the earth" etc. Thereby is answered the objection as to how one super-sensible Being (can be) present in many, either option, the presence of the whole or of a part, having to be rejected. By the second simile it is taught that, though present therin, just as in the case of *ākāśa* so present, there is no taint of defects resulting thereform. Through that is the objection answered as how to for that which has (the many) for its body, there can be no experience of defects consequent thereon. It is the opinion of *S'ruti* that there is difference in respect of sub-

jection to *karma* and the absence thereof. Nor can the (following) objection be raised: the Sun while not present in the water is understood as present there; since, however, the Supreme Self, is not in the same way understood as present, while not really present in the earth etc., but is admitted to be really present in the earth and so on, non-contact with defects consequent on the limiting adjuncts cannot hold good of Brahman, as of the Sun. The example "as the Sun in sheets of water is (cited) only to show the non-existence of the experience of resultant merit or defect, that just as the experience of increase and decrease consequent on the limiting adjunct, water, does not really occur to the Sun in the water, so too experience of merit or defect consequent on presence within the earth etc., does not occur to Brahman. This results from the harmonious understanding of the two illustrations. By explicating the scope of (the simile) to the extent (of making out) the non-presence of Brahman in the earth etc., as of the Sun in water, the *first mentioned simile would* indeed, be nullified. Nor is there a ruie that the illustration and *what is illustrated* should be similar in all respects; for, comparisons are made both in the Vedas and in wordly parlance only on the basis of imilarity in respect of the particular quality intended.

2.33 Thus, a section consisting of ten *sūtras* beginning with *na sthānata* etc., is devoted to establish that Brahman is endowed with attributes, that He is the abode of faultless auspicious qualities. After that, the same is confirmed by (the process of) objection and answer. A further section is made up of nine sūtras commencing with *prakṛtaitāvattvam hi pratiṣedhati tato bravīti ca bhūyaḥ* (it is the this-muchness of the context that the text denies; and it declares more)" (III, 2, 21). The doubt there is whether the possession of two-fold characteristics, established by the previous section, holds good of Brahman or not. In that connection arises this doubt: in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, after stating of Brahman the form of the universe, sensible and supersensible, i.e., of earth, water, fire, air and ether, in the words "Two, verily, are the forms of Brahman, sensible and super-sensible" (*Bṛh.* II, 3, 1), there is the negation "then follows the teaching, not thus, not thus". Does the negation so made have for its

object the sensible and super-sensible forms declared of Brahman, so that what was said to be the form of Brahman, viz., the universe, sensible and super-sensible, is really not so? Or does it refer to the declared this-muchness so that the declared form, of the nature of the universe, sensible and super-sensible, does not *alone* become the form of Brahman, there being a host of other attributes as well?

This is the *prima facie* view; it is undisputed that by the 2.331
negative prefix *nañ* in (the sentence) "*not thus, not thus*" (*there is*) denial of what is signified by the world *iti* (thus); thus far, there is no dispute. The term *iti* (thus) which denotes a mode, relates to the mode already mentioned. And what are declared earlier are the two modes of Brahman, of the form of the worlds, sensible and super-sensible. Hence, it is proper (to hold) that the denial is of that. The repetition for the sake of comprehension, in "not thus, not thus," is for the purpose of demonstrating the denial in entirety of the two previously mentioned forms. Or else, the two-fold statement may have the purport that by one the sensible world is negated, and by the other, the super-sensible world. That the declared this-muchness is denied, is not (a) suitable (*interpretation*): for that does not enter into the context, like the *two* forms; further, the two-fold statement is not purportful in that negation as in the denial of the two forms.

The *siddhānta*, hower, is thus: (the knowledge of) Brahman's 2.332
being qualified by the form of the worlds, sensible and super-sensible, being conveyed by *Śruti* itself in the earlier statement, and not being attainable by any other means of knowledge, cannot be negated by the succeeding statement, as contradiction will result between the earlier and the later, option not being possible in the case of facts, as (it is) in the use or rejection of the *ṣoḍaśin* cup. Hence, it is proper to conclude that the mode of the nature of the declared this-muchness, which is entertained in the intellect because of the earlier statement about being qualified by forms, sensible and super-sensible, is here denied.

Immediately afterwards, (the *Śruti*) predicates again a host 2.333
of attributes in the residual sentences "there is verily nothing else higher than this '*it is not so.*'" Then (comes) the name, "the

truth of the true. The senses are the true, He is the truth thereof" (*Bṛh.* II, 3, 6). By the first statement "It is not so," it is said that a being, higher greater than this Brahman said to be within the range of the declared this-muchness, does not exist, thereby being asserted the quality of having none superior to Him. Though there may be none higher than Brahman, yet there are His equals, in respect of embodiment in the sensible and super-sensible world, and the control of both of them. There are indeed, among the inhabitants of this planet, adepts in Yoga, and released persons, in whom is (found) as much as in Brahman the capacity to control both (the forms), as embodied therein. To remove this doubt, the sentence beginning with "Then the name" etc., after mentioning the name "the truth of the true", gives the derivation thereof. By the term *prāṇa* the individual souls who control the senses are there indicated. They are of the nature of the true; they are unchanging, as there is no origination of their form from another form, as in the case of ether and so on. Superior even to these, is Brahman, the truth, since (for Him) there is no origination even in the sense of the contraction and expansion of knowledge, as in the individual soul. Hence, though in Yogins and in released souls, there may be, after the blossoming out of knowledge, the power to control the world at that time, that did not exist previously when knowledge was in a state of contraction. Hence it is held that Brahman alone is the eternal controller of all the worlds, that there is no finite self equal to Him. Or else, by the entire residual sentence only the absence of equals is taught; the absence of superior (beings) results by the argument *a fortiori.* In this position, this is the construction of the first sentence, "It is not so"—Brahman alone is higher, greater than the sensible and super-sensible worlds, (which are) the correlate of the this-muchness that is negated; superior to this world, as controller (thereof), there is none other than He. Or else, this (other) construction (is possible): "it is not so"—other than this Brahman, who is within the range of the negation of the declared this-muchness, there is no great being, superior to the world as its controller. In both of these constructions, there is the merit that the word "other" in the text cannot be thought to be purportless.

Now, this residual sentence harmonises also with the position which negates both the forms (sensible and super-sensible). How? This is the meaning of the first sentence: "it is not so"—there is no being higher than the two forms negated, which appears to be other than this Brahman. The second sentence is for the purpose of confirming that. By the term *prāṇa* signifying the senses, sense-objects are indicated. Of the objects of knowledge, in the statements, "the lump of clay exists, the pot exists, the potsherd exists, dust exists" etc., the lump of clay, the potsherd etc., are variable reals, whereas Brahman is the real that is constant along with whatever is known by the predication of existence in all those judgments. The varying (forms) are seen to be imposed on the constant (real), as garland, snake, a fissure in the ground etc., (are imposed) on the "thisness" of the rope. Hence, the variable pot etc., merely appear to be real: Brahman is superior to them, the final truth: this is the sense of that (text). 2.3331

If it be said that, since it is possible thus to interpret the residual sentences in conformity with the understanding of "thus" as referring to the two declared forms any other mode of interpretation is unsuitable, (we reply) that it would be so, if Brahman could be an object of perception in the form of existence, like the "thisness" of the rope. That, however, is not possible. Texts like "His form does not stand within the reach of vision, no one sees (Him) with the eye" etc., (*Kaṭha*, V, I, 9) declare that Brahman, verily, is unmanifest, beyond the reach of perception and other (means of knowledge). The nature of Brahman is revealed by Himself to His worshippers, if pleased with the worship through the sacrifice that is meditation, based on firm devotion. This is understood from the following statements of *Śruti* and *Smṛti*. "This Self is not to be attained by discourse, by intelligence or by a multitude of texts; Him alone whom He has chosen, by him is (He) attained; to him this Self reveals His form" (*Kaṭha*, I, 2, 23). "This (Being) is to be seen by supreme devotion, by no other means whatever. Hari, and I, and Rudra and similarly other Gods and Asuras with fierce austerities are to this day desirous to get a sight of Him." Thus, devout con- 2.3332

templation (*samrādhana*) is declared to be the means of the intuition of Brahman.

2.3333 (The realisation of) even the lordship of the world is not different from the attributes of knowledge and bliss, in being the effect (of such meditation). Just as there is no difference between their knowledge and bliss and those of Brahman, so their comes to be no difference between their lordship over the world, and Brahman's lordship over the world. Hence it is that Lord Kṛṣṇa by the repeated practice of meditation, by uninterrupted concentration for a long period, attaining through intuition of Brahman, lordship similar to His over the world, is seen to reveal that to Arjuna in the *Gītā*. The exhibition by Agastya and Viśvāmitra of their capacity to drink up the ocean and to create another heaven, is seen from the Purāṇas. Nor is this improbable; even in our experience, it is seen that those who contemplate the *Garuḍa-mantra*, attain through the meditation of Garuḍa, the distinctive property of Garuḍa, that of counter-acting poison by mere presence. Hence, it is but proper that some distinctive attribute of Brahman's is realised by meditation on Brahman. It being thus settled that devout meditation is the cause of knowledge of Brahman, that its result is the attainment of His lordship and so on, it follows that because of the settled cause and effect not being seen in perceptions like "the pot exists" etc., the statement "not thus, not thus" denies the declared thismuchness, not the declared two-fold forms. How? The lordship manifested in those who have intuited Brahman may be said to be of a nature similar to Brahman's because of the text "the stainless one attains absolute equality (with the Supreme)." (*Mu.* III, 1, 3). Hence, just as it has to be accepted that Brahman's nature of knowledge and bliss appears in them, so His lordship too has to be accepted (as appearing in them), as, otherwise, absolute equality does not result. Verily absolute equality is equality of all qualities in every detail, not merely some amount of similarity in respect of some one quality. Hence, since even in devotees of Brahman is seen the manifestation of the distinctive attributes—knowledge, bliss, lordship and endless other auspicious qualities, there is no room to dispute the conjunction of an

infinitude of auspicious qualities with Brahman. Therefore, Brahman is certainly of two-fold character.

Now, if it be said that declaration of the world as of the form of Brahman, in "Two, verily, are the forms of Brahman" can be maintained on the (basis of the) relation of super-imposition between Brahman and the world, any other mode of maintaining it being impossible, and that, therefore, the statement "not thus, not thus" is suitably understood only as negating the super imposed world, no (we reply), since it is possible to maintain that the world is of the form of Brahman in other ways than by the relation of super-imposition. 2.334

That, indeed, is as follows: the term *rūpa* is indicative of state, not of quality. As both unity and multiplicity are predicated in "Rudra is one only," "All, verily, is Rudra," it stands to reason to understand that what is declared of Brahman in statements like "Two are the forms of Brahman" is a multiplicity of states like the multiplicity of postures of a single serpent such as being coiled, straight or crooked. 2.3341

Or else, let there be but difference between Brahman and the world; even then, (the treatment of the world) as of the form of Brahman—in the words "forms of Brahman"—is valid, since from the text "All this, verily, is Brahman" everything is related to the form of Brahman as one genus. Though there is difference between luminosity and what is luminous, yet since they are related to the same genus, brightness (*tejastva*), the usage "All this is of the form of brightness" is, verily, observed. 2.3342

Or else, let neither of these two positions be accepted; on the first view, indeed, two defects—transformation and inertness—may attach to Brahman; on the second view too, that may happen, since the world, dependent on the genus Brahman, is also admitted to be Brahman. Hence, on both views, there will be conflict with all texts predicating of Brahman freedom from faults. Therefore, (the relation) is to be taught here, as on an earlier occasion. Earlier, indeed, in the section *aṁśo nānāvyapadeśāt* (II, 2.3343

3, 42, *et seq*), it is declared of the class of intelligent beings, that it is an *aṁśa* (element) of Brahman, as a particular mode of what is qualified, being of the same nature as inseparable attributes like light, genus, quality, and the body. Let this be (true) of the class of non-intelligent beings as well; it is that which is said to be a form of Brahman; (hence) there is no flaw. In this way, the Purāṇic statement about things intelligent and non-intelligent constituting the body of Brahman (as stated in the verse), "The whole world of the nature of intelligence and non-intelligence is without a doubt the form of the all-pervasive Teacher of the universe, for the reason that the universe is under His control," comes to have the same meaning as the text "He of whom the earth is the body" and so on (*Bṛh.* III, 7, 3).

2.34 From the negation of old age etc., of Brahman in such texts as "By the ageing of this, that does not age," (*Ch.* VIII, 1, 5), "Not gross, not minute, not small, etc.," (*Bṛh.* III, 8, 8), the inference as to embodiment in the world is necessitated. Only if present therein, can we explain the declaration of the denial of the consequent defects, when there is a possibility of their being in Brahman. Hence, Brahman is flawless, possessed of attributes, related to the world. After having thus in two sections established of Brahman that He is endowed with qualities and connected with the world, in the section beginning with *paramatassetūnmāna-sambandha-bheda-vyapadeśebhyaḥ* (because of the mention of bridge, measure, connection, difference, there is a higher Being)" (III, 2, 30), it is shown by statement of *prima facie* view and conclusion that there is no other real, higher, greater than this Brahman.

2.4 Further, the section—*Ādarādalopaḥ* (Non-omission, because of emphasis) (III, 3, 39)–is set forth in the third chapter to prove that the attributes, physical form etc., of Śiva are true and eternal, not fictitious and impermanent. This is how (it is done). In the doubt whether Śiva's physical form characterised by blue throatedness etc., and His hosts of qualities like having purposes which come true, are but imaginary or the reverse, whether (consequently) any of them are to be dropped (in contemplation) or not, the *prima facie* view is (as follows).

It is acknowledged, because of texts like "Brahma is embodied in *ākāśa*," "He who shines in the form of Bliss, immortal" and so on, that Śiva's physical form is of the form of Bliss. Nor does stoutness or thinness result for Bliss through the (existence of) sides, throat, hands, fingers and so on. If that were admitted to happen, the possession of joy as the head etc., as declared of Brahman that is abundance of Bliss, in the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, in the words "of him, joy is the head, satisfaction is the right wing, supreme satisfaction is the left wing, Bliss is the body, Brahman is the tail, the support" would also be true. In that case, what is concluded earlier in the *sūtra-priyaśirastvādya-prāptirupacayāpacayau hi bhede* (having joy as the head etc., do not apply; with difference there would be increase and decrease)" (III, 3, 12) would be contradicted. Therefore, the physical form is imagined; and the collection of attributes mentioned therewith is also imaginary, that being opposed to texts (teaching) absence of attributes. 2.41

As for the *siddhānta*, (it is as follows). From the emphasis secured by repetition[1] of (the qualities of) blue-throatedness, lordship of Umā, having purposes which come true and so on. the truth of the physical form and of the collection of attributes necessarily results. Since *Śruti* is authoritative, only as stated in the *Śruti* may (anything) be admitted, by those who take refuge therein. For the Supreme *ākāśa* of the nature of Bliss, change in the nature of increase and decrease is admissible; not so however, the possession of joy as the head and so on. It follows that they are imaginary, since there is no means of ascertaining their significance, and further, they are mentioned along with the (clearly) imaginary wings, tail etc., of the (selves) of food and so on. If it be asked, what then is the purportful repetition here, we reply thus: in the meditation of (the Being within) the solar orb, in the words "obeisance to the golden-armed, golden-coloured, Him 2.42

1. The word *abhyāsa* has been used in the present context to refer to such repetition as may convey significance, serve, in other words, *tātparyaliṅga*. Othe repetition is but re-statement *(punar-āmnānam)*. In the translation, the wearisome re-iteration of the word "purportful" is avoided, it being understood wherever "repetition" is used, and not any other synonymous word.

of the form of gold, the lord of gold", there is repetition of the (idea of) lordship of Umā in different terms. In the *S'rīrudropaniṣad*, there is repetition of blue-throatedness in the words "obeisance to the blue-necked one and the blue-throated one." In the *Daharavidyā*, (as) in the *Kaivalyopaniṣad*, the companionship of Umā and the possession of three eyes are mentioned together, in the words "The companion of Umā, Parameśvara, the noble one, the three-eyed, blue-throated, gracious one" (*Kaivalyopaniṣad* I, 7). In the same *Daharavidyā*, (as) in the *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*, there is repetition (of the ideas), through the words "dark and tawny", "diverse-eyed", in the statement "the person who is dark and tawny, whose virility is the (upward-rising) fire, who is diverse-eyed" (*MN*, XII, 1). So, also the re-statement in the *S'āṇḍilyavidyā* of the qualities mentioned in the *Daharavidyā*, such as having purposes which come true and so on, is repetition.

2.421 How can re-statement due to differences of *śākhā* (branches of the Veda) amount to (purportful) repetition? Where there are differencess of *śākhā*, re-statement is for purpose of their being known by those who study the respective branches; re-statement where meditations are different, is for the purpose of having a knowledge of the various qualities (to be contemplated), since the qualities of one form of meditation cannot be understood in another, except by combination (*upasaṁhāra*). The re-iteration of certain qualities even in the same *śākhā* and meditation, is for the purpose of reminding (one) of the identity of meditation (which is) serviceable to the combination with one another of the qualities mentioned. If it be said that re-statements which have thus other purposes, should not be considered as repetition, whereby significance may be ascertained, (the answer) is (as follows):

2.422 This is the sense of the section beginning with *ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya* (Bliss and so on as belonging to the subject, have to be understood everywhere)" (III, 3, 11): the qualities of Truth, Knowledge, Bliss etc., the distinctive physical form of the nature of Bliss, qualified by blue-throatedness, companionship of Umā and so on, since all these are included in the definition of the essential nature of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, they are to be combined

in every meditation on the Supreme, since they are required for the purpose of attaining to Him in experience, as distinct from all other deities such are Brahmā, Viṣṇu, etc. It is also established in the *priyaśirastvādi* section, which succeeds the above, that even the qualities of having purposes which come true and so on, attained by released ones, these too are to be combined in all meditations on the Supreme, since they are required there, on the principle that the fruit is of the same nature as the meditation. In both these, the cardinal principle of combination (of qualities) even where meditations are different, is only the need for the same. It is only on the same principle that, though (the performance) of sacrifices, (the acquisition) of calmness etc., the wearing of sacred ashes, the repetition of meditation, the cessation and non-attachment of past and future karma as the result of the observance of meditation throughout life and the distinctions of path and seasons, such as those of light and so on, all these are mentioned only in some one meditation or other, their being understood in all meditations on the Supreme is established in the *sarvāpekṣā* (III, 4, 26) and other sections, by the removal of the special objections that arise in each case. Thus, since qualities like having purposes which come true, though mentioned in one place are understood in all meditations on the Supreme, their re-statement in other meditations, serving no other purpose, remains only as repetition capable of imparting significance. Hence, since by repetition emphasis is secured, physical form and the host of qualities are not to be omitted.

As for the texts predicating absence of qualities, (they), 2.43
corrected by texts predicating qualities, continue (authoritative) as denoting the absence of objectionable qualities; for, on the principle of the *padāhavanīya*, it is desirable to postulate that mode of settlement which would secure authoritativeness for both texts.

The next section *upasthite'tastadvacanāt* (Of him who has 2.5
approached Brahman; because of that being declared)" (III, 3, 40) is set out for the purpose of proving that Brahman attained by the released ones is of the nature of Śiva alone, endowed with physical form and qualified by eternal faultless attributes, that there

is no Brahman, free from qualities, (and) transcending that (other), which is attained by the released ones. This is how (it is done): the doubt is whether Brahman attained by the released ones is other than Śiva or is Śiva Himself. For that, there is the doubt whether release is the attainment of the condition of Brahman without qualities or the attainmeat of similarity to Brahman with qualities.

2.51 (This is) the *prima facie* view; hundreds of texts proclaim the position that the Supreme Brahman is formless and attributeless and that the attainment of that condition is liberation. The text declares with emphasis that "being Brahman alone, he attains Brahman (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 6)", "he, who knows that Supreme, Brahman, verily, becomes Brahman Himself, (*Mu.* III, 2, 9)." Therefore, Śiva, endowed with form and qualities is not the Supreme Brahman; nor is the attainment of equality with Him, ultimate release.

2.52 But the *siddhānta* (is as follows): only Śiva of the form above declared, is the Supreme Brahman; only the attainment of equality with Him is supreme release. Because, after the devotee has attained (Him) through meditation, as present within the small lotus (*dahara-puṇḍarika*) and so on, there comes about the manifestation of his own form, only as a consequence of which, there are his enjoyments, such as laughing etc., which are described in the texts "This serene being rising above the body, having reached the Supreme Light appears in his true form; he moves about there laughing, playing and enjoying, with women or vehicles or relatives (*Ch.* 8, 12, 3)" and so on; and further because, in the text "(the) stainless (one) attains supreme equality (*Mu.* III, 1, 3)", the attainment of supreme equality is declared of the stainless one.[1] The manifestation of one's own form or the destruction of the impurity called *ajñāna* does not indeed exist except in the condition of final release. The texts that deny qualities like those which declare them to Śiva, the Supreme Brahman,

1. The expression *nirañjana, free from añjana,* i.e., the impurity known by that name, for convenience, is translated here as "(the) stainless (one)".

have the purpose of negating objectionable qualities. The particle *eva* in the texts "becoming Brahman alone, he attains Brahman", "he who knows Brahman becomes Brahman alone" (though apparently meaning *alone*), in conformity with texts about equality here means *iva* (like): for, the *eva* particle is seen to be used in the sense of *iva* in the text about sleep "(he) becomes blind, sheds tears as it were, reaches annihilation as it were," where *vināśameva* meaning annihilation *alone*, is used in the sense of annihilation *as it were*. Or else, this is the meaning of the two texts: "he attains Brahman only after obtaining Brahman's nature through the expansion of knowledge; he who knows the Supreme Brahman becomes himself capable of expansion through the expansion of knowledge. Thus, Brahman is only (that Being that is) endowed with attributes, possessed of physical form, connected with the world and with qualifications, not devoid of qualifications: in the system of Śrīkaṇṭhācārya who has established qualified-non-dualism as final conclusion, by himself establishing (the above conclusion as to Brahman) in many places, and by expounding that sense through the sūtras in several sections, where is the room for imagining that pure-non-dualism is his final view?

For those who take their stand on Brahman without qualities, 2.6
release without any need of departure (on the path of light etc.,) is declared in the words of the *aniyama* and other sections, "for devotees of what is non-related, there is liberation even here"; since, (however) that declaration begins with the words "Some say", it is clear in every case that it is a statement of opinion other than (the author's).

And as for the conclusion in the *sūtra - Śāstradṛṣṭyā tū-* 2.7
padeśo Vāmadevavat (The instruction is due to the insight based on Scripture, as in the case of Vāmadeva) (II, 1, 31) and other such *sūtras* that the case of release is the devotee's contemplation of non-difference with Śiva, that relates to imagined non-difference. Hence, it is that in the commentary on the *sūtra - Prakāśādivaccā* '*vaiśeṣyam prakāśaśca karmaṇyabhyāsāt* (And there is non-difference as in the case of light; and the light is intuited by repeated meditation) (III, 2, 24), occurring in the *Prakṛtaitāvattva*

section, it is shown that the basis of the contemplation of identity with Śiva is imaginary, by means of the illustration of the contemplation of identity with Garuḍa, the basis of which is imaginary; (these are the words of the commentary): "The manifestation by Kṛṣṇa and others of His (Brahman's) lordly qualities by contemplation of identity with Him, is seen in the words 'I give thee celestial vision; look at my lordly Yoga (my identification with Īśvara)". By the repeated contemplation of (identity with) Brahman, in Viśvāmitra and Agastya (are seen) the capacity to create another heaven and to swallow the ocean; in (our) experience too (there is) the attainment of the distinctive qualities of Garuḍa by magicians, through contemplation of Garuḍa." Even by *Sudarśanācārya* in the *Tātparya-Saṁgraha*,[1] only this illustration of contemplation of identity with Brahman is cited; "Padmanābha is said to be the Supreme Brahman, and the Supreme Real, the Supreme Light, and the Supreme Lord, since delighting only in contemplation of Thee, he is non-different from Thee, as the magician by contemplation of Garuḍa, is non different from Garuḍa" (*Śruti-Sūkti-Mālā*, verse, 42). It is reasonable to hold that that is the opinion of Śrīkaṇṭhācārya too, who follows him.

2.81 Now, if the commentator's vision is directed to qualified-non-dualism and the difference of the finite self from Brahman, then what is said in the *janmādi* section (I, 1, 2) and the *ārambhaṇa* section (II, 1, 15, *et seq*) about Brahman of the form of existence being the object of such perception as the "pot exists", fails to fit in (to the system): (those statements are as follows): "Material causality of all results for Brahman, the persistent existential element in all things, (as seen from the judgements) 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists'. It is of pots etc., of the nature of clay, that clay is regarded as the material cause" (I, 1, 2); "if it be said that just as the presence of clay is seen in (the judgement), 'the pot is clay,' the presence of Brahman is not similarly seen in (the judgement) 'this world is Brahman', (we reply that) the presence of Brahman of the form of existence is certainly

1. This is the *Catur-Veda-Tātparya-Saṃgraha*, known as the *Śruti-Sūkti-Mālā*. The author had another name-Haradatta.

seen in all, (as in the judgements) 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exits'" (II, 1, 16). This statement (is made) for the purpose of giving room for the inferential conclusion as to the illusoriness of the world (on the ground) that the variable pot, cloth and so on are imagined in the continuous existent Brahman, like snakes, etc., imagined in the *thisness* of the rope. Nor may it be objected that the statement is for the purpose of exhibiting the material causality of Brahman, that (purpose) alone being explicitly mentioned. If, of Brahman, material causality of the variety that transforms itself into the effect, as non-different therefrom, were acceptable, then indeed, for the purpose of explaining it, perceptions like "mud pot", "mud jar" which make one understand the non-difference of the effect from the material cause, would have to be cited in illustration. And Brahman being the material cause of the world in that fashion, is not acceptable to Śrīkaṇṭhācārya, that (view) being refuted in the *Prakṛti* section (I, 4, 23 *et seq.*). Hence, it is proper to take this as an illustration of another mode of presenting the perception of imagined identity, analogous to the perception "this is a serpent" or "this is a fissure in the ground" in the rope.

Thus, in the *Atṛ* section (I, 2, 9 *et seq*), while commenting 2.811
on the first half of the *Yadā tama* hymn (*Śvet.* IV, 11) the word *tamas*, darkness, is explained by the (following) objection and reply, as referring to the ignorance prevalent among finite selves at the time of the deluge: "Now, if it be asked how can the world be of the nature of darkness, if the eternally luminous Śiva, the Supreme Brahman exists, no, (we reply), for, what defect can there be in the self-luminous Śiva, the witness of all? For the finite selves lacking bodies and sense-organs capable of apprehending objects, which as devoid of name and form are incomprehensible, there is no apprehension of the world, through their own cognitive faculty, enveloped in impurity; even for the self-luminous Śiva, there is no apprehension as before (the deluge). Hence, the final state, of the nature of Supreme sleep, marked by the absence of all diversity of effects, is called *tamas* (darkness)"; then in commenting on the latter half of the same hymn, in the *Prakṛti* section (I, 4, 23 *et seq*) in the words "the dispeller of the

darkness of that period, the Supreme *Prajñā*, the energy of Knowledge, of the form of the great manifester, came forth", there are predicated of the Intelligence-Energy (*Cit-Śakti*) of Śiva, the function of dispelling the darkness, of the nature of ignorance.—(which is) declared in the first half (of the hymn), (to be) of the nature of ignorance among the finite selves—and the function of manifesting objects like pot, cloth, etc., to finite selves, (as seen from the name) the great manifester.

2.812 In the *ārambhaṇa* section, it is shown that the manifestation experienced in finite intellects, as "the pot appears to me" is of the nature of Brahman's Intelligence, in the words, "If the world were not pervaded by Śiva of the nature of existence and intelligence, then, deprived of existence and manifestation, how could it be seen to exist or to appear? It would be but unreal" (II, 1, 16). Of the happiness experienced by the finite self when he says "I am happy", it is said in the following works of the *ānandamaya* (I, 1, 13 *et seq*) and the *abhāvam Bādari* (IV, 4, 10 *et seq*) sections, that it is of the nature of a fragment of the supreme Energy that is of the form of Brahman's Bliss. "Of the self of Bliss, it is declared in the text 'This, verily, causes delight', that He is the cause of the bliss of finite selves. Only he who is full of Bliss himself can cause delight to others" (I, 1, 15): "Who indeed could breathe, who could live, if this *ākāśa* that is Bliss, were non-existent? This, verily, causes delight. He is the essence: having obtained this essence, one becomes blissful;" in these words, it is declared of that (*Cit-Śakti*) that it is the object of all enjoyment; thus it is that the gradations in the manifestation of Bliss, up to Brahman, due to obscuration by limiting adjuncts, are declared in the text commencing with 'This is one bliss of a human being' up to "This is one bliss of Brahman'" (IV, 4, 14); all this fails to harmonise (with the view of difference between Brahman and the finite self). This is indeed (taught) for the purpose of expounding the non-difference of finite selves from Brahman, for, it is inconsistent with the view of difference, since one's knowledge does not result from another's nor one's bliss from another's bliss.

If such an objection be raised, it will be said that it is not the view of the *ācārya* that the perception "the pot exists" etc., has for its object Brahman that is the *viśeṣya* element (i.e., the the subject of qualities). For, in the *Prakṛtaitāvattva* section (III, 2, 21 *et seq*) directed to inquire into the correlate of the negation in the text, "then the teaching 'not thus, not thus', "this doubt is raised: "now, Brahman of the form of existence that persists in (such perceptions as) 'the pot exists', 'the cloth exists," etc., is real; other variable objects like pot etc., are negated by the text in the statement 'not thus'"; then, introducing by way of reply the *sūtra-tadavyaktamāha hi* (the *Śruti* says indeed, that it is manifest) (III, 2, 22), the purport of that *sūtra* is explained by himself in the words: "Brahman's form is not manifested by other means of knowledge, such as perception. For the reason stated by *Śruti*, 'His form does not stand within reach of vision, it is not perceived by the eyes' and so on, it follows that the existence cognised through perception is not Brahman." Therefore, the two texts cited above from the *janmādi* (I, 1, 2) and the *ārambhaṇa* (II, 1, 15, *et seq*) sections should be related to the attributive element of Brahman (i.e., that aspect which is made up of attributes, in other words, (*Cit-Śakti*). For, by accepting the transformation of that into the form of all the worlds, the suitability results of explaining by the illustration from perception of non-difference. Nor may it be urged that since in the *īkṣati* section (I, 1, 5, *et seq*) Brahman is himself said to be existence, it is not proper to predicate of Him the experience of existence. For, it is just as reasonable to predicate existentiality of Brahman, though He is Himself existence, as to predicate Knowledge and Bliss of Him, who is himself the knower and the enjoyer. As for what is said of individual knowledge and enjoyment of objects being fragments of Brahman's Knowledge and Bliss, that holds even if Brahman and the finite self are different. For, just as the distinct hearing of various individuals belongs to the ether as delimited by the hollow space in (different) ears or to space as delimited by the cardinal points, the distinctively individual cognitions and enjoyments may be recognised to be elements of Brahman's Knowledge and Bliss, as particularised by their respective internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇa*). 2.82

2.821 Now, in the *abhāvam Bādari* section (IV, 4, 10 *et seq*), it is said without reference to delimitation due to the functioning of the internal organs, that the form of the supreme goal enjoyed by liberated ones, is but the replete, unlimited Bliss of Brahman. Then, after praising it in the words. "It is the Supreme Energy of the form of the Supreme Primal Being, the Highest Existence, the Harmony of Resplendent Bliss, that, as the form of Brahman, is called the Supreme *ākāśa*, which is the means of attainment of the goal directly for Brahman and the released souls, indirectly for the rest" (IV, 4, 14), after expanding the sense of "indirectly for the rest", in the passage beginning with the words "'Thus, indeed; 'who, verily, can breathe, who can live"', and so on, and ending with the words "the manifestation of Bliss is declared as of (varying) grades", the sense of the passage, "that which is the means of attainment of the goal directly for Brahman and released souls" is explained, through the statement "That Bliss is present in full in Brahman and the released ones, without limitations, because of the text 'and of the sage untormented by desires'." Then raising the objection as to how, if the sage untormented by desires is a released soul, there can be a declaration of the experience by the sage untormented by desires of the bliss of human beings and so on, ending up with the bliss of Prajapati,—which are (but) fragments of the Bliss of Brahman, manifested in varying degrees, because of the distinctive nature of limiting adjuncts—it is said in reply, "The wise one, the sage untormented by desires, is he who performs *agnihotra* and other rites, without desires and with intellect dedicated to Brahman. Of that liberated one, and of Brahman, the bliss is equal. In the case of him, who, by the excellence of his meditation (*Yoga*), transcends each stage, realising that what is gained at each prior stage is little, the bliss manifested to him at each stage may be compared to the bliss of human beings and so on; thus there is no contradiction." How is this consistent with the view of difference between Brahman and the finite selves? To the happiness of another, not appropriated as distinctly one's own, by some special act, the character of being the Supreme human goal to be experienced cannot surely attach.

If this (objection) be urged, it does harmonise (we reply), for, it is the Supreme Energy of the form of the Transcendent Bliss of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, that is acknowledged by the commentator to be of the form of the whole world, intelligent and non-intelligent. Hence, from the non-difference thereof in essence from the finite selves, there results blissfulness in essence: and from non-difference in respect of their qualities, of the nature of their respective intelligence-energies, (there results) blissfulness in respect of attributes. But to those, who, enveloped in impurity, are bound in the migratory cycle, that (Supreme Energy) does not shine either in itself or as non-different from them in respect of essence or attribute; therefore, it becomes an object of human endeavour, (only) as a fragment admitting of gradations, due to the limitations imposed by the special activities of the respective internal organs. As for liberated ones, it shines in all these three ways (i.e., in itself, and as non-different from them, both in essence and in attribute), hence, impartibly and fully; this is the difference (between the two experiences). It (*Cit-Śakti*) becomes the goal of man, in the form of Bliss, which is an attribute of Brahman and the liberated ones alike; this is made plain even in the present commentary, in the words "This bliss is present in full, without taint or limitations, in both Brahman and the released souls" (IV, 4, 14). Therefore, even if the finite self be different from Brahman, the Bliss of Brahman may appropriately be the goal in respect of finite selves; in comformity with this, there is no need to suspect any flaw in the view explicitly declared by the commentator as to the difference between Brahman and the finite selves. 2.822

This has, indeed, been declared clearly even in the *aṁśa* section (II, 3, 42, *et seq*). There, the *prima facie* view being stated that Brahman Himself, because of the influence of limiting adjuncts, real or fictitious, attains the form of the finite self, as a consequence of the refutation thereof, it is established of the finite self, that it is an element of Brahman, being of the nature of a particular attribute of the qualified Brahman. Four of the *sūtras* of that section—"*Ābhāsa eva ca* (they are but fallacious arguments)", "*Adṛṣṭā-niyamāt* (since that unseen principle exercises no 2.823

regulative influence)", "*Abhisandhyādiṣvapi caivam* (so also of the desires and so on)", and "*Pradeśāditi cenna, antarbhavāt* (if it be said, because of difference of place, no, since they are all included in Brahman)" (II, 3, 49–52)—are directed to the refutation of *prima facie* view that Brahman Himself attains the nature of the finite self by either the limitation of ignorance or real limiting adjuncts. Therefore, the final conclusion of the *ācārya* is the position of qualified-non-dualism—that Brahman is qualified by Energy of the form of the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent, not the position of pure-non-dualism—that Brahman is attributeless, formless, and unrelated to the world.

3.1 Though this is what appears from beginning to end, yet on a careful examination of the implications of the commentary, pure-non-dualism alone is (seen to be) the final conclusion.

3.11 Thus the *sūtra* - *Aniyamassarveṣām avirodhaḥ śabdānumānābhyām* (No restriction; there being no opposition to any text revealed or inferred)" (III, 3, 32) (favours this view). The commentary is first directed to the refutation of the *prima facie* view that departure on the path of light etc., are to be understood only in those meditations like the *Upakośala-vidyā* where they are mentioned, not in other meditations, since they are not heard of (there). There is no restrictive principle that departure on the path of light etc., are (confined) only to those places where they are mentioned. They come in, rather, in all meditations on Brahman. Only then is there no contradiction of the following *śruti* and *smṛti* texts. "Those who know this, and those who in the forest meditate upon Faith and Truth, etc.," (*Ch.* V. 10, 1); "Fire, light, day, the bright half of the month" and so on (*Bh. G.*, VIII, 24). Then comes this commentary: "Some say, 'No restriction', there is no restriction as to departure along the path of light etc., in the case of all devotees. Even if that be so, there is no contradiction of *śruti* and *smṛti*." Though this appears to be the statement of an opinion other than his own, yet he says later, "Even to that (interpretation) there is no objection, since, for devotees of that which is Non-related, there is no need of that (travel along the path of light)", explaining thus the non objection-

able nature of the other interpretation, on the ground of the needlessness of the departure on the path of light for devotees of *Nirguṇa-Brahman*, as if by a reason acceptable to himself: hence, it has to be inferred that both interpretations in the form of two varṇakas[1] are recognised as expressing his own position, the first of these for the purpose (of showing that the path of light etc., is) common to all meditations on the qualified Brahman, the second for the purpose of negating its applicability to meditation on Brahman without qualifications.

Similarly, the other opinion is expressed even at the close of 3.12
the *tadāpiteḥ* section (IV, 2, 8, *et seq*). This is how that section (goes).

The doubt is whether the departure taught in the prior section 3.121
Samānāca asṛtyupakramādamṛtatvam ca (equal up to the commencement of the departure and immortality)" (IV, 2, 7) and the subsequent departure apply to the enlightened one or not. They do not apply; for, attainment of Brahman even here is declared by *śruti* in the case of the enlightened ones, in the words "when released of all desires that entered the heart, then does the mortal become immortal, then does he attain Brahman" (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 7). (Further), modes of departure etc., in the case of the unenlightened are declared in the statements relating to the mode of departure, the attainment of another body, enjoyment of the fruit of *karma* (while) in that body so long as the *karma* lasts, and the return to this world, having acquired fresh *karma*, (in the words) beginning with "the tip of his heart glows, by that glow, this self goes up" (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 2), and ending with "So much for him who desires," (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 6): departure of the enlightened one is then denied in the words, "he who does not desire, who is desireless, free from desires, desiring the Self, with desires satisfied, of him the vital airs do not depart; being Brahman, he attains Brahman" (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 6). Nor may it be objected that it is of the enligh-

1. A *varṇaka* is one of several interpretations of the same *sūtra*, where the interpretations are fundamentally different, not different ways of expressing the same conclusion.

tened person that departure and travel along the path of light etc., are predicated in the following texts—"Those who know this" etc., (*Ch.* V, 10, 1), and "going up thereby he attains immortality (*Kaṭha.* VI. 16). For, since at the death of the enlightened person, the merger of all subtle elements, viz., speech, mind, vital air in the Supreme Divinity, Brahman, is declared in the text, "Of this person, dear one, speech in merged is mind, mind in the vital air, the vital air in fire, fire in the Supreme Divinity" (*Ch.* VI, 8, 6), for him there can be neither departure nor going, dependent on the (possession of) the subtle elements—the senses, mind and vital air. (Again), since the Supreme Brahman is everywhere, there is no need for departure or going. Thus, the texts asserting attainment of Brahman even here, and denying departure, (prove) stronger by showing (their own) consistency and avoiding the inconsistency (of the contrary position). In conformity with this, the texts about departure and going should be said to relate to that knower of Brahman, whose object is liberation by degrees. Nor may it be said that in the text. "of this person, dear one" etc., merger of speech and the rest, in the Divinity, is declared in respect of function only, not of their essence, since, on the latter interpretation, the departure common to both enlightened and unenlightened persons being described, merger of being in Brahman would result (even) of the speech etc., of the unenlightened, and it would not be proper to adopt a fresh interpretation of the expression "merges" in that case (alone). Since the text cited occurs in the context of the *Sad-Vidyā* (the teaching of Reality as Existence), (*Ch.* VI, 2), and the *Rūpa-Vidyā* (the teaching about the colours of elemental fire, water and the earth, as constitutive of the visible fire, Sun, Moon and Lightning. *Ch.* VI, 4), the departure described therein relates only to the enlightened person; further, even though of the expression "merges" as related to the merger in mind and the rest, the meaning is merger of function alone, yet on the principle adopted in the *sūtra-Syāccaikasya brahmaśabdavat* (different senses may hold good of the same word, as of the word Brahman)" (II, 3, 4), the sense of merger of being is preferable, as suitable in relation to the Supreme Divinity. The above is the *prima facie* view.

Now for the *siddhānta*. Though Brahman is present everywhere, only on the aitainment thereof at a particular place, is there release from the bonds of the body; the bodily bonds continue until the stage of attainment; for, from the declaration of the destruction of the bonds of *karma* only on reaching the abode of the Supreme Brahman, after crossing the river *Virajā*, it follows that the subtle body caused by (those bonds) continues to exist. Hence, the mention of the path of light etc., in various places, is only for the purpose of the attainment of the fruit of release, since there mention is in connection with meditations whose fruit is release, and since there is need of that (path). As for what is said about the inappropriateness of going, in the case of the enlightened, since speech and the rest are merged in their being in the Supreme Divinity, that is not (true), for the reason that even after the falling away of the (gross) body, a subtle boby continues for the enlightened one, that being seen on the authority of the text about discussion with the Moon and so on. In the *Paryanka-Vidyā* is declared the enlightened one's discussion with the Moon, on the path of the Gods: beginning with the words, "those, verily, who depart from this world, they all go up only to the Moon", it goes on thus: "This Moon is the door-way to the world of Heaven. Him who answers, he (the Moon) sets free. He who does not answer, (the Moon) showers him down here as rain. He is born here as a worm or a moth or a bird or a tiger or a fish or a bull or a man or anything else, in various places, according to his deeds and knowledge. Him arriving, one asks, 'Who art thou?" To him he should reply" etc., *Kauṣitaki*, I. 2). Hence, in conformity with this, the text "then the mortal becomes immortal" should be interpreted to declare only imminence of the attainment of immortality, not to declare immortality even on the cessation of connection with the body. It cannot be said that on the destruction thereof, immortality is declared, since the subtle body may be known to exist in some place; even in enlightened ones about to depart, semewhere, a quality of the subtle body is, verily, seen, viz., heat; that is not a quality of the gross body, not being perceived elsewhere (as in corpses, etc). 3.122

As for what is said about the departure of the vital airs of the enlightened one being denied by the text "of him, the vital airs do not depart", that is not (true). What is denied there is the departure of the prāṇas from the embodied one, not from the body, since the words "of him" relate to the finite self of the context, spoken of as one who has no desires:

3.1221 Now, by the possessive "of him", the finite self is indicated as that which is related to the prāṇas, not as the basis of ablation (*apādāna*)[1]. The *apādāna* is certainly the body. There being no question of the departure of the prāṇas from the finite self, the denial thereof is inappropriate.

3.1222 If it be objected thus, no (we reply). If a basis of ablation be needed (to complete the sense), in preference to the body that is not mentioned, the finite self which is mentioned as related (to the prāṇas) should be understood; further, since of the prāṇas understood to be in relation to the finite self, the statement of their relatedness would be unfruitful, the possessive which mentions bare relationship should be preferably interpreted to connote the specific relationship of ablation, as in "He listens to (the singing) of the actor" and so on, (where the bare possessive "of" means "proceeding from"). That the finite self alone is the apādāna is clear in the recension of one branch, the Mādhyandinas; their reading is: *Na tasmāt prāṇā utkrāmanti*, (from him, the prāṇas do not depart"). Nor is there the fault of denying what there is no possibility of; for, there is the possibility of the prāṇas leaving the enlightened soul, even at the very moment (of death), because of texts which speak of the attainment of Brahman even here, as in "He attains Brahman here" (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 7) and the rest. The departure even of the enlightened one through the (101st) artery in the head has also the support of *smṛti*; "Of those, there is one (artery) that goes up splitting the solar orb; by that (artery) passing beyond the world of Brahmā, one reaches one's Supreme desination" (*Yājñavalkya-smṛti*). Thus is this section set out in the six sūtras (IV, 2, 8 to 13), *tadapīteḥ samsāravyapa-*

1. The basis of ablation (*apādāna*) is that from which something departs.

deśāt (since the state of bondage is taught, until the attainment of that"), *Sūkṣmam pramāṇataś ca tathopalabdheḥ* (of subtle form, that being seen), "*Nopamardenātaḥ* (hence, not at destruction"), "*Asyaivacopapatterūṣmā* (heat is consistent only with that"), "*Pratiṣedhāditi cenna śārīrāt spaṣṭo hyekeṣām* (if it be objected on the ground of denial, no, from the embodied one; it is indeed clear in the reading of some"), "*Smaryate ca* (this is also supported by *Smṛti*").

By having thus established departure and going in the case of those who meditate on Brahman, the attainment of Brahman here, by those who know Brahman without attributes, may be taken to have been denied; it is to remove this doubt, that the other opinion mentioned at the close of the *aniyama* section (III, 3, 32), is mentioned again at the close of the present section also, in the words, "Some say that for devotees of what is Non-related, there is liberation here, even with the falling off of the (gross) body, passing along the path of light etc., not being obligatory (on all)" (IV, 2, 13). 3.123

This is the opinion of the *ācārya* who holds the above view: the statement "of him, the vital airs", etc., is made after finishing with the unenlightened one in the words "So much for him who desires" and undertaking to say something different about the enlightened one, in the words "Now, as for him who does not desire" and so on; it would appear that in consistency with the implicatiin of that undertaking to declare something special about the enlightened one, that sentence should deny the departure of the vital airs from the very *apādāna* from which they are declared to depart previously in the case of the unenlightened one. The departure of the vital airs of the unenlightened one has been declared previously, as (taking place) only from the body; "that departing, the vital air departs there with; the vital air departing, the senses depart therewith" (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 2). The departure of the vital airs and the senses is said to occur from the very place whence the finite self is said to depart; thus ends the description of departure along with the finite self. There is no dispute about the departure of the finite self being said to be from the body 3.124

alone. Since, thus, the text "of him, the vital airs" etc., is most suitably understood as denying departure from the body as *apādāna*, for what reason should this be abandoned? It cannot be said that while in conformity with the principles (of interpretation), the finite self alone which is mentioned in connection with the vital airs may be understood as the *apādāna*, the postulation of some other *apādāna*, not present to the mind, is unwarranted: for, of the body mentioned in the prior context as the *apādāna*, there is presence (to the mind). "Prajāpati gave a horse, to (the god) Varuṇa; he then obtained that deity (i.e., he caught the disease of that name); he suffered much; he thought of a sacrifice to Varuṇa, on four potsherds; he performed that sacrifice; thereby, he was relieved of the suffering caused by the bonds of Varuṇa (the disease)." From the drift of this introductory passage, it would appear to one that the performance of a sacrifice to Varuṇa on four potsherds is about to be enjoined on him who makes a gift of a horse. What follows, however, is "He who accepts a horse, catches hold of the disease,—Varuṇa; as many horses as he accepts, so many sacrifices should he offer to Varuṇa on four potsherds (for each sacrifice)." In this injunctive text, directly prescribing the sacrificer, though there is the expression "he who accepts a horse," it is not thought that the duty to sacrifice belongs to him who accpts. What more should be said to show that here, in the absence (even) of a text mentioning the finite self as the *apādāna*, the postulation of that as the basis, merely on principles (of interpretation) is not to be thought of? Nor (is the postulation necessary) in view of the later context. For, what we hear later is only this much: "Being but Brahman he attains Brahman. On this there is the verse: when all the desires that entered the heart are resolved, then, the mortal becomes immortal; (even) here he attains Brahman"; "Just as the slough of a serpent lies dead and cast-off on the ant-hill, so also the body lies. Then, this bodiless immortal spirit is nothing but Brahman Himself, nothing but light" (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 6 & 7).

3.125 Since the first of these texts teaches the manifestation of the ever present Brahman's being in the enlightened one, since, (consequently) there is no need of his going (along a path) in order to

reach a special place, the depature of the vital air, helpful in such going, is not needed; hence, the adoption only of that interpretation denying its departure from the body as *apādāna* is satisfactory, not the acceptance of the meaning of the non-separation of the senses from the finite self. Nor may it be said that since the text "He attains Brahman teaches distinction between Brahman and the enlightened one, as between what is attained and him who attains, the text cannot mean manifestation of Brahman, that, therefore. the particle *eva* (meaning alone) should be construed in the sense of *iva* (meaning like), and that this is the sense to be taken—that (the enlightened one) by the expansion of knowledge, becoming like Brahman, reaches Brahman. (For), of the word *apyeti* the sense is not reaching, but merger. Merger is but the manifestation of the identity in the pure subtle form, after abandoning the gross form qualified by vital air, the senses and the mind. Even where there may be the sense of attainment, what is meant thereby turns out to be but the manifestation of identity. In the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* itself, after the following hymns are given out, "Lead me from the unreal to the real: lead me from the darkness to light: lead me from death to immortality:", there is this *Brāhmaṇa* commenting on the three hymns: "When he says, 'lead me from the real to the unreal, the unreal verily is death, the real is immortality; 'lead me from death to immortality, make me immortal' is verily what he says: (when he says) 'lead me from darkness to light', darkness verily is death, light is immortality, 'lead me from death to immortality, make me immortal,' is verily what he says; (when he says), 'lead me from death to immortality', there is nothing in it, hidden as it were" (*Bṛh.* I, 3, 27). In this commentary, the word *gamaya* (lead) signifying attainment, is interpreted in the sense of the attainment of identity. It is determined therefrom that words signifying attainment in texts of similar import connote the manifestation of identity.

Similarly, it is quite clear that the second text too in the 3.126
form of a verse is best understood as negating that departure which has the body as the *apādāna*. Nor, on the principle that the present tense may be used in the close proximity of what is

to happen, may the word "here" in "he attains Brahman here" be interpreted as merely eulogistic, indicating the early attainment of Brahman; for, the acceptance of the primary sense alone is preferable. The understanding of the same sense is favoured by the third text too which compares the body abandoned by the enlightened one to the slough on the ant-hill, cast off by the serpent that has not left the ant-hill. The fourth text which predicates of the enlightened liberated one who has abandoned the body, the nature of Brahman, the cause of all life, and to show its suitability, declares (of him) the form of pure knowledge, in the words "nothing but light," is favourable only to that sense. Hence, it is not proper to give up the natural sense of the text "of him, the vital airs do not depart", even in conformity with the rest of the context.

3.127 Now, in the *Mādhyandina* recension, in the place of the text cited, the reading "from him the prāṇas do not depart" is seen. Hence, in conformity therewith, it is reasonable to construe the genitive "of him" in the *Kāṇva* reading, which expresses relationship in general, as terminating in a special relationship of the form of ablation. Thus, though in the first text, there is not gained for the enlightened one, on the death of the (gross) body, the mention of anything special, as compared with the unenlightened one, yet by the later declaration of the attainment of Brahman, there is obtained the mention of a special feature; hence, the promise to declare something distinctive must be understood to relate only to this. If this be urged, not so (we reply), for, after the text "from him the prāṇas do not depart", it is said of them, in the word, "they remain even here" that they are merged even here, so as to accord with the sense of the verse "he attains Brahman here": in conformity with this, the expression "from him" should be construed as referring to the body, figuratively on account of the non-difference of the body and the embodied. Hence it is that in the questions of Ārtabhāga, to the question "when the person dies, do the vital airs depart from him or not?," there is the reply, "'No', said Yājñavalkya, 'they remain even here. He swells, he is filled with wind; being filled with the wind, he lies dead,'" (*Bṛh.* III, 2, 11); it is seen

there that of the *apādāna* of the vital airs, there is mention of the physical characteristic of being bloated like a pair of bellows distended with air.

Now, Ārtabhāga's question and the answer (thereto) do not 3.1271
relate to the enlightened one, since that would conflict with the (tenour of the) later context. In that context, indeed, to this fresh question of Ārtabhāga's, "when of the dead person, speech merges in fire, the vital air in air, the eyes in the Sun, the ears in the cardinal directions, the body in the earth, the soul in the ether, the hairs on the body in medicinal herbs, the hairs on the head in the trees, blood and semen in water, where then is the person?" through the secret discourse of Ārtabhāga and Yājñavalkya, it is declared that *Karma*, of the nature of merit and demerit, is determined on as the abode (of the person), as the later text itself proclaims to that effect. It is there declared: "They two going out discussed it. What they said, it is but *Karma* that they said. What they praised, it is but *Karma* that they praised. By meritorious deeds one becomes meritorious, sinful by sinful deeds". Nor may it be said that in earlier statements "he in turn conquers death" (*Bṛh.* III, 2, 10), the crossing of *saṁsāra* (bondage) is declared, and that therefrom it is ascertained that the denial of departure applies to the enlightened one. For, it is after the mention, in the words "fire, verily, is death, that is the food of the waters", of the meditation on fire as the food of the waters, that it is declared as the fruit thereof "(he) in turn wards off untimely death". Hence, as a consequence of (the meditation on) the conquest of fire, there is the conquest of untimely death, not the crossing of bondage. Hence, since of that text too the subject is the unenlightened one, and since for the unenlightened one, the departure of the vital airs from the body must necessarily happen, the denial of departure from the finite self alone should be understood as the sense of that (text). For this reason too, it is so: in the earlier text "when this person dies", by the general name "person" the finite self alone is referred to as that from which the vital airs depart. Nor may it be objected that the reference of the term "person" is to the body; for, in the later portion (beginning with) "when of this person speech

merges in fire" and so on, there is a separate mention of the body, as related to the person of the context, in the words "the body (merges) in the earth" (*Bṛh.* III, 1, 13). Nor may it be said that the self too is separately mentioned, in the words "the self (merges) in the ether"; for, there, as in "*ānanda ātmā*, Bliss is the central portion" (*Taitt.* II, 5), there is scope for the expression "ātmā", to refer to the heart, as the central organ.

3.1272 Thus, if it be said that by figurative use, (based on) non-difference of the body and the embodied, the third personal pronoun in "He swells" should be construed as referring to the body, not so; for, because of the lack of occasion for the separation of prāṇas from the finite self, in the case of the unenlightened one, the denial there becomes improper; it must (hence) be necessarily said that the question and answer relate to the enlightened one.

3.1273 Now, since from the earlier and later questions and answers referring to the unenlightened one, it must necessarily be said that similar questions and answers also refer to the unenlightened one, the occasion for the separation of the prāṇas from the finite self must somehow be understood; if (this) be said, no (we reply), since by the mere proximity of question and answer relating to the unenlightened one, it is not possible to counteract the characteristic marks (indicating) the subject (to be) the enlightened one. In the series of Ārtabhāga's questions, the first question is "What is *graha*? What is *atigraha*?". The second is "It is a fact that all this is food to Death; which is the deity whose food is Death?". "When this person dies, do his prāṇas depart from him, or do they not?" is the third. "When this person dies, what is it that does not leave him?" is the fourth. The fifth is "When of this dead person, speech merges in fire" and so on. These questions not relating to the same topic, there does not result any unity of context. Even so, since the questions from the third onwards have one topic, as ranging round the history of the dead person, of the third question too, as of the fourth and fifth, because of the strength of their proximity, it may validly be said that the topic is the unenlightened one. If this be said, it is

answered (thus): *by Aśvala and others, filled with envy and engaging in a disputation with Yājñavalkya with a desire to defeat him, veiled questions are put, for the most part, with a view to humble him, as not sufficiently quick-witted.* For instance, the first question put by Ārtabhāga "What is *graha?* What is *atigraha?*" seems to relate to a sacrificial matter; since it occurs however, in the midst of a discussion concerning the soul, the reply, taking cognisance of the crookedness of the questioner, states that the breath, speech, the tongue, the eye, the ear, the mind, *the arms and the skin are grahas, and that the down-going vital* air (*apāna*), name, taste, form, sound, desire, action and touch are atigrahas. Similarly by Lāhyāyani is put the question "Where did the Pārikṣitas go?", making use of the little understood word *Pārikṣita*. The reply given by Yājñavalkya, "where the horse-sacrificers went", is but explicatory of the sense of that word. So too, envy is plainly expressed in the very tone of these words of Gārgī, "Just as a warrior of the Kāśīs or the Vaidehas may stand, having strung his unstrung bow, and with two foe-terrifying shafts in hand, even so do I present-myself before thee with two questions; do dhou answer them" (*Bṛh.* III, 8, 2). Thus, the proximity of the third question to the fourth and fifth which treat of the unenlightened one, being capable of explanation as *serving to generate thc confusion that all three relate to the same* topic, cannot serve to conclude the sense (of the question): much less (can it so serve), since a diffirent construction may be set up (for the third) in the light of the first and second questions, which refer to entirely different topics, viz., *graha*, and *atigraha*, and the deity who feeds on Death; least of all (is this possible) in view of (the proximity) being over-ruled by the characteristic mark (*liṅga*) in the third question, indicative of the topic referring to the enlightened one; this is the line (of criticism). Hence, travelling on the path of light etc., preceded by departure, established only in the case of devotion to *Saguṇa* Brahman, is not common also to the knowledge of the pure Brahman. In the interpretation of the sūtras in this view, it will be seen that it is the method shown in the *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* that is acceptable to the *ācārya*.

So, too, at the close of the section *Arcirādinā tatprathiteḥ* (On the path of light etc., that being well-known)" (IV, 3, 1) this other opinion is set out. That section (runs) thus: to the enlightened one, who has departed by the artery in the head, does the attainment of Brahman (come about) only by the path of light or by any other path?

In this doubt, this is the *prima facie* view: there is attainment of Brahman even by other paths. The stages of the path, such as the palates, the organ hanging down between them, the root of the hair, and the halves of the skull, mentioned in the (following) words of the *Vyāhṛti Vidyā*, "That which hangs down between the two palates in the form of a nipple, that is the birth-place of Indra, where the root of the hair splits up, dividing the two halves of the skull" (*Taitt.* 1, 6), these do not indeed find mention in the path of light etc. In the *Śaibya-praśna* in the words "He is led up to the world of Brahmah by the sāmans" (*Praśna*, V. 5), the property of conveying to the world of Brahman is declared of the sāmans studied in the sāma Veda. In the words of the *Dahara Vidyā*, "when the (person) departs from this body, then by the very rays he goes up (*Ch.* VIII, 6, 5)," the property of conveying is declared of the Sun's rays alone, to the exclusion of all else. Similarly, from the text (indicative) of speed, "when his mind is failing, (even then) does he reach the Sun" (*Ch.* VIII, 6, 5), there is absence of mention of prior stages like light etc., for the attainment of the Sun. Hence, the attainment of Brahman (is) by the respective paths established according to difference of topic and the mode of meditation, not the path of light etc., alone.

3.132 Now for the siddhānta: it is well known that the path of light etc., is common to all modes of meditation. (It is said) in the *Chāndogya* "Those who know thus, and those who in the forest meditate with faith and austerity" (*Ch.* V, 10, 1); so too in the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*, "And they who in the forest meditate with faith and truth" (*Bṛh.* VI, 2, 15).

3.133 Now, it may be said that the reference to devotees here, as "those who meditate", may relate to those modes of meditation,

where no path whatever is mentioned. This would be so, if the identity of the paths could not be established; but that can be shown. That which is described in the *Vyāhṛti Vidyā* as rising above the halves of the skull, the region of the root of the hair, passing up through the nipple-shaped organ, the seat of Indra,—who is either the finite self or Parameśvara—that is but departure through the artery in the head. What are referred to later as Fire etc., "in Fire, as *Bhūḥ*, he rests, in Air, as *Bhuvaḥ*, in the Sun as *Suvaḥ*", are but the stages on the path of light etc. The statement of resting in Fire and so on, is in the view that there is rest in (each of) these for some time. In the *Vyāhṛti Vidyā*, since there is meditation of the three vyāhṛtis, Agni and the rest, as of the fouth (*vyāhṛti*) Brahman, called *Mahaḥ*, the statement of rest in their worlds, on the strength of this, is proper.

In the statement, "He is led up by the *sāman* verses to the Brahma world" (*Praśna* V, 5), it is proclaimed of the *sāman* verses constituting the third of the three moments of the three-fold *praṇava*, an accessory to meditation, that as accessories to meditation they possess the capacity to lead up to Brahman, not as constituting a path; for, meditation with the *praṇava* of three moments is prescribed in the words, "Again, he who meditates on this syllable *AUM* of three moments, on the Highest person etc.," (*Praśna*. V, 5), after the mention of the meditation effected with *Praṇava* of one and two moments; and the three moments are taught to be of the nature of the *Ṛk*, *Yajus* and *Sāman*. 3.134

The exclusion, in the statement "Then, by the very same rays" etc., mentions the exclusion of the non-conjunction of attainment with that for (the attainment of) which the rays are prescribed (as paths), not the exclusion of light etc., for, of the same sentence, there cannot be the sense both of leading up by the rays, and the exclusion of all other (paths). 3.135

The statement (indicative) of speed which is justifiable, in comparison with the (long and tortuous) path of the Fathers, does not exclude the earlier stages. Nor is there intended any other path for the enlightened ones, having this (the Sun) as the final stage, 3.136

Thus from the exposition of the one-ness of all paths, it follows that it is not proper to over-ride the general statement of the *Pañcāgni-Vidyā*, which is supported by the principle of parsimony.

3.137 In order to remove the doubt that because of this demonstration of the path of light etc., being applicable to all meditations of Brahman, there may follow the denial of the attainment of Brahman, even for those who know Brahman without attributes, the contrary opinion is expressed even at the close of the present section, in the words, "Some (say) that for the devotees of the Non-related there is no (path of) light etc.", (IV, 3, 1). On this view, because of the expression, "well-known", in the *sūtra* "On the path of light etc., because it is well-known", the *sūtra* has to be understood (as expressing) a sense valid generally. It must necessarily be admitted by all that the sense (of the *sūtra*) is (valid) only generally, for, the path of light etc., does not apply to those deities up to Hiraṇya-garbha, who are released even from the respective worlds they are in. Nor may it be said that the prescription of this as the only path is intended (to apply) exclusively to human being, who are released through the practice of meditation on the earth; for; in the case of those released after attaining the status of Vasu, Rudra, Āditya, and Marut hosts, (a status) which belongs to the devotees of *Madhu Vidyā*, there must necessarily be another path comprising the status of Vasus etc., as the earlier stages; this is the view of the *ācarya*. Thus, in whatever section rising or departure is established of the knower of Brahman, in all those places, this opinion is expressed, in order to remove the doubt about the applicability of the respective sections to all knowers of Brahman; further, in the *aniyamādhikaraṇa*, that (opinion) is justified by (the author) himself; from these follows the excellence of the *ācarya's* view. Nor may non-acceptability be suspected from the introduction of the word "some" in every case. These may be explained away for the purpose of showing that he himself here takes his stand on meditation of Brahman with attributes, not on the knowledge of Brahman without attributes, (but) thereby it will not be possible to conceal the excellence of his view, as understood from his exposition through demonstration and repetition. In the *ānanda-*

mayādhikaraṇa, the body of the section is interpreted in this way: the (Self) of Bliss is the Supreme Brahman; the Brahman that is the tail, the support thereof is the Word—Brahman, called *praṇava*, which denotes that (other). Then is introduced, as a different view, with the words "Some say"; the position that the Self of Bliss is the Intelligence-Energy (*Cit-Śakti*), while Brahman that is the tail, the support is the Supreme Brahman; (this position) is expounded as his own, in the words of the *janmādi sūtra* (I, 1, 2): "That indeed which, being praised in the words, 'within that is the Self composed of Bliss', is demonstrated to be characteristic of the Supreme Brahman in the words 'that is one Bliss of Brahman', because of the unsurpassable supremacy resulting from the repetition beginning with 'this is the inquiry into Bliss', that itself, because of abundance, is spoken of figuratively as Brahman, in the words 'Bliss is Brahman'. Revelling in the enjoyment of such Bliss is said to be the eternal contentment of Brahman"; thereby is shown the *ācārya's* method of introducing a view acceptable to him, with the word "some".

Again, the acceptance of non-difference in meditation between Brahman and the finite self, which is favourable to the recognition of the knowledge of Brahman without attributes is seen in the section *Prāṇastathānugamāt* (I, 1, 29, *et seq*). There, it is determined that the vital air which is taught by Indra to be the object of meditation for release, in the words "I am the vital air, meditate on me as the Intelligent Self, as Life, as the Immortal" (*Kauṣītaki* III, 2), is the Supreme Self, not Indra. The *sūtra* "*Śāstradṛṣṭyātūpadeśo Vāmadevavat* (the teaching is due to scriptural insight, as in the case of Vāmadeva)" (I, 1, 31) which has for its object the removal of the doubt "how then does Indra say 'I am the vital air, meditate on me'?" is then explained in one way: the teaching of Indra "I am the vital air" is due to the realisation of the internal rulership of the Supreme Self because of the texts, "He who stands within the Self" etc., and of the fact that the denotation of words like "I" extends up to the Supreme Self, the internal ruler, because of the texts "That manifested names and forms" etc. Then another interpretation—(viz.), that the 3.14

teaching is due, in the alternative, to insight arising from such texts as "That thou art", which have for their object the non-difference of the Supreme Self from one's own Self—is given, in the following words: "Or else, it is determined that Indra's statement is of the same nature as the declaration about being Manu and the Sun, made in the realisation of his own all-pervasiveness by Vāmadeva, who by insight into Vedāntic lore, by meditation on the harmony of Brahman and the Self, had attained the nature of Brahman, got rid of the contraction (of intellect) due to self-consciousness centering round human and other bodies and sense-objects, and obtained Supreme Self-consciousness of the form of tha whole Universe".

3.15 Then comes the section "*Ātmetitu upagacchanti grāhayantica* (But as the Self, they understand and teach)" (IV, 1, 3), which, raising the doubt whether the contemplation of non-difference occurring in knowledge of the attributeless, (yet) does not occur in meditation with attributes, because of the difference between Parameśvara with qualities and the finite self, due to their connection with contrary qualities, such as all-knowingness and little-knowing-ness, seeks to show that, though there is empirical difference, yet their non-difference is to be contemplated, through insight into their essential non-difference.

3.151 This is how (it proceeds): in the doubt as to whether Brahman is to be contemplated as different from one's own self, or as non-different therefrom, this is the *prima facie* view. The meditation on Brahman should be performed as different from one's self, because of the demonstration of the Lord (*Pati*), the Supreme Brahman, as an entity other than the inner self, the bound soul (*Paśu*), the finite self, in texts and sūtras, such as "Rudra, the Supreme Sage, transcending the Universe" (*Śvet.* III, 4), and "But higher, because of the mention of difference" (II, 1, 22), and further, because of the irreconcilability of the nature of Brahman with (that of) the finite self in respect of such qualities as omniscience and so on.

3.152 But (this is) the *siddhānta*. Though the Supreme Brahman called Śiva is certainly higher than the finite self, yet the devotee

meditates thereon, in the form "I am Brahman"; for contemplators of old, have understood that as but their Self, in the words "I am verily Thou, O Lord, O Divinity, Thou verily art I" (*Jābāla Śruti*).

Nor is this co-ordinate with the relationship of the body and the embodied. In that case, the statement "Thou, verily, art I" would alone be appropriate, since in respect of Parameśvara, designated by the word "Thou" there is the applicability of the word "I" limited in denotation to His own body. But the statement "I am, verily, Thou" is not appropriate; for, it does not stand to reason that the word "Thou" denoting Parameśvara should apply to one's own self which is of the nature of the body of Parameśvara (and is) designated by the word "I". It is indeed of words denoting the body that a capacity to extend to the embodied (also) results, not capacity to signify the body in the case of those (words) denoting the embodied. Nor may it be said that both sentences have the same kind of sense, the words "Thou" in both sentences denoting Parameśvara as qualified by the attributes mentioned, while the words "I" signify the same Being qualified by the presence in one's body. In that case, there results the futility of the difference between the two statements, constituted by the use of the pronouns of the First and Second Person—"I" and "Thou"–placed earlier and later, along with the corresponding verbal forms, "asmi (am)" and "asi (art)", in *tvam vāham asmi, aham vai tvam asi*, (I am, verily, Thou; Thou, verily, art I). Since, even through one statement, the non-difference of the internal ruler of one-self from Parameśvara results, there also follows the futility of the other (statement). Nor do the two sentences serve the purpose of confirming the cognition of non-difference; for, there being no erroneous notion of difference between the internal ruler and Parameśvara, as (there is) between the finite self and Parameśvara, there is no need for bringing about that confirmation. Hence, it is concluded that (the meditation) is enjoined here for the purpose of confirming the (sense of) non-difference by removing the doubt as to difference or non-difference, through the interchange of objects (of contemplation), i.e., of the non-difference of Parameśvara from one-self, and the non-difference of one-self from 3.153

Parameśvara. Similarly of the *Aitareya* text also "What is I, that is He, what is He, that is I".

3.154 To the devotees who understand thus, the Supreme Brahman though different from them, bestows His grace by granting His own form. "They in turn, teach their pupils, through (texts like) 'That Thou art', that, though different, (Brahman is) of their own form". Of the text "That Thou art", the co-ordinate relation is not that of the body and the embodied. From the use of the word "art", it follows that therein is taught the non-difference of Parameśvara designated by the word "That", and previously described and defined as the cause of the world and so on, from what is designated by the word "Thou"; The word "Thou" refers but to the finite Self that is addressed, and does not extend to the internal ruler thereof; for, reference to one's internal ruler, as what is addressed, not being so well-known from one's own experience or the teaching of the ancients, as the reference to one's self, the term (Thou) is not capable of denoting that (the internal ruler). As for establishing that Parameśvara, the *Sat* of the present context, has been taught earlier to be somehow one's own internal ruler, there arising no doubt as to their difference, the repeated teaching of that (their non-difference) is not needed.

3.155 Nor may it be objected that what is acceptable to the commentary in the meditation of non-difference with Brahman is not real non-difference, but only imagined non-difference, as in the contemplation of non-difference with Garuḍa, that being cited as an illustration of the meditation of non-difference with Brahman, in the commentary of the *prakṛtaitāvattva-adhikaraṇa* (III, 2, 21 *et. seq.*). For, the reality of non-difference is understood from the (following) statement in the *Śāstradṛṣṭi-sūtra* (I, 1, 31) "Of him who had attained Brahman-hood by the contemplation of the harmony of Brahman and the finite self", and the statement in the *ātmeti tūpagacchanti* section: "Though the being contemplated is a different entity (from the devotees, yet) the Supreme Brahman bestows His grace on the devotee conferring on them His own form'" (IV, 1, 3). If non-difference were not real, the declaration of an actual attainment thereof would not be appropriate. The clause "though the being contemplated is a different entity"

means "though empirical difference does exist"; nor is there any contradiction in taking it to have the purpose of refuting even a possible ground of objection. Hence, it is that in the following words of the commentary on the *vikārāvarti-sūtra* (IV, 4, 19), it has been proclaimed that the contemplation of one-self as Śiva continues even in him who, in the world of Parama-Śiva has attained union with Him, after the complete extinction of merit and demerit, the cause of all delusion etc. "Wandering about freely in the worlds of the (celestial) rulers from Sadāśiva up to Brahmā, eating what he desires, taking on what forms he desires, rid of the desire of for human and other bodies, functioning with the there energies (*iccha*, *jñāna* and *kriyā*) uncontracted, (he) enjoys the splendour of perfect self-consciousness, immersed in the world, which is of one texture with the nature of Brahman, the harmony of Śiva with Śakti, which abounds in Supreme Bliss, light and power. Thus it is that his perfect self-consciousness, as ensouling the entire world of enjoyer and enjoyment, is derived from the text 'I am the food, I am the food, I am the food, I am the eater of the food, I am the eater of the food, I am the eater of the food' (*Taitt.* III, 10)'. (It may be said that) identification in consciousness with the Supreme Being which, as present in all bodies, directs all enjoyment and enjoyers as (His) body, may come about of itself without standing in need of the contemplation of non-difference with Śiva; for, by the expansion of the Intelligence of him who has attained union with Śiva, the capacity to direct the world, present in the Being that pervades the Universe, is not aroused; (further), in the commentary on *asantateścāvyatirekaḥ* (And non-difference because of non-prevasiveness)" (II, 3, 48) and other sūtras, there is shown in him the existence only of this kind of perfect self-consciousness. Though (this be so), yet it is not what is intended in the commentary on (this) *sūtra*; the perfect self-cansciousness is rather of Brahman alone, as determined by the force of the qualification applied to that self-consciousness, viz., "immersed in the world which is of one texture with the nature of the Supreme Brahman". What is stated there of the world is but its inclusion in the nature of Brahman, not its being His body. Of the liberated one, confirmed in the contemplation of identity with Śiva, the continuance of that

(consciousness) is declared till the falling off of the body, even at the time when he sings as he pleases, (I am the food, I am the food etc.).

3.16 The non-difference of Brahman from the finite self thus shown to be acceptable to him, through the commentaries which elucidate the contemplation of non-difference, is also shown in a somewhat indirect way in the commentary on the *sūtra - vadatīti cenna, prājño hi prakaraṇāt* (if it be said that it is declared, no; for the topic verily is of the Self)" (I, 4, 5), occurring in the *ānumānikādhikaraṇa* (I, 4, 1—7). The *prima facie* view in that section is that the unmanifest mentioned in the *Kaṭhavalli* text "The Unmanifiest is higher that the great one, the Person is higher than the Unmanifiest is higher than the great one, the Person is higher than than the Unmanifest" (*Kaṭha* III, 11) being the *pradhāna* acceptable to the Sāṅkhyas, the sāṅkhya system is based on the text cited. In *jñeyatvāvacanācca* (and on account of non-mention of being known)" (I, 4, 4), which is the secondary *sūtra* directed to the refutation (of the above view), there is a further reason given in support of the final view. If this same text were the basis of the Sāṅkhya doctrine, then the property of being a necessary object of knowledge to him who seeks release should have been declared of the *pradhāna*, which is acceptable to the Sāṅkhya, which declares release to result from discriminative knowledge of the Self, (Puruṣa), from Primordial Matter (Prakṛti). That is not here stated. Hence, it is to be noted that the Sāṅkhya doctrine is not based on that (text). For, it is not reasonable that in that which is the basis of a branch of knowledge, there should be no mention of what is described in that branch of knowledge.

Now, it does not happen that there is no mention of the property of having to be known; for the *Kaṭha-valli-śruti*, verily, in the hymn "Soundless, touchless, formless, etc.'; (*Kaṭha*, III, 15) declares of the Unmanifest (*avyakta*) which is higher than the category of the Great One (Mahat) devoid of sound etc., that it is to be known. The *sūtra - vadatīti cenna* etc., (I, 4, 5) refers to this fresh Sāṅkhya doubt and serves to refute it. In that hymn (*Kaṭha*, III, 15) Parameśvara is declared, not the *pradhāna*, the

context being of Parameśvāra alone. In the commentary, where, to show the mode of refutation, based on the context relating to Parameśvara a text from the context relating to Parameśvara should be cited, there is cited the hymn "The wise one should suppress speech in the mind, sink that into sentient intellect; sentience he should suppress in the Great Self and that (again) in the peaceful Self" (*Kaṭha*, III, 13). This is how the commentary on that *sūtra* (proceeds); "If it be said that being known is declared in the later hymn 'Soundless, touchless, formless, undecaying, tasteless, eternal, odourless, beginningless, endless, higher than the Great One, and constant, realising that, one escapes the jaws of Death' (*Kaṭha*, III, 15), no, (we reply), since the earlier discourse is about the Prājña alone, as seen from *yacced vāṅ manasī prājña*, the wise one should suppress speech in the mind etc.' (*Kaṭha*, III, 13)". From the use of the word *Prājña* in that *sūtra*, it appears as the natural sense of the words of the commentary that the present context relates to him who is referred to by the word *prājña* in that hymn. The finite self desirous of release is referred to in that hymn by the word *prājña*, for, the injunctions as to the control of speech, mind, etc., are purportful only in regard to him. The context may also relate to the Supreme Self, since that is what is principally intended to be indicated in (the hymn). "The Unmanifest is greater than the Great one, the Person is greater than the Unmanifest; than the Person there is nothing higher, He is the goal, He (is) the final destination" (*Kaṭha*, III, 11). This being the case, if the commentator had not at heart the non-difference of the finite self and Parameśvara, his citation of a word indicating the finite self, where a word belonging to the context (and) referring to the Supreme Self ought to have been cited, would be certainly unsuitable.

Now, even thus, how can there be absence of unsuitability, 3.161
when even by those who accept the non-difference of the finite self from Parameśvara, there is accepted, because of the empirical distinction between the two, a division among the Vedānta texts into those which concern the finite self and those which concern the Supreme Self? If (such an objection) be raised, it is met (as follows).

3.162 In the *Kaṭha-valli*, to the question put by Naciketas about, the departed finite self,—in the words, "There is this doubt, of a man, who is dead, some (saying) he is, others he is not; this, I would know, being taught by thee. Let this be the third of the boons" (*Kaṭha*, I, 20),—a reply relating to the Supreme Self is given by Vaivasvata, in the words, "Realising through self-contemplation that resplendent Being, difficult to see, deeply hidden, located in the cave (of the heart), dwelling in the abyss, that ancient one, the wise one abandons joy and grief" (*Kaṭha*, II, 12). It is quite certain that the question relates to the departed finite self, that being the conventional sense of the word *preta*. That the question relates to the departed finite self is also made clear by the words of Vaivasvata "These damsels with there chariots and their lutes—such ones are not obtained by mortals. Be waited on by these, given by me. Do not question about death, O Naciketas" (*Kaṭha*, I, 25). (There are also the following grounds to support that conclusion): Naciketas in the words "In respect of which there is this doubt, tell us what that is in the great hereafter" (*Kaṭha*, I, 29), again asks for the answer to the very question of his, which had been condemned by Vaivasvata as inauspicious, because of its relating to death; subsequently, Vaivasvata begins his teaching only after criticising the position of "some (who say) he is not (after death)", in the words "The other world appears not to the puerile fool, dazed by the delusion of the wealth; believing that there is no world other than this, he repeatedly falls into my clutches" (*Kaṭha*, II, 6) and later on is seen a reply relating to the incidents directly connected with the departed finite self, in the verse; "Behold! I teach thee, O, Gautama, the mysterious Brahman, the constant one, as also what becomes of the self after death. According to their deeds and according to their knowledge, some enter into wombs and are embodied, (while) others become immovable objects" (*Kaṭha*, V, 6 and 7).

Similarly, it is also certain that the reply beginning with, "That, difficult to behold" etc., relates to the Supreme Self; for, after the question, it is said by Vaivasvata in the words "Even the gods have had doubts about this, of yore; subtle is this topic,

not easy to know. Choose some other boon, O Naciketas, press me not, (but) set me free (from granting this boon)" (*Katha*, I, 21), that the reply to the question relates to a very difficult matter, such as cannot easily be stated. Thereupon Naciketas prays that only what he asked for should be explained to him. (saying), "O! Lord of Death, thou sayest that even the gods, verily, have had doubts about this, and that it is not easy to know. Another teacher of it cannot be found equal to thee; nor is there any other boon equal to this" (*Katha*, I, 22). Desiring to test the firmness of his capacity (for the knowledge prayed for), Vaivasvata, in the words beginning with "Choose sons and grandsons, who will live to be a hundred, plenty of cattle, elephants, gold and horses; ask for a wide extent of earth, and live thyself as long as thou desirest", and ending with "O! Naicketas, question not about Death" declares the gain of sons etc., to be objects of human desire worthier then what was questioned about. In spite of this, Naciketas, in words beginning with "Fleeting (are these), O! Lord of Death, they wear out the vigour of the senses of man. All life is but brief. Thine alone be the chariots, thine the song and the dance". (*Katha*, I, 26) and ending with "Understanding the pleasure of song and love (to be thus ephemeral), who would delight to live long?" (*Katha*, I, 28), condemns these pleasures as of doubtful (permanence), though praised by (Yama) himself, and as leading to the diminution of the vigour of the senses, under-rates the life of all beings even from long-lived Brahmā down to a small insect, as (lasting) but for a brief period, and prays that what was questioned about should be expounded. Seeing the firmness of his capacity (for the inquiry), Vaivasvata distinguishes the two kinds of fruit attaching to the goal of human endeavour, viz., beatitude and the accomplishment of desired objects, as the good and the pleasant; then, discriminating between those two and saying that the wise one chooses the good, the fool the pleasant, and so on, he praises the boon chosen by Naicketas; he (further) praises Naciketas, in respect of the desire for knowledge and the strength of renunciation helpful thereto, in the words "I hold Naciketas to be desirous of knowledge; desires manifold could not shake thee" (*Katha*, II, 4); then, after refuting the doctrine that the body is the self,

through the words "No hereafter" etc., he declares the difficulty of realising the Self that is to be taught, in the words "Him even to hear of whom is not gained by many, Him, whom many, even though they hear, know not, he who teaches (Him) is a marvel; he who attains Him is skilful; he who knows (Him, when) instructed by the able, is (also) a wonder" (*Kaṭha*, II, 7). Then follow the words "That, difficult to behold" and so on. (The above analysis provides a further ground for holding that the reply relates to the Supreme Self). Thus, it being seen that to a question about the finite self, a reply is given about the Supreme Self, it is inferred that the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman is the view of the Śruti, as otherwise, there would result lack of congruity between question and answer.

3.1621 Now, let it be that the reply relates to the Supreme Self. It does not stand to reason that the question relates to the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self; for, Naciketas has already faith in its existence. Otherwise, his query "Father, to whom wilt thou give me?" prompted by the object of remedying the fault of deficiency in the father's sacrifice, his departure of his own will to the world of Yama, in order to prevent the evil of falsehood from attaching to his father, who had said "I give thee unto the Lord of Death", his own words "like cereals the mortal decays, like cereals he is born again," (*Kaṭha*, I, 6), his asking as a boon for the knowledge of the fires whose fruit is heaven, these do not harmonise. Further, even if there be really non-difference between the finite and the Supreme Self, to the question about the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self, the reply should confine itself to that,—the teaching about the Supreme Self and the means of attaining Him being irrelevant; for, it is admitted even in the systems of those who maintain the non-difference of the finite self and the Supreme Self, that, to the questions relating to the incidents connected with the finite self, which occur in the question of Ārtabhāga, the *pañcāgni-vidyā*, and so on, the answers (too) relate only to that topic. Therefore abandoning the illegitimate desire to establish the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, because of the principle of congruity of question and answer, the question and answer should be understood to

relate to the existence or non-existence of the released soul; for, the word *pretya* is seen to be used of the released one in the text *na pretya samjñāsti*, when he is liberated, there is no more consciousness" (*Bṛh*, II, 4, 12); further, the word *preta* may well have the force of "the released one", i.e., he, who by being drawn away from here (*prakarṣeṇa itaḥ*) has attained the destination from which there is no return. Thus, liberation being of the nature of the attainment of the world of the Supreme Self, called the Supreme Abode, the demonstration of the Supreme Self, of the attainment of His Supreme Abode, in the words, "he attains the end of the paths, that is the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" (*Kaṭha*, III, 9), and of the means for (that attainment) all these fit in with that object (of liberation).

If this be urged, not so, (we reply); for, even if the question 3.1622
be imagined to relate to the incidents connected with the liberated one, the unsuitability of asking for a knowledge of the fires, helpful in procuring heaven, (remains) common (to both of us). What is meant there by the word "heaven" is but the world which is attained through the path of light etc., on the extinction of merit and demerit, and which is said to be the Supreme Abode attained by the released one, (whose existence is) in doubt. For, the glories of the heavenly world are thus described: "In the heavenly world, there is no fear whatever; Thou art not there; nor does one fear old age. Rising above both hunger and thirst, transcending sorrow, one enjoys in heaven" (*Kaṭha*, I, 12); then the teaching of the knowledge of the fires, helpful in attaining (that world) is prayed for thus: "And Thou knowest Agni, the means to heaven, O Lord of Death; teach that to me full of faith. (The Knowledge whereby) those whose abode will be heaven, attain immortality, that I ask as my second boon" (*Kaṭha*, I, 13); and Vaivasvata at the close of the teaching, in describing and praising the fruit (thereof), specifies the fruit—the attainment of heaven—as coming after the cessation of all the bonds of *saṁsāra* (the migratory cycle): "He having first thrown off the shackles of Death, rising above Sorrow, enjoys in Heaven" (*Kaṭha*, I, 18). If a justification of the question (about the existence of the released soul) be attempted, on the ground that its object is to

strengthen the faith in the existence of released souls, originally gained through the words of well-wishers, and to know further details (about them), then, even so may the question about the existence of the departed soul be justified; hence, it is not right to abandon the reference to the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self, this being arrived at both by the conventional sense of the word *preta* and the natural sense of (the words) "question not about death", which occur later. Even here, (in our experience) are seen persons who, settled in the observance of duties pertaining to the (attainment of the) other world, because of their faith in the words of well-wishers, still inquire as to what is the basis for the view that the self is but the body, and how it is to be refuted. In the Śāstras studied by those who perform Vedic rites, after a due study of the Vedas, there is seen the view of the self being but the body as also the basis of its refutation. If it be said that, even so, the question being about the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self, the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self, the existence thereof alone should be stated in the reply, and that the demonstration of the nature of the Supreme Self and of the means of attaining Him, do not fit in, no (we reply), for, if the question be about the existence or non-existence of the released one, his existence alone, should be mentioned; the irrelevance of the demonstration (of the Supreme Self) is common, therefore, even to the other view; (for there is not, indeed, seen in the description of the path of the Fathers and so on, relating to incidents connected with the departed finite self, any description of the Moon attained thereby, or the means of attaining thereto. If, on the ground of there being, in the answer, a description of the Supreme Self and the means of attaining to Him, it be postulated that the significance of the question about the existence or non-existence of the released one, extends up to that (attainment), then since, in the answer is seen the demonstration of the non-difference of the finite and the Supreme Self, it may be postulated, in conformity with the natural sense of the word *preta*, that the significance of the question about the existence or non-existence of the departed finite self extends up to that non-difference. There is, indeed, the demonstration of that non-difference in such

places as the following: "What is here, the same is there, what is there, the same is here. From death to death he goes, who sees any difference here" (*Katha*, IV, 10). Nor can it be said that difference is denied only as between Parameśvara as known here in the body and as known there in the solar orb etc., and not as between the finite self known in the body and Parameśvara that exists in the solar orb etc., for, there is no occasion for difference in Parameśvara, on the ground of difference in place. So also after teaching the identity of the finite self and Brahman, through the hymn "The person of the size of the thumb" etc., (*Katha*, IV, 13), the error of the doubt "how can there be identity of those possessed of contrary attributes?" is declared by the hymn "As certainly as water rained down on a lofty place flows down the slopes, even so does one who sees things as distinct run after them alone" (*Katha*, IV, 14); to those who perceive that there are in the finite self and Brahman distinct attributes opposed to their non-difference, saṁsāra, characterised by that same distinctness, continues. Thus, though a word belonging to the context and referring to the Supreme Self should have been cited in order to indicate in the above manner that the context is one which relates to the non-difference of the finite self and the Supreme (Self), not one relating to the finite self alone or to the Supreme (Self) alone, (and) though the citation of other hymns bearing on the (present) topic is possible, the hymn containing the word *prājña*, in conformity with the words of the *sūtra* *prājño hi prakaraṇāt* (the Self because of the topic)" (I, 4, 5) is cited by the commentator, in the belief that the composer of the sūtras, though he ought to have illustrated the subject of the topic by a word referring to the Supreme Self, has (actually) illustrated it by means of a word referring to that from which the subject of the context is to be desired to be expounded as non-different. The acceptability of the non-difference of the finite self and the Supreme (Self) is thus shown by an indirect statement, at the close of the explanation of what is acceptable to the text and the *sūtra*.

So, too, in the first *adhikaraṇa* (it is said as follows). The 3.17
text "This Self is Brahman" (*Bṛh.*, II, 5, 19), through the particle

"this" teaches the very self, which is known to perception, to be Brahman. Therefore, where is the doubt here? This is the *prima facie* view as to the non-commencement (of the study) of the science, set up through showing the absence of any doubt in respect of Brahman, which is accepted as the object of the *śāstra*. In the refutation (of this view), instead of establishing the difference between the finite self and Brahman, like other commentators intent on the difference between the two, he (thus) explains the doubt as finding an object in the doubt as to the significance of the texts (which declare the existence) of difference and of non-difference: "When the text 'This self is Brahman' and so on declares this same migratory being bound in self-consciousness to be Brahman, even from that, (there arises) the doubt. Brahmanhood, verily, is the possession, in excess, of the grandeur of unexcelled knowledge, Bliss and Power, free from all disturbance by any evil; while finite self-hood is the condition of putting up with boundless suffering, in bondage to the function of entering and leaving various bodies suitable to the enjoyment of the fruit of the variegated *Karma*, which, resting on the impressions of beginningless ignorance, has (since) expanded. Why should there not be this doubt 'How do the texts declare one-ness of these two entities wlth mutually repellent characteristics?"'. Thereby is manifested his intention not to deny the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman.

3.18 Why elaborate? In the commentary, it is loudly proclaimed in almost all places, that the *Cit-śakti* of Brahman is non-different from the worlds, being of the form of all the worlds. So, too, the non-difference of *Cit-śakti* from Brahman, is loudly proclaimed everywhere. How is it possible to avoid the final conclusion thus resulting, as to the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman?

3.181 Let this be so. What is said of *Cit-śakti* being of the form of all the worlds, that is favourable only to qualified non-dualism; for, through that is reached the truth of the non-difference therefrom even of the non-intelligent world of ether etc., as of the intelligent world. If being of the nature of all the worlds were declared to be of the nature of non-difference from *Cit-śakti*, in

the case of intelligent beings, and illusory appearance thereof in the case of non-intelligent beings, then, indeed, would pure non-dualism result. It has not been so declared. Its being of the form of all the worlds has been established in the *prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (I, 4, 23, *et seq*) etc., only as transforming itself into the world. Nor is there declared the non-difference of *Cit-śakti* from Brahman; even if stated anywhere, it is (only) figurative. Hence it is that in the *janmādi* section (I, 1, 2), it is said, (in the following words), that the co-ordination oi Bliss and Brahman in the *Bhṛgu-valli* is figurative. "That, indeed, which being praised in the words 'within that is the Self composed of Bliss, is demonstrated to be characteristic of Supreme Brahman, in the words, 'that is one Bliss of Brahman', because of the unsurpassable supremacy resulting from the repetition beginning with 'this is the inquiry into Bliss',—that itself, because of abundance, is spoken of figuratively as Brahman, in the words 'Bliss is Brahman'." As for the difference between Brahman and *Cit-śakti*, that is exhibited in many places. For instance, in the *akṣara* section (I, 3, 9), in commenting on the inferential ground provided by the *sūtra*, viz., supporting (everything) up to (and inclusive of) *ākāśa*, difference as between support and what is supported is shown (to exist) between Brahman and *Cit-śakti*, this (latter) being referred to by the word *ākāśa* in the words of the *Gārgi-Brāhmaṇa*, "In this *akṣara*, O Gārgi, *akāśa* is woven as warp and woof" (*Bṛh*. III, 8, 11), In the *dahara* section (I, 3, 13, *et seq*) in the words "the ether within that is small; what is within that is to be sought" (*Ch*. VIII, 1, 1), the difference between *Cit-śakti* and the Supreme Brahman—which are spoken of as the small ether and what resides therein,—is exhibited by their being designated as the seat and what is seated. Though in the section *ākāśo arthāntaratvādi vyapadeśāt* (*ākāśa* is Brahman, on account of the mention as another entity and so on)" (I, 3, 42, *et seq*), it is not made clear that the term *ākāśa*, occurring in the *Chāndogya* text "What is called *ākāśa*, verily, is the sustainer of name and form; what is within that is Brahman, the Immortal, the Self". (*Ch*. VIII, 14, 1), refers to *Cit-śakti*, yet that reference is made clear by the following sentence (occurring) in the *janmādi-sūtra* (I, 1, 2), while commenting on the text "Brahman embodied in

ākāśa" (*Taitt.* I, 6): "The Supreme material causality of the resplendent expanse of Intelligence (*Cidākāśa*) results from such texts as 'all these beings verily originate from the *ākāśa* alone' (*Ch.* I, 9, 1), 'what is called *ākāśa* verily, is the sustainer of name and form' (*Ch.* VIII, 14, 1) and so on". There, the difference between *Cit-śakti* and the Supreme Brahman,—referred to by the words *ākāśa* and Brahman—is manifested by the mention of the (different) qualities of sustaining name and form, and being untainted by them. In the *prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* too (I, 4, 23 *et seq*), while commenting on the *sūtra - pariṇāmāt* (because of transformation)" (I, 4, 27) introduced to answer the doubt "how can the Supreme Śiva, undisturbed by even a trace of any evil, the boundless ocean of auspicious qualities, endowed with powers uncontracted and ever-realised, transcending the world, function as the material cause of the world, which is to be condemned as the abode of ignorance and change?", he exhibits as follows the literal sense of that sentence in the *sūtra* which mentions the inferential ground. "The taking on of the form of the world, as its material cause, is consistent in the case of Parameśvara, the efficient cause, though He is possessed of eternally pure Bliss and an unsurpassable auspicious nature; for He transforms Himself into the form of what is intelligent and non-intelligent"; he then raises the doubt "Alas! transformation, verily, is of the nature of a causal change; the abandonment of a prior form and the obtaining of another constitute transformation. If it be asked how Parameśvara is reserved from this detrimental characteristic etc.," and gives the mysterious reply "transformation takes place in such a way that there is no taint of change in the efficient cause, though (functioning as) the material cause" thereby again creating the desire (thus expressed): "What is this wonderful transformation? We are eager to hear of it; pray expound"; then, after promising the reply with the words "Listen, we shall expound", and explaining the *yadā tama* hymn (*Śvet.* IV, 18), he makes out that the transformation of the Supreme Brahman being opposed to (His) immutability takes place though His *Cit-śakti* of the form of Prajñā. and not in his own nature; by the distinction thereby established between transformability and non-transformability, their difference is exhibited. If their non-diffe-

rence be recognised, the changeability accepted in the case of *Cit-śakti*, should be acknowledged even of Brahman; hence an incurable contradiction of the conclusion about his unchangeability. Therefore, the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman does not result from the mention everywhere of *Cit-śakti* (taking on) the form of the world. To say that that results because of some few characteristic marks cited in the *aniyama* and other sections is but (evidence of) an illegitimate desire. For, it is not possible in the case of an interpretation condemned with the authority of the sūtras in many places, to support (it) merely by showing a few characteristic marks. If it be thus objected, it is said (in reply, as follows).

If by the acceptance of the doctrine of the attributeless 3.182
Brahman mentioned in the *aniyama* and other sections, there resulted contradiction of the proof of the doctrine of transformation, then, indeed, would the former have to be discarded, by some such postulate as that it refers to an opinion other than his own. But there is no such contradiction (resulting) thereby. Indeed, the establishment of transformation is but helpful to the doctrine of illusion. Only from connecting the world with Brahman as the transformation of the latter and from the denial of that (i.e. the transformation) does it follow that it (the world) is an illusory manifestation of Brahman. Hence it is that in the text "That desired 'may I become many'", there is first shown the evolution of the world from Brahman. In Śaṅkara's commentary too, after first showing in the *bhoktrāpatti* section (II, 1, 13; Ś) that the world is a transformation of Brahman, by the denial (thereof) in the later *ārambhaṇa* section (II, 1, 14 *et seq*; Ś), its being an illusory manifestation of Brahman is taught. Again, in the *upasaṁhāra* (II, 1, 24; Ś) and the *kṛtsna prasakti* (II, 1, 26; Ś) sections, he brings about intellectual assent to the doctrine only of the world being a transformation of Brahman, by answering the objections that occur (thereto). In the following verses of the *Saṃkṣepa-Śārīraka* too, in conformity with the commentary (of Śaṅkara), it is elaborately shown of the doctrine of transformation that it is helpful to the doctrine of illusion. "The disputants argue, basing themselves only on the doctrine

of origination (*tārkika*), collocation (Buddhist), transformation and illusion. Refuting the views of origination and collocation, the Great Sage takes up the two (other) views as acceptable. Of these, taking up, at first, the doctrine of transformation, introducing the *bhoktrāpatti-sūtra* (II, 1, 12; Ś) in order to answer the objections thereto, he proceeds to preserve the empirical world, in as much as it is (a necessary) auxiliary to the injunctions ranging about duty and the rest. (Then) arriving at the doctrine of illusion which is directly acceptable to him, he holds to it, (but only) with an eye to the former (doctrine). The doctrine of illusion may be based on texts like *vācārambhaṇam*, etc., (*Ch.* VI, 1, 4) only when the doctrine of transformation first arises (from them); only by getting up on the first step is it possible to rise to a higher one; so too, the Śāstra, in respect of the notion of cause and effect. Having first declared transformation, now it denies that, to secure the unreality of change. In the Vedānta, the prior ground of the doctrine of illusion is the doctrine of transformation. (While) resting thus on the doctrine of transformation, the doctrine of illusion arrives of itself. Just as people having acquired the means, obtain what the means lead to (i.e., what they desire), so, too, do the Great Sage and the texts declare the doctrine of transformation, in order to reach to the doctrine of illusion (*Saṃkṣepaśārīraka*, Chapter II, verses 57—62)". "Having declared (the doctrine of) transformation, through texts like "may I be many, may I grow forth' (*Ch.* VI, 2, 3), the *śruti* then leads on to the doctrine of illusion, in order to declare the unreality of change." (*Ibid*, Ch. II, verse 67). In the commentary of the Ācārya (Śrīkaṇṭha) too, of the perception "the pot exists" etc., it is shown through the exclusion of the reality of the world as its basis, that it has another basis of the nature of identity with the material cause; (this is) for the purpose of reminding (one) of the fact that the elaboration of the doctrine of transformation is in order to help towards the acceptance of the the doctrine of illusion. Hence, it is but proper (to hold) that the proof of transformation is undertaken only as an aid to the acceptance of the doctrine of illusion.

As for what is said of the non-declaration of the non-difference of *Cit-śakti* from Brahman, that does not follow; for, the statement thereof is seen in many places. Thus, indeed, in the *ākāśastalliṅgāt* section (I, 1, 23), after mentioning the text "What is the essence of this word? He said *ākāśa*" (and so on) the conclusion is established that *ākāśa* is not elemental ether, but Parameśvara; then is raised the doubt as to what is the object of using the word "elemental", in his own statement about "elemental ether", and the purpose of that (word) is stated thus: "since creatorship of all beings is true of the Supreme *ākāśa*, the supreme material cause, (the use of the word 'elemental' in the other case) is purposeful"; then, the further doubt being raised as to how, if creatorship of all beings could hold even of the Supreme *ākāśa*, this *ākāśa* could be determined to be Parameśvara, the reply is given "because (it) is non-different from that (Parameśvara)". In the *dahara* section (I, 3, 13, *et seq*), after proof of the conclusion that the small ether—mentioned in the *Chāndogya* text, "Therein is the small *ākāśa*; what is within that is to be sought after." (*Ch.* VIII, 1, 1)—is Parameśvara, this doubt is raised: "according to another text 'He who rests within this *ākāśa* in the heart, controller of all, lord of all' (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 22) and so on, (only) He who is to be meditated on as *within* the small *ākāśa*, can be Parameśvara?"; How then can the small *ākāśa*, be said to be Parameśvāra?; and the solution is given thus: "even here, (in the case of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* text) Parameśvara, He who resides in the middle of the small *ākāśa* is to be contemplated; further, since of the qualities of Parameśvara, such as freedom from sin etc., connection with the small *ākāśa* is declared, even the small *ākāśa* (is to be comtemplated), as His form of the effulgent expanse of Intelligence (Cidambara)" (I, 3, 16). In the section *Sarvatraprasiddhopadeśat* (I, 2, 1) while explaining Brahman's (property of) being signified by all terms, the properties of being of the essence of Brahman and being His attribute as of the form of all His qualities are declared of *Cit-Śakti*, in the following words: "It follows from the authority of *Śruti*, *Smṛti*, Itihāsas, Purāṇas and the maxims of the learned that the self-contained Supreme Energy, of the form of Supreme Power in all the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent, possessing existence of 3.183

the form of supreme wisdom and bliss, devoid of the limitations of space and time, becomes both the essence and the attribute of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman. Apart from that, there does not come about for Brahman the possession of the properties of omniscience, omnipotence, originating all, controlling all, being contemplated by all, bestowing grace on all, and being the cause of the (attainment of the) spiritual goal by all. Further, even the property of being designated by names indicative of supremacy such as, Maheśvara, Śiva, Mahādeva, Rudra and so on does not come about". Similarly in the *ādhyānādhikaraṇa* (III, 3, 14) too, there is established the non-difference of *Cit-Śakti* from Brahman in essence. So too, in the section *Ānandādayaḥ pradhānasya* (Bliss and so on, as belonging to the subject, have to be understood everywhere)" (III, 3, 11), it is made clear (1) that the host of qualities such as unexcelled knowledge, bliss and the rest and the possession of a distinctive form qualified by blue-throatedness etc., (which constitute) the essential differentia of Brahman, are all of them to be understood in every meditation on Brahman, in spite of difference of topic, (2) that thereby Brahman, distinct from all others such as Brahmā, Viṣṇu etc., enters into experience, as if grasped by the horns, like the lunar orb which is different from all other planets, asterisms and stars by its superior brightness, and that consequently, like the continuance of that luminous brightness in all perception of the Moon, the continuance of qualities like knowledge, bliss and the rest and of the distinctive form is (but) proper in all meditations of Brahman. After this, in the section *Priyaśirastvādyaprāptirupacayāpacayau hi bhede* having joy for its head and so on are not established, becaus of increase and decrease consequent on difference (III, 3, 12)", the doubt is raised whether in the understanding of the unsurpassable knowledge well-known to be characteristic of Brahman, from such texts as "along with the Intelligent Brahman" (*Taitt.* II, 1,) and "He who knows all, he who understands all" (*Mu.* II, 2, 7), there should be understood the secondary qualities of having joy for the head etc., (which are) well-known from the text "within that there is another Self, the Self of Bliss; joy is its head and so on" (*Taitt.* II, 5), in the same way as there is understanding of the secondary qualities of having purposes which come true

and so on; and it is made clear (1) that though joy etc., are specific modes of Bliss, their being the head etc., is (but) imagined in the meditation for facility of comprehension of the unsurpassability of Brahman's Bliss, and is not real, (2) that if Brahman's Bliss really possessed a head and so on, then to His form of Bliss, there would result increase and decrease (of the nature of) occasional stoutness and occasional thinness, (3) that if such modes of existence as support and what is supported were real, difference would result, and (4) that consequently, those characteristics of knowledge and bliss, like omniscience, having purposes which come true, having desires which are satisfied etc., which, through (their) imperishability are equal to Brahman's nature, and are also of th. form of the fruit obtained by released ones, as possessing forms equal to Brahman, those alone should be understood in all meditation on Brahman, not the property of having joy for the head and so on.

After that, in the section *Ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt* (for 3.1831
meditation, there being no other purpose)" (III, 3, 14), the *prima facie* view is stated that though in the understanding of the unsurpassable Bliss characteristic of Brahman, in all meditations of the Supreme, as stated in the expression "the Self of Bliss," its having joy as the head etc., is not understood, being (but) imagined for the comprehension of its unsurpassability, yet, being within the four other sheaths consisting of food etc., should certainly be understood, (they being not imaginary).

This is refuted thus. The sheaths of food etc., are not to be 3.1832
understood, there being no purpose (served). They are not useful for liberation, that being secured by meditation on Śiva, after abandoning all else. What is the object, then, of the mention of the sheaths of food etc.? For the purpose of meditation (*ādhyāna*); *ādhyāna* is direct, reverent meditation, and reverence comes from comprehension of superiority to all; the mention of the sheaths of food etc., is for the comprehension of that (superiority). Hence, for the purpose of comprehending superiority to all (which is) helpful in attaining excess of devotion, the sheaths of food etc., should be thought of as the determinants of supe-

riority, even prior to the practice of meditation, (which) should follow the excess of firm devotion.

3.1833 Now, the sheaths of food etc., being spoken of as the caves, are to be thought of not as the determinants merely of superiority, but also as the determinants of the quality of being within, which is thougt of at the time of meditation. If it be said, therefore, that like the meditation of the Brahman-city and the heart lotus in the *Dahara vidyā* for the purpose of meditating on Brahman as within the heart-lotus situated in the middle of the Brahman-city (i.e., the body), the thought of the sheath of food etc. is (also) constant on all occasions of meditation, no (we reply), because of the mention of the word "self" in the words "another self within" in every one of those hymns. If the sheaths of food etc., were non-intelligent entities of the nature of the body, the vital air, the mind and the intellect, then would they have to be thought of, like the Brahman-city etc., at the time of meditation; that, however, is not so; they, verily, are presiding (deities) of food etc., differentiations of intelligence and are of the nature of Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Īśvara, the beings who, in the words of the *Atharvaśikhā* "Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Indra, originate from Him" are declared to have been created by Śiva; they, again, are those who,—because of (the words), which, after enjoining meditation on Śiva thus, "The cause is to be meditated upon, the Being endowed with all lordly powers, the Lord of all, Śambu, in the middle of the *ākāśa*," say "Śiva alone, the doer of what is auspicious, is to be meditated on, abandoning all else" are said to be excluded, because they have to be left out of the meditation, in the nature of an uninterrupted flow of thought about Śiva, which is to be performed by him who desires release. Whence (this conclusion)? From the (use of the) word "Self" "in another self within" in every hymn, and from the teaching in texts like "he reaches this self consisting of food" and so on, about the special deities attained to, stage by stage, prior to the attainment of Brahman. Thus, in order to reach to the contemplation of the presence in the cave mentioned in the text "he who knows the one hidden in the cave" (*Taitt.* II, 1), and for the comprehension of the superiority resulting from the

description of the cave, and what is within that (cave), their contemplation is necessary; for that reason alone, in texts like "this self consisting of food" etc., it is declared of those who attain the fruit mentioned in the text "he who knows Brahman attains the highest", that, as the fruit of meditation on them (Brahmā etc.,) there is attainment of them (Brahmā etc.,); though this be so, the superiority resulting from the description of the cave and what is within the cave,[1] like the superiority resulting from stories of the destruction of the Tripura and so on, should be understood only prior to the commencement of the meditation. Though the contemplation of these, which are helpful in the contemplation of the presence within the cave, should be performed every day, yet that contemplation should be performed even prior to the commencement of the contemplation of Śiva, each earlier stage being abandoned step by step in the order of its attainment; (this is so) because of the injunction to abandon in "abandoning all else", because the absorption of each earlier stage step by step in the later one is well-known in the Śaiva Āgamas, and because in the chapter on meditation in the Yoga Yājñavalkya, after prescribing meditation step by step on Brahmā and the rest, it is said in the same tenour, "O Gārgi, this is *said* by the excellent ones among those who know Brahman; absorbing the various effected forms such as Brahmā and the rest in their respective causes, with mind concentrated, the self is to be united to Parameśvara." Thus, at the time of commencement of the meditation on Śiva, only that meditation is to be performed (which is) of the form of a stream of consciousness having Śiva alone for

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1. The Saṃskṛt expression "*guhā tadvat bhāva varṇanam*" has been translated as "the description of the cave and what is within the cave". The expression tadvat, i.e., guhāvat, may mean either what possesses the cave, i.e., what is within it (as here understood) or what is *like* the cave; in the latter case the reference would be to the sheaths of food, breath, mind, and knowledge which are the cave as it were, within which is the supreme *ākāśa*, the seat of Brahman; on the former interpretation the reference would be to the Supreme Being. The reason for preferring this interpretation is the comparison of the description of the cave etc., to the story of the destruction of the Tripura. Here *Tripura saṃharaṇam* is comparable to the *guhāt* the *saṃhāravān* is the Supreme Being; a similar interpretation for *guhāvān* seems, therefore, more suitable.

its object; this shuld be preceded by meditation step by step on what are described as of the form of the cave and are referred to as the sheaths of food, vital air, mind, knowledge, i.e., Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Īśvara [or Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Īśvara and Sadāśiva, interpreting what is understood by the term "sheath of knowledge" and the term "Indra" of the *Atharvaśikhā* passage "Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra, Indra" etc., as referring to two—Īśvara and Sadāśiva—in conformity with the Śiva Āgamas, the Yoga Yājñavalkha etc.]; and there should have been contemplation of the absorption of each earlier one in the later, and of Sadāśiva in the Supreme *ākāśa*, (which is) of the nature of of the seat of Śiva. At the time of meditation on Śiva, His being in the sheath of food etc., is not to be meditated on.

3.18331 Now, if this be so, even the companionship of Umā may not be meditated on, that being opposed to the injunction to abandon all else. In the text, "abandoning all else", Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Rudra and Indra of the context being understood even by the expression "else", the superfluous word "all" has the significance resulting in the abandonment of all deities (whatsoever) except Śiva. Nor may it be said that because of the non-difference from Śiva of Umā, (who is) of the nature of *Cit-Śakti* referred to by the expression "Self of Bliss", there can be no possibility of that being the object of the injunction as to abandonment. For, from the expression "self" heard in the case of the sheath of food etc., being common even to the Self of Bliss, it is preferable to understand finite self-hood of the Self of Bliss, as of those (others).

3.18332 If (such an objection) be urged, not so. The "self" understood in the Self of Bliss refers to the Supreme Self, not to the finite self as in the self of food etc., for, from the non-mention later of something else to be attained by him who has attained the Self of Bliss, as (there is) in the case of him who has attained the self of food etc., it follows that the attainment (of the Self of Bliss) is liberation. So, too, of the word "self" which is taught to be common to the finite self and the Supreme (self), in the words "'Self' (is used in the sense of) the finite self, strength, the body, nature and the Supreme Self", it is

proper to adopt whatever sense is suitable (to the context). Nor may it be thought, that since in the *Ānandavalli* the word "self" is invariably seen to refer to the finite self, the sense of the context (should prevail here too). The reference to the finite self being incompatible with the reference to the cause of the world in "from the self, ether originates" (*Taitt.* II, 1), a reference to the Supreme Self has necessarily to be declared; in the case of the Self of Bliss too, a similar reference to the Supreme Self is intelligible, there being no difference (between the two), in respect of the characteristic marks or the contradiction of the sense of the context. Hence, Umā being non-different from Śiva, the contemplation of the former is not contradicted, at the time of the meditation of the latter.

Now, if Śakti, referred to by the expression, "Self of Bliss", 3.18333
and admitted to be of the form of all the world—Intelligent and Non-intelligent—be non-different from Śiva, then of all intelligent beings non-distinct from that (energy), non-difference from Śiva being inevitable, of Brahmā and the others too, referred to by the words "self of food" etc., non-difference from Śiva should be declared, because of their connection with the word "self", which in the previous and succeeding sentences has been determined to refer to the Supreme Self: of them too, as of Umā, contemplation at the time of the meditation Śiva should not be contradicted.

If this be said, no (we reply), because in (the text), Śiva 3.18334
alone is to be meditated on, the door of what is auspicious, abandoning all else" (*Atharvaśikhā*), the property of being contemplated is limited to Śiva alone. If Brahmā and others are not the objects of that exclusion, what can be its object? Not the Non-intelligent world, nor the Intelligent world other than Brahmā etc., under reference, because of the natural denotative power of the general name "else (*anya*)". (For, the term) refers to other Intelligent beings, like Śiva, the correlate (of the exclusion), just as in the statement "in the rest there is similarity to the *Śyena* rite" which is made after prescribing certain special rites as the elements of the *Iṣu* sacrifice, the reference of the expression "the rest" is to the (other) special rites because of similarity to the *Iṣu* special

rites which are the correlates (of that expression); (hence), there must necessarily be a reference to Brahmā etc., the other intelligent beings who are thus in our thoughts. Though, in consonance with proximity to the term "all," (the term "else") is common to the other intelligent beings as well, the reference to Brahmā and other intelligent beings that have entered our thoughts cannot be got rid of; further, even in the case of other intelligent beings, the inappropriateness of (the exclusion) referring to them is common, they too being non-different from Śiva, like Brahmā and the rest. Therefore, the abandonment of what is really different from Śiva is not here enjoined, but of what appears to be different from Śiva. Hence, too, one's own self, (which), in meditation on Brahman, (is contemplated) as non-different from Śiva, in the form "I am Śiva", is not to be abandoned; (and) because of the appearance of the difference of the selves of food etc., both from Śiva and among themselves, (as seen) from the declaration "another self within" in each hymn, their exclusion cannot be helped. As for Umā, though spoken of in the relationship of abode and what abides, as the Supreme *ākāśa*, and in the relationship of Attribute and Substance, in (the text) "It is one Bliss of Brahman", yet difference is mentioned (only) of the from of abode and of the form of unsurpassed Bliss, not of the intelligent Being of the nature of Ambikā; of that form, non-difference alone is declared. For, (in) the *ānandādhikaraṇa* (III, 3, 11) is established the understanding of the "Person, dark and tawny," in all meditation; from the expression "dark and tawny" (there are declared) of Śiva alone dark colour in respect of the form of Ambikā, and tawny colour in respect of the male form; thereby (the section) is pregnant with the non-difference of Śiva and Śakti. Hence, (it follows) that the selves of food etc., are not to be contemplated in the same manner as Umā, at the time of the meditation on Śiva. Thus (is) this section set out in the four sūtras "*Ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt* (for meditation, there being no other purpose)". "*Ātmaśabdācca* (because of the expression 'self')", "*Ātmagṛhītiritaravaduttarāt* (the understanding of 'self', as in other places, because of what follows)", and "*Anvayāditi cet syādavadhāraṇāt*

(if it be said 'on account of connection', it may be, so, on account of ascertainment)", (III, 3, 14—17).

It is shown in the commentary inquiring into the sense of the third of these sūtras, that *Cit-Śakti*, of the form of the Self of Bliss, is but Śiva, the Supreme Self, and not different therefrom. Nor may it be said that the commentary seeks to establish the Supreme Self-hood of the Self of Bliss—following the first of the positions set out in the *ānandamaya* section (viz.,) that the Self of Bliss is Śiva, the Supreme Self, and not, indeed, to establish the non-difference of *Cit-Śakti* from the Supreme Self, basing (itself) on the second interpretation set out in that section, viz., that the Self of Bliss is *Cit-Śakti*. For, on the basis of the first position, since it follows even from the *ānandamaya* section that the Self of Bliss is the Supreme Self, the establishment of that (view) here is unnecessary; and it is also understood clearly from the *janmādi sūtra* (I, 1, 2) that it is only the second of the positions set out in the *ānandamaya* section that is aceeptable to the commentator. Hence, it is quite consistent (to hold) that the non-difference of *Śakti* from Śiva is made clear by the commentator in the *ādhyāna* section (III, 3, 14-17). 3.18335

Similarly, its non-difference from Śiva is described in the section *Īkṣati karma vyapadeśāt saḥ* (He, being designated as the object of sight)" (I, 3, 12). There, while saying in reply to the question of Satyakāma, "The syllable *AUM* is verily the higher and the lower Brahman" (*Praśna*, V, 2), after mentioning the fruit of the meditation on the *praṇava* with one moment, viz., the attainment of the world of human beings reached by the *Ṛk* verses, which are of the nature of the first moment, and the fruit of the meditation on the *praṇava* of two moments, viz., the attainment of the middle space reached by the *Yajus* verses, which are of the nature of the second moment, it is said, "He, again, who meditates on this Supreme Self with the syllable '*AUM*' of three moments, being relieved of sins, even as the serpent of its slough, is led up by the *Sāman* verses, to the world of Brahmā; he perceives there the Supreme Person, the dweller in the city, who is higher (even) than the collective form of all these living beings"; 3.1834

(*Praśna*, V, 6). The position that is acceptable finally is that "the world of Brahmā" there is the world of Śiva, the Supreme Brahman, and the person seen in that (world) is Śiva. To that end is set forth the (following) *prima facie* view: "The world of Brahma is the world of Viṣṇu, for, in the later hymn 'by Ṛks this world, by Yajus the middle space, by the Sāmans that which the enlightened ones know' (*Praṣna*, V, 7), which summarises the sense declared (earlier), one is reminded, in connection with the world of Brahmā, of the property of being experienced by enlightened ones, which (in another context) is understood of the world of Viṣṇu, through the hymn 'the enlightened ones constantly perceive that Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu' (*T. S.* I, 3, 2a). Hence, the person seen therein is but Viṣṇu."

3.1835 This is how that (*prima facic* view) is refuted in the conclusion, through the explanation of that (text): "As for the reference to the 'Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu', there is no contradiction in (holding) that that which is other than the form of the world, of the nature of Bliss unexcelled, of the form of the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu, that itself is the Supreme Brahman, called Śiva, for the reason that between Viṣṇu and Śiva, there is no essential difference other than a difference of state, as between the material and efficient cause'.

3.18351 Here, in order to reconcile with *Śivaloka* the sense recalled by the hymn "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" etc., it should be shown of that hymn only that it refers to Śivaloka, not that it refers to Śiva. Hence it is that in the commentary on the section "*Kāryam Bādarir asya gatyupapatteḥ* (To the caused, opines Bādari, going being appropriate in that case)" (IV, 3, 6, *et seq*), the *Kaṭha* Valli hymn "he reaches the end of the path, that is the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" (*Kaṭha* III, 9) is shown to refer to the world of Śiva. It is not possible to show that the hymn "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" etc., refers to Śiva, holding to the present commentary (on I, 3, 12). It is not indeed the commentator's conclusion that Śiva is directly of the nature of Viṣṇu who is of the form of the universe. It is shown, rather, in the commentary on the *prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (I, 4, 23 *et seq*) and else-

where, that he is but a mode of Śiva Śakti, Supreme Bliss of the form of Śiva Śakti, being his essential nature.

Hence, the sense of that commentary should be understood in the following way: by the words "that which is other than the form of the world, of the nature of Bliss unexcelled, of the form of the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu, *Cit-śakti* the material cause of the mode of Viṣṇu who transforms himself into the form of the world, is referred to; it is that that functions even as the world of *Parama Śiva*; in this way is shown the reference of the hymn about "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" to the world of Śiva. By the words "That itself is the Supreme Brahman called Śiva" is declared the non-difference of that (*Cit-Śakti*) from the nature of Śiva. Now, in order to exhibit the absence of conflict with what is re-called, it should be said of the hymn about "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu", only that it refers to *Cit-Śakti*, which takes on the form of the world of Śiva; the statement of the non-diflerence of *Cit-Śakti* from the nature of Śiva does not there fit in. There being this objection, in order to show the utility of that (statement), by removing the objection, there is the sentence beginning with "for the reason that bet ween Viṣṇu and Śiva" etc. This is the objection that arises here: it cannot be that the supreme form of Viṣṇu is Śiva-Śakti, Viṣṇu being spoken of repeatedly in Purāṇas and Itihāsas, as non-different only from Śiva. The reply is indicated through the following statements. For the very reason that there is no difference of nature of Viṣṇu from Śiva, even of Śakti that is of the form of the material cause of the mode Viṣṇu, there is non-difference of nature from Śiva; further, the identity of Śiva's Śakti and Viṣṇu is taught in the *Kūrma Purāṇa* and elsewhere. 3.18352

Or else, this is the sense of the statement in the commentary, "That itself is the Supreme Brahman, called Śiva". Here and there in Purāṇas and Itihāsas, the Supreme Brahman taught by the entire Vedānta, the cause of all, He who is attained by the released ones, is designated as but the form of Viṣṇu, the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu and the Supreme Abode called Viṣṇu, as is seen from the (following) narrative of Nārada in the *Mokṣa-Dharma*- 3.18353

Parva of the *Mahābhārata* (Ch. 205): having seen, on the slopes of the Himālayas, a certain virgin, and the persons with limbs studded with gems, with forms like that of the Sun, wearing jewels on their heads, who coming out of her mouth when she yawned, circumambulated her and re-entered her, Nārada prostrated and asked her reverently "Who are Thou? Who are those three persons? What are the gems in their bodies? What is the radiance on their heads" Being told (by her) "I am Sāvitri: those three persons are the Vedas; the gems are of the form of sacrifices and their fruit, the sense of the Vedas; the radiance on the heads, the Great Shining Splendour taught by the Vedānta, that is not knowable even by me", he worshipped the Lord Viṣṇu for a hundred years to find out what the radiance was. Then looking at the Lord, who, pleased, appeared in front of him, and prostrating before Him with gratification, he asked Him "O Lord of the world, explain to me what is known by thee, O Acyuta; show me that Grace, Hṛṣīkeśa; I desire to hear that, O Hari". He was then instructed by the Lord, thus: "What thou sawest on the heads of the Vedas, that is my form. Ascetics free from dualities and egotism, endowed with pure vision, they perceive me constantly. Ask them what thou desirest". There, by the words "my form" the form Śiva alone is mentioned, in the realisation of non-difference. Hence it is that though it is declared to be "my form", it is also said "ask them" in the view that there is some element of mystery (yet) to be questioned about. Therefore it is that of the form shown by the Lord as His own, the qualification of *belonging to the Lord* is mentioned even by himself, in the words of the *Gītā*, "Look at my union with the Lord", and "the Supreme form of the Lord" (*Bh. G.* XI, 8 and 9). Thus, the declarations in the Bhārata of "the Supreme Abode of Viṣṇu" and "the Supreme Abode called Viṣṇu", which proceed on the realisation of the non-difference of Viṣṇu and Śiva, are also seen to refer to Śiva. On this view, the non-difference of *Cit-śakti* from Śiva must be taken to be described by the statements in the *Ikṣatyadhikaraṇa*; for, Viṣṇu, a special mode of *Cit-Śakti*, being non-different from Śiva, the difference of *Cit-Śakti* therefrom is irreconcilable (therewith).

The existence of the *Cit-Śakti* of Parameśvara in this wise, its non-difference from Parameśvara, its being even then His attribute, all these are established even in the śāstras, which are primarily non-dualistic (in their conclusion). Thus, indeed, in the *Saṃkṣepa Śārīraka*, (it is said as follows): The true stainless energy of Parameśvara is called *Cit-Śakti*; the other inert energy is called Nescience (*avidyā*). The world originates from the mutual intercourse of these two energies of the Lord. The Lord's *Cit-Śakti*, is transformed (as it were) by the unreal changing energy. Thus say some. Others, again, with some faith (in the Scriptural declaration of creation) say that this is acceptable to enlightened ones, in one sphere, but is not acknowledged in another. In the sphere of injunctions as to action and meditation, as enjoining them, it is acceptable; it is not recognised in the sphere of the Attributeless Real or in the consideration of Vedic texts relating thereto" (Chapter III, verses 228 and 229). The same sense is indicated in the *Pañcapādikā* by the statement "Bliss, Experience of Things, and Eternity are attributes. Though non-different from intelligence, they appear as if different"[1]. 3.184

Thus, because of the existence in *Cit-Śakti* of the property of being an attribute, from the empirical point of view, though (it is) non-different in essence, the teaching of difference as between Substance and Attribute and so on in the *Gārgi Brāhmaṇa*, *Dahara Vidyā*, etc., is quite consistent. As for the statement in the *janmādi-sūtra* (I, 1, 2) "That is itself figuratively spoken of as Brahman, because of abundance", that is in the view that in a context pertaining to the statement of its being an attribute from the empirical point of view—as seen from its being referred to as Attribute in the adjacent texts of the *Ānandavalli*, "that is one Bliss of Brahman"—the relation of co-ordination should be interpreted figuratively, not in the view that there is difference from all points of view. Even thus should be understood the statement made as to the figurative application of the word denoting knowledge—as an attribute—to the Substance (itself), in the *sūtra*, *tadguṇa sāratvāttu tadvyapadeśaḥ prājñavat* (But the self is so 3.185

1. *Vizianagaram Saṃskṛt Series Edition, page 4.*

designated because of that being its essential quality; as in the case of the intelligent Self)" (II, 3, 29).

3.19 Thus, the four-fold result,—viz., Brahman's *Cit-Śakti* being of the form of all the worlds, intelligent and non-intelligent, its being of itself of the essential nature of Brahman, its being of the form of the host of qualities pertaining to Him, and the unchanging nature of Brahman—is acceptable to the ācārya (Śrīkaṇṭha). That result does firmly indicate his ultimate view to be that Brahman is attributeless, unconnected with the world, non-different from the finite self, and of the nature of pure non-duality. If, verily, *Cit-Śakti* is non-different from Brahman, and that is itself of the nature of all His attributes, there are not any attributes of Brahman different from Him. It is rather He Himself that appears as attribute, because of an imagined difference. It thus follows that Brahman is in reality attributeless. The genuine relationship of Attribute and Substance is not indeed consistent with non-difference. Nor can it be said that like non-difference, difference also such as is consistent with genuine relationship of Attribute and Substance, is accepted by the *ācārya* (Śrīkaṇṭha); for, in the commentary on the *ārambhaṇa* section (II, 1, 15, *et seq*) he discards the doctrine of difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*), as self-contradictory.

3.191 Nor is there in the system of the *ācārya*, as in that of Madhva, the acceptance of *viśeṣa* (specificity), which, though there is no difference between Attribute and Substance, takes the place of Difference. Nor even thereby can the relationship of Attribute and Substance be maintained to be genuine; for, since even by Madhvas it is admitted only as discharging the functions of Difference, there follows of it (*viśeṣa*) only (the properties of) appearing and being spoken of as Difference. If *viśeṣa* could do everything that Difference does, then, under the name *viśeṣa*, Difference alone would have been acknowledged (in the system). Hence, it is that in a work of Madhva's, known as *anuvyākhya*, in the words "In destruction, there is difference also,"[1] (it is) conceded (that) in the real threads, there is of the destructable cloth, etc.

1. *Anuvyākhya*, p. 25, Sarvamūla Edition.

different from the threads. In the commentary thereon, the *Nyāya Sudhā*, the following doubt is raised: "Just as the differences which enter into our discourse and which would help (to establish the reality of) Difference, are said to be otherwise derived from the ground of *viśeṣa,* even so it may be possible to bring about through *viśeṣa,* non-existence in what exists; why then should difference and non-difference be admitted (in that case)?"; and it is answered thus: "Through the capacity of *viśeṣa* to create empirical distinctions alone, it is not possible to bring about non-existence; if it did everything which Difference does, *viśeṣa* would be Difference itself, not its deputy."[1] Hence it is confirmed that in respect of Attributes, only the position of the *Pañcapādikā* that "though non-different from Intelligence, they appear as if different" is acceptable (to the commentator).

So, too, through the acceptance of non-difference from Brah- 3.192
man of *Cit-Śakti* which is of the form of the entire universe, it follows of the world of ether etc., that it is an illusory manifestation of that (*Cit-Śakti*). Or else, if it be admitted of the fleeting (world of) ether etc., that it is a transformation (of *Cit-Śakti*), there would result a contradiction of the unchanging nature of Brahman, who is non-different there-from (i.e., from *Cit-Śakti*).

Now, though *Cit-Śakti* and Brahman are really non-different, 3.1921
yet to support the relationship of Attribute and Substance, abode and that which abides, obtained from the *Gārgi Brāhmaṇa*, *Dahara Vidyā*, *Ānanda Valli*, etc., empirical difference should necessarily be admitted; only then is there consistency of the distinction which is made between Brahman and *Cit-Śakti* as non-changing and changing, in spite of the property of transformation admitted of *Cit-śakti*. Though the finite self and Brahman are non-different, there is distinction between agency, enjoyment, etc., and the absence thereof. If it be said that so, too, (a distinction must be admitted here, (we reply) even thus, in the stage of final release through the cessation of empirical difference, the cessation must be declared of the world of ether etc., as of the agency, enjoy-

1. *Nyāyasudhā*, Vol. II, p. 135.

ment etc., of the finite self; (hence), the conclusion that it is an illusory manifestation of Brahman cannot be helped. Therefore, in the manner stated in the *Saṁkṣepa-Śārīraka*, the holding on to the doctrine of transformation in the commentary is in order to support action, meditation, etc., from the empirical view point, and in order to provide an occasion for refuting it, that refutation being needed from the view-point of truth; hence, it is firmly established that only the view of Brahman's being unconnected with the world is acceptable (to Śrīkaṇṭha).

3.1922 Though *Cit-Śakti* is said to be of the form of the entire world of Intelligence, as of the form of the whole Non-intelligent world, it does not follow of the world of Intelligence that it is an illusory manifestation like ether etc., for, if that were so, that (world) ceasing through realisation of the truth, there would result non-existence of the experience of the fruit of release; further, from the non-difference of that eternal (world) from Brahman, there would result a contradiction of the unchanging nature of Brahman.[1]

3.1923 Now, the *sūtra* "*Pariṇāmāt* (because of transformation)" in the *prakṛtyadhikaraṇa* (I, 4, 23, *et seq*) is explained to mean "because of transformation into the form of the Intelligent and the Non-intelligent". It is also said that from the statement of the doctrine of transformation, the doctrine of illusion follows of itself. This is true. But yet the mention of Brahman's transformation in respect of the element of Intelligence either refers only

1. The text here is rather obscure. Following the not-too-clear text of *Ānanda Laharī*, the present text reads: "*nityasya tasya brahmābhede brahma-nirvikāratvavirodhaprasaṅgācca*;" but at least two texts (A and O) read *virodhāprasaṅgācca*. On this reading, the sense would be "since from the non-difference of that eternal world from Brahman, there would *not* result any contradiction of the unchanging nature of Brahman". *Prima facie*, it is clear that from identity with what is eternal, there cannot result any conflict of the kind suggested. Identity in the case of material creation cannot be taken iliterally, just because of the non-eternal character of that world. There is no such difficulty in the case of the eternal world of Intelligence. Hence, there is no need here to explain identity as that of illusory manifestations with there substrate. This interpretation and the text suited thereto, seem more logical. The reading adopted in the text is less easily intelligible.

to the eternal existence of Intelligent Beings as modes of Brahman's *Cit-Śakti* or is made in the view that even in respect of Intelligent beings, through the medium of their own *Cit-Śakti*, there is transformation in the form of contraction and expansion of knowledge and happiness. The eternity of Intelligent being in their own nature has been established in the section "*Nātmā śruteḥ, nityatvācca tābhyaḥ* (the Self is not originated, on account of the statement of Śruti, and the eternity resulting therefrom)" (II, 3, 18). It is therefore firmly established that it is acceptable to the *ācārya* (Śrīkaṇṭha) that Brahman is attributeless, unconnected with the world, non-different from the finite self, and of the form of pure non-duality.

Now, if, both from the empirical standpoint and that of re- 3.2
lease, there be no distinction of the ācārya's system from the doctrine of him who upholds (pure) non-dualism, why should a separate commentary be undertaken? If (this question) is asked, it is answered (as follows). The attainment of the nature of Brahman results, verily, from the intuition of the non-specific Brahman. That intuition is gained by the meditation thereon. By those who have not gained the firmness of intellect enabling them to meditate on that extremely subtle being, intellectual firmness is gained through the grace of that Being who is worshipped with firm devotion unintermittently for a long time, and who is endowed with endless auspicious qualities and a shining form; for, *Śruti* says "let him unite our intellects with auspicious *Smṛti* (i.e. Knowledge)" (*Śvet.* III, 1, 4) and Smṛti declares "seek knowledge of Īśvara". Hence it is that the Khaṇḍanakāra (Śrī Harṣa) says: "This desire for (knowledge of) non-duality which rescues one from the mighty fear (of migration) arises in two or three men, if at all, only by the grace of the Lord".[1]

The grace of God is obtained by meditation on Him, (as seen) from the Paurāṇic statement: "Just as a man is pleased with women through intimate service, so through intimate meditation is Maheśvara pleased". Hence, in order to attain the

1. *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍa-Khādya*, para 163, verse 25.

excess of devotion requisite for concentration on Him for a long time, (it has to be taught) that He alone is the Supreme Brahman, and that there is no true form of His, other than this; a fresh commentary is undertaken by the *ācārya* who teaches this. in order to exhibit that reconciliation of the Vedānta texts and the *Brahma-Sūtra* which is suitable thereto.

3.21 Now, in order to secure excess of devotion thereto, it would be proper only to proclaim His distinctive glory, as understood from *S'ruti, Smṛti,* and Purāṇas, and not to condemn His other form, which is real and has to be expounded as the sense of the Vedānta conforming to Logic, in order to attain what is acceptable (even) to himself as the supreme good of the soul. If (this objection) be stated, it is answered thus: this method (of exposition) is seen even in ancient sages. In order to secure strength of capacity for those prior observances by the practice of which fitness for a later stage is attained, there is confirmation (secured) in those observances, through exhibiting the condemnation of that (later stage) as contrary to texts and reason,—though (such condemnation is) really unacceptable,—and through restraining persons from primarily engaging therein.

3.211 In this way, in the *Kalpa-Sūtra,* confirmation in that state (of the house-holder) is secured through condemning renunciation by showing its opposition to *S'ruti* and *Smṛti,* through restraining people from taking to it in the first instance, and through praising the state of the house-holder, wherein are observed sacrifices and other such rites for the purpose of obtaining purity of the internal organ,—(a quality) auxiliary to the excess of devotion characteristic of those fitted for renunciation. Thus, indeed, is it said by the ācārya, Āpastamba: "Then they quote (the following) two verses from a Purāṇa. 'Those eighty-thousand sages who desired offspring passed along the southern course of the Sun and reached the cremation ground. Those eighty-thousand sages who did not desire offspring passed along the northern course of the Sun and obtained immortality.' Thus are praised those who keep the vow of chastity. Then they become also capable of realising their desires by the mere wish; for instance, (the production of)

rain, the bestowal of children, vision of objects at a (considerable) distance, transporting oneself with the speed of thought, and other (powers) of this description. Therefore, on account of the texts and on account of the visible results, some declare these orders (of ascetics to be) the most excellent. But, it is the firm opinion of those who are well-versed in the three-fold learning that the Vedas are of (supreme) authority. They consider that what are there ordered to be performed with rice, barley, animals, ghee, potsherds, (in the company of) a wife, (to the accompaniment of) loud or muttered (hymns) should be performed and that any rule of conduct opposed thereto is unauthoritative. As for what is said of the cremation-ground, it ordains (as the fitting *finale*) at the end of many sacrifices, the sacrificial offering of the body.[1] It is declared that thereupon (results) a reward without end, designated as 'heaven'.

Further, of him, the Veda declares the offspring to be immortality; 'in thy offspring thou art born again; that indeed is thy immortality, O! mortal'. Further, he (the father) himself is perceived by the senses, to be reproduced here, (as a) distinct (being); the likeness (between the two) can be even seen, the bodies alone (being) different. Those (sons) who observe the duties enjoined increase the fame and (enjoyment of) heaven of the ancestors in the other world. In this manner, each succeeding (generation increases the fame and enjoyment of heaven) of the preceding one. They (the ancestors) live in heaven, until the destruction of the (primal) elements. In the *Bhaviṣyat-Purāṇa* (it is said) that, at the new creation, they become disseminators of seed. Then, too, (there is) the saying of Prajāpati, 'those dwell with us who practise these—the study of the three Vedas, the (duties of the) student's career, the creation of progeny, faith, austerities, sacrifices and the bestowal of gifts. He who praises other (orders of life) becomes dust and perishes'. Of these (sons), those who commit sin, they alone perish, as of a tree, the leaf (attached by worms, falls itself alone, not affecting the branch or

1. As the commentator, Haradatta, explains, it does not mean that dead house-holders become demons and haunt cremation-grounds.

the tree).[1] They do not injure others. (As) in this world, no connection is known of him (the ancestor) with the acts (of his sons), so too in the next (no connection exists) with the fruit of the acts. (The truth of) that may be known from the following (reason): This creation is the work of Prajāpati and the sages. The bodies of those (sages) who have done what is meritorious, appear in heaven with superior resplendence (as of the constellation of the seven Ṛṣis, i.e., the Great Bear). Even if it be that some (ascetic) by a residue of works or by austerities attains heaven while embodied, or realises his desires with the mere wish, that can be no ground for the superiority of one order over another".[2] Thus, (1) through showing by (the statement of) the first and final views, the unauthoritativeness of renunciation, as being opposed to all Scriptures which enjoin the performance of sacrifices etc., (2) through refuting with texts and reasoning the condemnation of the house holder's state, as leading to the cremation-ground, as not bringing about immortality, and (consequently) inferior, (3) through condemning *in toto* other orders of life, by the citation of the saying of Prajāpati, (4) through removing by argument the doubt that if good deeds done by sons, grandsons etc., constitute heaven for the ancestors, the evil deeds of the former may constitute a hell for the latter, (5) through demolishing the superiority claimed for the other order (of renunciation) on the ground of special attainments, by showing that the power of realising one's desires by the mere wish and so on are achievable through deeds and austerities and may be acquired by any one whether in the house-holder's or in any other order (of life), and (6) through the praise of the house-holder's order, (which is) connected with the observance of sacrifices and other rites, there is brought about with great effort, for the man of low capacity, whose non-attachment is unsteady. confirmation in the house-holder's order, in order that through purification of the internal organ there may be gradual attainment of steadiness of

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1. The words in brackets constitute Haradatta's explanation.

2. *Āpastamba Dharma Sūtras*, II, 9, Khaṇḍas 23 and 24. Dr. Buhler's translation in the Sacred Books of the East, Vol. 2, has been followed for the most part.

non-attachment. In the sūtras, *athāpi* means and also; *amṛtatvam hi kalpate* means they become immortal. In *anantyam svargyam*, the additional letter '*y*' is metrical. *Dehatvameva anyat* means the bodies alone being different. *Te svargajitaḥ punassarge bijārthā bhavanti* means that dwelling in heaven till the deluge, as a result of the other-worldly good deeds performed by sons, grandsons etc., they, at the commencement of a fresh creation, become Prajāpatis concerned with the creation of the world. *Tairitsāhasmaḥ*, with them alone do we dwell; it means that only for those possessed of the wealth of the three Vedas etc., is there attainment of our world. In *nāsyāsmin loke*, the singular *asya* (his) is used in the plural significance; it means that for those ancestors there is no connection in the other world with the evil deeds committed by their sons etc., in this world, and with their results.[1]

Here, the statement "any rule of conduct opposed thereto is unauthoritative," denying the basic authority for the order of renunciation, is not valid, that (authority) being obtained directly from the *Jābāla Śruti*,[2] and other (texts). The existence of other orders of life is acknowledged by the ācārya, Āpastamba himself, earlier, in the words, "There are four orders of life—that of the house-holder, of dwelling with the teacher, of silence, and of forest-dwelling; practising these steadily, whichever of these is suitable, according to the teaching, one attains welfare" (*Dharma Sūtra*, II, 9, 21, 1 & 2). By the statement "according to the teaching", the basis for all (orders) is acknowledged. Since four-foldness results even by the enumeration of the house-holder's order and so on, the statement "there are four" is for refuting the view that there is (but) one order (which counts). Thus, to say that "any rule of conduct opposed thereto is unauthoritative" is to contradict his own statement. As for the statement "It is declared that thereupon (results) a reward without end, designated as 'heaven'", that is to lean on a reed. If there are such 3.212

1. This commentary, is, for the most part, taken by our author from Haradatta's *Ujjvalā*.

2. The declaration of that Śruti is *yadahareva virajet tadahareva pravrajet*, The day on which there is non-attachment (established), renounce even on that day" (*Jābāla*, 4).

revealed texts, they are but eulogistic, like "the merit of those who have performed the four-monthly sacrifice, is, verily, inexhaustible. The other texts cited such as "in thy offspring thou art born again" are also thus explained. The argument and example based on the identity of father and son are very puerile. The similarity of two bodies is not, indeed, invariably connected with non-difference of soul. So, too, the statement as to the non-attainment of hell by the ancestors through the evil deeds of sons etc., is questionable, because of opposition to such texts as that "They (the evil-doers) perish along with their ancestors" As for the argument "(creation is of) Prajāpati and the sages" etc., that is shown to be worthless, by the ācārya Āpastamba himself, earlier, in the words, "Because of their distinctive splendour, there is known of them no sin" *Dharma Sūtra*, II, 6, 13, 8). All this has been said by Āpastamba neither in ignorance nor in error; but dull witted people, who, pleased merely at hearing the fruits of renunciation, by suddenly starting on it, though there is not (in them) the strength of non-attachment suitable thereto, might fall, not being able to keep up that life, it is, rather, in order to show grace to such people, in the desire that they should not so fall, that the sense of the (following) text is elaborated (by Āpastamba) in the realisation of its drift: "Of what (good) is the impure (intercourse of the house-holder's state)? The deer-skin, the unshaven whiskers, austerities, of what (good are they)? O! Brāhmins, desire a son; he, verily, is the blameless source of enjoyment"[1]

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1. *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa*, Ch. 33, 1, 7a (Ānandāśrama Edn., Vol. II, p. 836). The translation follows the commentary of Sāyaṇa, particularly in the interpretation of the expressions, impurity, goat-skin etc. Prof. Keith considers the commentator's interpretations groundless, in the present case, and prefers to translate thus:

> "What is the use of dirt, what of the goat-skin?
> What of long hair, and what of fervour?
> Seek a son, O! Brahmin!
> This is the world's advice"
>
> (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 25, page 300)

Unfortunately, Prof. Keith does not tell us what other interpretation is suitable, or how the literal sense he adopts fits into the context.

So too, in the *Śānti-Parva* of the *Mahābhārata*, to Yudiṣṭhira 3.213
who contemplates renunciation and prays for permission to renounce, in the words "Or, living alone and observing the vow of silence, with my head shaven clean, I shall support my body begging each day of only one tree" (Chapter, IX, Verse 12), there is addressed at length by Kṛṣṇa, both in his own words and through sages and others, a condemnation of renunciation; (this is done) because through the prayer to the brothers for permission to renounce, lack of steadiness of non-attachment is understood (by Kṛṣṇa), (and, it is, therefore) desired to engage him (Yudhiṣṭhira) in sacrifices *etc.*, to purify the internal organ for the purpose of (securing) that firmness. Again, through the qualification "purifying" (applied to the path) in the verse "Having abandoned the purifying path Janaka shaved off his head; his dear wife saw him penniless, practising the life of medicancy" (*Śānti*, XVIII, 4b 5a—edition used by M. N. Dutt) which occurs in the tale of Janaka,—it is shown that it is not proper to abandon the path of duty auxiliary to the (securing of) steady purity of the internal organ, and take suddenly to the order of renunciation.

So, in the *Manusmṛti* too, only with reference to these persons 3.214
not steady in their non-attachment is it said that "One should direct one's mind to renunciation after discharging the three debts; he, who, without discharging (them), practises renunciation, goes below" (*Manusmṛti*, VI, 5) as if in disregard and suppression of the sense of the explicit texts, "The day on which there is non-attachment (established), renounce even on that day, whether from the house (-holder's state) or the forest (-dweller's)", and "renounce even from the order of student-ship" (*Jābālopaniṣad*, 4).

It is only thus that the reconciliation of Vedānta texts with 3.215
the doctrine of (Brahman) with attributes has been shown by the ācārya (Śrīkaṇṭha) in order to bestow grace on the dull-witted person by turning him away from the pursuit of what is attributeless, and making him pursue with firm devotion the meditation (of Brahman) with attributes lest, (the fool), pleased with the mere hearing of the excellent fruit, namely, the attainment of the pure Brahman, but devoid of the mental concentration that can

bring about the meditation and intuition necessary for the attainment, should abandon the pursuit of meditation on Brahman with attributes, take forcibly to the pursuit of hearing, reflection and meditation pertaining to Brahman without attributes, and, not reaching to the concentration of mind necessary therefor, fall between both. Nor does the exhibition of this synthesis amount to showing that to be intended which was never intended, like the demonstration in the *Kalpa-Sūtra* "In thy son thou art born again", that immortality for the house-holder is the pro-creation of sons. For, of such texts as "By the command of the Imperishable One, O Gārgi, the Sun and the Moon are held apart" (*Bṛh.* III, 8, 9)". "He is the controller of all, ruler of all, the master of all" (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 22) and so on, though occuring in topics relating to (Brahman) without attributes, there is an intermediate sense relating to (Brahman) with attributes, understood as a means to the comprehension of the attributeless (one). As for the (statement) that there is no other pure reality higher than that, the concealment thereof (i.e., of the higher real), like that of renunciation in the *Kalpa-Sūtra,* is for the purpose of (creating) faith in that kind of dull-witted inquirer, through teaching him thus by arguments comprehensible by his intellect.

3.22 Now, if the construction of a separate system be necessary for dull-witted inquirers, that work should be done independently, and not based on the *Brahma-Sūtras,* as the *Brahma-Sūtras* have the object of inquiring into Pure Brahman; for, if it be admitted that the Pure Brahman is recognised by the ācārya (Śrīkaṇṭha), it should also be acknowledged that (the Pure Brahman) is the object inquiry (of the Sūtras), as shown by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda. If this be urged, true (we reply); but by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda himself it has been shown in the case of the Sūtras that they have Brahman with attributes as an object of inquiry, on the ground that many-sidedness is an ornament that follows from the definition of a *sūtra.* Thus, in the commentary even on the first *sūtra* (it is said) "Brahman does exist, of the nature of eternal purity, intelligence, and freedom, omniscient and endowed with all powers. The properties of eternal purity etc., are indeed, predicated, in view of the etymology of the word Brahma"

(*S'aṅkara-Bhāṣya*, M. Ed. p. 8); thus by showing the etymological significance of Brahman (as holding good) of both the Pure Brahman and Brahman with attributes, it is indicated that the word Brahma, about which there is inquiry, refers to both of them. There by is manifested his intention that like the Pure Brahman, Brahman with attributes too is to be inquired into, along with the source of knowledge, the form, the means and the fruit. As helpful thereto, in the *janmādi-sūtra* (I, 1, 2 : S), the nature (of Brahman) has been determined through the definition of both (Brahmans) in the view that the property of being the cause of the world, both as efficient and material cause, non-different from the world, is characteristic of Brahman with attributes, as *proprium*, and of the Pure Brahman, as an *accidens*. One interpretation having been given of the *śāstrayoni-sūtra*, (I, 1, 3 : S), as confirming the possession of omniscience involved in the *Saguṇa*-Brahman'a creatorship of the world, there is shown another interpretation for the purpose of establishing that the *S'āstra* is the source of knowledge of Brahman in general, *Saguṇa* as well as *Nirguṇa*. In the *samanvaya-sūtra* (I, 1, 4 : S) in order to show the authoritativeness of the *S'āstra* in respect of Brahman mentioned in the prior *sūtra*, the connection of that which is of the form of the Vedānta with the reference thereto (i.e., to Brahman) is exhibited only as common to (both) *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* (forms). And that results in distinguishing between the synthesis of all Vedānta texts with *Nirguṇa* (form) as their supreme significance, and with the *Saguṇa* (form) as their intermediate significance, in the manner indicated by the (following) words of the *S'aṃkṣepa-S'ārīraka*: "The synthesis of texts declaring attributes with the attributeless substance is always possible; it is not as if the synthesis of what is with attributes cannot bear synthesis with the attributeless substance. The form of *Saguṇa* Brahman is (a combination of) truth and falsehood; the meditation (thereon) is also so; the Vedic texts referring thereto are like that; hence, the intermediate sense of these Vedic texts is of a different kind (i.e., other than the final one); the other attributeless Substance, the true object (of the *S'āstra*) is proclaimed to be different" (*S'aṃkṣepa-S'ārīraka*, I, 463 & 464). Even of the texts, read in

the topic relating to the Nirguṇa form, an intermediate reference to a Saguṇa form qualified by the attributes, resulting from the significance of words occurring in such texts, is quite legitimate.

In the *Īkṣatyadhikaraṇa* (I, 1, 5, *et seq* Ś) refuting the reference of the Vedānta to the causality of the pradhāna acceptable to the Sāṅkhyas, the reference to the causality of Brahman is made clear, only in common to (both) the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* forms. Hence it is that up to the sūtra "*Svāpyayāt* (because of attainment of Self in sleep)" (I, 1, 9 : Ś), texts are cited from topics connected with the *Nirguṇa* form, such as the *Sad-Vidyā* and so on, and in the commentary on the *sūtra* "*Gati sāmānyāt* (because of identity of purport (I, 1, 10; Ś)" there is exhibited the harmonious declaration of all Vedānta texts in respect of the causality of Intelligence, as common to the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* forms; but in the commentary on the *sūtra* "*Śrutatvācca* (and because of its being declared)" (I, 1, 11; Ś) there is cited the following hymn read in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* which sets out to demonstrate the glory of Parameśvara, the *Saguṇa* (Brahman): "There is of Him, in the world, no Lord nor controller nor any characteristic mark. He is the cause, the master of the masters of the senses; of Him there is neither Creator nor Master" *Śvet.* VI, 9). In introducing the *ānandamaya* section that follows (thereon), the whole of the rest of the chapter is shown to arise as referring to both the *Saguṇa* and the *Nirguṇa* (forms), in the words beginning with "Two forms, indeed, are understood of Brahman, (one) with the limitations of name, form and change, and (another) different therefrom, devoid of all limitations" and ending with "Thus, Brahman, though one, is taught in the Vedānta as connected with limitations and devoid of limitations, as an object to be meditated on and an object to be known; hence is commenced the rest of the work". Later, through the sūtras "The Self consisting of Bliss is the highest Self, on account of repetition (I, 1, 12; Ś)", "The bhūman is Brahman, as the instruction about it is additional to that about sleep (I, 3, 8; Ś)", "The Imperishable is Brahman, as it supports everything up to *ākāśa* (I, 3, 10; Ś)", "That which possesses the attributes of invisibility etc., is Brahman, because of the declaration of attributes

(I, 2, 21: *S*)", "The person of the measure of a thumb is Brahman, on account of the very term used (*Iśāna*) (I, 3, 24: *S*)", "On account of the mention of the highest Self as different in the states of deep sleep and departure (I, 3, 42; *S*)", the synthesis of Vedānta texts is shown with Brahman that is of the nature of Truth, Knowledge, Infinite Imperishable Bliss, devoid of all attributes like grossness etc., and is non-different from the inner Self. Similarly their synthesis in a suitable manner with even (that form of) Brahman which is endowed with attributes, united to a resplendent auspicious form for the purpose bestowing grace on devotees, possessed of infinite auspicious qualities like having desires which come true, purposes which come true, etc., is exhibited, in the sūtras, "The one within is Brahman on account of His qualities being declared (I, 1, 20; *S*)"; "That which consists of mind is Brahman, because what is known everywhere is taught (I, 2, 1: *S*)" "The small *ākāśa* is Brahman, because of what is said later, (I, 3, 14: *S*)", and so on. In the chapter devoted to showing absence of contradiction (in the Vedānta doctrine, i.e., the second chapter of the Sūtras), just as there is shown the refutation of objections to the synthesis with the attributeless (Brahman) in the *sūtra* "Their non-difference results from such terms as origin and the like (II, 1, 14: *S*)", (the same refutation is shown) even in the case of Brahman with attributes, possessed of the properties of being the material cause of the world, creating the world, bestowing grace on all beings etc., through the (following) sūtras; "Brahman cannot be the cause of the world, because of difference of nature; this difference is known from Scripture (II, 1, 4: *S*)", "Brahman is not the Creator of the world, as beings engaging in action have a motive (II, 1, 32: *S*)", "There is no inequality or cruelty in the Lord, on account of his regarding merit or demerit; for, so Scripture declares (II, 1, 34: *S*)", and the rest. In the (third) chapter teaching the means of attainment, the understanding of qualities like the possession of desires which come true is described for the purpose of meditation in the case of Brahman with attributes, in many sūtras like "Possession of true desires and so on have to be understood here and there, on account of abode and so on (III, 3, 39: *S*)"; (this is done) in the same way as the qualities of

Bliss etc., non-grossness etc., (are described) for the comprehension of Brahman without attributes, in the sūtras "Bliss and so on, as belonging to the subject, have to be understood everywhere (III, 3, 11 : Ś)", and "But the negative conceptions concerning the Imperishable are to be understood in all meditations, because of the equality, and of the object being the same, as in the case of the upasad; this has been explained (III, 3, 33: Ś)". In the (fourth) chapter about the fruit, in the first pāda, in the sūtras "Repetition is required, because of the text instructing more than once (IV, 1, 1: Ś)"; "But, as the Self, *Śruti* acknowledges and makes us understand Brahman (IV, 1, 3: Ś)"; "Sitting (a man is to meditate) on account of possibility (IV, 1, 7: Ś)"; "Where there is concentration, there meditation may be performed, there being no difference (IV, 1, 11: Ś)"; On the attainment of this, there is non-clinging and destruction of later and earlier sins; this being declared (IV, 1, 13: Ś)",—the repetition to be performed of hearing etc., in the case of the *Nirguṇa* (form), and of meditation etc., in the case of the *Saguṇa* from and some such other matters are shown by double interpretation[1] to govern both the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* forms. In the second *pāda* are described the mode of departure of the enlightened one for the purpose of attaining the fruit of meditation on the *Saguṇa* (form) and the absence of necessity for departure for the attainment of the fruit of Knowledge of the *Nirguṇa* (form). In the third *pāda*, it is shown that the path of light etc., is followed by those who know the *Saguṇa* Brahman, that what is attained by means of that path is the *Saguṇa*-Brahman. In the fourth *pāda* are determined the nature of the fruit attained by the knower of *Nirguṇa*-Brahman, in three sections beginning with "Having entered the highest light, there is manifestation of his own nature, as seen from the word 'own' (IV, 4, 1: Ś)", and also the nature of the fruit attained by him who meditates on the *Saguṇa* (form), in the sections beginning with "But by the mere wish, the released effect their desires, that being declared (IV, 4, 8: Ś)".

1. *Tantra* is a mode of interpreting a *sūtra* in more than one way, for different purposes; according to the dictionary, it is "a means which leads to two or more results" (Monier-Williams).

Now, if, in the manner stated, even by the *ācārya* Śaṅkara himself, who showed that for the Sūtras there is also a sense inquiring into the *Saguṇa* Brahman, there had been an inquiry into the nature, source of knowledge, means and the fruit in the case of *Saguṇa* Brahman too, for what purpose was another commentary written by the *ācārya* Śrīkaṇṭha with reference to the *Saguṇa* (form)? If it be said that it was for the purpose of securing excess of devotion to the *Saguṇa* (form) by interpreting the Sūtras, in their entirety, as referring to the *Saguṇa* (form), why did not the *ācārya* Śaṅkara interpret them as referring in entirety to the *Nirguṇa* (form), in order to secure increased faith in the *Nirguṇa*. If this be asked, we reply here (as follows). Only the existence of the *Saguṇa*-Brahman was established by Śaṅkarācārya; He was not demonstrated to be Parama Śiva, by the removal of doubts about His being any other deity like Viṣṇu. 3.23

In the *Daharādhikaraṇa*, (I, 3, 14: Ś), after making an initial statement of the conclusion that Parameśvara alone can be the small *ākāśa*, not the elemental ether or the finite self, there is introduced the answer to the following objection: "In the prior sentence 'that which in this Brahma City' etc., the finite self is referred to by the word Brahma, since that is the Lord of the city in the form of the body; hence, he alone, who was mentioned earlier, can be the small *ākāśa*"; therein, occur the words "Or else, it is in connection with the body of the finite self alone that there is taught the proximity of Brahman, like the proximity of Viṣṇu in the *sālagrāma*", which mentions as between Viṣṇu and *Saguṇa* Brahman that is to be determined to be the small *ākāśa*, a relationship as of object of comparison with the subject; hence, it is indicated that the *Saguṇa* Brahman here to be demonstrated is not of the form of Viṣṇu. For in the *daharādhikaraṇa* itself, both before and after (the present context) occur the words "though elemental ether is the conventional sense of the word *ākāśa*, yet the comparison of that with itself is not proper", and "though the word *ākāśa* is well-known to signify elemental ether, that is not to be understood, because of the absence of the relationship as between object and subject of comparison"; thereby is established the difference of the small *ākāśa* from the elemental 3.231

ether, because of the two being designated as subject and object of comparison, in the words "As big as is this ether, so big is that *ākāśa* within the heart" (*Ch.* VIII, 1, 3). The application of this principle is unbroken even in the case of what occurs in the middle (between those two statements of the commentary).

3.232 So, in the commentary of *yāvadadhikāra* section (III, 3, 32 : Ś) (it is said), "An ancient sage, a teacher of the Vedas, Apāntaratapas by name, at the direction of Viṣṇu, was born on the earth as Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana, at the time of the conjunction of the Kali and Dvāpara Yugas. Sanatkumāra also, a son of Brahmā's mind, was born as Skanda, because of the boon granted by himself to Rudra". By this indirect statement it is indicated through the argument *a fortiori* that Saṃhāra Rudra (the Lord of Destruction, one of the three forms of the Deity) thus shown to be inferior even to Viṣṇu can much less be *Saguṇa*-Brahman, (whose nature is) to be ascertained. It is well-known from the Purāṇas that Saṁhāra Rudra, verily, praying to Brahmā (thus) "I desire thee alone as a son or one like to thee, O Pervasive One" was granted the boon, and the consequent birth is the subject of the story of the birth of Kumāra. That *Saguṇa*-Brahman thus indicated to be different from Viṣṇu and Rudra is Parama Śiva, higher than the three forms of the Deity, is shown by the use of the expression Paramaśiva, generally signifying Parama Śiva, in the case of the *Saguṇa*-Brahman, (whose identity is) desired to be determined in the sections about (the being) within the Sun (I, 1, 20 : Ś), and so on.

3.233 Vācaspati Miśra, who knew what the Bhagavatpāda had at heart, says at the commencement of his work (*Bhāmatī*) "To the eternal being endowed with six limbs and manifold members, to the Veda and to Bhava, we bow". Here by the terms "Veda" and "Bhava" are suitably understood what are related as source and object of knowledge, and designated as worthy of adoration; it is (thus) indicated that *Saguṇa*-Brahman, (whose nature is) ascertained in that work, is but Parama Śiva, (who is) well-known to be denoted by the word "Bhava", and qualified by a host of auspicious attributes in the form of six limbs and ten members.

Though (there are such indications in Śaṅkara's system), yet this is not established by refuting in the case of the relevant texts in each section, (their possible) reference to other deities. Extremely subtle suggestions cannot of themselves be evidence appealing to the hearts of the hearers; hence, for that purpose, a separate commentary is begun by the *ācārya* (Śrīkaṇṭha) in order to demonstrate the harmony of the Vedānta texts with the position that the *Saguṇa* Brahman taught in this *Śāstra* is but Parama Śiva, that He alone is to be meditated on as conjoined with Umā, in accordance with the injunctions in the *Dahara*, *Śāṇḍilya*, *Upakośala*, *Vaiśvānara* and other Vidyās, and that the abode attained through the path of light etc., by the devotees of the *Saguṇa* (form) is but His resplendent world. 3.234

The advantage of demonstrating that (i.e., *Saguṇa*-Brahman) is thus declared in the following verse of the *Kalpataru*: "The demonstration (of Brahman) as with attributes is out of compassion for those dull-witted ones who have not the capacity to intuite the Supreme Brahman without attributes; having thereby directed their minds to the pursuit of the *Saguṇa*-Brahman, it (*Nirguṇa* Brahman), devoid of all figments of duality, directly manifests itself" (*Kalpataru*, p. 192)[1]. Now, if, for gaining this advantage, another commentary (like that of Śrīkaṇṭha) has necessarily to be undertaken, the demonstration of *Saguṇa* Brahman in Śaṅkara's commentary is in vain. If this be said, listen to (our account of) the purposefulness even of that. The commentary is begun by Śaṅkara Bhagavatpāda only with the object of demonstrating *Nirguṇa*-Brahman. That demonstration has to be effected in each section by refuting the doubts and *prima facie* views arising out of the possible reference of the relevant texts in each section to what is other (than Brahman), such as the finite self and so on. That refutation has to be effected by means of such characteristics as the properties of creating all, protecting all, controlling all, destroying all, and so on. There is room for this doubt: of Brahman that is demonstrated here, of which all attributes are denied, (and which is of the nature of Intelligence alone, whence 3.184

1. Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrin's edition.

these attributes by the acceptance of which as characteristic of Brahman, the *prima facie* references to the finite self etc., are refuted? This is the statement of the answer: though really devoid of attributes, yet from the empirical standpoint there are of Brahman many characteristics of the nature of auspicious qualities. As endowed with these, that same Brahman without attributes, is also figuratively called Brahman with attributes.[1] The attributes of that qualified (Brahman) meditated on in the *Dahara*, *Śāṇḍilya*, *Vaiśvānara* and other modes of contemplation are also taught in the topic concerning the non-qualified (Brahman), as a means of comprehending it and for the purpose of remembering it; by these are refuted the *prima facie* references to the finite self and so on; in order that they may be comprehended as useful for that purpose (of refutation), they have to be demonstrated by citation of the texts relating thereto.

3.2351 The demonstration is also needed for the comprehension of the fruit. This is how it is needed: though from the view-point of truth, the first fruit of the knowledge of the truth is the attainment of Brahman's Being, yet the same non-qualified Brahman, takes on and continues in the form of Iśvara with attributes, until the (final) liberation of all; hence, from the empirical view-point, the fruit (of knowledge) turns out to be of the form of the attainment of the nature of Parmeśvara, characterised by the possession of desires which come true and so on. Hence it is that in the first chapter, in the section relating to the small *ākāśa*, it is (first) made clear through the qualities like possession of desires which come true, etc., mentioned in the residual sentences, that the small *ākāśā* is Parameśvara; then is raised the doubt that these are not characteristic of Parameśvara, since the qualities are mentioned of the finite self too, in the words "That self free from sin, old age, death, sorrow, hunger, and thirst, possessing desires which come true", occuring in the *Prajāpati-Vidyā* (*Ch.* VIII, 7, 1); in the *sūtra Uttarāccedāvirbhūta svarūpastu* (if it be said that as seen from a later context, the finite self is meant, there is that reference to the finite self only in so far as its true

1. The reading *upacaryate* seems to be more significant than *ucyate*, and consequently preferable.

nature has become manifest)" (I, 3, 19: Ś), which sets out to remove that objection), it is said (in the following words) that the manifestation of qualities, like the possession of desires which come true, in the released soul is only on the attainment of the nature of Parameśvara, not in the state of difference therefrom, and that there is thus no inappropriateness in their being characteristic of Brahman: "Hence, that non-ultimate form of the finite self established in ignorance, sullied by the faults of agency and enjoyment, attachment and aversion and the rest, united to manifold evil, by the dissolution of that (form), what is opposed thereto, viz., the true nature of Parameśvara, possessed of the qualities of freedom from sin etc., *is attained through knowledge*" (*Ś Bh.* M. Ed. p. 175).

Even in the first chapter, in the *jagadvācitva* section (I, 4, 3.2352
16, *et seq*: Ś) while leading up to the establishment of the reference to the Supreme Brahman by the introductory and the concluding portions of the discussions between Bālāki and Ajātaśatru, it is said "the reference even of the concluding portion to Brahman is seen from the statement of unsurpassed fruit in the text 'keeping off all sin, he who knows thus attains pre-eminence over all beings, independence, and mastery'"; thereby, it is shown that the fruit of release is of the form of attainment of the nature of Īśvara with attributes; for, mastery of all beings does not exist elsewhere than in Parameśvara.

In the second chapter too, in the *aṁśādhikaraṇa* (II, 3, 43 3.2353
et seq: Ś), the attainment of the nature of Parameśvara by the released one is made clear by the following statement of objection, "If the finite self be admitted to be an element of Īśvara, then from his experience of the sorrows of bondage, there would be experience of misery for Īśvara also; just as in ordinary experience, by the pain occurring in the hand, foot or some other part, there is experience of pain for Devadatta, of whom that is a part. And hence, those who attain that will attain greater misery. Therefore, the prior state of bondage would itself be superior; hence, perfect knowledge would be fraught with evil" (*Ś. Bh.*, M. Ed. p. 480-481). It is also (made clear) by the reply (which

is) bassed on the non-confusion effected by the well-known relationship of original and reflected image. Nor may the word Īśvara be interpreted in some way so as to signify pure Intelligence; for, in the prior section "*Parat tu tacchruteḥ* (from the Supreme, that being declared)" (II, 3, 41 and 42: Ś) it is (first made clear that the agency of the finite self is dependent on the Lord; then is introduced the secondary *sūtra* of that section "(The Lord acts) having regard to the effort made, for the sake of the non-futility of injunctions and prohibitions (II, 3, 42: Ś)" in order to answer the objection, "if, now, there be causal agency in the Lord, there should also be (in Him) inequality and cruelty"; that section thus relates to the *Saguṇa* Lord; therefore, the *aṁśa* section, which follows it (also) relates to the same topic. The identity of topic with the preceding section is (also) made plain by the (following) introductory passage of the present section setting out the *prima facie* view: "The relationship of the helper and the helped has been declared as between the Lord and the finite self. The relationship is observed in experience, as between master and servant or as between fire and sparks. Hence, the relationship of the helper and the helped being admitted as between the Lord and the finite self, in the enquiry whether it is to be said to be like the relationship of master and servant or like that of fire and sparks, (the *prima facie* view is) that it is either undetermined or that it is the relationship of master and servant, that variety being well-known to be the relation of the ruler and the ruled". (Ś. *Bh.*, M. Ed. p. 478).

3.2354 In the third chapter, in the section on dreams (III, 2, 1 *et seq*: Ś), the *sūtra* "But by meditation on the Supreme that which is hidden is made manifest; from Him, indeed, proceed bondage and its opposite (III, 2, 5: Ś)" is introduced in order to answer the objection that the creation of the imaginary chariot etc., in dreams comes about through the lordly powers of the finite self, who is non-different from the Lord. In explaining that *sūtra*, (it is said) "Though the finite self and the Lord be related as element and that of which it is an element, the difference in characteristics between the finite self and the Lord is certainly patent. Is there then no community of characteristics between

the finite self and the Lord? Not that there is none; but though existent, it is hidden by the veil of ignorance and so on. That, again, which is hidden, is manifested to some person, who, having their ignorance dispelled by strenuous meditation on Parameśvara that is Existence, attain perfection by the grace of the Lord—just as the power of clear vision is recovered by the potency of medicine on the removal of the obscuring film" (*Ś. Bh.*, M. Ed. p. 568). In this context is exhibited the attainment of the nature of *Saguṇa* (Brahman) by the released one; for, on the attainment of the form of pure Intelligence, there cannot be the manifestation of the qualities, such as possession of purposes which come true and so on.

In the fourth chapter, (this is made still more clear in the 3.2355
following way): being desirous to know in what form is described the manifestation (of the soul) referred to in the texts "in its own nature (the soul) manifests itself (*Ch.* VIII, 12, 3)", we are told by the *sūtra* "By the form of Brahman, (thinks) Jaimini, because of the reference and the rest (IV, 4, 5: *Ś*)", that manifestation is in that form of Brahman (the description of which) begins with freedom from sin, ends with the possession of purposes which come true, and includes omniscience and lordship over all: (this is seen) from the reference (in the text) "That Self free from sin etc.," (*Ch.* VIII, 1, 5), and the passage "He moves about there, laughing, playing, rejoicing, with women or vehicles" (*Ch.* VIII, 12, 3), which makes known the possession of lordly powers; so thinks Jaimini. In the next *sūtra* "By the nature of Intelligence alone, that being the nature of the Self; thus thinks Auḍulomi (IV, 4, 6: *Ś*)", a different opinion is introduced, that, the true nature of the self being understood to be bare Intelligence, from the texts "Thus this Self has neither inside nor outside, but is only a mass of Intelligence" (*Bṛh.* IV, 5, 13), the manifestation is by that alone. The next *sūtra* "Though it be thus, because of the reference to and the existence of the qualities mentioned earlier there is absence of contradiction; so Bādarāyaṇa thinks (IV, 4, 7: *Ś*)", which states the conclusion, is thus explained: "Even though the ultimate nature (of the Self) as Pure Intelligence is admitted, (yet) since there is no denial of the lordly power of

Brahman understood from earlier references and so on, from the empirical view-point, Bādarāyaṇācārya holds that there is no contradiction" (Ś. Bh., M. Ed. p. 850): thereby it is made still more clear that the released one attains the nature of *Saguṇa* Īśvara, possessed of unexcelled lordly power. Since it has to be said in the doctrine of *Nirguṇa* Brahman, that the attainment thereof is release, how can it be said that the attainment of the nature of *Saguṇa* Īśvara is release? This doubt too is answered, thereby. Though from the view-point of truth, the released one is but bare intelligence, (yet) from the empirical view-point of the bound soul, till the (final) release of all, there will attach to the soul that has attained the nature of Parameśvara, that is the original imge (as contrasted with the individual who is the reflected image), as well as to Parameśvara Himself, unsurpassed lordly power and the entire host of other attributes well-known to belong to Parameśvara. Thus, the commentary of the Bhagavatpāda undertakes to exhibit all the auspicious qualities of Parameśvara mentioned at length in all meditations on the *Saguṇa* form; for, (these qualities), are useful in exhibiting the characteristics of Brahman for the purpose of demonstrating the characterless (Brahman), and are further helpful in elaborating the glory of the *Saguṇa* Lord, who is of the form of the fruit attained by true knowledge; what has to be expounded being thus extensive, in (that commentary), though primarily setting out to demonstrate *Nirguṇa* Brahman, talk of the *Saguṇa* form is seen to bulk largely, while the inquiry into the *Nirguṇa* form, owing to non-extensiveness of what is to be expounded, takes up little space. Just as in the four Vedas, all setting out only with the identical object of teaching the supreme spiritual good,—(which is) of the nature of attainment of Brahman,—for the purpose of showing grace to all creatures, the exposition of action alone, which generates purity of the internal organ, as helpful thereto (i.e., the attainment of Brahman) is elaborated at length; the Vedānta portion, which has for its object the exposition of Brahman, is small, because of non-extensiveness of what is to be expounded.

3.2356 Now, if thus, the inquiry into the *Saguṇa* form is for the purpose of inquiry into the *Nirguṇa* form, the former follows by

arthāpatti, even from the promissory statement as to the latter inquiry, as something (necessarily) to be undertaken, like the inquiry into the means and fruit; (but) by the statement in the commentary "Brahman does exist etc.," it is declared that the term "Brahman" referring to what is to be inquired into is common to the *Saguṇa* form, in order to secure the conclusion that the inquiry into the *Saguṇa* form too is promised. Why should this be done? If (you) ask this, know then, that is declared as helpful to the promise in respect of that (inquiry), in order to indicate that for the *Brahma-Sūtras*, in their entirety, there is another interpretion as referring to the *Saguṇa* (form). (The other interpretation is arrived at) by recourse to differences in the combination (of words) and so on. It is only to show (this), at least to some extent, to those eager (to understand) how the other interpretation (is arrived at), that, on the analogy of the single rice from the pot, two varṇakas are set out in the *śāstrayoni-sūtra* (I, 1, 3 : Ś). It is only to show that the commentator has followed the maxim of the single rice from the pot, in setting out these two interpretations of the *śāstrayoni-sūtra*, referring to both the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* forms, that the author of the *Kalpataru* himself makes clear the indication of a reference to both the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* forms, in the commentary (*bhāṣya*) on the *sūtra* "But *agnihotra* and the like tend to the same effect, that being shown by Scripture (IV, 1, 16 : Ś)". By him, indeed, an interpretation is offered of the *sūtra* "*agnihotra* and the like etc.," (IV, 1, 16 : Ś), relating it to the attributeless (form), (in the following way): *agnihotra* and the rest have an effect of the nature of that direct knowledge of the attributeless Brahman, which is praised by the words "on the attainment of that" in the *sūtra* "on the attainment of that, later and earlier sins etc., (IV, 1, 13 : Ś);" this is shown by the text "they desire to know, by sacrifice etc., (*Bṛh.* IV, 4, 22)". Though opposed to the genus *Karma*, as burning down the whole host of *Karma*, yet the origination of that knowledge by specific acts such as permanently obligatory sacrificial rites, is not inconsistent; for, though the burning is of the entire forest, the burning of the forest is seen to be the work of the bamboos etc., in the forest. Then is shown

another interpretation relating to the *Saguṇa* form: *agnihotra* and the rest have the effect of the attainment of *Saguṇa*-Brahman, the observance of sacrifices etc., being seen in Kekaya and others who knew *Saguṇa* Brahman. There is not, as in the case of the fruit of knewledge of the attributeless, any inconsistency in the fruit of devotion to the *Saguṇa* being effected by *Karma*, since that (fruit), which is of the form of enjoyment in Brahmaloka, is seen to admit of degrees. Thus, another interpretation for all the *Brahma-Sūtras*, referring them to the *Saguṇa* (form), has been but indicated by Śaṅkarācārya, by showing that the term "Brahman" which is the object of inquiry in the *jijñāsā sūtra* (I, 1, 1) is common to the *Saguṇa* form too, and by showing in some cases, two interpretations referring to both the *Saguṇa* and *Nirguṇa* (forms); it is to make this manifest for the purpose of showing grace to devotees that (the other interpretation) is undertaken by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya.

3.241 Now, this mode of demonstrating *Saguṇa* Brahman, being unopposed to the recognition of *Nirguṇa* Brahman, is acceptable to Śaṅkarācārya; if this same be what is shown by Śrīkaṇṭhācārya, then in his system, only those Vedānta texts which are admitted to refer to *Saguṇa* Brahman should be cited in the (respective) sections, and their sense determined to refer to the *Saguṇa* Lord acceptable to him after refuting their reference etc., to other deities. (But) those very Vedānta texts, such as the *Sad-Vidyā* (*Ch.* VI, 2, *et seq*), *Ānanda Valli* (*Taitt.* II), the story of Pratardana (*Kauṣ.* III, 1), *Kaṭha-Valii*, the *Antaryāmi-Brāhmaṇa* (*Bṛh.* III, 7), the *Muṇḍaka*, *Bhūma-Vidyā* (*Ch.* VII, 23 & 24), and so on, which are determined in the respective sections to relate to the attributeless (Brahman), are seen to be determined by him in in those very sections, to refer to the *Saguṇa* (Brahman). If they too relate to the *Saguṇa* (Brahman), on what authority are we to hold that the recognition of *Nirguṇa*-Brahman is based? Hence, it is clear that the present commentary is set out only in opposition to the doctrine of *Nirguṇa*-Brahman. If this be said, it is answered (as follows).

3.242 Śrīkaṇṭhācārya admits as his own final position, these conclusions of Non-dualism, (which are) helpful in reaching to pure-non-

dualism, viz., that the entire world, intelligent and non-intelligent is of the form of Brahman's *Cit-Śakti*, that it is of the nature of Brahman, non-different from Him, and of the form of all His auspicious qualities, that Brahman is really non-changing, that the perception "the pot exists" etc., relates to the existentiality of Brahman, that the perception "the pot appears" relates to the manifestation of Brahman, and that the perception "I am happy" relates to a fragment of the Bliss of Brahman; he expresses the opinion "there is liberation even here for the devotees of the Non-related", wherever there is occasion for the contrary opinion, and he establishes that (opinion), (speaking) in his own person; hence it is not possible to deny that in his ultimate conclusion Brahman is attributeless, unconnected with the world, non-distinct from all finite selves, and of the nature of pure non-duality. For, if this were denied, there would result conflict with many of his conclusions. So, in acknowledging pure-Brahman, only the *Sad-Vidyā* and other Vedānta texts determined by Śaṅkarācarya to relate thereto are the basic authority. The demonstration of the harmony of their sense with the *Saguṇa* (form) is not in the view that they have no reference to the *Nirguṇa* (form), but rather in the view that there is significance in respect of the *Saguṇa* also. Of texts which set out to introduce qualities, though occurring in topics related to *Nirguṇa*, such as the *Sad-Vidyā* and so on, there is, indeed, an intermediate significance in respect of the *Saguṇa*, as qualified by the respective attributes, (a significance) by holding to which Brahman's characteristics are explained even in the *Śāṅkara-Bhāṣya*. Thus, verily, in the *īkṣatyadhikaraṇa* (I, 1, 5, *et seq*: *S*), the initial seeing (i.e., desiring) is the characteristic; in the *ānandamaya* section, creatorship of all which is mentioned in the *sūtra*, "And because of its being declared to be the cause (I, 1, 14: *S*)" and declared in the text "He created all this etc., whatever is here (*Taitt*. II, 6)." is the characteristic; in the section "Prāṇa is Brahman, that being understood from a connected consideration of the passages (I, 1, 28, *et seq*: *S*)", controllership, mentioned in such texts as "He is the Lord of the world, He is the protector of the world" (*Kauṣ* III, 8), which embrace the grounds for the understanding (referred to in the

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sūtra), constitutes the characteristic; in the section "The eater (is Brahman) since whatever is movable and immoveable is mentioned" (I, 2, 9, *et seq* : *Ś*), the characteristic is the property of destroying the world indicated by the words Brāhmin and Kṣatriya, mentioned in the text under reference "He of whom both Brāhmin and Kṣatriya become the food (*Kaṭha*, II, 25)", which states the ground (mentioned) in the *sūtra*; in the section "The internal ruler of the devas (is Brahman), His qualities being designated" (I, 2, 18, *et seq*: *Ś*) the characteristic is internal rulership of all, as mentioned in the text "He who directs the earth from within" which establishes the ground (mentioned) in the *sūtra*; in the section "That which possesses the attributes of invisibility etc., (is Brahman), because of the declaration of attributes" (I, 2, 21 *et seq*: *Ś*), the characteristic mark is omniscience etc., mentioned in the text "He who knows all, he who understands all" establishing the ground (mentioned) in the *sūtra*; in the *bhūmādhikaraṇa* (I, 3, 8 & 9: *Ś*) the characteristic mark is being the cause of all, as stated in texts, like "from the self, the prāṇas (*Ch*. VII, 26, 1)" etc., which establish the second *sūtra* (of the section) "And on account of agreement of the attributes (I, 3, 9: *Ś*)"; in the section about the Imperishable (I, 3, 10, *et seq*: *Ś*), the property of directing is the characteristic mark, as mentioned in texts like "By the direction of that Imperishable, O Gārgi, Sun and Moon stand apart (*Bṛh*. III, 8, 9)", which establish the second *sūtra* "This supporting can be the work only of Brahman, because of the direction, declared of the Imperishable (I, 3, 11: *Ś*)", in the section about deep sleep and departure (I, 3, 42 & 43: *Ś*), the characteristic mark is the mastery of all and the rest, mentioned in texts like "Controller of all, Lord of all, Master of all (*Bṛh*. IV, 4, 22)," which establish the second *sūtra* "And on account of such words as Lord etc., (I, 3, 43; *Ś*)"; in the *jagadvācitva* section, (I, 4, 16, *et seq*: *Ś*), the characteristic mark is the creatorship of the whole world, mentioned in the text "He, O! Bālāki, who is the creator of all these persons, He of whom they are the creations, He, verily, is to be known (*Kauṣ*. IV, 19)", which is included in the ground (mentioned) in the *sūtra*; and in the section *vākyānvayāt* (I, 4, 19: *Ś*), the creatorship

of the entire world of name, form, and work, as mentioned in texts like "What we have as the *Ṛg.-Veda, Yajur Veda*, etc., has been breathed forth from this mighty Being (*Bṛh.* II, 4, 10)", (is the characteristic mark as) that is embraced by the word "connected meaning" (in the *sūtra*, "on account of the connected meaning of the texts"). There is thus found mention of the form and characteristics qualifying *Saguṇa*-Brahman in sections relating to the *Nirguṇa*. By that it is necessarily understood that though these texts mentioning the respective attributes occur in topics concerning the *Nirguṇa*, there is of them an intermediate significance in respect of the *Saguṇa* form qualified by the respective attributes. On this is based Śrīkaṇṭhācārya's declaration of the synthesis of the topical text in each section with *Saguṇa*-Parameśvara. The non-declaration of the synthesis with the *Nirguṇa*, the object of ultimate significance, is for the purpose of increasing devotion to the *Saguṇa*, by concealing the (other) and is, hence, legitimate.

Now, the non-declaration of synthesis with the *Nirguṇa* may, 3.2421
in the manner indicated, not be opposed (to the recognition of pure-non-dualism). (But) the texts relating directly to the *Nirguṇa*, by identity of construction wherewith, those *Saguṇa* texts occurring in *Nirguṇa* contexts have to be shown to refer, in the end, to *Nirguṇa* (Brahman), as their ultimate significance, even of these a *Saguṇa* interpretation is seen (to be offered) with (much) effort; as, for instance, of the text "one only without a second" in the *īkṣatyadhikaraṇa* (I, 1, 5, *et seq*) or of the text "where nothing else is seen etc.," in the *bhūmādhikaraṇa* (I, 3, 7 & 8) or o the text "just as, dear one, by one lump of clay all that is made of clay is known, all modification being a name based on words, the truth being clay alone, in the *ārambhaṇa* section (II, 1, 15, *et seq*). The *Saguṇa* interpretation offered of the first of these texts is cited even in (our exposition of) the *prima facie* view, (in this work). Of the third, the following two interpretations are shown: modification (form) and name are *vācārambhaṇam*, i.e., become the cause of speech, of the nature of designation and utility. The mode pitcher etc., and the name pitcher etc., which become the producers of experience, of the nature of desig-

nation and utility, are only of the substance clay. In reality, pitcher etc., are true, i.e., veritable, only as clay, the existence of the pitcher not being seen apart from the clay. *Or else*, change is *vācārambhaṇam*, i.e, the modification pitcher is the object only of the statement "This is a pitcher". It (the pitcher) is but another mode originated from the substance clay for practical purposes, not a substance other than clay. The name is true only in respect of the clay; "all names like clay, pitcher, etc., are true,—truth is what holds of Sat, i.e., a veritable object—when pitchers etc., are considered to be but clay, not when considered to be another substance; (this is) because the pitcher is but clay". These two interpretations are offered to show that the *vācārambhaṇa* text seeks to establish the essential non-difference of cause and effect, and to refute the view that the text seeks to establish non-reality of the effect, which is distinct from the cause. Thus, verily, knowledge of all by the knowledge of one having been promised earlier, in order to explain that, the text "Just as, dear one, by one lump of clay everything made of clay is known" is introduced as an illustration. Here, (it may be said) this illustration does not apply. The lump of clay being radically distinct from its modifications, pitcher, basin, etc., because of difference of utility and designation, from the knowledge of the lump of clay, knowledge of its modifications does not follow. With reference to this objection, it is the opinion of the *ācārya* (Śrīkaṇṭha) that the *vācārambhaṇa* text has set out with the object of setting forth an illustration establishing the non-difference of the effect and cause, viz., pitcher and lump of clay.

3.24211 This is the sense of his first interpretation. *Modification* means the property of being a pitcher, i.e., having a large rounded belly and so on; *name* means a word like pitcher etc., whose functioning is conditioned by that; both these are *vācārambhaṇa*. "*Vācā*" is speech, discourse, such as "bring the pitcher"; thereby is indicated also the utility arising therefrom. "*Ārambhaṇam*" means begun, originated thereby, i.e., cause. The cause of speech; that is, modification and name are respectively the cause of utility and designation. The word *ārambhaṇam* applied to both *vikāraḥ* (in the masculine) and *nāmadheyam* (in the neuter)

is in the neuter gender and singular number, because of the rule, "A neuter noun, which has the same form, only differing in affix, is optionally retained, and the other dropped, and it is like a singular number (*Pāṇini*, I, 2, 69)"[1] This is what is said thereby. Of the lump of clay and its modifications, though identical in substance, there is difference (in respect) of utility and designation, due to difference of form such as lumpiness and the possession of a large round belly, as also to the difference of name, whose functioning is conditioned thereby.

Now, because of the doubt, "why is there not the same difference (here) as between different substances like the cow and the buffalo?", it is said that the clayiness alone is true; of the pitcher, basin, etc., clayiness alone is (veritable), it being proved by the recognition "that very lump of clay is now of the form of the pitcher," and the test of the absence of difference, between them in respect of heaviness. Having thus established their proved identity, it is proper to postulate of the differences involved in discourse and (practical) utility that they are of the nature of the limiting adjuncts of name and form; this is what is meant.

As for the second interpretation, this is its sense. Modification 3.24212
originates in speech; the modification—pitcher, basin, etc., is an object only of the judgment "This is a pitcher", and not a substance other than clay.

Now, (there is) the doubt, if it is not a substance other than clay, how do the names pitcher, basin, etc., not applicable in the stage of the lump of clay, come to be applied later on? (In reply to this doubt) it is said, the name is true only is respect of the clay; even the names pitcher, basin etc., apply to an existent veritable substance, only considered as that substance clay, not considered as another substance; for, another substance is unproveable, being opposed to recognition and so on. On this view, because of the *Smṛti* text "the word *Sat* (is used of) the true and the fitting", to the word *Sat* which is a synonymn of *Satya*

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1. The translation is that of *The Sacred Books of the Hindus.*

signifying a veritable being, is added the suffix *ya* signifying what is applicable thereto. The word '*ārambhaṇa*' has to be construed as ultimately meaning the condition of being what the word denotes, since it means here not the originator (but) the condition of being the originator. Though it is predicated of what is in the masculine gender, it is mentioned in the neuter, which is used to describe what is of common gender, as in the *Sūtra* of Pāṇini, "*Dvigureka vacanam*, the compound *Dvigu* is singular in number (where the subject *Dvigu* is in the masculine and the predicate *ekavacanam* is in the neuter)" (*Pāṇini,-Sūtra* II, 4, 1).[1] This is the peculiarity (of the interpretation),

3.24213 In the same way, in the sections "*na sthānata* (III, 2, 11, *et seq*)" and the rest, the texts referring to absence of attributes and form in Brahman, and to non-connection with the world are interpreted to signify the absence of objectionable qualities and (the existence of) connection with the world. Further, the supreme declarations "That thou art" etc., which are at the very head of the authorities for non-difference of the finite self from Brnhman, are stated in support of the *prima facie* view as to the non-difference of the finite self from Brahman in the *sūtra* II, 1, 21 and III, 4, 2, which are the sūtras setting out the *prima facie* view occuring in the *ārambhaṇa* section (II, 1, 15, *et seq*) and the *puruṣārtha* section (III, 4, 1, *et seq*); then there is the commentary on the two sūtras stating the conclusion (in each section), viz., "But more, because of the designation of difference (II, 1, 22)" and "But because of the teaching of the different one, Bādarāyaṇa's view is valid, this being seen (III, 4, 8); there is also the commentary on the two secondary sūtras of the *ākāśa* section in the third *pāda* (of chapter I), viz., "Because of difference in sleep and at departure (I, 3, 43)" and "Because of expressions like Lord and so on (I, 3, 44)", which are introduced as a reply to the objection that there is no Parameśvara other than the inner self, because of the teaching in such texts as "That thou art"; in all these, that (*prima facie* view) is refuted, since those (texts) do not refer to non-difference, as shown by the citation of manifold texts establishing difference.

1. The translation is that of *The Sacred Books of the Hindus.*

In the section beginning with "(The jīva is) a part (of Brahman) etc." (II, 3, 42, *et seq*), in setting out to refute the *prima facie* view that Brahman Himself, because of limiting adjuncts, attains the nature of the finite self, the supreme declarations (of non-difference) are directly interpreted (as follows), as signifying something other (than non-difference): from the teaching of such texts as "That thou art", "This Self is Brahman" etc., there is absence of otherness between Brahman and the finite self, as between pervader and what is pervaded; just as between the bodies pervaded by the Yogin and the Yogin who pervades them, there is inseparability and absence of otherness, so too as between the finite selves and Brahman. All this is certainly opposed to the acceptance of pure-non-dualism. 3.24214

If (the above) be said, all that is (presently) explained in such a manner as is not inconsistent (with the acceptance of pure-non-dualism). The *sūtra* "But more, because of the designation of difference (II, 1, 23)" is one which establishes not that the finite self is different from Brahman, but rather that, because of the mention of difference in respect of little knowingness and omniscience and so on, Brahman is higher than the finite self in respect of the qualities of omniscience etc., and that hence the bonds of agency, enjoyment etc., in the finite self are illusory. There is not for Him as for the finite self the erroneous notion that the creation of the world which is the ground thereof (i.e., of agency and enjoyment) is the doing of what is undesirable; therefore, that (creation) is only for His sport, according to the maxim, "(just as) a person plays with (his) reflection seeing the effect of straightness, crookedness etc., occurring therein, so does Brahman (play) with the modifications of the finite self"; this is what the sūtra is directed to establish. Otherwise, the defect of not effecting what is agreeable,—which is suspected (in Brahman) on the basis of the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman,—being removed even by the exhibition of their difference, the statement in the *sūtra* about (Brahman) being "more" will become useless. (Now) the next *sūtra* is "And as in stones etc., that is inappropriate (II, 1, 23)", and the commentary thereon (is to the effect) that since it is declared of the 3.24221

finite selves too, as a stone, a stick, a clod or a wisp of straw that in virtue of their ignorance etc., they belong to a class entirely different from Īśvara, who is associated with ominiscience etc., the identity of the two is inappropriate; it appears from this that by refuting the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, their difference is established. Though (this be so), yet its (real) significance is in the refutation of the non-difference of the class of inert beings from Brahman, by the *a fortiori* argument, on the ground that when non-difference does not hold even of the finite self which to some extent at least belongs to the same class (as Brahman), what then of the Non-intelligent, which is entirely of a different class? Hence, the immediately following portion of the commentary: "thus, even of the Intelligent, there is non-appropriateness of the being of Īśvara, because of their difference in respect of excess of attributes; what then of the Non-intelligent which is essentially of a different character? This is the sense". Nor may it be said that, when because of the creation of the world, the defect of not effecting what is agreeable is suspected on the basis of the non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, the refutation of that should proceed by the establishment either of their difference or their being related as higher and lower, though non-different, and that the refutation of the non-difference of the class of inert beings from Brahman serves no purpose here. For, though not useful here, it is useful in establishing that the non-otherness mentioned in the *sūtra* II, 1, 15 (*tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*) is not of the form of non-difference of the class of inert beings from Brahman. Hence it is that these three sūtras II, 1, 21 to 23 beginning with *Itaravyapadeśāt* etc., are not interpreted in this commentary as constituting a separate section, as (they are) in other commentaries.[1] Similarly, even the *adhikopadeśa-sūtra* (III, 4, 8) occurring in the section about the *summum bonum* seeks only to show that Parameśvara, (who is) higher than the finite self, does exist, by refuting the *prima facie* view that there is no being whatsoever of the name

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1. If they constituted a separate section, II, 1, 23 would not relate back to II, 1, 15, as Appayya Dīkṣita wants to make out. It is worth noting that according to the Mysore Edition, II, 1, 21–23 constitute a fresh *adhikaraṇa*.

of Parameśvara, and that the Upaniṣadic knowledge of the self is only knowledge relating to the finite self. So too, the two sūtras beginning with that about deep sleep and departure (I, 3, 43 and 44) refer only to the existence of Parameśvara who is higher than the finite self, not to the establishment of difference (between the two). Hence it is that in the commentaries on the sūtras, there is no interpretation offered favouring (the view of) difference, of the texts like *That thou art*, which are mentioned in the statement of the *prima facie* view, as supporting that (view).

Though in the commentary on the *aṁśa* section (II, 8, 42, 3.24222
et seq) there is an interpretation of them as favouring difference, yet, that (interpretation) being negatived by the commentary on the *sūtra* "But as the Self, *Śruti* acknowledges and makes us understand Brahman (IV, I, 3)", is not capable of expressing their inherent meaning. There, verily, the commentary expounding the final position, which sets about to refute the *prima faeie* view—that meditation on Brahman by those desirous of release should be performed only as on what is different from one-self as on one's śeṣin (i.e., the principal to which one is accessory) and not as identical with one-self—(proceeds thus): "though the Supreme Brahman known as Śiva is certainly higher than the finite self, yet the devotee meditates on that as 'I am Brahman', for the reason that devotees of yore have understood that as but the Self (saying) 'I am, verily, Thou, O Lord, O Divinity, Thou, verily. art I': though the Being meditated on is a being different from the devotees, the Supreme Being (yet) bestows grace on them by conferring his own form. They, in turn, teach that as the Self to other disciples, through (texts like) 'That thou art'". It is but clear that by the exhibition here of the non-dualistic sense of texts like *That thou art*, the sense of inseparability declared earlier, on the basis of the relationship of body and the embodied, is negatived. It is only in order to show this that the *Jābāla* text "I am, verily, Thou" is cited. This sense has been elaborated earlier, in order to show that if the co-ordination were limited to the relationship of the body and the embodied, the words "I am, verily, Thou" would be inappropriate. That the

natural sense of the text *That thou art* is but non-difference has also been elaborated already.

3.242221 It cannot be that what is said in the *aṁśa* section (II, 3, 42 *et seq*) is negatived by this; for, it is not proper that what is established in an earlier section, on the strength of sūtras, should be later negatived by one-self. The commentator's opinion should, rather, be taken to be this: Brahman is to be meditated on either as embodied in one's self, in the *Dahara* and other meditations, in the manner stated in the *aṃśa* section (II, 3, 42 *et seq*), or as non-different from one-self in the manner stated in the *ahaṃgraha* section (IV, 1, 3). And thus, of the sentence "They in turn teach that as the Self to other disciples, through texts like *That thou art*", the sense must be taken to be that texts like *That thou art* refer to the *meditation* of non-difference, and not to real non-difference; for, difference and non-difference are opposed.

3.242222 This objection too is refuted (thus): it is improper to postulate the acceptance by the commentator of the sense of the text *That thou art*, as declared in the *aṃśa* section, (II, 3, 42, *et seq*), for, that is opposed (1) to the legitimate sense of the *Jābāla* text and the expression "*Thou art*" (in "*That thou art*"), (2) to the commentary on the *ahaṃgraha* section (IV, 1, 3) which is intended to establish—in the (following) words, "The attainment of Śiva's nature which is abundance of limitless supreme Bliss is release; the attainment of Śiva's nature cannot come about except by the cessation of the state of the bound creature; the cessation of that state of bondage cannot be except by the meditation of that (*Śivatva*). Hence, the devotee from whom the state of bondage is gone, by the destruction of the bonds in the torrent of ceaseless contemplation 'I am Brahman', becomes Śiva Himself"—that there is no release except by the meditation of non-difference from Brahman, and (3) to the commentary on the *ādhyāna* section (III, 3, 14), which establishes the abandonment of all that is understood to be different from Śiva, in the meditation on Śiva, for the purpose of release; further, it is not proper to hold that that the sense of difference declared in the *aṁśa* section (II, 3.

42 *et seq*) being accepted, another sense of the nature of non-difference in meditation is also accepted by the commentator, since the two senses of the one text "*That thou art*" are contradictory, like difference and non-difference of the finite self from Brahman.[1]

If now it be said "Let not its sense be that of the relation of the body and the embodied; there is only one sense, that of the nature of the meditation of imagined non-difference", no, (we reply); for, it cannot be held that the contemplation of non-difference has but an imagined object, since the knowledge of non-difference with Brahman is declared to persist even in released ones, in the (following) words of the commentary on the *vikārāvarti sūtra* (IV, 4, 19), relating to what happens to the liberated one, "he enjoys the splendour of perfect self-consciousness, immersed in the world which is of one texture with the nature of Brahman—the harmony of Śiva with Śakti—which abounds in Supreme Bliss, Light and Power", as also in the words of the commentary on the *ahaṃgraha* section (IV, 1, 3) "For, it is the sense of all revealed texts that release is the attainment of supreme self-hood, which is free from the state of the bound creature, characterised by love of bodily conditions such as that of Brāhmin, etc., which is full of essential unsurpassable bliss, and is of the form of Śiva, the self-luminous witness"; *there is the further* reason that the non-difference of finite selves from Brahman, through *Cit-Śakti*, cannot be avoided. 3.242223

Now, how can it be said that the interpretation, of the nature of the relationship of the body and the embodied, (which is) exhibited by him to support the sense declared in the *aṁśa* section (II, 3, 42 *et seq*) is negatived by himself elsewhere? It cannot be said either that only the possibility of the relationship of body and the embodied being pregnant with real difference is denied by the exhibition of the sense of non-difference, not that sense (itself), which is of the relationship of body and the embodied; for, of one sentence referring to non-difference, it is not proper 3.242224

1. In the latter case, the two alternatives have been recognised to be contradictory by the commentator himself, in II, 1, 22.

to postulate another significance also in respect of the relationship of body and the embodied, which is unreal. Nor can it be said that to make persons of inferior capacity engage in meditation on the *Saguṇa* Lord, and in order to create increased devotion thereto, the interpretation relating to what is not (real) sense is set out on the principle of the *sugar coated capsule,* to induce that (devotion) by concealing the truth about the attributeless (Brahman); for, even the meditation on the *Saguṇa* (Lord), has to be performed, verily, through non-difference, in the form "I am Brahman". Hence, it must be shown here, of sentences teaching non-difference of the finite self and Brahman, that the sense is just that (i.e., non-difference literally) or of the form of non-difference in meditation; the setting forth of a sense which is of disservice to meditation does not stand to reason. If this be said, it is answered (thus).

There is not, even among those who, understanding release to be the *summum bonum*, are desirous of attaining to it, full development of competency, because of deficiency in the agent; (this is) of the capacity required in practice or laid down in the Śāstras in respect of either the contemplation of the non-qualified, following on the hearing of and reflection on that sense, which imparting truth is helpful directly to release, or in the meditation on the Qualified, in the form of the meditation of the small (ether, *dahara vidyā*) and so on, which is helpful in securing concentration of mind etc., thereon. The path of service well-known in Purāṇas, Itihāsas and Āgamas is intended for such persons. Though this (path) is, on the *tatkratunyāya*, capable of bringing about the attainment (only) of the status of Śiva on the Himālayas or on Kailāsa, in the capacity of Lord of the Hosts and so on, yet on the attainment of that status, it brings about release, through the stages of meditation etc., even from there. Hence it is that it is said in the *Kāmika*: "Those spiritual teachers in the world who wear My marks, meditate on Me and seek refuge in Me alone, in them is the fitness (to partake of what has been offered to Me), not in any other creatures. What is eatable, tasteable, drinkable and whatever else is offered to Śambhu, that may be eaten by those who consider themselves as

servants. Those who, established in Śaiva Pāśupata and seeking release, have reached to the path of service, by them alone is (this) to be drunk or eaten or smelt". In (thus) distinguishing competency and the lack of it to partake of the remnants of food offered to Śiva, the qualification "one who seeks release" is applied to those who have reached to the path of service. Thus, in the view that grace should be shown to those of gross understanding unfitted for meditation etc., by starting them on the path of service, in order to create for them a taste therein, (it is said) that the path of service alone is the purport of all the treatises on release. Being of the opinion that what is so declared in them should be indicated (here) in some measure, another mode of interpretation of texts like *That thou art*, in the sense of the relationship between oneself and one's master, (which is) of the nature of that between the body and the embodied, is made out by the *ācārya* in the *aṃśa* section; thus there is no inconsistency.

As for the postulation of a different interpretation for the 3.24223
ārambhaṇa śruti (in II, 1, 16). that is helpful for the purpose of strengthening faith in the *Saguṇa* topic, and is, hence only a figurative explanation. This too has been explained in what has been cited before from the commentary on the *sūtra* "*aśmādivacca tadanupapattiḥ* (And as in stones etc., that is inappropriate; II, 1, 23)", By that commentary indeed, it is declared that the non-otherness of the inert world from Brahman cannot be of the nature of non-difference therewith. Thereby, the non-otherness declared of it in the *tadananyatva-sūtra* (II, 1, 15) ends only in its being incapable of being spoken of apart from Brahman; for, non-difference from Brahman being absent, there cannot be non-difference from *Cit-Śakti* ether, which is non-distinct from Brahman, and hence, the declaration of its (this inert world's) being a transformation of *Cit-Śakti* ends only in (its being) an illusion. Therefore, it is the opinion of the commentator, as it is the view of the *Sūtrakāra*, that the sense of the *vācārambhaṇa-śruti* is only that modifications are fictitiously imposed on the ground (thereof).

4 This view of the *Sūtrakāra* is made clear in his own work, the *Mahābhārata*, through the narrative of Suvarcalā and Śvetaketu, set out in the *Mokṣa-Dharma* (*parva*). This is how it is related there. Suvarcalā, the daughter of Devala knew from birth the truth about Brahman, having acquired it in previous births, and was looking for a husband equal to herself (in knowledge). Having come to understand Śvetaketu, son of Uddālaka, to be one such, the father bestowed her of the holy vows on him. That couple who understood the truth about Brahman continued in the house-holder's life, which is associated with the performance of sacrifices and other such duties auxiliary to that (Brahma-knowledge). Therein is described the following dialogue between them concerning Brahman.

On one occasion, Suvarcalā asked her husband Śvetaketu "Who art Thou? Tell me, O best of the twice-born". The lordly one skilled in discourse replied to her "That is known by thee, without a doubt; I am the best of the twice-born, O lovely one, one who practises the vow of truth". She said to him "I ask about the self that rests in the heart". Hearing that, he replied "That (Self) does not speak, O beautiful lady: If thou thinkest what is united to mind to be the Self, that is illusory. Where there is a name, there is (also) the bondage of the body. The thought "I am this" is present in you also. "I am even thou. I am myself, I am all"; this alone holds (true). That which thou askest of me, that Being higher than thyself is not here".

Here, in order to find out how Śvetaketu,—who has been repeatedly taught by his father "That thou art" in the *Sad Vidyā*,—understood the Self, the first question "Who art thou, O best of the twice-born?" is put (to him) by Suvarcalā. Though understanding the object of the question, yet in the belief that she should be taught the sense (of the Self) by stages, this reply is given by Śvetaketu: "by thee who addressest me as best of the twice-born, I am certainly known to be a Brāhmin: why then is this questioned?" Then it is said by Suvarcalā "I do not ask about the Brāhminhood that is perceptible and is imagined

in the Self, as limited by bodily conditions; rather do I ask about that Self, which thou dost designate by the word 'I' in the statement 'I am the best of the twice-born', as different from the body and as residing in the heart". To her is this reply given: "The word 'I' applies to that aspect of the Self which is associated with the mind; that however, is of an illusory character; terms like Brāhmin etc., which are posited in connection with the bodies of Brāhmins and so on, born of Brāhmin families and so on, apply only to that (illusory form). Hence, since 'I-ness' also, like Brāhminhood, refers to what is imagined, it is not fit to be questioned about by those who seek to know the nature of the Self. This 'I-ness' is common to thee and me and to all beings including lower orders of creation; hence, by thee, who seekest knowledge of the nature of the Self, this question which does not refer to the transcendental reality is not fit to be put". Then (there is) the question "If thou dost understand the 'I' which is associated with the properties of being agent and enjoyer to be fictitious, then, understanding thus, how dost thou engage in the observance of action which is opposed thereto?" To that is the reply given: "I engage in them for the benefit of the world, though they are not helpful to one-self". Then, a question is asked about the connection between sound and significance, with a view to (find out) how this word "I" applied by all to refer to the Self can fail to signify that. To that the reply is given that between them there is not the relation of conjuction and the like, but the relationship of statement and what is stated. Then follows this series of questions and answers between the couple:

Suvarcalā: This word (I) signifying egoity is clearly always applied to the Self; (hence) the statement that speech does not apply thereto becomes fictitious.

Śvetaketu: The word 'I', O one of holy vows, applies to egoity, not to the nature of the Self; speech which is characteristic of the qualified does not apply to the Supreme, Imponderable One.

Suvarcalā: If this be so, O best of Sages, tell me then what is egoity and also what is the nature of the Self.

Śvetaketu: Like the appearance of a pitcher in what is verily, (but) a mass of clay, even so is egoity recognised here in the Supreme, Imponderable (One); the nature of the Self is Great and Supreme. Hence, there is no inconsistency in the statement that speech turns back therefrom.

Here, the question is asked how, if sound and sense be related as what signifies and what is signified, the word "I" could fail to signify the Self; to this is given the reply that the word "I" is applied, primarily, not to the Self, but to egoity. Then the question being asked "What is that Self other than egoity?", the two are distinguished, in that egoity is illusorily posited in the Self, like the form of pitcher etc., in clay; and it is concluded that the word which sets out as applying to the illusorily posited form cannot reach up to the pure substrate, as the word "silver" does not extend to the form of the pure mother-of-pearl. Therefore, it is concluded that since the word which signifies the ego, qualified by agency and other attributes is said to turn back even from the neighbourhood of the Pure Self, there is no contradiction whatever. Then on the assumption that, Brahman, the abode of the whole world, is nothing but the Self, which is fully discriminated from what is designated by "I", Śvetaketu teaches that just as, though the world is seen to be in ether, yet there is not for the ether any clinging to the world, so too there is no clinging for Brahman. Then this fresh question and answer.

Suvarcalā: The ether is constantly perceived to be unchangeable, super-sensible, impartible and omnipresent; (but) the Self is not so perceived.

Śvetaketu: One feels by contact again and again the air that is in the ether; one smells the smell present therein; one similarly sees with the eyes light, darkness, the host of solar rays, the assemblage of clouds, rain and the constellations, but

does not see the ether. That which is the nature of Existence is determined to be the Ether even of the ether. This (ether) is imagined in the Existential Substance; that is the true, and (that is) but Viṣṇu. Names which signify the qualified apply to the Supreme Self figuratively. The Supreme all-pervasive one is not (known) by the eyes or by the mind or by any other means; it is thought by the subtle intellect; it cannot be described by speech. All this wide world is established therein alone.

The question is "Why is Brahman, the abode of the Universe, not perceptible like the ether?" This is the reply given thereto: there is experience only of air etc., as present in the ether, not of the ether as distinct (from them); if that be the case with ether, though an object of experience, what more need be said of Brahman, of the form of Existence, who is far more subtle than ether? Therefore, everything is imagined in the Existential Substance; that alone is true and pervasive, and all words applicable to what is limited by qualities do not apply in their primary sense to that which is distinguished from the qualities, and is understood by means of knowledge whieh makes known the real. In this series of questions and answers it is quite clear that by the citation of example of the appearance of pot, in what is, verily, clay, by the declaration—in the words "That which is of the nature of Existence is determined" etc,—that the finite self of the context is of the form of Existence, and by the statement "This is imagined in the Existential Substance; that is true, (that is) but Viṣṇu", the sense of the *vācārambhaṇa* text (Ch. VI. 1. 4) and of the texts "*That Thou art*" and "In that has all this its Self, that is the true, that is the Self" (*Ch.* VI, XI, 4) are shown to favour the conclusion that Brahman is unrelated to the world, non-distinct from the finite self, and free from qualifications.

Further, in another context in the *Mokṣa-Dharma* itself, non- 41
difference is set forth in these words: "I desire, O Divinity, Thy Supreme Abode; let there be identity of me with Thee; let there be for me no re-birth; when a man sees different things as non-different, then he is free from taint, becomes none other

than the Supreme Self"; "The collocation of the assemblage of elements is not the body of the Supreme Self; that Viṣṇu who is embodied as it were, is the delusive Hari"; in such words is (the) formlessness (of Brahman) set forth. In the *Viṣṇupurāṇa* and the like, also, the nature of Brahman, as Pure Intelligence, free from all difference, and devoid of qualifications, is declared thus: "That Knowledge, wherein all differences have disappeared, which is of the bare nature of existence, which is unattainable by speech, and is self-realised, that is known as Brahman". Thus, pure-no-dualism alone is what is accepted by the *Sūtrakāra*; since the commentator (Śrīkaṇṭha) elaborates pure-non-dualism here and there, after his (the *Sūtrakāra's*) own heart, the object of the setting forth of qualified-non-dualism in other places must be explained only in conformity therewith, in the manner declared by us.

5 As for the demonstration of qualified-non-dualism in the commentary of others and of pure-non-dualism in the commentary of yet others, that is in the view of the falsity of that (pure non-dualism). Of these, it is not possible to make out, as in the case of Śrīkaṇṭhācārya's (commentary), an interpretation conformable to pure non-dualism; for, nowhere has there been shown by them as by Śrīkaṇṭācārya, any indication of pure-non-dualism in the sense above set forth. Further, those who succeeded either of the commentators up to this day, have been ready only to condemn pure-non-dualism. Therefore, the only commentary that may be accepted by those who have regard for the means of correct knowledge is that of Śrīkaṇṭhācārya, which alone is set out (1) for the purpose of the true comprehension of the Non-qualified Supreme Brahman, (2) for the purpose of the meditation of non-difference, to be performed by him of middling capacity, in respect of the Being who has taken on the form of the Qualified, to show grace to His devotees, and is characterised by the entire host of auspicious qualities, and a resplendent auspicious form, and (3) for the purpose of the meditation of the relationship of one-self and one's master, to be carried on by him of least capacity,—all these being appropriately distinguished: thus everything is consistent.

Here ends the work called *ŚIVĀDVAITA NIRṆAYA* composed through the grace of the Supreme Śiva,—the Highest Real, the *fore-head-eyed*,—by the direct descendant (of the Lord), known to fame as Appayya, the son of Raṅga Rāja, best of sacrificers, the performer of the *Viśvajit* Sacrifice, and the great preceptor of the Advaita School of Thought, (who shone as) the gem in the Ocean of the family of Bhāradvāja.

Appa Dīkṣita, whose intellect is fixed on the lotus-feet of Sadāśiva, has here condensed the essence of the entire system of Śrīkaṇṭha[1]

1. The couplet of which this is the translation, occurs only in Manuscript "O" and that too after the colophon; it is possibly by other hands than Appayya's.

NOTES

[The references in square brackets are to paragraphs]

NOTE 1

Vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthaḥ (*Nyāya-Sūtra*, II, 2, 65; II, 2, 63, according to the edition used by Dr. Jha). [P. 2·22]

The translation of the *sūtra* and Vātsyāyana's *bhāṣya* thereon are here set forth: "In Reality the Individual, the Configuration and the Generality—(All three) constitute the Denotation of the word—(*Sū*. 63). The term *tu*, in reality, serves the purposes of emphasis. 'What is it that is emphasised?' What is meant to be emphasised is that all the three are denoted by words,—there being no hard and fast rule as to which one is the predominant and which the subordinate factor. For instance, when there is (on the part of the person pronouncing the word) a desire to lay stress upon the difference (of a thing from others)—and when the cognition brought about is also one pertaining to the distinctive features of that thing—there the 'Individual' forms the predominant factor (in the denotation of that word) and the 'Generality and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors; when, on the other hand, the difference is not meant to be emphasised,—and the resultant cognition also pertains to the commonalties,—then the 'Generality' is the predominant' factor, and the 'Individual' and the 'Configuration' are subordinate factors. Many instances (of such varying predominance and subservience) may be found in actual usages. An example of the predominance of 'Configuration' may also be found" (Dr. Jha's translation of the *Nyāya-Sūtras* Vol. II. pp. 448–449).

Dr. Jha's use of the word "denotation" in place of the more general term "significance" tends to introduce a slight confusion. *Jāti* and *ākṛti* would more naturally constitute part of the connotation rather than the denotation of the word; the latter is more properly the *vyakti*. The Naiyāyika's insistence on all three constituting the significance is parallel to the western logician's

doctrine that every term possesses both connotation and denotations though, with different classes of terms, either aspect may dominate over the other. The important point is that they all together constitute *one* sense, not different senses of the word. Disjunction of the three is not meant, as seen by the use of the singular number in padārthaḥ. The Buddhist who holds terms to have no possitive significance, but only to perform the function of excluding (*apoha*) the significance of other words, makes the mistake of separating these three aspects, and then failing to understand how a word can function usefully as referring to any one of them alone. His position is set out and refuted elaborately in the *Nyāya-Vārtika*. See also Keith's *Indian Logic and Atomism*, p. 159. It is unfortunate that this author too uses the word "denotes", where "signifies" is distinctly preferable. Professor Radhakrishnan's exposition of the topic seems clear and less open to objection. "The word" he says "suggests the form, denotes the individual and connotes the genus" (*Indian Philosophy*, II, p. 107).

NOTE 2

triḥ prathamām anvāha triruttamām [P. 2·324]

The *Darśa-Pūrṇamāsa* sacrifice is the model for several other sacrifices. The former is the *prakṛti* rite and the latter *vikṛtis*. In the *prakṛti* rite, eleven ṛks are prescribed to be chanted in the matter of getting the fire to blaze in the first instance (*agni samindhana*). These ṛks are known as *sāmidhenī*. The injunction is that fifteen sāmidhenis are to be chanted (*pañcadaśa sāmidhenīranvāha*), while, however, only eleven ṛks are mentioned. The number fifteen is made up, therefore, by chanting the first and the last ṛks thrice, instead of once. Now, though the *sāmidhenī* ṛks are the same both for the *prakṛti* and all the *vikṛti* rites, their order is not always the same. Thus in the *Darśa Pūrṇamāsa*, the first *ṛk* is *Pravo Vājā* etc., and the last *Āhuhota* etc. But in other rites, any other *ṛk* of the eleven may be first, as determined by the nature of the rite, the deity sacrificed to, and so on. The question here is whether the injunction to repeat

thrice applies to what may happen to be the first and last ṛk in each rite, or what is known to be the first and last ṛk in the *prakṛti* rite, in connection with which arises the injuction to three-fold incantation. The final view is that the first and last ṛks of each particular rite have to be chanted thrice, not those of the *prakṛti* rite, the reason being that words "first" and "last" signify position primarily, not what occupies the position in a particular context. With marking the place they becomes *functus officio*, and may not be called upon to discharge any other function.

NOTE 3

Ṣodaśigrahaṇāgrahaṇanyāya [P. 2·332]

The following is taken from Jacob's *Laukika-Nyāyāñjali*, Part III. "The rule as to the use or omission of the *Ṣodaśistotra* (at the *Atirātra* sacrifice). In very common use as an indication of option being allowable in regard to something. From the introduction to the third volume of Dr. Eggeling's translation of the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa*, we learn that 'the distinctive feature of the *Atirātra*-sacrifice, as the name itself indicates, is an overnight performance of chants and recitation...At the end of each round, libations are offered, followed by the inevitable potations of Soma liquor and the performance partook largely of the character of a regular nocturnal carousal'. Then as to the *Ṣodaśin*, he says (page xviii)—'As regards the ceremonies preceding the night performance, there is a difference of opinion among ritualists as to whether the *Ṣodaśistotra* is or is not a necessary element of the *Atirātra*, Āśvalāyana (5, 11, 1) refers incidentally to the *Ṣodaśin*, as part of the *Atirātra*, though it is not quite clear from the text of the *sūtra* whether it is meant to be a necessary or only an optional feature of that sacrifice.' There can be little doubt, however, that the learned writers who use the *nyāya*, regard the use of the *stotra* as optional". (pp. 137–138). It is, however, rather doubtful whether the reference is primarily to the *stotra*. What is more likely is that the use of the *Ṣodaśin* cup (the sixteenth cup) is intended. The question, then, would be whether

the cup and the accompanying *stotra* and *śastra* are necessary elements of the *Atirātra* sacrifice, the answer being that they are optional, in view of contrary injunctions in respect thereof. See, Keith, *Religion and Philosophy of the Veda*, pp. 335–336.

NOTE 4

The *Padāhavanīya-nyāya* [P. 2·43]

The general injunction is that all sacrifice should be performed in the *āhavanīya* fire. In the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice, however, it is enjoined that offerings are to be made in the hoof-marks of the horse. This injunction would be entirely purportless, if the general rule were considered to over-ride it; if however, its validity for the particular sacrifice be admitted, the rule "*yadāhavanīye juhoti*", would be only limited in its application, not nullified. Both injunctions would thus be purportful. The injunction "*pade juhoti*"; would be an exception to the general rule "*yadāhavanīye juhoti*"; the general applicability of the latter should be construed in the light of this exception.

NOTE 5

Andho bhavatyapi roditīva etc., [P. 2·52]

The quotation here would appear to be a jumble of words from *Chāndogya*, VIII, 10 and 11. Indra, acquiring knowledge of the Self from Prajāpati is told that the dream-self is the Supreme Self. On reflection, Indra finds that that will not do, since, though not affected by bodily defects and impurities, the dream self has its own trials and tribulations: it is wounded, as it were; it cries as it were. He, therefore, goes back to the preceptor, and is told that the self in deep sleep is the Supreme Self. That knowledge too is not free from doubts, for that self reaches annihilation, as it were. If *eva* here (*vināśameva*) were understood as *alone*, there would be no liberation, no manifestation of the Self in its own form and so on. Hence, *vināśameva* has to be understood on the analogy of *roditīva* in *Ch.* VIII, 10, 2 and 4.

NOTE 6

Pañcāgni-Vidyā [P. 3·132]

This is the instruction imparted to Gautama by *Pravāhaṇa Jaivali* concerning that knowledge, the teaching of which belonged only to the Kṣatriyas and was made available first to Gautama among the Brāhmins. It relates to the five fires which are the Heavenly region, rain, the earth, man, and woman. In the fifth libation, water comes to be called "man". Man lives up to the full span of life, and then dies; at his death, he is carried to the fire where from he originated. Those who know this and those who in the forest meditate upon faith and austerity, they depart on the path of the Gods. Those who do not know this, but spend their lives in works of charity and public utility, they depart on the path of the Fathers, and ultimately return to this world, after their stock of merit is exhausted by enjoyment. The reference is to *Chāndogya*, Chapter V, *Khaṇḍas*, 3—10 (both inclusive).

NOTE 7

Madhu-Vidyā [P. 3·137].

The Sun, it is said, is verily the honey of the devas. Its rays spreading east, south, west, north and upwards constitute the honey-cells in each of these directions. The honey-producers in each case are the Ṛks, the Yajus verses, the Sāmans, Atharvāṅgirasa, and the secret instruction (*guhya ādeśaḥ*). The waters in each case (i.e., the Soma juice, butter, milk, etc., poured into the fire) are the nectar. He who knows the first kind of nectar becomes a Vasu, and retains his status so long as the Sun rises in the east and sets out in the west. He who knows the second nectar becomes a Rudra, for as long as the Sun rises to the south and sets to the north. He who knows the third nectar becomes an Āditya, for as long as the Sun rises in the west and sets to the east. He who knows the fourth nectar becomes a Marut for as long as the Sun rises in the north and sets in the south. He who knows the fifth nectar becomes a *Sādhya* for as

long as the Sun rises over-head and sets down below. Thus are described the various forms of meditation on the Sun as honey, and the fruit thereof. The fruit is limited through admitting of different degrees of duration. Not so, however, is the fruit of Brahma-knowledge, the realisation of that Supreme Being which neither rises nor sets. The Bliss attained thereby is illimitable, indestructible. Hence, even those who by the practice of *Madhu-Vidyā* have attained the comparatively happy status of Vasus etc., have to seek *Brahma-Vidyā*, their status being but transient. But, in the case of these, departure along the path of the gods is obviously unsuitable, that path having been prescribed for beings on the lower, human plane of existence. The reference is to *Chāndogya*, Chapter III, *Khaṇḍas* 1 to 11 (both inclusive). The question of the fitness of devatas for Brahma knowledge is discussed in *Vedānta-Sūtras*, I, 3, 25–32.

NOTE 8

Samānam itarat śyenena [P. 3·18334]

The *jyotiṣṭoma* sacrifice serves as the model (*prakṛti*) for several other rites (*vikṛtis*). Two of these are the *Iṣu* and the *Śyena*. In prescribing the conduct of the *Iṣū*, certain distinctive elements are first mentioned and it is then said that in the rest there is agreement with the *Śyena*. It is contended by some that the distinctive features having been already mentioned, the general clause refers only to those elements which the *Iṣu* derives from *jyotiṣṭoma*, which serves as the model. The mention of the *Śyena* has no special significance, that rite being cited only as another instance of a rite modelled on the *jyotiṣṭoma*. The final view is that the similarity is in respect not of the general features common to the *prakṛti* and *vikṛti* rites, but of the distinctive rites of the *Śyena*. Thus, the Ṛtviks in the *Śyena* rite should wear red turbans; the Ṛtviks in the *Iśu* should do like-wise. The reason for this conclusion is that otherwise the statement '*samānam itarat śyenena*' becomes merely repetitive, thus losing its force and authority. No Scriptural passage may be interpreted in such a way as to make it lose its authoritativeness, unless there is no

help for it. In the present case, no such necessity arises. The word *itarat* means what is other and goes beyond not merely the distinctive *Iṣu* rites already mentioned, but also those elements known to be common to the *jyotiṣṭoma* and the *Iṣu* on the ground of their being related as *prakṛti* and *vikṛti*. The similarity intended and enjoined can be only in respect of the distinctive elements of the *Śyena*. Thus, the mention of the word *Śyena* also becomes purportful The part of the discussion which is relevant to Appayya's purpose is this: where resemblance is mentioned after the citation of certain distinctive elements, that resemblance must be in respect of other elements which are also distinctive, not those common to the *prakṛti* and all other *vikṛtis* thereof. For a full discussion of the topic, see *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, VII, 13—16 and Śabarasvāmin's commentary thereon. In legal terminology, the principle is that of *ejusdem generis*.

NOTE 9

Ṣaḍaṅga and *Daśa-avyaya*. [P. 3·238]

The obeisance to Veda and Bhava is the third of the invocations occurring in the *Bhāmatī* (see page 4 of Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrin's edition). As applied to the Veda the six limbs are *Śikṣā*, *Chandas*, *Nirukta*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Jyotiṣa* and *Kalpa*; the avyayas (indeclinables) are innumerable, like the particle *ca* meaning "and" The six limbs of Bhava are Omniscience, Contentment, Eternal Wisdom, Independence, Eternal Illimitable Resources, and Unimaginationable Power; the ten members are Knowledge, Non-attachment, Lordly power, Austerity, Truth, Mercy, Firmness, Creatorship Self-knowledge, and Controllership. The enumeration is that of the author of the *Kalpataru* who bases himself on Purāṇic authority (see p. 4 of Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrin's edition).

NOTE 10

The Advaitin's conception of *Mukti* [P. 3·235—8·2356]

Appayya Dīkṣita shows with considerable skill and trouble that even for him in whom nescience has ceased, liberation takes the form of the attainment not of Brahman, but of Īśvara, endowed with innumerable auspicious qualities and so on. Identity with Brahman is possible only when all finite selves are liberated. So long as there is a residue of *Karma* even for, one finite self, the liberated one can attain only the nature of Īśvara. For, on the hypothesis that there are many finite selves and that each finite self is Īśvara, as reflected in *māyā* with the cessation of *māyā* for one finite self, all that results is the merger of that reflection with the original that was reflected, that is, in other words, the merger of that *jīva* with Īśvara. But so long as there are other jīvas, Īśvara continues still to be an image, a being possessed of the quality of being reflected; and the being that has got merged with Īśvara can claim nothing higher. When all finite selves are liberated, *māyā* as a whole vanishes, Īśvara is no longer a *bimba*, a being capable of being reflected; both He and the finite selves realise their identity in Brahman that is Pure Intelligence.

The doctrine is attractive in many ways. The prospect of merger in *Nirguṇa*-Brahman does not appeal either to the intellects or to the emotions of most. It seems difficult to realise how one being can become the Absolute while others are left to wallow in ignorance; and the ideal even if possible, seems undesirable, being clearly anti-social. The difficulty in accepting this doctrine is due to the fact that the hypothesis of a plurality of finite selves is not the only possible one for the advaitin. There are the *ekajīvavādins*, for whom clearly enlightenment should lead directly to identification with Brahman. There are also those who consider that Īśvara Himself is a reflection (a *pratibimba* not a *bimba*), that Īśvara is Brahman as reflected in *māyā*, and *jīva* is Brahman as reflected in *avidyā*. On this hypothesis too, irrespective of the unity or plurality of souls, release would necessarily have to be identification with Brahman; for the merger

of a reflection in the original *is intelligible, not its merger in* another reflection, like Īśvara; if the latter were possible, then one *jīva* might as well become another *jīva*, and the so-called release would be no release at all.

Appayya, has, *therefore, to show that his own hypothesis* of the plurality of souls and the bimbatva of the Lord is the only tenable one. This he does in the *Siddhānta-leśa-saṃgraha*, by showing, as in the present work, that his own view of mukti is the orthodox advaita view, being that of the Bhagavatpāda himself. The argument is developed at some length with reference to each chapter of the Sūtras, and is substantially identical with that of the present *work*. There is a slight elaboration in respect of one or two points, which may tend to indicate that the *Saṃgraha* is the later work. Thus, demonstrating through statements from the bhāṣyakāra's mouth that release consists in the attainment of the being of Īśvara, Appayya argues back and says that the *ekajīvavāda* and the *Īśvara-pratibimbavāda* are untenable, as they are inconsistent with the orthodox view of *mukti*. The only advaita work which he explicitly *condemns* as hostile to his view is the *Saṃkṣepa-Śārīraka*.

The doubt naturally arises *as to how this mukti is different* from that attained by the devotees of *Saguṇa*-Brahman. The difference is in that the latter, seeking the Lord through devotion, never *attain to* an *intuition* of the Impartible Absolute, and that, therefore, they continue still to be enveloped in ignorance. Theirs is not the full measure of the being or the bliss of *Saguṇa* Brahman. They are equal to Him, but only in respect of enjoyment; theirs is not the unsurpassable lordship of Īśvara Himself, the power to create, sustain and destroy the universe. He who becomes Īśvara by realisation of non-duality becomes Īśvara with no reservation).

On the whole subject, see further *Siddhānta-leśa-saṃgraha*, pp. 447 to end, and the *daharādhikaraṇa* of the *Nyāya-Rakṣāmaṇi*: Dharmarājādhvarin's *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* may also be consulted; see, particularly, Prof. S. Radhakrishnan's Introduction to the edition brought out by the University of Calcutta.

NOTE 11

Sthālipulāka nyāya [P. 3·2356]

The following is from Apte's Sanskrit-English Dictionary: "In a cooking-pot all the grains being equally moistened by the heated water, when one grain is found to be well-cooked, the same way may be inferred with regard to the other grains. So the maxim is used when the condition of the whole class is inferred from that of a part".

NOTE 12

Guḍajihvikā nyāya [P. 3·242224]

Jacob (*Laukika Nyayānjali*, I, 24) explains this as "the maxim of *the tongue* (smeared) *with treacle* (in order to disguise an unpalatable draught)". He also quotes a passage from the Vācaspatya, which says that just as a parent makes *his child*, who is afraid of the bitterness of the essence of neem, drink the essence after first coating his tongue with treacle, even so do the eulogistic passages serve to engage human beings in the performance of rites requiring the expenditure of great energy and labour, by extolling the fruit of those rites as everlasting heavenly bliss and so on. In the present translation, the phrase "maxim of the sugar-coated capsule" has been used, as serving to convey the same sense in a manner more familiar to most present-day readers.

NOTE 13

Tat-kratu-nyāya [P. 3·242225]

This is the maxim "What a man meditates on, that he becomes". The Scriptural authority for this is a Chāndogya passage, which, after prescribing calm meditation on Brahman as that in which all this begins, ends and continues, goes on to say to show the need for it saying, "*Yathā kraturasmin loke puruṣo bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati*, according as his will is in this world, so will the man be after he has departed hence" (*Ch.* III,

14, 1; the translation is Dr. Jha's). The following is from Śaṅkara's commentary on the same: "According as a man's will or determination is, in this world, during his present life,—so does he become when he has departed from this body;—that is to say, his condition is in keeping with the result in accordance with his will. This fact we come to know from the Scriptures: 'Thinking over whatever disposition, one renounces the body in the end etc.,' (*Bhagavad-Gītā*). And inasmuch as such sequence is maintained by the Scriptures, one who knows this, should have this will,—i.e., the will or determination that we are going to explain" (Dr. Jha's translation, p. 181).

NOTE 14

Pareṣām bhāṣye viśiṣṭdvaita nirūpaṇam, anyeśām bhāṣye śuddhādvaita nirūpaṇam [P. 5]

The reference seems to be to Rāmānuja and Madhva, these two being explicitly mentioned in the corresponding portions of the *Ānanda-Lahari*. This is a rough translation of verse 58 of that work: "The declaration of the enjoyment of the bliss of Brahman, by the released ones, as in this (*bhāṣya*), contradicts the (doctrine of) difference between Brahman and the finite self; there are other similar indications in other bhāṣyas; but these come in, somehow, in the failure to realise their self-contradictory nature, not as prompted by the realisation of essential non-difference; for, they are confirmed haters of pure Brahman, as also of *Saguṇa*-Siva, suffering as they do from the curse of Dadhīci and others".

The other indications mentioned in the verse are explained in the introduction to the verse, with reference to the system of Madhva. The bonds of the *jīva* are, in that system, unreal; there are no attributes differentiating the jīva from Brahman, except dharma; Brahman who is known by him who seeks release is not an object of meditation; the *jīva* is a reflection of Brahman; *avidyā* (nescience) is removable by knowledge, and so on. But these are not genuine indications of the acceptance of non-

difference as final. For, though at release the finite self is said to enjoy the bliss of Brahman, yet other selves are recognised who, failing to obtain true knowledge of Brahman, attain *asan-mukti*, fall into the three hells, and suffer everlastingly. This is incompatible with non-difference. Further, neither Rāmānuja nor Madhva rises to the conception of release as the attainment of the state of the Attributeless Brahman. As for the indications in Madhva's system, he himself interprets his doctrines in such a way as to lend no colour even to a suspicion of acceptance of non-dualism. Thus, though the bonds are fictitious in relation to the *jīva*, they are real enough in relation to the internal organ (the *antaḥ-karaṇa*); though the *jīva* is a reflection of Brahman, they are yet distinct, like the face and its reflection; though *avidyā* is removable by knowledge, the former has yet a true existence; and so on. Though their admissions cut at their own positions, they make these not in the recognition of advaita, but in the failure to realise that they are helplessly falling into the pit of self-contradiction. They suffer to this day from the curses of Gautama, Dadhīci, Upamanyu, Nandikeśvara and others. Their minds are tainted by the hatred of the superiority of *Śuddhādvaita* and Parama Śiva. Imagining themselves to be Vaiṣṇavas, they shower multifarious abuse both on the doctrine of the pure-non-duality of the attributeless Brahman and on Parama Śiva.

The concluding words of the *Ānanda Laharī* contain a fine tribute to Śrīkaṇṭha, which is worth noting here. Though in the commentary there cannot be seen any out-spoken criticism or upholding of his position by the abuse of that of others, yet the *bhāṣya* written by the great lord seated on the throne of the empire of knowledge (*vidyā sāmrājya*) leaves all this to be done by the commentators thereon, merely giving an indication thereto, just as a great lord, in order to protect his dominions from the inroads of robbers, signals to his servants to look to that business, merely by knitting his eye-brows.

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